ANTICIPATING STRATEGIC-LEVEL SURPRISE

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06606667
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 75
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-02397
• Publication Date: January 1, 2013

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UNCL-mooiricutiry uoc VINILT
IF
INTELLIGENCE IN FOCUS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Strategic-Levelting
� Surprise
JANUARY 2013
CIA-DI-12-01775
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS FOR PRACTICAL USE
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UNCLASSIFIL 01-1-1LAHL UJt.UIMLY
Anticipating
Strategic-Level
Surprise
JANUARY 2013
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS FOR PRACTICAL USE
This assessment was prepared by the Office of Russian
and European Analysis. It may contain copyrighted material that is
for official use only. Further reproduction or dissemination of that
material is subject to copyright restrictions. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Eurasia and Regional Dynamics
Issue Manager, OREA,
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fable Of Contents
Key Findings
Scope Note
Anticipating
Strategic-Level Surprise:
1
Analytic
Frameworks for Practical Use
Introduction: Anticipating
1
Discontinuities
�Why It Is Hard
1
A Typology of Surprise�An Aid
to Early Recognition
Type I Surprise: Sudden Hostile Action
7
7
Subtypes and Examples of
Sudden Hostile Action
14
Barriers to Early Perception
of Type I Surprise
17
Aids To Anticipating
Type I Surprise
Stealthy Surprise? Sudden
Hostile Actions Using Novel Methods
74
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Type II Surprise: System Shock
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Subtypes and Examples of
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System Shock
Barriers to Early Perception of
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Type II Surprise
Aids To Anticipating
34
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Type II Surprise
Daisy Chains of System Shocks
38
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Type III Surprise: Tectonic Transformation
39
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Subtypes and Examples
39
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of Tectonic
Transformation
Barriers to Early Perception of
42
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Type III Surprise
42
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Aids To Anticipating
Type III Surprise
"Epiphanies" as Clarifiers of Type
44
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III Change
�The Case of the Atomic Bomb
Techniques Helpful in Anticipating
46
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All Types of
Surprise
for Analysts
48
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Resources
Appendix A: Alternative Ways of
49
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Categorizing
Surprise
Appendix B: Academic Resources on Surprise
51
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Appendix C: Unclassified IC Training Aids
56
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Table Of Contents
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Key Findings
Anticipating strategic-level surprises�the sudden outbreaks of wars,
revolutions, genocides, or economic calamities that affect core US interests�remains
the hardest task for Intelligence Community (IC) analysts. Such surprises can include
sudden hostile actions targeted at the United States or its allies, as well as unexpected
developments�such as the sudden fall of a government�that are not aimed at the
United States but that directly or indirectly affect US interests, for good or ill. A review
of the many strategic-level surprises that have befallen all the major powers since
the onset of World War II indicates recurring patterns of surprise, including in the
following areas:
The three types of events that tend to surprise us.
The barriers to early perception and warning of these various types
of surprise.
The approaches and tools that can assist early recognition and warning of
looming surprises (see figure 1).
Type I. Sudden Hostile Action. This type of surprise involves abrupt,
deliberate action by a unified actor�an armed force, a state, a terrorist cell, or a radical
group�intended to disorient, defeat, or destroy an unprepared opponent. Typically
concentrated in space and time, subtypes of such actions include surprise attacks,
coups, diplomatic surprises, strategic power plays, military-technological surprises, or
the initiation or escalation of major human rights abuses.
Type II. System Shock. This type of surprise involves the abrupt failure
or transformation of a complex system or set of systems, such as a state, an empire,
an economy, or an international organization or alliance. The action in system shock
can occur in weeks, months, or years, but it still represents a dramatic acceleration
in the rate of change from the previous status quo. Type II surprises are the result of
human actions but not the result of a master plan executed by any one controlling actor.
Subtypes of such shocks include the popular overthrow of a ruler, the failure of a state,
the onset of a genuine revolution, a deep recession or hyperinflation, the breakdown of
an alliance or international body, or the outbreak of widespread communal violence.
Type III. Tectonic Transformation. This type of surprise often includes
sweeping nonlinear changes to an entire domain or region, such as a continental
economy or a regional military balance. Unlike the first two types of surprise, it does
not involve sudden, obvious change but rather large-scale, cumulative evolutionary
changes that transform with gathering momentum the entire domain over a period of
years or decades�along with the strategic, political, and economic systems therein.
Subtypes include industrial and technological revolutions, the rise of new powers; the
birth of new ideological and social movements or the transformation of existing ones, or
revolutions in military affairs.
These transformations disrupt the status quo, force leaders and institutions
to respond, punish maladaptive systems, and often lead to further discontinuities of
all types.
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ome barriers to early recognition of looming dangers are internal to
intelligence agencies. These barriers include:
IC organizational barriers to information sharing and learning; pressures for
group consensus and "clean story lines," which tend to limit discussion of nonlinear
or unlikely outcomes; analysts' mind-sets, biases, and cognitive limits, which weaken
their ability to anticipate discontinuous changes; and a reluctance to warn for fear of
crying wolf, of being wrong, of upsetting the group consensus, or of riling superiors.
