HISTORY OF THE MONTONEROS IN ARGENTINA FROM MARCH 1970 TO EARLY APRIL 1977[SANITIZED] - 1977/05/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06627579
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: May 27, 1977

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WARNING ?MICE - SOISEEIVE INIELLIGENCE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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HISTORY OF THE MONTONEROS IN ARGENTINA
FROM MARCH 1970 TO EARLY APRIL 1977
27 May 1977
S E T
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SCOPE
This paper contains a history of the Montoneros in Argentina
from March 1970 to early April 1977. The report has been divided
into the following four phases: 1) March 1970 when the Montoneros
were formed to the spring of 1973 when the Peronists won the elec-
tions; 2) March 1973 when Hector Campora assumed the presidency
to 6 September 1974 when the Montoneros declared war on the govern-
ment and voluntarily went underground; 3) 6 September 1974 to
8 September 1975 when the government outlawed the Montoneros;
4) 8 September 1975 to early April 1977.
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HI STORY OF THE MONTONEROS IN ARGENTINA
FROM MARCH 1970 TO EARLY APRIL 1977
1. The Montoneros were formed In March 1970 as a predominantly
peronist-oriented organization which included leftist peronists,
radical catholics, leftist nationalists and marxists. The original
membership was drawn from all classes, but the majority consisted
mainly of students and professionals plus a limited number of workers.
The Montoneros took their name from groups of irregulars who fought
in the Argentine war of independence and in the civil war and up-
risings against dictators during the period from 1820-1853.
Philosophically, the Montoneros embraced the traditional peronist
beliefs in social justice, economic development free of foreign
influence, a just distribution of wealth within a national socialist
system, and political independence. The ideology of the Montoneros
gradually tilted more to the left, and in 1973 one of their leaders
described the Mbntonero ideology as a combination of marxism, nationa-
lism and peronism which, he said, was adapted to the objective condi-
tions existing in Argentina. He stated that their strategy was the
development of a 'popular war, led by the Montoneros, and that the
ultimate struggle in Argentina would be between the people and the
revolutionary vanguard on one side and the forces of repression and
imperialism on the other.. �
2. During the first three years of their existence, the Montoneros
functioned as a classic underground urban guerrilla terrorist group,
dedicated to overthrowing the military government and to restoring
Juan Peron to power, if necessary by force of arms. Their
first terrorist act was the kidnapping on 29 May 1970 and subsequent
assassination of former President Pedro E. Aramburu. Indica-
tions are strong that Peron did not disapprove of the action. After
the murder of Aramburu, the Mbntoneros undertook a series of political
assassinations, bank robberies, attacks on various military and police
Installations, and occupation of small towns. Unlike the People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Montoneros did rot seem to single out
foreigners or foreign firms as targets, although they did kidnap the
director of Phillips of Argentina in September 1972 and possibly con-
ducted other kidnappin's. The Montoneros took the war directly to
their main enemy, the military government.
3. The Montoneros also mounted joint operations with other Argentine
terrorist groups, the most spectacular being a massive break from
Rawson Prison in August 1972. Although MUntonero leader, Fernando
Vaca Narvaja, was among the group that hijacked an airliner
to Chi:e and escaped, most of the others involved were killed by the
military in the �Trelew Massacre." which has become a cause celebre
for Argentine terrorist groups.
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4. During their first three years underground, the Montoneros con-
tinued to expand their political base as well as conduct terrorist acts.
The Montoneros reportedly spent much of 1971 forming support groups in
the Catholic youth movement and establishing influence in the parochial
schools, universities and Catholic lay organizations. The Moutoneros
also became involved with "third world priests," a lposely:Icnit organiza-
tion of radical priests, a few of whom believed in violent revolution
to change the social order in Argentina.
�
5. During this time, the supreme body of the Montonero movement was
the National Command under which a number of provincial commands hld
been established. A member of the National Command was assigned VI
each provincial command to give it political guidance. The provincial
commands were made up of several basic recruiting units and basic
combat units .responsible for propaganda activities as well as armed
operations. These units were divided into cells.
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6. The 'Montoneros began to enter their second phase during the Spring
of 1973. In March 1973, the orthodox Peronist ParVasked all terrorist
groups in Argentina to stop their activities during the presidential
elections. While the ERP refused, the Montoneros agreed.
7. After the election of Hector Campora as President on the
Peronist ticket in March 1973, the Montoneros scaled down their
terrorist activity and began to emerge and operate quite openly in
Argentine.politics. They concentrated on becoming thJ rallying point
for ultra-leftist peronists, particularly among the .peronist youth.
The Montoneros increasingly shied away from political violence, although
they may have been responsible for the assassination of Jose Ignacio
Rucci,awell-known labor leader, on 25 September 1973.
8. Following Juan Peron's assumption to the presidency in October
1973, the Montoneros officially announced that they were merging with
the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) led by Roberto Quieto. The
new group would be. under the joint leadership of Quieto and Mario
Firmenich, the leader of the radical peronist faction of the
Montoneros and would use the Montonero. name. :The group pledged to
follow Peron and to undertake revolutionary development without violence.
A splinter group of the Montoneros, known as the "Savino Navarro Column",
rejected the merger and continued to advocate the creation of a socialist
state through armed struggle. It is believed, however, that this column
later rejoined the Montoneros. The FAR had made its initial appearance
in Argentina in mid-July 1970. It was first created to support Ernesto
"Che" Guevara in Bolivia, and most of its founders were trained
in Cuba. Its membership was largely drawn from the lower and middle
classes and students. The FAR's ideology was marxist-leninist, and the
leadership supported "Che" Guevara's theory of the guerrilla front. The
FAR had engaged in widespread terrorist activities, including the kid-
napping of foreign businessmen.
9. During the Fall of 1973, Peron continued to attempt to persuade
the Montoneros to give up violence and to keep them as a part of the
peronist movement. As of September 1973, Peron reportedly planned to
offer Firmenich and Quieto positions in the government, representing
the Montoneros, in exchange for their cooperation. The positions would
reportedly have been low-level ones and would have had little influence
upon the decision-making powers of the government. The kid-glove treat-
ment of the Montoneros continued. When both Quieto and Firmenich were
arrested in separate incidents in.February 1974 for carrying false
documents and illegally possessing weapons, they were quickly released
by the courts for lack of evidence.
10. It soon became clear to. the'MOntOneroi, however, that President
Peron was not going to take Argentina to the left as they desired. In
mid-October 1973 a delegation of Montonero leaders met with the Army
Chief of Staff and asked the army for weapons to protect themselves
from extremist elements in the trade unions and also to improve their
power position so that the "fascist" ring around President Peron could
be broken. The army refused. In the Winter and Spring of 1974, the
qr.
