FORECAST OF IMPENDING DEVELOPMENTS IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06626222
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-02132
• Publication Date: June 7, 1979

Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626222
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON,_D.C. 20505
19/X1 FA
/111( If0
National Intelligence Officers
1 June 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
FROM Acting NIO for Latin America
SUBJECT � Forecast of Impending Developments in Nicaragua
1. This.memorandum contains my judgement on the
of events in Nicaragua over the next 18 months or.so-
03 :77
ding
2. The political ferment and violence in Nicaragua is leading to
an overthrow of the government which, unlike palace revolutions in Bolivia,
Peru, and Argentina, will be a true revolution in the sense that virtually
all social and political structures will be changed radically when the
dust settles.
3. While there may be some effort to hold elections in an attempt
to establish a representative government after Somoza is ousted, in my
judgement, this would fail because of the intensity of popular feelinas
that all vestiges of the Somoza regime must be abolished.
4. I believe that a revolutionary council would be established
headed by "Commandant Zero" or one of the other insurgent leaders. The
National Guard would doubtless be disbanded and replaced by a revolutionary
army with the responsibility for preventing foreign incursions from .
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, or elsewhere, and to maintain internal
order.
5. I anticipate that all private enterprises would be nationalized,
probably without compensation. The Revolutionary Council would then set.
about establishing A government bearing a strong resemblance to that
established by Fidel Castro after the overthrow of Batista.
6. A revolutionary court would go through the motions of trying
Somoza and those members of the Somoza regime and the oligarchy who remained
in Nicaragua, finding them guilty of crimes against the Nicaraguan people,
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be expelled from the country and forced to leave behind all their valuables.
Some might be tried and imprisoned for supporting Somoza.
7. Early after its establishment, the new regime would recognize Cuba
and probably invite Fidel Castro to visit the country. It would condemn the
US for its long history of support to the Somoza regime, but would probably
heed Castro's advice not to alienate the US totally. Castro would doubtless
-offer to send technicians to Nicaragua to assist the new government in
getting established and offer advisors to assist in forming the army and
the security forces. These offers of Cuban assistance would be accepted
with alacrity.
8. Insurgents' success in ousting Somoza and replacing him with a
revolutionary/socialist government would stimulate restive forces in
El Salvador to take similar action against the Romero government and the
so-called "14 families" which control the economy of El Salvador. It
would likely also have profound repercussions in Guatemala where the Cuban-
backed Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) has harrassed the government of
President Lucas. While I do not anticipate that the EGP would succeed in
overthrowing Lucas, its insurgent activity would add to the malaise of
the region.
9. The foreign beneficiary of all this would be Cuba and, indirectly,
the Soviet Union, both of which would view the events as an erosion of US
influence in the Western Hemisphere. The USSR would stay in the shadows
but provide Cuba with any support it needed.
10. Omitted from the above scenario is any action the United States
or other nations might take to prevent this eventuality. Without dis-
cussing the various options available, which would require a much longer
paper than this, it is my considered opinion that none ou1d-do.niore than
to slow down or temporarily derail the train of events.
Distribution:
1 - DD/NFA
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1 - C)
1 - NION
2 - NIO/LA
1 - NFAC Reg
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