The following approaches, tools, and concepts may help analysts to surmount
the barriers to early recognition and warning of looming discontinuities, even in cases
where actionable intelligence reporting is wanting.
These methods are intended to supplement�not replace�substantive
expertise and sound tradecraft. Indeed, they will work most effectively when
employed by teams of analytic experts.
Sudden Hostile Action. Analysts can better anticipate sudden hostile action
by familiarizing themselves with the strategic patterns that tend to be more conducive to
surprise and by rigorously examining the incentives and motivations for would-be hostile
actors, including by:
dentifying historical patterns of sudden hostile action drawn from case
studies of precedents that may be analogous to current strategic circumstances in
some significant aspects.
Evaluating how closely current situations align with the preconditions for
surprise identified in scholarly literature on intelligence and strategic surprise.
Getting into the heads of would-be hostile actors to assess their calculus
for considering surprise in analytically sophisticated ways that avoid mirror imaging,
rational actor assumptions, or caricatures.
Conducting simulations, war games, and exercises to identify possible
situational incentives and,pressures on adversaries to strike suddenly.
Monitoring the rhetoric and vocabulary of foreign actors for signs that they
are losing patience with the status quo, heralding their readiness for drastic remedies,
or mobilizing followers to prepare them for sacrifice and violence.
) Brainstorming the vulnerabilities of would-be victims of sudden hostile
action, via such methods as intelligence prennortems and defensive casing�critically
surveying one's own defenses to assess blue force weak points, critical targets,
and readiness.
System Shock. IC analysts can supplement intelligence reporting on the
systems and networks that they are responsible for�states, alliances, insurgencies, or
economies�with concepts and approaches that bolster anticipation of the possibilities
for rapid, discontinuous change, including by:
Assessing the strengths and vulnerabilities of an entire system to better
anticipate system shifts and tipping points; applying some basic concepts from the
study of complex adaptive systems�including feedback loops, emergence, herd
behavior, nonlinearity, or butterfly effects�can help.
Employing far-domain analogies from the realms of science, medicine, and
engineering�phase transitions, critical mass, contagion, perfect storm, brittleness,
or "normal accidents"�to help conceptualize sudden, dramatic departures from a
seemingly stable equilibrium in the domains of national security and economic affairs.
Widening the range of imaginable outcomes via well-crafted scenarios,
alternative futures, or simulations can help analysts avoid single-point predictions�
the bane of sound strategic foresight.
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Key Findings
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Tectonic Transformation. Tectonic transformation involves such long-term,
large-scale changes that traditional intelligence sources are of even less use than they
are in anticipating system shocks. Instead, the following techniques can help analysts
dispel the "poverty of imagination":
Adopting multiframe perspectives via outside opinions, nonmainstream
thinking, or new sources of data and information can provide insights besides those
circulating in the usual intelligence channels, challenge the conventional wisdom, and
test mainstream hypotheses.
Brainstorming the core drivers or signature technologies of national,
regional, or global systems and their variegated effects on other domains with a
diverse group of experts across disciplines can help analysts expand the range of
imaginable scenarios and boost their anticipation of transformational changes on a
large-scale.
Aids To Anticipating All Types of Discontinuities. For all types of looming
surprise, FC analysts should scrutinize anomalous events, outlier data, and incongruous
information. The initial clues of impending discontinuities�analogous to the preshocks
of an earthquake�are often isolated, irregular, and ragged, but they deserve extra
attention. Hunches prompted by anomalous data can be valuable prods for reexamining
baseline assessments.
If done on a regular basis, stability audits�analytic surveys designed
to spur respondents' thinking about evolving system dynamics, possible surprises,
existing assumptions, and key information gaps�can expose the weaknesses of
once-stable systems and the breakdown of old analytic paradigms over time.
Intelligence premortems�which postulate that an existing analytic line
is wrong�can also help the IC prevent premature closure, go beyond straight
line extrapolations, and brainstorm hypotheses that could better explain new or
discrepant data.
Integrating analysis of possible discontinuities into mainline analysis can
help IC products to address a wider range of possible outcomes.