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Montoneros realized they could not achieve their aims openly. They
decided they would have to confront the Peronist government and even
President Peron himself. A minority faction in the MOntoneros wanted
to work toward the creation of a mass movement which would unite groups
with similar philosophies and ideologies and to avoid confrontation
and separation from the peronist movement at all costs. The majority
prevailed.
11. The confrontation with Peron came to a head during the 1974 May
Day celebration of National Unity when the Montoneros shouted anti-
government slogans during Peron.'s.speech, causing Peron to lose his
temper and denounce the hecklers as "stupid, immature hirelings of
foreign money." The Montoneros left the meeting en masse. A group
of moderate Montoneros who were still members of the Catholic Church
denounced the walkout and claimed that the Montoneros were being mis-
led by the FAR.
12. The death on 1 July 1974, of Juan Peron and the assumption to the
presidency of Peron's vice president, and widow, Maria Estela (Isabel)
Martinez de Peron, made the Montoneros' confrontation with the
government easier: They started a propaganda campaign in order to
pressure the government to proscribe their organization. This failed,
although the government banned the publication of the Montonero
magazine "La Causa Peronista," and the Montoneros were forced to take
the final step themselves when on 6 September 1974 they declared war
on the government of Mrs. Peron and went underground, announcing they
would undertake an anti-government campaign.
13. By early September 1974, the Montoneros had, according to a
Montonero leader, 15,000 members throughout the country, 2,500 of
whom could be considered armed combatants. In the Buenos Aires area
alone, the leader said there were 8,000 members, 1,500 of whom could
be considered armed combatants. He estimated that the Montoneros could
probably mobilize some 200,000 supporters throughout the country, and
between 50 and 60 thousand for demonstrations in the Buenos Aires area.
The Argentine estimated at that time that there
were 11,000 Montoneros, of wham 10'or 15 percent were armed and
dangerous. The Argentine believed the Montoneros were divided
into two factions, a violent-line group which represented 60 percent
of the membership. includina all of the FAR, and a moderate faction.
the violent faction controlled all of
the weapons and six million dollars in funds. As of 1974 the leaders
of the violent-line faction were, for the most part, former leaders
of the FAR and were more marxist than peronist. It was considered at
that time that a notable exception was Mario Firmenich, who adopted a
more moderate public image but who
was just as much a proponent of violence as the FAR. They
��onsidered Firmenich more dangerous than the other Montonero
leaders because of the sizeable following he enjoyed from both factions
and because of his skills as a political manipulator.
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14. In What could be considered "phase three" of the Montoneros,
that is ..om their decision on 6 September 1974 to declare war on
the government and go underground, to their being outlawed by the
government on 8 September 1975, the Montoneros carried out a number
of significant terrorist acts, some of which were the following:
19 September 197e-'The Montoneros kidnap two prominent
businessmen, Juan and Jorge Born of the Bunge and Born Company.
Jorge was released in June 1975 after his brother agreed to pay an
amount believed to range between 30-60 million dollars and 320,000
new pesos in merchandise distributed to the poor.
1 November 1974 -Me Montoneros assassinate by a remote-
controlled bomb Federal Police Chief Alberto Viler and his
wife while they were aboard a yacht.
26 February 1975 - The Montoneros kidnap John Patrick
E g a n, Honorary Consul for the United States in Cordoba. When the
Argentine government failed to negotiate and produce four alleged
prisoners demanded by the abductors, Egan was killed and his body
found 28 February 1975.
25-26 July 1975 - The Montoneros are responsible for numerous
bombings and other incidents-within the greater Buenos Aires area to
commemorate the 26 July death of Eva P e r o n.
28 July 1975 - The Montoneros assault the "Halcon" weapons
facility in Banfield taking over 600 guns, including 105 submachine guns.
Period around 22 August 1975, which is the anniversary of the
."Trelew Massecre." The Montoneros are responsible for various incidents,
including the explosion on a navy ship in the Federal Capital causing
serious damage.
15. The objectives of the Montoneros by now were to provoke through
terrorist activities a military coup d'etat followed by a polarization
of the political forces. The Montoneros reasoned that following a coup
d'etat with time the rightist sector would be dominated by the military
with the support of some civilians, and the leftist sector would consist
of a coalition of most of the leftist groups dominated by the Montoneros.
The Montoneros calculated that under such a situation the rightist
forces would be in a definite minority with many sectors sympathetic
to the rightist side remaining uninvolved out of disinterest or fear.
With the advantage of numbers, the Montoneros would then be in.a position
to press for elections and, through a leftist coalition led by the
"Authentic Peronist Party,", the Montoneros' political party front, take
control of the country via the electoral process.
16. To better organize. its. military...campaign, by mid-1975 the Montoneros
decided to devote about a three-month period'to intensive militant
operations, to be followed by some, six months of planning, selecting
specific targets and assigning teams against them, training cadre and
acquiring weapons and materiel. Militant activities were to continue
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during this latter phase, but on a lower level. The large-scale
terrorist activity during the 25-26 July 1975 period marked the
beginning of what the Montoneros called their "First Military Campaign"
which was to run through October 1975. The primary targets during this
campaign were to be the paramilitary forces of the Argentine government
since the Montoneros did not yet consider themselves prepared for direct
confrontation with the Argentine army. The Montoneros would retaliate,
however, whenever the Armed Forces became involved in repressive measures
against the Montoneros.
17. Up until about the time they were outlawed on 8 September 1975
the Montcneros had been able to operate with virtual impunity. As the
Montoneros had been an instrumental-faCtOi'in bringing about the return
to power of Juan Peron, and as they considered themselves representative
of peronism, there was a political problem for the government in turning
against them, despite the Montoneros' militant offensive against the
government of Mrs. Peron. Consequently, as a result of their virtual
free rein to operate, the Montoneros continued to gain recruits and
sympathizers. In September 1975 the
Montoneros had grown considerablY,AurinT.the previous few months, acquir-
ing a large number of new members from among workers who were disgruntled
over the worsening economic situation in Argentina. While
did not state the precise number of recruits, he indicated the number
Might be around 2,000.
18. During this period, in addition to acquiring actual recruits
within labor, the.Montoneros also managed to achieve influence among
the work force of several important industries, such as within automo-
bile plants. While the Montoneros never managed to control unions, they
did succeed in dominating the internal labor commissions of many
factories and being selected as labor delegates. These Montoneros
rarely revealed their true affiliation to their worker colleagues,
passing themselves off merely as peronists or, when pressed, as members
of the "Authentic Peronist Party.' They devoted their efforts in try-
ing to bring about higher wages and greater social benefits for the
workers and for the most part did not attempt to organize the workers
politically. It was not difficult for the Montoneros to enter a plant's
work force as they were usually wellAualified. 'Many companies hired
their workers and technicians based on examinations, and consequently,
the Montoneros, most of whom had had some university education, were
usually able to pass the tests easily and be hired legitimately. For
example, the Montoneros would have their members who were engineering
students take the tests given by automobile companies.
