NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN FEBRUARY 21, 1975[SANITIZED] - 1975/02/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06627649
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: February 21, 1975

Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 C06627649
Ark
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USIB
UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE
BOARD
National Intelligence
Bulletin
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cret
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February 21, 1975
N2 636
Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 C06627649
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 21, 1975
CONTENTS
ARGENTINA: Counterguerrilla operations faltering.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 21, 1975
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ARGENTINA
The army's operation that began ten days ago
against Peoples Revolutionary Army guerrillas in Tucuman
Province is faltering.
The army has a reservoir of officers and noncommis-
sioned officers who are highly trained in commando-type
tactics, and many of them have been assigned as advisers
to regular units in the operation. However, Argentine
army commander Lieutenant General Anaya reportedly is
not heeding the advice of his counterinsurgency experts.
Instead of employing small-unit, commando-type tactics,
Anaya acceded to political pressure and ordered the army
to conduct a 5,000-man sweep operation in the southwest-
ern part of the province.. �Anaya does not want to alien-
ate thP people and has instructed his officers to make
apologies in advance for any "inconveniences" they might
suffer--thus signaling the army's target areas to the
guerrillas. Only a few casualties have been reported
thus far on both sides.
The Peoples Revolutionary Army units in the province
are well suited for irregular operations, have an estab-
lished logistic base, and enjoy considerable support
among the rural population. They could conceivably in-
flict heavy casualties on isolated regular army units.
General Anaya has been criticized before by other
officers for his failure to demand a full-scale army
counterterrorist role. They are now criticizing him for
acquiescing to political pressure for a highly publicized
show of force. Increasing criticism from these elements
can be expected in an effort to force Anaya to switch
from sweep operations to commando-type tactics. If his
critics are successful in forcing this change, the army
has a good chance of containing the guerrillas in the
province. Otherwise, the .government will most likely
suffer a serious setback in its heavily publicized Tucu-
man operation--something it can ill afford with urban
terrorism on the upswing. 3.5(c)
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Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 C06627649