Key Findings
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) Type I. Sudden Hostile Action
ate action by an adversary (such as a state, armed force, or
ist an unprepared target
CT
7.3
[U/ i 01 Type II. System Shock
Abrupt failure or transformation of a complex system or set of systems
(such as a state, empire, or economy)
uo] Type III. Ti
Sweeping changes in regional o
system, ideologies and religions, so
in Pearl Harbor in 1941
m Israel in the 1973 .Arab-Israeli war
11 September 2001
-ate, hostile deed by a unified actor (such as a state, armed force, 734
utionary vanguard party) aimed at disorienting, defeating, or
>?ared opponent
1:3
1:3
CD
. r
E such as the Soviet Unions blockade of Berlin fro:in-land- �
73[948 or,.its emplacement of offensive�weapons in Cubain 1962 0-
(11
2 Ise, such as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's ouster of Soviet
.1�). l972 of his yiit to Israel-in 1977
cD
�so) ation
cob-- Lion of mass human rights abases
-P- enial (secrecy, security, stealth) and deception by an
� e foe co
c) Inherent unpredictability of the tipping points that lead to nonlinear
cs)
0) fallacious rational actor assumptions I changes�the butterfly effect
c)
cs) CT
cs) of actor's commitment, risk-tolerance, or bias toward action ---- �
a)
-4 co
niation ...,- �
CT
Observer's tendency to make straight line extrapolations
Difficulty of timing the onset of a system shock
�
�
4:3)
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co
The widely distributed nature -V-
plain sight 0
The large scale of change�im
Scope, dimensions of change-
assess:Warningr:indicator0,:ori:regular�baig. � Apply., 0i4p1.0(�yate th's4rialY,0
ani/fnferfsic'as'sessinerits'of actor's inea,ns, motives, and" c4S�iblettiggefor'Catal'
�
ig,an,d;.prerrintstertis...of wealcnesses,.,'system sni
�
ys,temtliat mayiiivite.npporturiisticatt4ck
; level Of political commitment,
assess an a ,out e ort.
; asess strategic red lines � AntiCipate-prediCtable-sufprie,crige's caused -Bygysteiniirirespptisivene
.� � :-
Ltegic stability audits to identifiable -problems, .growing aiieisdefiit�'bi." to deferiordtiti"
environmental conditions ' - '
Employ far-domain analogies�such as ,Phase transitions; avalanches, or.
earthquakes�to examine possible tipping points
�
Fall of the Shah of Irariiin.1978�79"
-Collapse of tornmunigifiri-Eastern Europe and Soviet Uniiinin 1989-91
Ouster of Egyptian President HOsni Mubarak in 2011
�
China's economic transformatic
'Growth', oftivil rights, human r
Rise pf the World Wide Web, It
Emergence of political Islam
Rapid transformation of a complex system or systems�a state, economy, cr
or international organization�or the rapid failure of a maladaptive system (ari,3
empire, an alliance, or a war effort)
� � � �
� Extensive long-term changes, ft
economic systems, demographic pa
often culminating in an epiphany >
-cs
significance of change -cs
Industrial revolutions cp
-Eddnomietranaformatien
,
Emergence anew powers, dec
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'Rise or fundamental changes4ff
belief systems, such: as Marxism-I
.Ouster of a'lorigtirne-politicaLruler�
Outbreak Of'ciVitWar.of kCessionist niovernen
Outburst of communal violence
Depression,.:
Supply shock, such as the�OPEC.oil�einbargb .1.73 -74
Financial panics and hyperinflations
�
� --Growth of social movements
System complexity, chaos, and randomness
:Foster acute spns4i.v.i to anpmalous occurrnes
, ,
incongruit.ics;: anticipate in cc points
11 ff
nEkanaltiercOr.SY..ste.m. drivers, ie
ectrwith-WidellietWOrkof
ong eranalogn4histbfiC prf
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engineering;.tich a.,tectonic chatiE
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� . Apply concepts systems thin]
Fukiiyarna;�Samuel Huntington), 0(
Joseph Schnnipeter) and strategy (1
Howard, John Keegan, Paul Kenne(
'tectonic change�technological or military innovation, economic
Source: Based on a review by a senior CIA analyst of more than two dozen cases of intelligence surprise
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[mon Figure 1
A Typology of Surprise
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Cr
CA)
Abrupt, deliberate action by an adversary (such as a state, armed force, or `-- Abrupt failure or transformation of a complex system or set of systems
(A) terrorist cell) against an unprepared target (such as a state, empire, or economy)
(U/ Um Type I. Sudden Hostile Action
tuft oi Type II. System Shock
: �
� Diplomatic surprise, such as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's ouster of SOW 0-
'tar.), adviser's in 1972 or hisvisit to Israel in 1977
�
.0 Political assassination:.
CA-) .
�
Initiation,f M ha b
JaPan'S--,attacknMPearl Harbor in 1941 -
Egyo'a attack�orriarael'iri the 1973 Arab Israeli war �
The attacks Of 11 September 2901'
CT
C.a.)
[UP 1101 Type III. Tectonic Transformation'
Sweeping changes in regional or global domains (such as an interstate
system, ideologies and religions, societal mores, technology, or economy)
Abrupt, deliberate, hostile deed by a unified actor (such as a state, armed force,
terrorist cell, revolutionary vanguard party) aimed at disorienting, defeating, or
destroying an unprepared opponent
Fail 6fthe Shah of if79
Collapse of conamunisin. MEas:t,ern Europe and Soviet Union in 1989.-9i "--' � �
Oliste.1::Of Egyptian President HOSiir Mubarak in 2011
_
Rapid transformation of a complex system or systems�a state, economy,
or international organization�or the rapid failure of a maladaptive system (an
empire, an alliance, or a war effort)
CT
Cr �
Abrupt power play such as the Soviet Unions blockade of Berlin from land. �
corninunicat1onS in 1946nrits emplacement of offensive weapons in Cuba in 196 ;
. .