19. Within the student sector, the Montoneros were also acquiring
recruits and influence. The Montonero student front at the secondary
level (high school) was the "Union of Secondary Students" (UES), and
at the univers':, level the "Peronist University Youth" (JUP). The
primary object:� of the UES was the continuous formation within
"
secondary schools, and particularly technical schools, of "base groups,
which generally consisted of four people, one being the group leader.
The UES rarely assembled to agitate en_masse_fOr_student causes. Efforts
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to promote the objectives of the UES were normally carried out quietly
through individual contact.
20. Within the university sector, the JUP became more vocal than the
UES, utilizing its organizational strength and the experience and
capability of its members to champion causes or pressure for actions.
To help achieve its objectives, the JUP resorted to public rallies,
propaganda, and pressure on professors. The JUP's activities were
directed both at national political matters, as well as strictly
student aspects. For example, with respect to the latter, problems
such as inadequate student dining rooms, professor absenteeism, lack
of vacancy in a particular course and difficulties with enrollment all
became the concern of the JUP in an effort to win student recruits and
sympathizers. Individuals represented within the JUP were elected by
students from individual university departments. Within-each depart-
ment there were "student centers" which were politically oriented
student groups competing with one another to obtain student representa-
tion within various university organizations, including the JUP. The
Montoneros infiltrated both openly and clandestinely "student centers"
in almost all university departments throughout the country. The
Montonero-dominated "student centers" obtained-adherents both through
ideological appeal, as well as through services, such as providing
textbooks at low cost, course aids and employment opportunities.
.21. The JUP had a national leadership consisting Of two representa-
tives from Buenos Aires, one from the Littoral, one from La Plata
and one from Cordoba.- The JUP leadership would meet alone every
fifteen days and with the national leadership of the Montoneros every
month. While both the JUP and the UES became influential throughout
the country, within the Federal Capital area the JUP was particularly
strong within the National University-of:Buenos Aires, notably in the
departments of Medicine, Architecture and Urbanism, Exact Sciences,
Pharmacy and Biochemistry, Philosophy and Letters, Economic Science,
and Law and Social Sciences. At the secondary level, the UES became
strong in the Federal Capital area within the Buenos Aires National
College, Carlos Pellegrini National College and Sarmiento National
College.
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22. What might be considered "phase four" of the Montoneros, that
is 8 September 1975 when the Montoneros were outlawed until the present,
has been marked by a continuation of terrorist incidents by the
Montoneros against the Argentine military, police, and business sector,
and, in response, an all-out anti-subversive effort by the military
and civilian security forces, particularly after the military took over
in a coup d'etat 24 March 1976. By September 1975 the Montoneros were
anticipating more serious confrontations with the Armed Forces to
begin about the end of 1976-early 1977. In order to attack armored
vehicles, the Montoneros were reportedly preparing anti-tank and anti-
armored vehicle devices, such as Viet Cong-type mines and anti-tank
grenades. They also planned to use a Spanish-type 51 mm mortar. On
5 October 1975 the Montoneros took the initiative in the largest attack
to date against a military garrison. Ir a.three-stage simultaneous
assault, the Montoneros (1) attacked the 29th Regiment Army Base in
Formosa, were met with hea-y resistance and consequently suffered a
number of casualties; (2) took control of the Pacu Airport in Formosa
and (3) skyjacked an Aerolineas Argentines domestic flight which was
diverted to Pacu Airport to pick up survivors of the attack against
the 29th Regiment, The crew was forced to fly to an isolated landing
area where the Montoneros deboarded and escaped.
23. Toward the end of 1975 the military and civilian(
were beginning to take a harder osition against the Montoneros, and
on 28 December 1975 Argentine officials picked up Roberto
Quieto on a beach in the Buenos ires suburb of MartirTz, and this
time he was not released. Quieto told that the
Montoneros as of December 1975 had between 7,000-10,000 active members
and about 300.,000 supporters. He said that he and Firmenich were still
the top leaders of the Montoneros, and that the third-.ranking leader
was Alberto Jose Molinas Menuzzi, National Chief of Propaganda.
Molinas was subsequently killed 29 September 1976 in a confrontation
with security forces. At the time of his death, Molinas was identified
as being number six in the Montonero hierarchy.
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24. Quieto identified the Montoneros' largest and most important arms
cache located in a warehouse in the Buenos Aires suburb of Villa Ballester,
and said this was also where the Montoneros had held the Born brothers.
Based on Quieto's information, security officials raided the warehouse
and confiscated 150 "Halcon" submachine guns made in Argentina, new
automatic shotguns of Italian manufacture, five "Colt" heavy machineguns,
approximately 100 hand guns, including some U.S. models, "FAL" rifles,
hand grenades, three million rounds of small arms ammunition, one
thousand barrels for a type of submachine gun under manufacture by the
Montoneros, a large quantity of equipment for cleaning and maintaining
small arms, Montonero uniforms and a detailed field manual providing
instruction f 11.� a i..' '' -xplosives and guerrilla tactics.
this raid constituted the largest
amount or subversive weapons and munitions confiscated by the government
thus far.
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25. Quieto also stated that the Montoneros maintained a Swiss bank
account containing 150 million dollars, with another 50 million
dollars distributed throughout Argentina. In August 1975 an Argentine
revolutionary had reported that most of
the funds used by the Montoneros to carry out their operations were
obtained through kidnappings and robberies. He said that some of the
monies thus obtained were invested locally and abroad and used to
purchase shares in major Argentine companies to insure continuing
Income. Other income was provided through the purchase and sale
of real estate. Such transactions were handled by legal members of
the Montoneros, that is, those members who had not been identified as
Montoneros by the authorities. A less significant source of funds
came from Montonero members themselves. Those who were legally
employed were required to contribute a percentage of their income to
the organization with the percentage varying according to the
individual's financial circumstances.
26. In addition to Firmenich, himself and Molinas, Quieto identified
the following as other leaders of the Montoneros as of December 1975:
Alberto Miguel Camps, Chief of -Logistics at the
National level.
Ricardo Rene Haider, Chief of Foreign Affairs with
-responsibility for maintaining foreign connections. At the time of
Quieto's capture, Haidar was residing in Rome., Italy. In February 1977,
however, Haidar was picked up by the authorities in Buenos Aires.
Juan Julio Roque, alias "Mater6," Chief of the Buenos
Aires Region, which included the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires Province.
Francisco Reynaldo Urondo, Chief of Propaganda for the
Buenos Aires Region.
Ignacio Velez Carreras, Chief of Cordoba Province.
Hernan Agosto Osorio, Chief of the Southern Region.
Maria Antonia B e r ge r, Chief of the combat unit for the
Southern Zone.
