LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS: STAFF NOTES AUGUST 25, 1976[SANITIZED] - 1976/08/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06627531
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: August 25, 1976

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C06627531
3.5(c)
Latin American Trends
STAFF NOTES
>Ss-e.rff
159
CI SNL A 76-043
No. 0723-76
August 25, 1976
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
August 25, 1976
ANNEX
Argentina: No Moves on the Political Front . 11
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ANNEX
Argentina: No Moves on the Political Front
Since their takeover last March, Argentina's
ruling generals have made demonstrable progress
against the twin problems--leftist terrorism and
economic disorder--they had singled out for priority
treatment. Problems of a political nature, however,
have gone begging. The generals have made no seri-
ous effort to construct a popular base of support nor
to rehabiliate civilian institutions, both of which
will be necessary to ease the eventual return to
democracy they promise.
The junta has chosen instead to sideline all
civilian politics for an indefinite period while it
gets on with what it considers the real job at hand.
To do this, the officers outlawed all partisan ac-
tivity, dissolved congress, and are carefully con-
trolling crganized labor. The most notorious of the
Peronist labor leaders and politicians still are in
jail or in exile. The press, while not completely
muzzled, is closely watched.
Thus far, at least, the strategy appears to be
working. With no evidence of serious popular dis-
satisfaction, the officers have made inroads against
the guerrillas and scored encouraging results on the
economic front. The number of terrorists killed or
captured continues to mount, as does the number of
important safesites destroyed. The recent killing
of Peoples Revolutionary Army leader Santucho gave
the security forces a particular psychological lift.
Economic results have been even more gratifying;
monthly inflation is down dramatically, the stock
market has soared, and foreign financial assistance
is flowing into Buenos Aires.
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These important gains have come only at great
cost. The counter-insurgency struggle, for example,
has unleashed a wave of abuses and counter violence
on the part of security officials acting with at
least the tacit support of some ranking military
authorities. The junta's anti-inflation program has
produced a recession, which in turn has meant eco-
nomic hardship for many accustomed to guaranteed
employment and periodic wage increases.
Organized labor, the civilian sector that has
the greatest disruptive potential, has been the
hardest hit by the junta's policies. The March coup
toppled labor from its long-privileged position and
placed it under close federal supervision. It lost
virtually all its top leaders and its right to strike
or engage in any but the most routine bureaucratic
functions.
Under the military, workers have been unable to
catch up with the continuing high cost of living,
because wages have been kept near the levels they
had, reached just before the coup. Unemployment has
grown as 7roduction declined in the face of slackened
demand. Moreover, the junta continues to stress the
need to reduce the bloated government payrolls.
Workers, who at best distrust any military re-
gime, may well have begun to resent the junta's
frankly pro-business policies. To date the govern-
ment has:
--adopted substantial price supports and spe-
cial lines of credit for farmers;
--enacted special tax incentives for business;
--lifted price controls;
--made special overtures to multi-national firms.
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In effect, the junta may well have added to the
historical antagonism between urban labor, on the
one hand, and business and agricultural entrepreneurs
on the other. The presence of Dr. Martinez de Hoz,
scion of a wealty land-owning family,as top economic
policy maker, cannot fail to contribute to such
antagonism.
Continued relative deprivation for workers may
yet seriously alienate them. When and if aroused,
labor would be a formidable opponent. Workers are
accustomed to getting their own way and do not shy
away from confrontation tactics. It is likely,
moreover,that leftist infiltrators are seeking to
exploit their frustration. Although labor is gen-
erally conservative, at least some workers could in
time prove susceptible to the blandishments of those
who play on themes such as hard economic times and
lost political clout.
Junta policies could eventually alienate other
sectors of the populace as well. The political and
administrative hold maintained by the military of-
ficers at all levels of federal and provincial gov-
ernment is bound to rankle many Argentines. Specific
groups, notably politicians, journalists, and to a
lesser extent academics, are also adversely affected
by the officers' authoritarian rule and have little
prospect of receiving any concessions from the
government.
All Argentines are greatly disturbed by politi-
cal violence. Their fears of the relatively indis-
criminate actions of the right, however, may soon
surpass their fears of violence from the left, which
generally has been highly selective. Few believe
that abuses and murders of known and suspected
leftists are junta policy, but concern continues to
mount that the government is powerless to stop such
activity.
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ST
Rightist abuses in particular have blunted the
efforts of President Videla and others who support
him to maintain an even-handed approach to governing.
Videla has, for example, consistently avoided public
castigation of the ousted Peronists, preferring in-
stead the rhetoric of conciliation.
Videla's feelings on this score, however, are
not universally shared by his military colleagues.
A number of officers are known to .favor still more
arrests and stiffer punishment of Peronist leaders,
as well as the complete and irrevocable dismantling
of the labor movement. Such officers oppose not only
Videla's soothing rhetoric, but occasional, tentative
efforts to open a dialogue with selected leaders of
labor and other groups, and indications of such at-
tempts have become less frequent.
The resolution of this difference of opinion
is not in sight, and it is by no means certain that
Videla and his supporters will prevail. The Presi-
dent may be trying to neutralize some of the officers
who in a variety of areas favor tougher, more punitive
measures. If he succeeds in this, he may be able to
initiate a process of *genuine political conciliation
with broad sectors of the populace. If he does not,
widespread disaffection may be generated which could
only complicate life for the iunta and make its goals
harder to achieve. 3.5(c)
August 25, 1976
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