_
escalation o ass man rights a uses I
,---, 0
Effective use of denial (secrecy, security, stealth) and deception by an Cr � System complexity, chaos, and randomness
improvising, adaptive foe ....--��
----, � Inherent unpredictability of the tipping points that lead to nonlinear
CT �
..._.... � Mirror-imaging; fallacious rational actor assumptions 0�-) changes�the butterfly effect
....--.0
0,.) � Underestimation of actor's commitment, risk-tolerance, or bias toward action 1 � Observer's tendency to make straight line extrapolations
�6, � Failure of imagination -----.... �
nifirigt.;=, ' Monitor and reassess warning indicators on regular. basis
eonceP4/...S_'...") � 'Conduct red ceanificirenaio assessments Of actor's means ; nionyes, ariel
Approachei " opportunities to commit a sudden hostile ant. . "
Ouster of a longtime political ruler
Revolution �
Outbreak of civil War or secessionist niciyernent
Outburst of eorninunal violence-
Depression
Supply shock, such' as the OPEC odembargo of 1973-74
EFinancial panics and hyperinflations
Difficulty of timing the onset of a system shock
tfilna's economic transformation since late 1970a'
GiOwthlOf civil rights human rights movements
Rise of the World Wide Welo, Internet, surge of social e.
� �
Emergence of political Islam
_Extensive long-term changes, fundamental alterations of core technologies,
economic systems, demographic patterns, political allegiances, or ideologies�
often culminating in an epiphany, an event that exposes the sweeping scale,
significance of change
� Industrial revolutions �-�;.
Economic transform lions
Emergence of new powers, decline of old ones'
. .
� _ Rise or fundamental changes of political ideologies, religions: decay of old �
belief systenii, such is Marxism Leninism
� Growth of social Movement's
CT
(a) � The widely distributed nature of bottom-up change that is hidden in
plain sight
CT
(a)
The large scale of change�impossible for an observer to monitor in entirety
Scope, dimensions of change�too diverse, contingent to forecast accurately �
.....��� � 'Appli, complex systems an-41y* focusing on identifYin feedback I ' CT
cx.) .possible triggers, or catalysts for change. - . � . ;:'� I � ' "---"'
.---...
'1:� E Brainstorm possible black swans "wild cards Mat would impose � 0�-)
,
--, 's "
' � Defensive casing and piernortems of imaginable surprise: assess weaknesses," system shift � I
. .
-----..
0vulnerabilities in systems that May invite opportunistic attacks � - .�...., � Foster acute sensitivity to anomalous occurrences, data outliers, CT
:7-1----. F�Measure actor's level of political commitment, especially an all-out effort to "63 incongruities; anticipate inflection points ....--��
0�-) bolster capabilities; assess strategic red lines .....�.... � EAhticipate predictable surprises�crises caused by System unresponsiveriei 0)
:
...--...----� to identifiable problems, such as growing debts and deficits or to deteriorating'�', .
Cr Cr environmental conditions I
....._........-..-� .. -----....
,....�..,....--,
Employ far-domain analogies�such as phase transitions, avalanches, or CT
.....�(k). ....._.W earthquakes�to examine possible tipping points -----....
....._,
0
Do regular strategic stability audits
In most instances, the driver(s) of tectonic change�technological or military innovation, economic
xpansion, and the rise of new powers or ideologies�will be widely known. However, the scale of the change
nd its effects on states, organizations, and societies will not be comprehended because the consequences areas
Widely distributed and their ramifications for strategy and politics are not understood or anticipated.
Key Findings
Cr
(a)
Source: Based on a review by a senior CIA analyst of more than two dozen eases of intelligence e
experienced by US, British, French, Israeli, and Soviet services between 1939 and 2010.
Lii ExeninecOre system drivers, identify, signature technologies; brainstorm
their effects with Wide network of interdiiciplinarynxperts
, - , , .. ,
DCpl.:Bider analogous historic precedents�employ "Thinking in Time" .
concepts of Richard Neustadt and Ernest May � �
01 Apply most relevant far-domain analogies from science, medicine, or
engineering, Such as tectonic change, evolution
LGenerate scenarios to expand the range of imaginable future outcomes
Apply conceptsnf systems thinkers in politics (for example, Francis
.uyama, Samuel Huntington), economics (David Landes, Douglass North,
Joseph Schumpeter) and strategy (Robert Jervis, Thomas Schelling, Michael
Howard, John Keegan, Paul Kennedy)
....... �.---
...... .....
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Scope Note
The purpose of this training aid is to help IC analysts better anticipate
major discontinuities, including surprise attacks, political upheavals, major economic
dislocations, and mass human rights abuses. It assumes that clear, timely and
actionable intelligence reporting before future discontinuities will�as in historical
cases�remain the exception, rather than the rule, and that IC analytic teams will
therefore need to supplement empirically based intelligence analysis with a variety of
techniques to boost analytic anticipation of looming dangers.