Fernando Vaca Narvaja, Chief of the "Cuyou Region, which
included the Provinces of San Juan, Mendoza and San Luis.
Esther Norma Arrostito, Chief of the combat unit
for the Northern Region who had participated in the operation against
former President Aramburu. Arrostito was picked up by the security
forces 2 December 1976 and reportedly later killed.
Jorge Omar Lewinger, Chief of the Western Region.
Lewinger has since been reportedly captured.
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27. In the action 29 September 1976, which led to the death of
Molinas, Army G-2 also reported the death of the following, all
of whom, according to G-2, were members of the Montoneros' National
Political Secretariat as of September 1976:
Jose Carlos Coronel, alias "Julian," head of the
Montonero front of factory workers
Ismael Salame, alias "El Turco," Montonero head of
agitation and activities at the student level.
Maria Victoria W a 1 s h, alias "Hilda," head of the
press section of the labor front.
Ignacio Bertra n.
Montoneros who, in addition to Arrostito and Firmenich,
had participated in the operation against former President Aramburu
were Carlos Raul Capuano Martinez, who was killed
18 August 1972; Carlos Gustavo Ramus, who.wat killed 7 September
1970; and Fernando Luis A b a 1 Medina, who was killed 7 September
1970.
28. In a captured document entitled "Annual Plan of the Montoneros
from February 1976 through February 1977" the Montone:os express their
intent to engage in the "First Military Campaign" of this period during
March and April 1976 with the objective of trying to "annihilate" the
police forces and carry out actions against business executives.
According.to the document, subsequent military campaigns were to
depend on the outcome of the March-April offensive. Other
documents refer to the Montoneros "Fourth Military Campaign" which
took place between early August 1976 to mid-October 1976 with the
principal assassination targets continuing to be the "repressive forces"
and business executives. In addition to killing, the Montoneros also
engaged in harassment operations against their targets, which involved
such actions as threatening phone calls and letters; threatening packages,
some actually with bombs, some without; explosive devices in gifts of
flowers, etc. The overall objective of the harassment campaign was to
provoke fear and confusiop among* the targetted sectors with little cost
to the Montoneros.
29. Following are some of the significant actions during 1976 against
the military and police which are attributed to the Montoneros:
15 March 1976 - The Montoneros are responsible for the
detonation of a powerful bomb which had been placed in a car parked
next to Army Headquarters in an assassination attempt against General
Jorge Videl a, Commander of the Army.
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18 June 1976 - Federal Police Chef Brigadier General
Cesareo Angel Cardosa was killed bYabomb placed under the
mattress of his bed by Ana Maria Gbnzalez,amember of the
Montoneros.
2 July 1976 - The Montoneros are responsible for the powerful
bomb explosion in the dining room of Federal Police Security (Intelligence)
headquarters which caused the death and Injury of numerous people.
2 Octoberj9.76ThOontonerot are believed to be responsible
for a bomb which exploded under:the'reviewing stand at Campo de Mayo,
resulting in several wounded. President Videla had been seated in the
stands a few minutes beforehand but was not hurt.
17 October 1976 - The Montoneros are believed to be responsible
for the powerful bomb explosion in the Military Club in the Federal
Capital in which numerous people were injured.
15 December 1976 - The Montoneros are responsible for the
explosion of a powerful bomb at the cinema of the Defense Ministry's
Planning Department in downtown Buenos Aires which killed at least
fourteen people and injured another thirty.
-30. With respect specifically 64644ustness sector, in a document
dated August 1976 theMentoneros claim that they sent 2,000 threaten-
ing letters to business executives warning that they would be judged
by the "revolutionary tribunal" if they collaborated with the govern-
ment. In their campaign of intimidating and killing business executives,
which was directed particularly against multinational companies, the
Montoneros hoped to discourage international investment and promote
the continuation of economic chaos, a situation which the Montoneros
consider to be advantageous to their ultimate objective of taking
control of the country.
31. The "Fourth Military Campaign" was also to focus on acts of
sabotage against large industries, primarily those which had allegedly
been dismissing or suspending workers without paying wages. The auto-
mobile and textile industries were singled out as particular targets.
The Montoneros reasoned that sabotage operations presented an especially
effective way to strike blows at the enemy and could be carried out
by an insider in a clandestine manner with a minimum of risk; politically,
sabotage operations helped provide public proof that there still existed
a viable and potent opposition movement; and militarily, sabotage
operations forced the enemy to disperse their troops and thus weaken
their position. The Montoneros directed that sabotage acts were to be
carried out with primarily three objectives in mind: (1) Destroying
goods produced, such as stock on hand; (2) slowing down overall
production; and (3) causing serious damage to the final stages of
production, including retail aspects. Sabotage operations at beginning
stages were to be avoided as they caused too many people at later stages
of production to be put out of work.
�
ett f'
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32. On 17 August 1976 the Montoneros held a press conference of
foreign correspondents in which the Montonero representatives present
Informed the correspondents that in the foreseeable future the
Montoneros would be concentrating on propaganda/psychological action
operations with less attention directed at military activities. The
Montoneros assured that the.organization was in no hurry to achieve
power and would work behind the scenes to gradually strengthen its
support. They stated that as a result of the "plan of hunger" of
Jose Martinez de Hoz, Minister of Economy, conditions
were such that propaganda/psychological action operations were
tactically the appropriate course for the Montoneros to pursue and
not great military operations.
33. As defined by numerous confiscated documents, "propaganda/
psychological action operations" were in fact the type of operations
which the Montoneros had already been carrying out through most of
1976, i.e., isolated assassinations, bombings, sabotage and harass-
ment, with a concurrent effort, particularly in the propaganda area,
to strengthen opposition to the government both in Argentina and abroad.
With respect to the Armed Forces specifically, in addition to trying
to kill various officers and provoke fear within the ranks, the
Montoneros sought to denigrate the Armed Forces command in an attempt
to exacerbate disunity within%theservices and to bring about the
isolation of the military government from the rest of the population.
-The Montoneros recognized that their ultimate victory would depend
less on their carrying out military offensive operations than on
their promoting disruptive actions designed to thwart the success
of the government. The Montoneros calculated that through growing
opposition to the government and disunity within the ranks the Armed
Forces governing process would eventually collapse on its own, at
which time'the military would be compelled to permit elections, thus
allowing the Montoneros to-gain power legally as the vanguard of a
leftist front and the main element in the formation of a socialist
state. Mario Firmenich stated in a press conference 30 June 1974
that as of that time he envisioned that a ten-year program would be
necessary before Argentina could achieve a socialist government.
