NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TOPICS OF CURRENT INTEREST

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06626215
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-02132
• Publication Date: April 6, 1982

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6 APR Me
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TOPICS OF
CURRENT INTEREST .
. July - December 1981
TCS 2285-82/2
Series B
Copy of 25
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LATIN AMERICA
29. What is the outlook for instability and insurgency in Central America and
especially in Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica? How vulnerable are Mexico and
Haiti to instability or insurgency? How extensive is the Soviet or Cuban role in Central
American insurgencies and to what extent can those insurgencies threaten existing
regimes without direct Soviet or Cubcst assistance?
Central America's continuing slide toward instability probably will accelerate over
the next year or so. The flow of weapons and trained guerrillas into the region from
Nicaragua, Cuba, and other Communist countries is accelerating the exploitation of
economic and social conditions already receptive to revolutionary growth.
�In Honduras, the new civilian government will face mounting
political and social challenges because of IMF-mandated
spending cuts that are reducing funds for the military and for
social programs. The Honduran economy has also been hurt by
the spillover of insurgency and terrorism and the attendant
loss of capital. We do not expect the onset of an active
insurgency soon, but the chance that border clashes with
Nicaragua could escalate is a constant danger. There is clear
evidence of Cuban/Soviet counsel and aid to the radical left
and we need to improve coverage of extremist groups.
�In Guatemala the insurgency is likely to intensify, but we do
not believe that the guerrillas will gain sufficient strength
over the next year or so to launch warfare on the same scale
as in El Salvador.
�In Costa Rica, the ineptness of the outgoing administration,
serious economic problems, and a small-scale but
unprecedented surge of terrorism has mode the country more
vulnerable than at any time in decades. Sandinista activities
in northern Costa Rica also are a potential threat to the
regime. In addition, arms trafficking, leftist training, and
activities of the radical People's Revolution Movement have
increased. A new leftist political organization is being set up
with Cuban assistance and directed by former security
minister Echeverria. We also suspect Cuban/leftist
penetration of the Office of National Security. Nevertheless,
Costa Rica's strong democratic institutions should allow it to
weather these challenges.
During the decade of the 1980s Mexico's stability is unlikely to be threatened by
either domestic or foreign insurgents. Existing socioeconomic inequities, however, are
being worsened by the petroleum boom and over the next few years could cause the
central government serious problems. For example, while per capita income has grown
by more than 5 percent annually since 1976, average real wages are lower today than in
1976, and unemployment and underemployment remain high. On the other hand, profits,
rents, and interest are up sharply, and the incomes of the middle and upper classes are
soaring. Moreover, increased inflation is undermining savings while a slipping peso and
growing foreign debt are undercutting confidence in the government.
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Haiti's chronic economic weakness and corruption are a serious threat to stability.
We lack information, however, on the extent of domestic dissatisfaction with the
Duvalier administration and the likelihood of overt moves against it.
Haiti's disparate, weak, and disorganized exile groups are incapable of executing
action that would threaten the regime. Some have close links to Cuba and have received
assistance from Havana and Moscow, but reports on the status and intentions of most
groups is fragmentary.
Since the fall of Somoza in 1978, the Castro regime has perceived that the climate
in Central America is receptive to revolutionary upheaval. As a result, Havana has
increased virtually all types of assistance to the revolutionaries in the region, including
arms, funding, training, and counsel. Support funneled through Havana and Managua is
critical to the insurgents in El Salvador and at present is sufficient to maintain current
levels of activity. Should this assistance stop, the insurgents would over time cease to be
regime threatening. The many fundamental problems contributing to instability would
remain, however, and leftist extremists would continue to harass the government.
The 20-year-old insurgency in Guatemala the most persistent in the hemisphere,
would continue without outside assistance. The funding, training, guidance and arms
provided by Havana�and to a much lesser extent, Moscow�have helped the guerrillas
implement their current strategy of harrassment and economic sabotage. But economic
and social conditions in Guatemala have deteriorated sufficiently to continue to feed
revolutionary ferment. Although the four main groups�Guatemalan Communist Party,
the Guerrilla Army of the Poor, the Rebel Armed Forces and the Organization of the
People in Arms�formed a coalition in late 1980 under the banner of the National
Revolutionary Union, the coalition at present does not appear to be viable. However,
even though they have been very active GOG security forces have scored some telling
hits and slowed some of the activity. Reporting is available on Cuban involvement in the
activities of the radical left, and involvement of the Salvadoran left in planning
operations within Guatemala. We lack information on Guatemalan insurgent groups,
particularly their intentions and capabilites. Field stations have been instructed to give
priority attention to filling these gaps.
The USSR, while allowing Cuba to take the lead, has gradually expanded its
involvement in the insurgencies. Moscow provides funding, propaganda support, training,
and facilitates the flow of arms and supplies to local extremist groups. The Soviets can
be expected to heighten their involvement in the region whenever they believe they can
advance their interests without provoking damaging reactions from the United States.
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