This training aid seeks to help analysts understand:
The nature and properties of real-world discontinuities.
The many cognitive and organizational barriers to strategic foresight and
warning of looming discontinuities.
Methods to enhance early recognition of looming discontinuities.
The concepts offered in this training aid were drawn from a sabbatical on
intelligence surprise undertaken in 2010 by a senior analyst in the Regional Dynamics
Program, the tradecraft cell of the Office of Russia and Eurasian Analysis in CIA's
Directorate of Intelligence. The analyst conducted an in-depth study of more than two
dozen cases of intelligence surprise affecting all the great powers since the onset
of World War II across all domains�strategic, diplomatic, political, economic and
technological. The author also reviewed many of the keystone academic studies of
intelligence surprise published since the appearance in 1962 of Roberta Wohlstetter's
classic work, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, which ushered in the modern field of
intelligence studies.
This training aid focuses on practical applications and tools that analysts,
working alone or in small teams, can employ to better anticipate discontinuities,
particularly in cases where accurate, timely reporting on warning indicators is scarce.
It does not address quantitative models that Can help predict the likelihood of outlier
outcomes. It is unclassified to broaden its availability.
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Introduction
Gunmen of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad fire into the reviewing stand,
killing Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and 11 other Egyptian and foreign
officials and wounding 28 more during a military parade on 6 October 1981.
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Anticipating Strategic-Level
Surprise: Analytic Frameworks
for Practical Use
Anticipating major discontinuities�sudden
outbreaks of wars, surprise attacks, revolutions,
genocides, diplomatic reversals, or economic
calamities�remains the hardest job for Intelligence
Community (IC) analysts. Historically, the inability of
collectors and analysts to persuasively warn of looming
dangers has been the precondition for most cases of
intelligence surprise.
The purpose of this training aid is to help
IC analysts in the trenches to anticipate discontinuities
and thereby reduce the risks of future surprises and
intelligence failures.
The paper begins with a discussion of the
numerous barriers to analytic perception and warning
of major discontinuities.
It then offers a typology of intelligence
surprise, discusses three key classes of surprise
in depth, and suggests ways for IC analysts and
managers to anticipate surprise.
Introduction: Anticipating
Discontinuities�Why It Is Hard
Major discontinuities in any one domain
or geographic region are rare events. Even dynamic
open systems�the global balance of power, a regional
economy, or a political order�will usually exhibit
considerable continuity, inertia, and only incremental
changes over the short and medium terms. As a result,
most analytic accounts on a day-to-day basis will
exhibit a fair amount of orderliness, predictability, and
only modest, incremental change. Analysts seeking a
baseline understanding of their account will often treat
these "typical" periods as ones of "normalcy."
These periods of normalcy, which may have
begun long before an analyst started following an
account, will often habituate analysts to see what they
expettla-�ee�continued normalcy, defined as gradual
incremental changes in their areas of responsibility.
This tendency to expect the status quo in the near and
medium terms is compounded by cognitive habits.
Experiments from cognitive psychologists suggest that
most people have a deep-seated need to perceive the
world as orderly, comprehensible, and predictable.
� Moreover, evidence of impending
discontinuities is usually sparse and in some, cases
never appears at all. Even if such evidence is received,
it usually appears noteworthy only in hindsight.
Before the event, such clues�if they are observed
at all�tend to be obscure, irregularly timed, and
inconsistent with or even contradictory to most of the
other incoming data. Such clues often come as "weak
signals" and are hard to discern from the other "noise"
that overwhelms most analytic systems.
� As a result of these tendencies, analysts
may not be in the appropriate analytic posture for
recognizing or reacting when their account or issue
is at increasing risk of a "phase transition"�a rapid
shift from peace to war, stability to instability, order to
disorder, popular apathy to public engagement�that
is, from predictability to unpredictability.
A Typology of Surprise�An Aid to
Early Recognition
The typology of intelligence surprise discussed
in this paper is designed to help intelligence analysts
identify looming discontinuities early on. Based on
an extensive review of historical cases and academic
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Discontinuity, Surprise,
and Warning Definitions
The discussion in this paper refers to a series of related terms.
A discontinuity is a rapid increase in the rate, scale, or scope of change�or a sudden shift
in its direction�in any country or region or in any field relevant to US national interests. It can include
events targeted at US interests as well as events not aimed at the United States but that significantly affect
it, such as the sudden onset of instability in the Arab world in 2011 or the collapse of the Soviet bloc
beginning in 1989. Examples of discontinuities include the following:
� A surprise attack on the US Homeland or on US forces or targets at home or abroad.
� The sudden departure from power of a key national leader or collapse of a government for
any reason.
�r�rhe outbreak or sudden escalation of widespread human rights abuses or a genocide campaign.
Surprise is the jolt that an analyst, an intelligence service, or an unprepared government
experiences in the face of unexpected, often dangerous, new developments that confound one's
assumptions, expectations, and strategy. Examples of the jarring disorientation that can ensue as a result
of a discontinuity include the following:
The surprise attacks on France, the Soviet Union, and the United States early in World War II and
al-Qacida's attacks on US targets, starting in 1998.