34. In accord with the Montoneros' political objectives, under the
military government, the Montoneros have been trying to form a broad-
based opposition "national resistance movement" which eventually would
be expanded into a more politically organized "national liberation
front". The Montoneros also founded the clandestine "Montonero Party"
or 17 October 1976, the anniversary of peronist "Loyalty pay," with
the Secretary General of the party being Mario Firmenich, who was to
continue to function as head of the Montoneros. The party was to be
the channel for the political expression of the Montoneros' concept
of peronism, as well as the focal point for the creation of the
"national liberation front." While the "Montonero Party" and
eventually the "national liberation front" were to represent the
political elements of the Montoneros, the "Montonero Army" and the
militias were to serve as the Montoneros' militant element. What
previously had been known as "peronist resistance" came to be known
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as "Montonero resistance. The Montonero document announcing the
creation of the "Montonero Party" was signed by Firmenjch, mendizabal;" _
who is probably Horacio Mendizabal, and "Vaca Narvija", who
is probably Fernando Vaca Narvaia. By August 1976, the Montoneros
had begun to distribute regularly a plimphlet entitled .
"Resistencia Montonera%-and7viefe7also-EbtViiiiiii4-t6Out-out regularly
their official publication "El Montonero:
35. The effort of the Montoneros to extend their influence also
embraced the religious sector, as revealed by a Montonero
document believed to have been written August or September 1976. As
of the writing of the document, the Montoneros had already begun efforts
to organize the followinTthreeAroups directed at expanding Montonero
influence within the religious sector: (1) Social Christian Movement
(SCM). The SCM was to be primarily a political entity to integrate
sectors of the PopularChristian Party and the Revolutionary Christian
Party. At the time the document was written, the SCM had about 42
affiliates, some of whom, according to the document, were first-and
second-echelon members of the latter two parties. (2) Movement for
the Unity of Christians. This Movement was to be comprised primarily
of clergymen and Was to be directed at attempting to sever the
relatively close relationship then existent between thegovernment
and the Church hierarchy. (3) Christians for Liberation (CPL). The
CPL, contrary to the other two groups, consisted mainly of Montoneros.
The CPL had been established within the' Greater Buenos Aires area,
and it was the intent of the Montoneros to promote the CPL nationally
as part of the broad-based opposition "national resistance movement.'
36. Another document revealed the effort of the Montoneros
as of July 19 Itypromote the formation of "Neighborhood Resistance
Centers." The purpose of the-Centers-was.to help organize, coordinate
and lead the resistance movement within poorer residential areas,
including encouraging the poor to become participants in acts of
terrorism. In the past, Montonero subversive operations had been
conceived and carried out by highly trained specialized groups acting
independently of the people. However, by mid-1976 the Montoneros were
encouraging the people to plan and implement their own operations, such
as killings, with whatever weapOnsraight-be available to them; setting
fires, bombings, causing streets .to be blocked, and isolating wealthy
neighborhoods through acts of sabotage, leaving them without water,
electricity, gas, etc.
37. Within labor, following the coup d'etat and the suspension by the
government of traditional labor activity, the Montoneros attempted to
organize the General Labor Confederation/Resistance-(CGT/R) as a
clandestinelabor organization parallel to the legal, but suspended,
General Labor Confederation (CGT). According to a press release of
the CGT/R sent to foreign news correspondents in Argentina, the CGT/R
held its first plenum 14 August 1976 at a secret site in Buenos Aires
Province in which representatives of unions throughout the country
were in attendance. During the session, officers of the CGT/R were
elected with metal worker Arturo Gari n, which might be an alias,
being named as thetGT/R chief.
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38. Throughout 1976 the Mbntbneros continued to hold discussions with
the ERP regarding the possibility of unification of the two organiza-
tions in an attempt to strengthen opposition against the government.
Such talks had been going on since at least 13 February 1974 when Mario
Firmenich, Mario Roberto Santucho, Commander of the ERP, and
others met in Mendoza Province to discuss the unification issue at that
time. In a subsequent press conference, Firmenich acknowledged that
the two organizations had been holding talks but said that no profound
agreement yet existed. Firmenich stated that in the opinion of the
Montoneros the ERP's basic error was in trying to copy the model of
the Vietnam situation, particularly in believing that the enemy could
be clearly defined, that weapons represented the principal strength,
and that the focus should be in the rural areas. In addition, the
Montoneros believed that the ERP's blind adherence to marxist theories
had caused the ERP to become strapped by dogma and to commit political
errors which resulted in the ERP becoming separated from the Argentine
people. The Montoneros also considered the ERP to be overly concerned
with military aspects to the exClusiob of political developments.
39. Firmenich admitted that the coneros had also made mistakes,
noting that originally the Montoneros believed-that the armed struggle
in Argentina should be modelled after the "Che" Guevara experience and
that the Montonero effort should therefore be concentrated in the rural
areas. Firmenich said that the Montoneros later realized that this was
unrealistic, that while-the rural sector should not be abandoned, the
emphasis should be on urban guerrilla warfare because the masses of
workers were in the cities, not in the mountains.
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40. The ERP, in turn, accused the Montoneros of being opportunists
without a definable ideology. The ERP claimed that the. Montoneros were
not true revolutionaries because they did not follow any. approved
revolutionary doctrine and because, at least under President Campora
and President Juan Peron, they were willing.to operate within the
Argentine political system.
41. Despite their failure to achieve unification, some contact and
cooperation continued between the two groups. During a raid by the
security forces in early 1975 a Montonero document
stating that meetings' would be held throughout 1975 by the Montonero
national leadership with the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), the
political element of the ERP. With respect to joint operations, on
18 August 1975, the Montoneros and the ERP together stole an Army
truck loaded with submachine'gunsamd.other weapont. A communique
claimed that the two organizations _joined forces
in tnls operation to retaliate against the recent killing, presumably by
rightist forces, of the Mariano Pujadas family in Cordoba.
The communique also stated that the Montoneros and the ERP would continue
with assassinations, particularly directed at Argentine military and
security personnel.
I
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42. In September 1976,a Mbntonarn leader:commented that coordination
lk''
between the MontonerosO
�ianhii ERP,had4mOroved and that a permanent
coordinating council ha&beenj estibiiibet, although there was still
no central leadership,overikftroups.: He stated that an example of
Montonero/ERP cooperation was tbe.coordinated assault in Cordoba on
21 August 1975 in which the ERP attacked a police station while the
Montoneros attacked an Army communications center. In September 1975
the Army received information that the Montoneros would be send-
ing about eighty men to Tucuman Province to assist the ERP in urban
terrorist activities. �
43. Upon questioning afterhiSAetentiOn18 December 1975, Roberto
Quieto told the authtwitiesthatIteilietimen the Montoneros and the
ERP were minor. Quitto claimed that the ERP had distributed propaganda
portraying a stronger relationship between the two organizations than
was actually the case in order to build the ERP's image, lure recruits
from the Montoneros and confuse the authorities.
