ARGENTINE ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA - 1981/10/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06627562
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: October 9, 1981

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MEMORANDUM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
9 October 1981 .
Argentine Assistance to Bolivia
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Economic
Figures on Argentine economic assistance to Bolivia from
July 1980 to the present are very tightly held by Buenos Aires
officialdom both because of Argentina's deep political
involvement in Bolivia's internal affairs and the manner in
which Buenos Aires has provided the assistance. Moreover,
although terms for the assistance are unavailable, it appears
Bolivia will be unable to make repayment.
The Argentines were one of the major financial backers of
the 17 July 1980 coup by General Garcia Meza; in September
1980, the
Argentines had contributed $200 million to help finance the
coup effort.
IThis grant reportedly was
entirely separate from subsequent Argentine assistance through
balance of payments loans and subsidized purchases of Bolivian
gas, major vehicles Buenos Aires has used to support the
military regime in La Paz.
This meznorandum was prepared at the request of the Office of
Intelligence Support of the Treasury Departznent. It contains
information available as of 9 October 1981. It was prepared by the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Questions and comments
should be aridressed to Chief, South America Divisionl Office of
African and Latin American Analysis
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Military
Argentina maintains a unique military assistance and
advisory group in Bolivia that serves as_a conduit for
Argentine policy input and was instrumental in bringing General
Garcia Meza to power. It operates independently of the
Argentine Ambassador.
The MAAG
may have been considerably lager in the summer of
1980 at the time of the Garcia Meza coup Aside from its
political function, it also has providedlftaining for Bolivian
officers in anti-subversion intelligenceTtechniques, with a
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heavy emphasis on "interrogation" (read,40orture"). Argentina
also provides standardized training courses to personnel from
all three Bolivian services, but it has supplied little in the
way of military hardware
Political-Diplomatic Support
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Argentina appears prepared to support any government in
Bolivia as long as it is a right-wing military dictatorship.
Although it lobbied hard to obtain a normalization of relations
between the US and the Garcia Meza government, it is not wedded
to any specific personality. Rather, it will accept any
alternative Bolivian government that will safeguard Argentina's
interests by securing normal diplomatic relations with the US
while implementing hard-line policies at home. It thus has
urged the US to recognize the present Torrelio regime.
Motivation
Military leaders in Buenos Aires perceive that political
liberalization in neighboring Bolivia could lead to a left-wing
government that might provide sanctuary for Montoneros or other
terrorist groups bent on destabilizing Argentina. Thus, their
current commitment, which includes substantial economic
assistance that they can ill afford, is-Supportive of this
logic. It is not, as they seek to portray it, a warm espousal
of US policy objectives. For example, although they may pay
lipservice to interdicting Bolivian druglEraffic, it does not
cause them major concern except insofar as this trade is an
impediment to US recognition of and economic assistance to
Bolivia. 3.5(c)
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BOLIVIA: The Argentine Connection
Despite repeated disavouals by Argentine leaders of complicity
in the Bolivian coup., there is persuasive evidence that since last
spring members of Argentina's military mission in La Prz have been
deeply involved.
There also are indications that once the coup plans
were set, the Argentine Government may have had second
thoughts about its involvement. Strong pressure from
the US in May and June could have led Buenos Aires to
instruct its Ambassador and military attaches in La Paz
not to intervene in Bolivian affairs. From that point
until the coup was actually carried out, however,
Argentine intervention probably Was not essential.
Argentine officers are reportedly again acting as
advisers to members of the new Bolivian Government and
are participating in the "interrogation" of some 2,000
political prisoners. They also are supplying food and
weapons to the Bolivian military.
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ARGENTINA: Support of Bolivian Junta
Argentine leaders appear detcrnined to prop up the military
rcgime in Bolivia, even at the risk of jeopanficin7 recent improve-
ments in relations with the US.
3.5(c)
President Videlahas for the first time publicly
expressed sympathy for the new ruling group led by General
Garcia Meza and implied that Argentina would provide food
aid and financial credits. These are the latest in a
series of supportive actions taken by the Argentines,
whose military mission was deeply involved in planning
the recent coup and presently is helping the junta con-
solidate its position. 3.5(c)
The Argentines allegedly aided the coup plotters
because they feared that a left-of-center civilian gov-
ernment headed by leading presidential candidate Siles
would prove weak and ineffectual and lead to a Communist
takeover. They insist that their own national security
interests were directly threatened because a left-leaning
Bolivia mi:7,!it have become a safehaven for Argentine ter-
rorists. There is no evidence to support such a claim
but it is consistent with Argentine apprehensions of
creeping Communist pene4ation of the Western hemisphere.
3.5(c)
Argentina's recognition of the new regime on 28 July
was followed by the postponement of a visit to Buenos
Aires by a high-ranking US official--a visit eagerly
sought by the military government as a continuation of
high-level bilateral meetings begun last January to pro-
mote better understanding and cooperation.
Although President Videla may send a personal emis-
sary tc Washington to discuss the Bolivian problem, there
is little reason to expect the Argentines to show flexi-
bility. Though there may be minor differences of opinion
in the Argentine government hierarchy, those officers who
count believe strongly that in Bolivia at present there
is no civilian alternative to a rightwing military junta.
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