CUBA-NICARAGUA: SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN INSURGENCIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06626219
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-02132
• Publication Date: June 20, 1980

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
20 June 1980
MEMORANDUM
Cuba-Nicaragua: Support for Central American InsurgenciPs (U)
Summary
Revolutionary unity and solidarity emerged as major themes in
Central America during the past month, highlighted by the decision of
Guatemala's pour main insurrectional groups--at Wan urging--to form a
united front. Castro reportedly repeated the promises of greater finan-
cial aid and training�though still short of direct arms shipmente--that
he used successfully several years ago to resolve differences within
Nicaragua's Sandinist movement. The Guatemalan revolutionaries' "unity"
declaration, however, seems at this juncture to represent more hope than
reality, since--as they theizsevea acknowledae--thare are still eignif-
cant obstacles to overcome.
Information from a number of reports and sources, although
scattered and fragmentary, tends to confirm the existence of land, sea,
and air "routes" for arms shipments through Nicaragua to El Salvador
but Managua 'a involvement remains veiled and deniable.
This memorandum was requested by the National Security Adviser to
the President. It responds to specific questions and is not intended to
be an analysis of the overall relationship between Cuba-Nicaragua and
Central America. It was prepared by the Latin America Division of the
Office of Political Analysis under the direction of the National Intelli-
gence Officer for Latin America, and coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the Office of Strategic Research. Information in this
memorandum reflects information available through 15 June 1980.
PA-M-80-10282C
SC-01806-80
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Guatemala
At a mid-May meeting in Havana, the Guerrilla Army of
the Poor (EGP), the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA).
the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the dissident faction of
the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) agreed to enter into a
"popular and democratic front," which at the moment is
probably little more than a loose working alliance among the
guerrilla groups. (See 15 April 1980 memorandum, pp. 7-8,
for reports on earlier Cuban efforts to bring these organiza-
tions together.)
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organization is called the Coordinator for he Revolutionary
Forces for the Liberation of Guatemala. (S
Fidel Castro's personal role in bringing about even
this much unity among the guerrilla organizations is detailed
in reports from other sources. At the Havana meeting, for
example, the Cuban leader is said to have offered the groups
both training and funds to purchase arms. He explained that
he could not undertake direct shipment of arms to Guatemala
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because of the politica1 damage to Cuba if it were discovered.
(S
In regard to the training, Castro is alleged to have
acknowledged that 250 Guatemalan revolutionaries from ORPA,
FAR, and the EGP were now in Cuba, and he offered to accept
an additional 50 from the PGT dissidents. The group is said
to be selecting its first 25 candidates, who reportedly will
travel to Cuba via Nicaragua for the training, which is
supposedly to last at least six weeks. (S
Castro also urged the dissidents to establish a perma-
nent representative in Havana, as other radical leftist
groups had done, as this would give the dissidents a chance
to "meet comrades from all over the world and. . . appeal
to them for help." The dissidents reportedly have decided
to hold the offer in abeyance, however, largely because
their political commission could not agree on a candidate.
(S
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Apparently feeling considerable urgency about the
situation in Central America, and in Guatemala especially,
Castro reportedly said that "the time for words, for poli-
tics, was past, the fight is here and now." The Cuban
leader explained that the pressure to have "revolutionaries"
trained and in place as soon as possible arises from several
factors. One is his feeling that there is an imminent
threat to the position of President Lucas, who Castro be-
lieves should be kept in office because he is "stupid" and
is alienating the Guatemalan people. Another element is the
possibility that the US would recognize what is happening
and become directly involved. (S
Moreover, the revolutionaries are concerned about the
recent announcement in Paris by Guatemalan political exiles
that they had formed a so-called Patriotic Liberation Front.
This supposedly broad coalition, which has so far received
scant support from anti-government groups in Guatemala,
was considered by the guerrillas to be a preemptive effort
that threatens the "correct road of armed revolution."
(S
Despite Castro's urgings, and the 'public pledge of the
four guerrilla groups to strive to overcome their differences,
their announced unity seems fragile. Even the declaration
published by Prensa Latina on 26 May acknowledged that the
four groups "still had problems to solve." Aside from the
personal jealousies and conflicting ambitions of the various
leaders, the main stumbling blocks reportedly. are:
--What groups and sectors should be included in the
political Broad Front (Frente Amplio) the revolu-
tionaries want to form, and what role this Frente
should play.
--Whether or not the guerrilla groups should try
to "win over" younger and supposedly more reform-
minded of ficexs in the Guatemalan military.
(S
Threaz13:acriais...s.
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