44. The prospect of unification also suffered a setback after the
unsuccessful attempt by the ERP on 23 December 1975 to seize the
"Domingo Viejobueno Arsenal Battalion" at Monte Chingolo in Buenos
Aires Province in which over fifty ERP participants were killed.
While the Montoneros reportedly provided assistance to the operation
In a support capacity, they were nighty critical of the ERP for the
'failure of the operation and consequently reassessed the desirability
of unifying with a group which, in the opinion of the Montoneros, had
bungled so disastrously. In addition, the Montoneros were reluctant
to become too closely associated with an organization which had a
purely marxist orientation, considering that they could function more
effectively under the peronist. banner. Unification talks also suffered
a setback with the death on 19 July 1976 of Mario Roberto Santucho and
numerous other actions against the ERP by the security forces.
45- The Montoneros and the ERP nonetheless continued with their
loose cooperative arrangement, and as of July 1975, being in financial
straits, the ERP had borrowed at least U.S.S600,000 from the Montoneros.
46. By mid-1976 both the Montoneros and the ERP were promoting an
International propaganda campaign against the Argentine government,
and in this regard each organization was represented within the
"Argentine Center of Information and Solidarity" (CAIS), headquartered
in Paris, France. As of August 1976, however, CAIS was having internal
problems which was affecting its propaganda output. These problems
largely concerned infigilting between Rodolfo Mattarol 1 o,
alias "RaulNa-va-s," amilitant of the ERP; and Luis Cerruti
Costa,aMontonero-who was head of the GAB foreign relations
section. Part of the difficulty was allegedly due to an effort by the
Montoneros to assume authority over subversive matters in Argentina.
As of mid-1976 the CAIS reportedly had a direct relationship with the
"Latin American Students Section" (AELA) in Germany; the "Antifascist
Committee Against Repression in Argentina" (SAFRA) in Rome, which has
the support of the Italian Communist Party; the "Argentine Anti-
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Imperialist Socialist Movement" (MASA1 in the United States; "C.O.S.A."
(sic) in London:, "Cala, del Pueblo-AtOentilq",in Mexico; "Amnesty
International; the:.-10sse11,,,TriOunaAM the "Peace Aii-oZiation"
in the U;S-4-anethe-"Inteitatltiill-CoMmission of Jurists.,"-i-ub-
sidiary Of-the-tomMuniSt-front-"World Peace CouritIT."
47. In November 1975 left-wing Montoneros
were a dominant element within the "Casa del Pueblo Argentino" in
Mexico City and that Mexico City was being used as a type of support
base for the ERP and the Montoneros. In this regard, the "Casa del
Pueblo Argentina" was providing documents, housing, travel funds
and other assistance.
48. In June 1976 Envar El Kadre, representing the Montoneros,
attended a meeting in Lisbon, Portugal of the "Revolutionary Coordina-
ting Junta" (JCR), a coordinating body consisting of the ERP, the
Uruguayan National Liberation Movement/Tuparmaros, the Chilean
Movement of the Revolutionary.Left4and the Bolivian Army of National
Liberation. The purpose of the meeting was to advise the group that
the Montoneros, while not actually joining the JCR, would participate
in an observer/advisor status; as well as provide the JCR with
financial assistance on a monthly basis.
49. Despite their efforts to expand their influence and impede the
-efforts of the government, by late Maech 1976 the Montoneros
privately conceded that despite the recent assumption of the military
government they had already been dealt blows by actions
of the security forces, particularly in interior and most notably
in Cordoba, Mendoza, the Northeast-anethe Littoral. The Montoneros
considered it inevitable that as the interior continued to come under
the control of security elements, the government would channel more
of its resources into offensive actions against the Montoneros in the
Federal Capital and Buenos Aires Provinte. As the rear guard of the
Montoneros in the Buenos Aires area was regarded as weak and in no
condition to successfully combat the Armed Forces offensive, the
"tactical command" of the Montoneros ordered the implementation of
"operation chameleon" calling for a large number of Montoneros to go
into hiding. To help allow these Montoneros to live clandestinely,
the "tactical command" directed. that beginning 30 April 1976 an
intensive effort was to be initiated to obtain legitimate documenta-
tion and identifying data of citizens who were not Montoneros. The
Montoneros would then alter the documentation as necessary for use by
the clandestine Montoneros or make false documents from the personal
data acquired. Parallel with the defensive "chameleon operation," the
Montoneros would continue to engage in offensive militant operations,
both for the purpose of trying to stop the advance of the military, as
well as to re-enforce the image of the Montoneros.
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50. As a result of the capture of Roberto Quieto, whom the Montoneros
condemned as a traitor for allowing himself to be picked up and for
revealing information and because of other actions
against the Montoneros by the security forces, the Montoneros re-
appraised their situation and consequently instituted organizational
changes beginning about May 1976.
51. Whenthe Montoneros'wer0,first formed, they were a relatively
small group consisting-of cadre units which operated for the most
part independently. As the membership expanded, it became apparent
that a more centralized and.s,:ructured organization was necessary to
respond to reality. In May 1973 steps were taken to gradually consoli-
date the cadre units into a more cohesive body. The cadre chiefs
became the overall national leaders, a number which eventually was
reduced to three men, Firmenich, Quieto and possibly, at least at some
point, Molinas. With time, a superstructure evolved which resulted in
both a large bureaucracy with a period of demilitarization. The de-
militarization broughtftabout an absence of military training and led
to low-Teveroperationnebureaucracy became unwieldy and Montonero
members began acting on their own, carrying out activities at will
without authorization or supervision. A father problem was that the
national leaders became inaccessible. The decisions of the national
leaders were not to be questioned, nor were they interested in suggestions.
The primary focus of attention of the national leadership was in the
Federa) Capital area, and as a consequence the national leaders lacked
knowledge of the different Montonero regions. The national leadership
failed to produce a consistent and broad policy which encompassed the
entire organization, resulting in contradictions between the Federal
Capital area and the regional districts. In sum, the organizational
structure which evolved lacked an effective channel to discuss and
resolve problems.
52. In earl), 1976 the Montonero "national council" recommended the
following to help correct the situation which had developed: (1)
Greater democratization of the organization to allow for more effective
communication between elements and the opportunity for members at
all levels to express views and criticisms; (2) Better military
training with at least one operation a year involving a large Montonero
troop contingent; (3) Greater knowledge about and interest in members
of the organization at all levels to help avert possible security
problems. This latter point referred to the Quieto situation in which
Quieto had apparently been denounced to the authorities by his wife
who was angered over Quieto's affair with the Montonero "Ana;" (4)
The assignment of a security officer to each regional district to be
alert to potential problems from the membership which could affect
the security of the organization; (5) Insistence that all members
continually carry a weapon to be used either to try to resist capture
or to kill oneself if capture appeared certain; a cyanide capsule
was also to be carried to commit suicide.