The fall of the Shah of Iran in 1978-79 and the swift ousters in 2011 of President Ben Ali from
Tunisia and President Hosni Mubarak from Egypt.
The onset of the global financial crisis�with all its attendant effects on politics, society, and
strategic events worldwide�starting in 2008.
Surprise can be positive if the discontinuity is beneficial to US interests, as was the collapse
of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, even if the event is favorable
to US interests, lack of advanced notification from the IC is still a bad outcome because it leaves US
policymakers less prepared to take advantage of opportunities than they would have been if they had
been expecting it.
Warning�a core IC mission�is the clear, convincing, accurate, and timely notification
of policymakers of a threatening or potentially dangerous development. Persuasive strategic warning
convinces policymakers of the existence and gravity of the looming event. Timely warning gives
policymakers the opportunity to deliberate on the issue, decide on a course of action, and implement it
in time to avert the danger or�should it occur anyway�to mitigate the damage to US interests.
An intelligence failure is the label often given to episodes in which the IC did not provide
policymakers with adequaie warning of events�often discontinuities�that gravely damaged US
interests. Examples include the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941; the USSR's detonation of an atomic bomb
in 1949, five years before CIA weapons analysts estimated that it was possible; North Korea's invasion of
South Korea and communist China's intervention in the Korean war in 1950; the outbreaks of the Arab-
Israeli wars; the fall of friendly governments in Iraq (1958) and Iran (1978-79); the Warsaw Pact invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 1968; the Rwandan genocide in 1994; and the attacks of 11 September 2001.
In some of these cases, policymakers had, in fact, not received warnings from the IC; in
others, policymakers judged that they had not been adequately warned�as then Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger publicly claimed after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war�because the warnings that they
received were poorly sourced, ambiguous, or not emphasized repeatedly.
2
JAN 13 OREA 12-304INDD(462646)
Introduction
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writings, it breaks intelligence surprise into three types,
based on the essence and origins of that type of
surprise: sudden hostile action, system shock, and the
effects of tectonic transformation.
The goal is to improve analysts' foresight
of discontinuities by bolstering understanding of the
types, patterns, and diversity of discontinuous change,
based on previous historical examples.
Each section's accompanying matrix
examines five aspects to each of these surprise types
(see appendix A for other ways of classifying surprise).
Classic examples of that type of discontinuity.
The essence of that type of discontinuity.
Various subtype's of that discontinuity.
�
� Barriers to early perception, which can differ based
on the nature of the surprise involved.
Concrete measures that can help analysts better
anticipate discontinuities.
This typology does not imply that there is
always a clear division between the various categories
of surprise or that they only occur in isolation. In major
upheavals, multiple types of surprise are typically in play,
making the task of analysis even harder.
Foresight Based on Early Pattern
Recognition
Educating analysts about past patterns
of surprise can help them anticipate future
discontinuities. The Recognition-Primed Model
(RPM) of rapid decisionmaking�first described
in the 1980s by behavioral scientist Gary Klein�
suggests that humans by default react to new
situations by trying to put them in a more familiar
context. They do this by recognizing�based on
prior experiences and expertise�the similarities
between the current situation and past ones
with which they are familiar. Critical to this effort
is acquiring rapid situational awareness, which
can only be based on an expert's sensitivity to
relevant cues and expectations about how the
situation might evolve, derived from extensive
prior experiences with roughly similar but rarely
identical problem types. The RPM model suggests
that familiarizing analysts with past categories and
patterns of surprise can increase the speed with
which they recognize emerging crises that could
lead to future discontinuities, thereby increasing
the odds of early assessment and warning.
EIMMIVIE,MEITILIT=.q.MCMCLUMIZZYZ�71MMIL
Introduction
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The Overlapping Nature Of Surprise:
The Case Of Cuba
The events leading up to the Cuban
Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962 demonstrate the
multiple, overlapping dimensions of surprise
that frequently precipitate major crises and
geopolitical upheavals.
The long-term changes that created
the preconditions for the crisis are all examples
of Type III surprises, Tectonic Transformations.
They include the rise of the Marxist-Leninist
ideology that inspired Nikita Khrushchev
and Fidel Castro; the growth of Soviet power
in the middle of the 20th century; the onset
of the Cold War; the revolutions in physics,
engineering, and weaponry that led to the
development of ballistic missiles armed with
nuclear warheads; and the spread of radical,
anti-US nationalism in Cuba and Latin America
in the 1950s and early 1960s.
The rapid crumbling of Fulgencio
Batista's dictatorship to a radical insurgent
movement under Castro's control in late
1958 was a Type II surprise, System Shock,
that reverberated throughout Latin America
for decades.
The Soviet effort to covertly emplace
nuclear weapons in Cuba, which escalated
into the most dangerous crisis of the Cold
War, was a Type I surprise, Sudden Hostile
Action�a strategic power play that Soviet
leader Khrushchev intended as a fait accompli
to spring on the United States and the world as
soon as the missiles were operational.
