LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06626201
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-02132
• Publication Date: January 15, 1988

Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626201
Directorate of
Intelligence
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Latin America
Review
15 January 1988
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ALA LAR 88-003
15 January 1988
Copy 454
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Thtefet,...
Guatemala: Counterinsurgency
Operations
Two offensives in the western highlands by the
Guatemalan Army since late September have
disrupted insurgent supply lines and civilian support
networks, kept the guerrillas off balance, and denied
the rebels security in their traditional strongholds.
The unprecedented use of task forces has improved
the military's ability to control and coordinate
multibattalion operations over large areas.
Nevertheless,, the Army has encountered some
problems. The commitment of nearly one-fourth of its
combat battalions has strained resources, task forces
have been hamstrung by logistic difficulties, and
many patrols have displayed poor tactical procedures.
Neither offensive probably can be sustained beyond
March, increasing the importance of consolidating
gains through a continued military presence and more
effective civil action programs to prevent a resurgence
of guerrilla activity
In September, the military launched simultaneous
campaigns against insurgent strongholds in the
western and northwestern highlands.
the operations were
planned more than two years ago, when the high
command prioritized the various insurgent threats.
The General Staff had hoped to begin the first of
three planned offensives�one against each of the
Guatamalan rebel groups�in January 1986, but
repeatedly postponed it because of insufficient logistic
support. The Army, meanwhile, managed to contain
the guerrillas in the sparsely populated highlands,
and in the northern
jungle. Throughout this time, the military bolstered
its presence in the insurgent areas with civic action
programs designed to gain the support of the local
Indian populations.
Forces and Objectives
The military has committed nearly eight of its 32.
combat battalions, organized into two task forces, to
the operations. Task Force Xancatal, involving nearly
three battalions, is operating in the Lake Atitlan area
against some 100 guerrillas of the Revolutionary
7
Guatemalan Insurgents
Government pressure on the rebels�who number some 1,200 to
1,500 full-time combatants�has restricted their attacks largely to
unpopulated areas. Battlefield reverses and a steady decline in
popular and foreign support for the guerrillas since Guatemala's
transition to civilian rule in January 1986 have led to debates
among rebel leaders about strategy. The insurgents' proposals for a
formal dialogue, which President Cerezo has refused unless the
rebels lay down their arms and accept amnesty, reflect their
concern that their military prospects are waning.
Factions
Leaders and
Strengths
Area of Activity
Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR)
Jorge Ismael
Soto Garcia 400
to 500 members
Northern Guatemala
Guerrilla Army of
the Poor (EGP)
Ricardo Ramirez Northwestern
de Leon 600 to Guatemala
800 members
Revolutionary
Organization of the
People in Arms
(ORPA)
Rodrigo Asturias Southwestern
Amado 450 to Guatemala
650 members
Guatemalan
Communist Party/
Orthodox Faction
(PGT/0)
Ricardo Rosales
Roman fewer
than 200,
unarmed
Ties to urban labor
Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), who
have been active laying mines, harassing civilian
traffic, and assassinating local government officials.
Task Force Kaibil Balam, involving five battalions, is
facing a force of approximately 250 rebels and 200
additional supporters of the Guerrilla Army of the
Poor (EGP)�which
the Army considers its most important target. The
attache reports that both task forces are assigned to
locate and destroy guerrilla forces, disrupt supply
ALA LAR 88-003
15 January 1988
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Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626201
Guatemala: Rural Civic Action
The Guatemalan military believes that its civic
action programs are crucial to gain Indian support
and undercut the guerrillas.
ivic action, coupled with the military's
operations, as been successful in reducing local
support for guerrillas in the task force areas.
The mainstay of civic action has been the "poles of
development" program in the northern highlands�
initiated by the Army several years ago�which has
attracted thousands of Indians to government-
sponsored villages over the last few years. The
program is considered particularly important in the
northwest, where 45,000 Indian refugees who are
living across the border in Mexico are an important
source of supply for the guerrillas. The villages,
however, are often surrounded by poor land, and
there are no markets in the area to support large
populations. Moreover, the Army is hard pressed to
supply food and medicine, given its own logistic
difficulties and government funding is extremely
limited.
lines, and occupy rebel-held villages. In the past,
counterinsurgency operations have been more diffused
and limited in their objectives
The organization of these task forces was intended to
improve command and control.
by allowing one commander to
control battalions from several different military
zones to concentrate their strength against specific
rebel forces. Past operations had generally been
limited to efforts within particular zones, with only
occasional coordination between zone commanders for
maneuvers along common borders
Tactical Successes
Sustained search-and-destroy missions by both task
forces have kept the guerrillas off balance. Rebel
supply lines have been seriously disrupted
and the Army has maintained
the tactical initative. Using company-sized units that
ThttreL,
have denied the rebels any numerical advantages in
clashes, Guatamalan troops have been patrolling
throughout the rebel areas and have uncovered
numerous camps, arms caches, and field hospital sites.
