GUATEMALA: SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ACTORS AND THEIR INTERACTION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06626206
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-02132
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Guatemala:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interaction
A Reference Aid
ALA 85-10099
CR 85-13566
October 1985
Copy 372
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Despite these gains and the resiliency of the insurgen-
cy, the inability of the major guerrilla groups�
described below�to overcome widespread ideological
and 1,,ersonality differences has limited their effective-
ness
lAs a
consequence, decisions on military actions generally
are uncoordinated�an insurgent failing that we be-
lieve has helped the Guatemalan military by mid-
1985 to carve back the insurgency to what we esti-
mate are about 1,500 full-time combatants, roughly
half its 1982 force level. Even though the rebels are
unlikely to reverse the momentum now favoring the
government, we nevertheless expect that they will
retain their ability to conduct urban terrorism, carry
out assassinations, and sabotage economically impor-
tant targets.
Major Insurgent Groups. The Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR), Guatemala's oldest insurgent group, was
founded in 1962 as a breakaway faction of the pro-
Moscow Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT). Although
decimated during the counterinsurgency campaign of
the late 1960s, the FAR reemerged in 1977 and now
operates principally in the remote northern depart-
ment of El Peten. Headed by the Cuban-trained Jorge
Ismael Soto Garcia, the FAR is a small but highly
effective combat force of some 400 to 500 members,
and it may be the only insurgent group to have grown
since Rios Montt initiated the country's innovative
counterinsurgency program in 1982. The resurgence
in early 1985 of insurgent activity in the Las Minas
Mountains area of eastern Zacapa Department is
probably the work of FAR guerrillas trying to exploit
the Army's thinly stretched logistic and transporta-
tion lines. The government's limited presence in the
Z,acapa area may be an added enticement for the
FAR. In similar circumstances the FAR has built
what we judge�on the basis of its apparent fore-
knowledge of troop movements and success in evading
government sweep operations�is an excellent intelli-
gence and supply network in the Peten.
Perhaps the major reason behind the FAR's relative
success, however, is its location within a sparsely
populated and economically unimportant area and the
concentration of government counterinsurgency assets
elsewhere. However, the Army's growing concern over
its continuing problems with the FAR is likely to
make this guerrilla group a major counterinsurgency
target.
that four infantry battalions�one composed of units
on rotation from other commands�are dedicated to
the Peten this year, and that tighter security measures
around Santa Elena Airbase and other militarr instal-
lations also have been noted in recent months
The Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), headed by
Ricardo Ramirez de Leon, is Guatemala's largest
insurgent group with an estimated 600 to 850 full-
time members. Originally formed by FAR dissidents
in the early 1970s, the EGP began military operations
of its own in 1975 and has been one of the most
effective of the insurgent factions because of its
emphasis on working among Guatemala's large Indi-
an population,
the
group's tactics are similar to those of other insurgent
groups. It ambushes small Army units when it can,
collects "war taxes" at makeshift roadblocks, tempo-
rarily occupies small towns and farms for propaganda
purposes, and periodically destroys selected economic
targets, such as specialized farm machinery.
The EGP emphasizes the establishment of extensive
local supply networks and the creation of a part-time
militia. Its operations focus largely on the northwest-
ern highlands area of Huehuetenango and Quiche
Departments, where it recruits among the Indian and
peasant populations. In early 1982, the EGP was in de
facto control of much of Huehuetenango Department,
where it overran a small military garrison�the first
and last such success by any insurgent group. In
response, US defense attache
shows that the Rios Montt government concentrated
its heaviest counterinsurgency effort against EGP
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"Theeeet�._
Figure 3
Insurgent Operating Areas, 1985
71 Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)
F7 Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
I-1 Revolutionary Organization of the
People in Arms (ORPA)
Extent of insurgent activity, 1982-83
All areas c/ guerrilla activity are not shown.
Guerrilla control is confined to relatively
small areas and is not shown.
sp
Kilometers
Mexic0
11:110
North ,
Pacific Ocean
BELMOPAN'
Caribbean
Sea
Honduras
0 El Salvador
SAN SALVADOR* 1---;.?
/
1.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
705875 (545493)10-85.