Agency
T Hughes of the Defense Intelligence
gency briefs Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara and reporters in February 1963 on
US intelligence on the Soviet deployment of nuclear
weapons to Cuba and their subsequent withdrawal
in the fall of 1962.
JAN 13 OREA 12-305IND13(462647)
Introduction
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"El.5
c.)
=1
C.)
a�
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=
=1
Checklist
A Checklist on Anticipating Discontinuities in My AOR:
A 10 +1 Point Inspection Plan
Page 1 of 2
1
4
actoJp,trr,1
otivations azdf�tiiiibns for SuddenrHostile:AciroitiWho are the:ektiethe alpha
area of orisileaders who,are'fiXate to the point'
s24:Stp!.$Xif, -only via extreme are tolerant of
apabilities and Plans for Sudden Hostile Action. Are any actors�states or
subnational groups�developing the capacity for sudden hostile action? Do they now possess
such capabilities? Are any such actors making a maximal effort to acquire the means for a
strategic strike against their enemies? Are there signs or clues that they are undertaking a major
denial and deception effort to conceal these efforts?
Escalation Potential. Are there opportunities foisudd�hostile action? Are there
one or others.,s
more enduring belligerent ,
the
trategic red lines? Has a state been weakened
by internal factors or foreign pressure in ways that make it vulnerable to surprise attack? How
vulnerable are k yAOR? Do they possess single
wivalries or frozen conflicts in my AOR? Is one side growing
eaker more
desperate? What is the trend line? Are one
or more parties close breaching
points of strategic failure?
e actorsm,m
Brittleness of Key "Systems': What are the critical actors�states, organizations,
institutions, militaries�in my AOR? How adaptive are they? Are they coping with current
problems? Can they cope with added strains, novel problems, or one or more crises? What might
be driving my AOR toward System Shock or Tectonic Transformation, or constraining such
discontinuities? What are the "normal accidents" waiting to happen�involving maladaptive
states, organizations, businesses, militaries�in my AOR?
I,asek transitpolitical or financial�
ions
�
s 4-61-1 ikrei.transilafiOjia
far
ok like in myAOR? How interdependent are the key actors? How
influences�media ideological commercial�in my AOR? What
phase
utterfly effects seismic shifts�from other
(m
- transitions
anticipate_discontinuous change?
Drivers of Tectonic Transformation. What are the core system drivers, signature
technologies, principal ideologies, defining military systems in my AOR? Is my AOR
undergoing profound economic, technological, or social changes? Are there multiple tectonic
"plates" in my AOR? Are they shifting in divergent or conflicting directions? What previous
epochs or eras might my AOR current resemble? How might current times compare or contrast
to previous epochs?
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
JAN13 OREA12-551INDD(466029) (b)(3)
Introduction
5
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Checklist 1
Anticipating Discontinuities in vly AOR:
A 10 +I Point Inspection Plan [Continued) ,
Page 2 of 2
70
80
90
100
Gila-engin& Status sstnn
.. , ... ,, ,. ,,. . .
-agsdinytionOn.'14,AOR? appro ,
oinorro*AiOptetty,:innt look likeitoday;
,.4vni'dibei*rininhed,tia::the curnnlativeiwei
es can
atchan e.wi
0owledge Gaps. What are the critical variables in my AOR? What are the biggest
information gaps regarding them? What can I do now to close those gaps and/or compensate for
them? Would I know it if the situation were close to a tipping point, a sudden phase transition
from peace to war, stability to instability, state function to failure? Why or why not?
sight?" What. ar,e,:thepossiwith seismic impacts�that.mihtun
Warning. Are there looming crises or discontinuities that I should warn of now?
Do my management chain and IC peers need to be alerted? Should Tissue an "intermediate"
warning that shines a light on changing system dynamics and increased precrisis tensions in my
AOR? Who is the right audience for such a warning? What is the best way to convey a warning?
Are there opportunities for deterrent or remedial actions? What sorts of arresting graphics and
visualization aids might I employ to persuade skeptical audiences? Should I brief this problem to
my chain, IC peers, and key customers?
And Finally...
11
cStrategk:E'64;:$2136. I have the proper fdcqs on key tegi( issues ih my AOR to
eep from being blind-'sid� Is the urgent crowding out the important? Am Ltackling the
ard problems with sufficient otus4an resources? Is the need for current intelligence drivin
my focus? Am I publishing the right mix of near eT.11:1 'and tactical assessmenfs on the one
hand and ,standback,:strategic es ,on the other? Am I stuck in the weeds?iAm I limitin
� int *04:ti,riy{:00:kcilgItnirlaf,i oselssues', which I
group in ways a e
collaborating have reporting?
me see
big picture?
JAN 13 OREA 12-551INDD(466029)
(b)(3)
(b)(3
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(b)(3)
6
Introduction
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Type I Surprise:
SUDDEN HOSTILE ACTION
The US Navy's Battleship Row at Pearl Harbor
minutes into the attack by Japan on 7 December 1941.