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53. Around May 1976 it was decided to refer to the "Commander"
of the Montoneros as the "Secretary General" and to divide responsi-
bility of the "tactical" (military) and "strategic" (political)
functions, which hitherto had been combined. The "tactical" aspects
would be controlled by a "national secretariat" operating from the
Federal Capital. "Strategic" aspects would be more regionally
oriented. "Regional_eaements,ii"iva, were to be replaced by
"columns" or "zones" led by a secretary general. The "columns"
or "zones" would have more of a vertical command structure than
did the "regional elements".
54. In sum, during this period the new Montonero organizational
structure included the following: "National leadership (conduccion
nacional), consisting of a secretary general plus three "area
chiefs;":(2) secretariat, consisting of the secretz'v general and
the national secretaries responsible for military, r:itical,
organizational, propaganda and indoctrination matter Ind inter-
national aspects; (3) "columns" or "zones," each lea a secretary
general, plus four sub-secretaries in charge of military, political,
organizational, and propaganda and indoctrination matters.
55. The military sub-secretary for the Federal Capital would have
responsibility for three departments: The department of production
involving the manufacture of armaments; the department of services
-which was to be responsible forlogistical supports, medical
facilities, caches and documentation; and the department of informa-
tion responsible for maintaining intelligence files on personalities
of interest and other potential targets, such as aspects of the
country's infrastructure, etc.
56. Within the Federal Capital the political sub-secretary would
be in charge of four departmentsyStudent, labor, press and
propaganda, and the "national liberation front."
57. Within the Federal Capital the organizational sub-secretary
would be in charge of five departments: Personnel, prisoners,
finances, communications and technical assistance.
58. The propaganda and indoctrination sub-secretary within the
Federal Capital would be in charge of preparing, publishing, and
distributing propaganda.
59. The national secretary in charge of international aspects
headed four departments: Latin America, Investigation and Informa-
tion, Special Logistics, and Relations with Europe, Africa and
theSoviet Bloc. A document dated 1975 outlining the "work plan"
of the Montoneros for 1975 stated that the International Section
of the Montoneros would maintain periodic contact with the embassies
of Cuba, friendly Arab states, such as Syria, Iraq and Algeria; and
other communist states, the selection, according to the document,
to be made at a later date. The "work plan" also noted that
preparations would be made to send a mission to Western Europe
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to disseminate propaganda relating to repression in Argentina and
to obtain the support of "social democratic groups" ir) that area.
60. The Montoneros new organizational structure also called for
armed operations to be carried out by "combat groups," consisting
of some twenty people divided into units of four directed by a
unified command., In addition, the Montoneros began to institute
an operational system of roving patrols for the purpose of carrying
out terrorist acts on the basis of targets of opportunity. The
main feature of the members of a. given patrol would be that they
all knew the area in which they were operating extremely well.
The patrol system differed from past operating techniques, in which
the Montoneros carefully planned an operation well in advance and
then selected individuals who would comprise a "commando unit" to
implement the operation, basing the selection on various factors
which did not necessarily include knowledge of the operating locale.
61. By late-1976And early 1977, as a result of countersubversive
actions, the Montoneros had lost numerous members and supporters
and had been dealt severe blows to their logistical and organiza-
tional structure.
62. Within the labor area, the Montoneros suffered a setback as a
result of actions by the security forces which began as early as
January 1976. At that time, the security'forces, having information
that the subversives had infiltrated labor commissions at the factory
floor level, picked up several Montonero labor penetrations. The
Montoneros then pulled out many of their labor penetrations still
remaining and helped them go into hiding. The result was a decline
in the influence which the Montoneros had hitherto been able to
acquire within the labor sector. To further hinder the developments
of subversive infiltration-within labor, after the military took over
the government in March 1976, the Army 601st Intelligence Battalion
gradually became involved in an effort to infiltrate the work force
of as many companies as possible to acquire information firsthand
on the labor situation and to identify subversives among workers.
As of January 1977, the Army 601st had infiltrated about one hundred
companies.
63. The Montoneros, however, still attempted to extend their
influence within the labor area to try to utilize the workers as a
base of support. By early 1977 the Montoneros were anticipating,
because of the deteriorating economic situation, a massive confronta-
tion between government forces and labor before the end of July 1977,
a situation which the Montoneros hoped to exploit. In preparation
for this possibility, the Montoneros planned to begin as of 1 January
1977 an intense effort to infiltrate as many factories as possible,
engage in a widespread recruitment effort, create small combat units
among factory workers and bring about Montonero control of internal
labor commfissions. The goal of the Montoneros was to have the support
of at least thirty percent of workers in each factory. The Montoneros
intended to give priority attention in their infiltration/recruitment
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effort t the textile and metallurgical unions. The Montoneros
also hoped to reorganize the CGT/R to make it more effective.
64. despite their
ambitious goals within labor, the Montoneros are faced with trying
to gain the supportof.worker,sohbyn general continue to be
responsive tolndittonalfiierOnfh labor leaders, and these leaders,
in turn, are not disposed towards sharing their power positions with
the Montoneros. While the Montoneros, through the CGT/R or some
other vehicle, might eventually be able to utilize labor discontent
as a power base, this would probably be a gradual occurrence over
a long period and not a situation which could evolve immediately.
65. With-respect to the Montoneros' logistical apparatus, various
actions carried out by the countersubversive forces against the
Montoneros in November 1976 represented, according to the Army
the greatest blow ever dealt to the logistical infrastructure ora
subversive organization in Argentina. As a result of raids against
Montonero weapons factories and supply centers, the authorities
confiscated almost all of the G-70 "Energe grenades made by the
Montoneros and almost all of:the,16-33-MP grenade launchers. In
addition, about one-fourthof,thi:Aand grenades under production
were seized, as were the prototypes for 60 mm mortars. These actions
were carried out in Chaco, Corrientes, Santa Fe and Villa Dominico
-in Buenos Aires Province.. � ' '
66. By early 1977 a Montonero document revealed that the Montoneros
were no longer in a position to provide small arms to their
militias who must acquire their own. However, fabrication of grenades
was continuing with priority being given to the manufacture of
SFM-5 grenades and launchers. The Montoneros hoped to have the
SFM-5 grenadesZready-for4ds&by April 1977. The Montoneros also
expected to have 1;000-2,000 G-40 grenades by the end of April 1977.
67. With respect to the Montoneros' finances, the Montonero national
military secretary listed in a document the financial expenditures
in the Federal Capital for August, September and October 1976 as
being, respectively, the peso equivalent of US$127,500.00,
US$233,250. and US$70,450. Roughly 42 percent of these totals was
for the purchase of vehicles, safehouses and other property, 38
percent for logistical and miscellaneous items and 20 percent was
invested. The Army assessed that while the Montoneros had
suffered losses in membership and in their logistical apparatus, at
least as of August, September and October 1976 there did not seem
to be a problem of funds.