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strongholds during the remainder of 1982. The gov-
ernment's subsequent introduction of patrol bases in
remote areas, civilian defense units, and model vil-
lages into the highly contested area, in our judgment,
has since severely disrupted the EGP's base of support
by undercutting its ability to rely on the population
for supplies and safehaven. The EGP has retaliated by
attacking the ill-equipped and poorly trained civilian
defense patrols to demonstrate that the military can-
not protect their villages.
The Revolutionary Organization of the People in
Arms (ORPA), led by Rodrigo Asturias Amado, is
Guatemala's second-largest insurgent organization.
On the basis of US Embassy
reporting, we estimate that ORPA has 450 to
600 full-time combatants. Originally formed in 1971
as a splinter group of the FAR, ORPA did not begin
military operations until 1979, presumably using the
intervening period to establish its infrastructure and
support base among the Indian population. According
to this group's periodic publications and public pro-
nouncements, ORPA appears to be less ideologically
rigid than the other major insurgent groups. Unlike
the larger EGP, ORPA also does not advocate a
broad-based rural structure, preferring instead to
concentrate on training and equipping its cadre.
ORPA conducts its operations along the southern
edge of the Western Highlands from the Mexican
border in San Marcos Department eastward toward
the slopes of the Atitlan Volcano in Solola De art-
ment�a traditional insurgent stronghold
appeared to be recovering from its rural setbacks by
early 1985, when local press accounts show that it
briefly occupied the important resort town of Santiago
Atitlan in Solola Department and soon afterward
seized another small town in San Marcos Depart-
ment.
The dissident faction of the Guatemalan Labor Party
(PGT/D) was formed in 1978 by veteran Communist
Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar, when the party's long-
time leadership�fearing government retaliation�re-
fused to join the armed revolution. Despite being the
newest and smallest member of the insurgency, the
PGT/D, which maintains close ties to the EGP,
periodically has carried out bombings, assassinations,
and kidnappings, according to communiques issued by
the party. Cardoza, however, has failed to recruit
noticeable numbers of new adherents to the party,
probably because he has attempted to guide the
PGT/D from his sanctuary in Mexico. As a result, we
believe the group has now probably dwindled to only
several dozen diehard followers.
The orthodox Moscow-line faction of the Communist
Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT/O), which has operat-
ed underground since the mid-1950s, is led by Ricar-
do Rosales Roman. Active membership is probably
less than 200, although the party probably has some
sympathy among unionized labor. Unlike the PGT/D,
it has not yet openly adopted armed revolution and is
not a member of the insurgent alliance.
the PGT/O is attempting to outfit a
small armed contingent suggests, however, that party
leaders may have finally succumbed to the longtime
pressures from members of the rebel alliance and
their supporters in Havana, Managua, and Moscow to
have them join the struggle.
ORPA's reliance on small, well-trained units�a fac-
tor that reduces its vulnerability to penetration�thus
far has allowed it to escape entrapment by the
military. In contrast to 1983, however, when insurgent
and military communiques alike show ORPA guerril-
las were responsible for some of the most damaging
attacks against the government, large-scale sweeps by
the Army in San Marcos Department in mid-1984
seriously hurt this guerrilla group
ORPA's ability to conduct
urban terrorist operations was severely damaged in
early 1984 after counterterrorist raids by government
security forces decimated the leadership of three other
small terrorist groups and forced ORPA to withdraw
its urban units to the countryside. Even so, ORPA
a small dissident
group of young militants, in an action similar to the
PGT/D breakaway in 1978, split with Rosales and
other party leaders in January 1984�again over the
issue of armed insurrection. Although the small mili-
tant faction is disorganized, it could later rejoin the
party if efforts to form a military arm prove success-
ful.
