COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE SOUTHERN CONE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06626709
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2019
• Case Number: F-2016-02161
• Publication Date: May 9, 1977

Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06626709
9 May 1977
SUBJECT: Counterterrorism in the Southern Cone
crib,
The security forces of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,
and Uruguay have for some time engaged in a formalized exchange of
information on leftist terrorists. Moreover, these governments jointly
carry out operations against subversives...on each other's soil. This
effort, dubbed "Operation Condor", is not publicly known. One aspect of
the program involving Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina envisages illegal
operations outside Latin America against exiled terrorists, particularly
in Europe. Because the existence of Condor is known to.foreign security
services, such activities have so far been frustrated. The extent of
cooperation in Condor is unusual in Latin America, even though the exchange
of intelligence information.by governments facing a common problem is a
routine practice throughout the world.
� The military-controlled governments of the Southern Cone all consider
themselves targets of international Marxism. Having endured real and
perceived threats from leftist terrorists, these governments lelieve that
the very foundations of their societies are threatened. most cases,
government leaders. seek to be selective in the pursuit and apprehension of
suspected subversives, but control over Security forces generally is not
tight enough to prevent innocents from being harmed or mistreated.
Cultural and historical developments in the region go a long Oay toward
explaining, if not justifying, the often harsh methods. In Hispanic law, .
for. instance, a suspect is presumed guilty until proven innocent. In
addition, most Latin American constitutions have provisions Tor states
of seige or other emergency clauses which greatly increase the governments'
powers of arrest, detention, and censorship,
There is a long history of bilateral efforts to control subversion
in the Southern Cone countries. The regional approach eventually formalized
in Condor, however, apparently was endorsed in early 1974 when security
officials from all of the member countries, except Brazil, agreed to.
establish liaison channels and to facilitate the movement of security
officers on government business from one country to the other. --*
- Among the initial aims of Condor was the exchange of information on
the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR), an organization believed to
consist of representatives of terrorist groups from Bolivia, Uruguay,
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06626709
Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay. The JCR coordinates activities
and provides propa:Janda and logistical support for its memher!... The Junta
has representatives in Europe, and they are believed to have been involved
in the assassinations in Paris of the Bolivian ambassador to France last
May and an Uruguayan military attache in 1974. The attache had been
involved in the successful campaign to suppress Uruguay's terrorist Tupamaros,
a member group of JCR.
Condor's overall campaign against subversion reportedly was inten-
sified last summer when members gathered in Santiago to organize more
detailed, long-range plans. Decisions included:
-- The development of a basic computerized data bank in
Santiago. All members will contribute information on
known or suspected terrorists.
Brazil agreed to provide gear for "Condortel" - the
group's communications network.
The f;asic mission of Condor teams to be sent overseas reportedly was
"to liquidate" top-level terrorist leaders. Non-terrorists-also were
reportedly candidates for assassination; Uruguayan opposition politician
Wilson Ferreira, if he should travel to Europe, and some leaders of
Amnesty Internation .,.;ere mentioned as targets, _Ferreira may have been
removed from the list, however, because he is considered to.have good
contacts among US congressmen. A training course was held in.Ruenos Aires
for the team heading overseas. More recently Condon leaders were con-
sidering the dispatch of a team to London -- disguised as businessmen --
to monitor ''suspicious activity" in Europe. Another proposal under study
included the collection of material on the membership, location, and
political activities Of human rights groups in order to identify and expose
their socialist and Marxist connections. Similar data reportedly are to
be collected on church and third-world groups.� �
Evidence, although not conclusive, indicates that cooperation among
security forces in the Southern Cone extends beyond legal methods. Last
May, for example, armed men .ransacked the offices of the Argentine Catholic
Commission on Immigration and stole records containina information on
thousands of refugees and immigrants. The Argentine police did not
investigate the crime -- a signal that Latin refugees, principally from
Chile and Uruguay were no longel welcome. A month "later, 24 Chilean and
Uruguay refugees, many of whom were the subjects of commission files, were
kidnapped and tortured. After their release, some of the refugees insisted
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06626709
their interrogdtors were security officers from Chile and Uruguay.. A
number of UruguJyans were held in Buenos Aires last summer for two weeks
and then flown to Montevideo in an Uruguayan plane. Uruguayan military
officers offered to spire them their lives if they would agree to .allow
themselves to be 'captured" by authorities -- as if they were an armed
group attempting to invade the country. MOreoVer, two prominent political
exiles in Argentina were killed under mysterious circumstances.
Condor also is engaged in non-violent activities, including
psychological warfare and a propaganda campaign These programs heavily
use the media to publicize crimes and atrocities committed by terrorists.
By appealing to national pride and the national conscience, these programs
aim to secure the support of the citizenry in the hope they will report
anything out of the ordinary in their neighborhoods. Propaganda campaigns
are constructed so that one member country publishes information useful to
another -- without revealing that the beneficiary was in fact the source_
For example, Bolivia and Argentina reportedly are planning to launch a
campaign against the Catholic Church and other religious groups that
allegedly support leftist movements.. Bolivia will collect information on
the groups and then send it to Argentina.for publication.
The Condor communications system uses both voice and teletype.
Member countries communicate via radio and each is required to maintain
an open channel
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Condor suffers from some organizationa
inefficiency, but this factor has not inhibited its overall effectiveness.
Condor has tiohtened security measures (b)(1)
Security has been strengthened at Condors operations center (b)(3)
in Buenos Aires, and compartmentation has been.increased. in addition,
once a Condor member has declined to participate in an operation, he-ii-bvi)
excluded from all further details of that particular plan. Hence, 1e5)1()
active members, such as Paraguay and Bolivia ()(3)
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may not be aware of many operations.
Outside the Condor umbrella, bilateral cooperation between-other -
security organizations in the region also is strong.--For-example,
intelligence organizations in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile work together
closely. Each security organization assigns advisers to the other countri
primarily to identify subversives in exile.
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06626709