68. This situation changed, , however, in February 1977 when
Argentine naval Offiters captured in Buenos Aires Ricardo Rene Haidar,
the Montonero National Secretary for Finances. Haidar provided
detailed information on the Montoneros' financial structure, including
the location of the Montoneros' principal financial reserves in bank
accounts in Spain and Switzerland, to which Haidar had direct access
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14 million U.S. dollars 4-i-6-M1;lb-ink account in Madrid, Spain and
tion and assistance, the forces were able to.withdraw
50 million U.S: dollars, plus stock certificates, from a bank in
Geneva, Switzerland. Haidar told the authorities that most of the
Montonero operations had been financed primarily by interest earned
on these two European accounts. Within Argentina, Haidar led the
authorities to 17 million dollars hidden in a safesite in Cordoba
and to four million dollars hidden in Mendoza. As a result of these
operations involvingHaidar, as of February 1977 the financial
reserves of the Montoneros had been
69. Within the student sector, soon after the coup d'etat the
countersubversive campaign moved against both secondary and univer-
sity levels. In early May 1976, President Videla remarked
that the government had made significant progress in identifying
subversive indoctrination activities at the secondary school level.
Videla noted that the previous government had done a good job of
keeping down such activity in the universities but had not focused
on this problem-at the secondary school level. He'said that what
the present militarMovernmentiWas4aitcovering was the extent of
infiltration by subversives inYtiandarschools, which in some cases
involved professors and directors of schools.
70. With respect to membership losses, in September 1976
the number of
Montonero militants at that time may have been about 7,000.
as of February 1977 the number of militants
may not have been more than 1,000, and that the Montonero
leadershi had been reduced by perhaps as much as eighty percent.
the figure of militants as of January 1977 at
about 2,000. Bot the leadership and rank and file had dispersed,
and as of March 1977 Mario Firmenich was said to be in France.
3.3(b)(1)
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71. Despite setbacks, per a Montonero document entitled "National
Plan from January through April 1977" signed by Rodolfo G a 1 i m -
berti, National Military Secretary, the Montoneros intended to
continue with terrorist operations in 1977, the principal terrorist
targets in order of priority being as follows: .
(1) Executives of monopolistic companies and members of
the oligarchy who have taken actions detrimental to the workers. The
primary objective of the terrorist campaign against these individuals
is to force them out of fear to leave Argentina. If they wish to
remain in the country and stay alive they must agree to provide the
wages and benefits to workers stipulated by the CGT/R. For the most
part, the targets are to be executives who do not have bodyguards or
who are otherwise easy to get at.
(2) Members of the Armed Forces and other security services.
In general, emphasis is to be placed on actions against the Armed
Forces rather than the police. Killing of individual police officers
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is to be primarily for the purpose of acquiring a weapon. The
Montoneros also consider it important to continue with their
propaganda/psychological action campaign aimed at intensifying
disunity within the military by working to exacerbate the differences
within the Armed Forces over the policies the government should
pursue. Propaganda in this regard is to continue to stress that
the military hierarchy favors the imperialists and the oligarchy
at the expense of the workers and the national interests. The
Montoneros also hope to develop a greater social consciousness
among the lower ranks of the military ,'and incite them to challenge
the decisions taken by their superiors.
(3) Argentine government officials, both military and
civilian. Selected high-level officials will be threatened with
death unless they resign. Lesser officials will be urged to promote
policies which benefit the lower and middle classes.
72. While the Montoneros continued to collect and maintain informa-
tion on the U.S. Mission in Argentina, the fact that U.S. officials
were not listed by the Montoneros as priority targets may relate
to a meeting held in Rosario in early September 1976 attended by
Mario Firmenich, Minas and "Pablo ventura, the alias, as later
revealed, of Ricardo Rene Haider. During this meeting the leaders
said they considered that the human rights issue, particularly
-within the U.S., was working to the advantageof the Montoneros.
Consequently, in the interest of maintaining this advantage the
Montonero leaders decided that for the present they would not
direct terrorist actions against.foreign.diplomattc missions or
their personnel in Argentina, as such actions would tend to weaken
the Montoneros' position in the human rights context. The Montonero
leaders noted that the human rights issue was generating sympathy and
support for the Montoneros and other leftist groups in Argentina,
and the attacks being made against the Argentine government were
ultimately to the benefit of the Argentine leftist radical sector.
73. In the face of increased toikersUbVersive actions, by early
1977 the Montoneros had brought about further organizational
changes. The position of Montonero secretary of organization had
been abolished, and the Montonero structure was becoming increasingly
decentralized with action concentrated at the zone level. The policy
of the Montoneros was no longer to exist as an elite and tight
entity, in effect separate from society, but to become diffused and
its members absorbed among the masses where they could exert influence
at the grass-roots level, particularly among the workers. In this
way, the Montoneros hoped to take advantage of the growing conflict
between labor and the government to try and become the vanguard of
the opposition force. The Montoneros intended to spread their people
throughout the country, both to promote the resistance of the govern-
ment nationwide, as well as to avoid a concentration of Montoneros
at any one placeia,f.Situation which would make them particularly
vulnerable to the security forces 'Specific political and military
actions within a zone were to be decided by the zone leader without
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the need for higher approval. &kW:Actions, howeven were to include
targets and be implemented in accord with the general .guidelines set
forth in the Montonero "Military Instruction Manual." This manual
was to have been completed by January 1977 and beginning February 1977
four-day courses were to be given by platoon leaders to militants
based on the contents of the manual. Every month a two-day meeting
was to be held of various zone chiefs with appropriate national
representatives to evaluate problems and successes of the previous
month, make plans for the upcoming month and discuss political
matters. Operations against any target were to entail a low risk
for the Montoneros involved and were to be implemented with as few
militants as possible. Those Montoneros carrying out an action
were to be familiar with the operating locale and plans were to be
made for an easy and rapid getaway, possibly by using bicycles or
motorcycles in congested areas rather than cars. The Montoneros
acknowledged that their communications procedures were extremely
vulnerable as the security forces.were aware-of:most of them, and
consequently from January through April 1977 a special effort was
to be made to improve communications.
74. Despite the plans and efforts of the Montoneros to maintain
their viability and fulfill their objectives, as of early 1977
President Videla was making public statements stressing the deter-
3.3(b)(1) mination of the government to continue its fight against subversion
until it was destroyed. Some officials
calculated that the subversives would be defeated by the
7, while others estimated that the struggle would be
prolonged until the end of 1978. The Montoneros, however, are
optimistic, believing that despite this period of confrontation
time is on their side, and that ultimately the leftist forces will
prevail and a. socialist state in Argentina, dominated by the
Montoneros, will be established.
en
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