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Searching for Unity: The URNG. The Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) was formally
established in Havana in February 1982 and publicly
proclaimed to exercise joint command and control
over all Guatemalan guerrilla forces, much as the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
attempts in El Salvador. Despite
pressure over the years from its Cuban and Nicara-
guan patrons to unify�including periodic threats of
an arms cutoff�the URNG remains little more than
a propaganda shell. Its members�the FAR, EGP,
ORPA, and PGT/D�probably resent Havana's at-
tempts to force them to stifle their strong ideological
and personality differences to ensure continued Cu-
ban aid.
cooperation among the various insur-
gent groups may be increasing. The apparent simulta-
neity of insurgent attacks across several departments
in early 1985, for example, suggests hat some of the
actions were coordinated in advance.
the Salvadorans in the area of human rights. Thus,
they contend that they are being victimized by a
double standard, and argue that US human rights
policy has discriminated against Guatemala and cre-
ated an imbalance between the treatment received by
their country and the
the guerrillas also are now
carrying out limited joint operations in some areas.
We believe such cooperation stems largely from the
rebels' dwindling ranks, increasing loss of popular
support, and the need to demonstrate that they re-
main a viable military threat.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
We anticipate no major shifts in the positions of the
key political actors and groups discussed in this paper
over the near term. Moreover, we expect Guatemala's
policymaking process on major issues will continue to
be based on broad, enduring national values that
historically have colored the country's outlook toward
the United States.
Guatemalans believe, for example, that size, popula-
tion, and relative economic and military strength
entitle Guatemala to a preeminent role in Central
America. Contributing to this sense of national pride
is the awareness that Guatemala's military successes
against leftist guerrillas have taken place without US
military aid. Guatemalans also do not view themselves
as having any worse a record than the Hondurans or
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The resulting "go it
alone" attitude and resentment of the United States
color Guatemala's policy perspective, and in our
opinion, is reflected in an ambivalent willingness to
cooperate with Washington, particularly among mili-
tary leaders.
Regardless of who wins the election, we believe that
Guatemalans regard the US role in influencing their
country's political fate as crucial and that they want
to deal directly with Washington on a multitude of
bilateral and regional issues. In this regard, we expect
that centrist-oriented groups will seek moral and
material support from Washington as a means of
obtaining and sustaining leverage with the Guatema-
lan armed forces. Although we believe that obtaining
US economic and developmental assistance will be
given the highest priority by the new government,
virtually all of Guatemala's announced presidential
candidates have at one time or another proclaimed
their sunoort for more than a
These same leaders are quick to add,
however, that the renewal of such aid must be contin-
gent on a continuation of the democratization process.
The military establishment is likely to be anxious
about its future no matter what the outcome of the
presidential election. We believe that many officers
are deeply concerned that a DCG victory might bring
reprisals against them for past abuses, or that the
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Army's ability to conduct its counterinsurgency pro-
grams will be seriously curtailed by a civilian-led
government. Still others fear any outcome�for exam-
ple, a Sandoval victory�that might jeopardize US
aid. The military, in our view, is overwhelmingly
compelled by the need to shed its role of international
pariah in order to pave the way for increased military
and economic assistance. As a result, it will continue
to try to adhere to its pledged neutrality in the
contest, and�unless its institutional prerogatives are
severely threatened�will honor the vote's outcome.
While the military and the key parties are working
toward a smooth transition to civilian rule, the poten-
tial for violence during the presidential campaign
appears greatest from groups that occupy both ex-
tremes of the political spectrum. The guerrillas proba-
bly are fearful that a successful election in November
will bring increased levels of
further jeopardizing their prospects. As
a result, we expect that Guatemala's various guerrilla
organizations may attempt to carry out more wide-
spread ambush and harassment operations designed to
lower voter turnout and discredit the election
we
believe further that the 1984 Constituent Assembly
election caused an active debate within some armed
factions about whether or not to continue the armed
struggle. If, as is likely, the insurgents are unable to
disrupt the vote, these ideological fissures almost
certainly would widen, thus further weakening the
insurgency.
The left's perspective is closely mirrored by many
elements of the Guatemalan right, which see a victory
by the left�either by force of arms or at the ballot
box�as totally unacceptable. As the political opening
grows and activism from all sectors increases, the
potential for violent action by the right against politi-
cal figures, labor leaders, university professors, and
others could escalate as rightwing extremists try to
limit the gains and slow the momentum of their
reform-minded competitors. Such an occurrence, in
our judgment, would seriously jeopardize the democ-
ratization process and set back progress made by the
current military regime in improving Guatemala's
image at home and abroad.
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