EGP and ORPA forces have been forced to move
continuously; their
control over "liberated" areas has been sharply
reduced.
The offensives have also uprooted guerrilla support
networks in the remote highlands.
the Army has confiscated about 75
percent of the EGP's harvest and has distributed it
among the indigenous population. This has not only
weakened the guerrillas but has improved the Army's
relations with the Indians, who have historically
distrusted Guatemalan forces and supported the
guerrillas. The Army has tried to consolidate its gains
with roadbuilding and assistance programs for
Indians within the areas of operation. With the loss of
their "liberated" areas, both the EGP and ORPA
have lost considerable prestige.
While trying to avoid major clashes with superior
government forces, the guerrillas have put up stiff
resistance to protect key base areas. For the most
part, they have preferred to ambush military patrols
only when they enjoy the advantage of terrain or
numbers. that the most
persistent resistance has occurred near the northern
villages of Caba and Amachel, which were EGP
strongholds. Intense fighting in this area has
contributed to significant casualties for Task Force
Kaibil-34 dead and 53 wounded by the end of
November The
Army feels confident that the guerrillas suffered
substantial casualties as well, but their losses cannot
be verified because the insurgents carry off their dead
and wounded.
We believe the two offensives have significantly
reduced the capabilities of both the EGP and ORPA
in the western highlands. The occupation of their
traditional bases has greatly diminished their political
control over those regions and denied them the use of
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"liberated" areas from which to launch ambushes and
sabotage attacks against government targets. The
that the rebels were surprised
by the offensives and that their confidence has been
badly shaken. The campaign also disrupted insurgent
plans. The EGP, for example, had intended to launch
its own offensive but instead had to retreat to jungle
hideouts to escape Task Force Kaibil.
both task forces are continuing to
choke guerrilla supply lines
and trails prior to movement, and poor security
practices during marches make them more vulnerable
to ambushes.
has helped the
rebels stage ambushes and evade sweeps. While the
that artillery and air
support has been adequate, a senior Guatemalan
officer told him that patrols are often reluctant to call
for available fire support. Furthermore, the senior
officer criticized patrols for failing to react
aggressively to ambushes.
Some Operational Problems
Despite these successes, sustaining simultaneous
campaigns has strained the Army's manpower and
materiel resources. have
noted that soldiers are tired, their boots are lasting
only 30 days�forcing them to pack sneakers�and
their old Galil rifles have worn chambers, reducing
the accuracy of their fire. The General Staff, because
of the relative quiet in the rest of the country, has
rotated fresh troops into the areas of operation to
retain the momentum.
the Army can maintain such a high pace of
operations only until March or April before
exhausting its resource base.
The military has had problems providing adequate
logistic support for the task forces, which are
operating in remote areas at the end of the Army's
supply line. The terrain is rugged, transport vehicles
are limited, and helicopter support is severely
constrained, making
resupply and troop transport difficult. Maintenance
problems have often kept two-thirds of the Army's 33
helicopters grounded. Some soldiers have gone
without food for days
and, without helicopter transport, troop movements
have been more susceptible to rebel ambushes.
Outlook
intends to press its advantage regardless of such
difficulties. The continuing use of task forces will help
to concentrate and coordinate forces in critical areas
and keep pressure on the guerrillas, in our view. In
addition, the Army's assistance to the Indian
population in these regions should help to undermine
the legitimacy of the guerrillas.
Nevertheless, logistic problems, poor tactical
execution, and continuing socioeconomic difficulties
in the highlands are likely to prevent the Army from
ending the EGP and ORPA insurgencies. We believe
the Army will be forced to decrease the scale of
operations and focus on consolidating its gains by
maintaining a military presence for security and
gaining more funding for civic action programs. The
Army is unlikely to begin a planned major offensive
against a third rebel force�the Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR)�which operates in the remote Peten region
until it has pacified the western highlands. We believe
the Army will continue to press the government to
seek more military aid from the United States to help
alleviate logistic problems
has sometimes resulted in
unnecessary casualties and failure to exploit
opportunities. For example, Army patrols' frequent
use of the same routes, failure to reconnoiter roads
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