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Type I Surprise:
Sudden Hostile Action
(b)(3)
Sudden hostile action involves abrupt,
deliberate action by an actor aimed at disorienting,
defeating, or destroying an unprepared opponent. The
actor can be a state, an armed force, a terrorist cell, or a
revolutionary party (see figure 2).
� The action in Type I surprise takes place by
human design and agency, often in a concentrated
geographic place (a capital city or a military base, for
example) in a concentrated time span that can usually
be measured in days, hours, or even minutes.
Subtypes and Examples of Sudden
Hostile Action
Surprise Attack. Surprise attack includes
any initiation or escalation of military violence using
conventional or unconventional weapons against an
unprepared target-adversary.a It includes surprise
attacks by states and nonstate actors, such as
terrorist organizations.
Strategic surprise attacks may initiate war, as was
e case in Japan's raid on Pearl Harbor and Nazi
Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.
� Alternatively, surprise attacks can also occur in
ongoing wars in which the element of surprise involves
the attack's location, timing, or novel methods and
capabilities (see figure 3).
ri Examples of surprise attack include the following:
a
The North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950.
The Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956),
Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979).
Iraq's invasions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990).
he start of all the major conventional wars of the
Middle East (1956, 1967, and 1973).
This training aid focuses mostly on strategic-level
surprise attacks that initiate, escalate, or widen wars and conflicts.
It does not focus on the use of surprise at the operational or tactical
levels of conflict.
Argentina's seizure of the British Falkland Islands
in 1982.
� he al-Qa'ida attacks of 11 September 2001.
Military-Technological Surprise. This type of
surprise involves the rapid development and deployment (b)(3)
of new weapons systems or the novel adaption and
employment of existing ones that an enemy or potential
foe lacks the ability to counter.
Examples of military-technological surprise include
the following:
Nazi Germany's wartime development and use of
early-generation cruise and ballistic missiles (the V-1
and V-2, respectively).
The Soviet Union's development and test of an
atomic bomb in 1949�at least five years earlier than
US intelligence analysts had estimated.
�F�The Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957,
which stunned the US Congress and public.
India's surprise nuclear tests in 1974 and, again, .
in 1998.
Abrupt Strategic Power Play. This subtype of
sudden hostile action includes any move by an adversary
to seize strategic advantages on the ground short of
overt war.
Examples of strategic power plays include
the following:
Nazi Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland in
1936 and its annexation of Austria in 1938.
� Jrhe Soviet blockade of Berlin from all land
communications in 1948-49.
�
East Germany's construction of the Berlin Wall
in 1961.
oviet emplacement of strategic weapons in
Cuba in 1962.
(Continued on page 12)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Figure 2
Anticipating Sudden Hostile Action
Abrupt, deliberate action by an adversary (such as a state,
armed force, or terrorist cell) against an unprepared target
ZeRY'Ret:
/..E4ssence
"attaCks.o etSe
eti2
Abrupt, deliberate, hostile deed by a unified actor
(such as a state, armed force, terrorist cell, revolutionary
vanguard party) aimed at disorienting, defeating, or
destroying an unprepared opponent
crsmswialm?
3�LlliprIsOaqc
communicatinns:m-
4nitiationesca itiorvo ;mass humanfrights,abuses
Effective use of denial (secrecy, security, stealth) and deception by an improvising, adaptive foe
Mirror-imaging; fallacious rational actor assumptions
Underestimation of actor's commitment, risk-tolerance, or bias toward action
Failure of imagination
onitor andsr, eas�,essiIxampj
itdrs:Ontr�
orensic assessmen simeAnsi.motive,s;.arld,opportunities
efensive:casin 4.an -remor erns,,o ,imaginable 4,ssessi,weakneses
'StOn-isgthatqria. ,i0ifefopportunistic 1t0C
Measure actors eye political commitment
an all -05.foretii;
's-e-ss.$'strategic iT.e. lines
stability
co,re
arstrategic
Jo .60i:in-nit
'Olstercapabilitie:
Source: Based on a review by a senior CIA analyst of more
than two dozen cases of intelligence surprise experienced by US,
British, French, Israeli, and Soviet services between 1939 and 2010.
JAN 13 OREA 12-555INDD(466021)
8
I. Sudden Hostile Action
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Varieties of
Military-Technological Surprise
Numerous situations can give rise
to the kind of surprise involving an adversary's
capacity to inflict military damage that the victim
has failed to anticipate, including the following:
.F�NIew weapons technologies, such as
US development and use of the atomic bomb
and Germany's development of cruise and
ballistic missiles in World War II, and Britain's
introduction of tanks to the Western front in
1917 in World War I.
�
Significant improvements to or
adaptations of existing technologies, such as
the Japanese development of shallow-running
aerial torpedoes to attack Pearl Harbor in
1941; the USSR's mass production of the T-34
medium tank, with its sloped armor, reliable
engine, and turreted gun early in World War
II; and the Iraqi insurgents' effective use of and
adaptations to improvised explosive devices.
IIJThe effective integration of two or "
more existing weapons or systems, such as
the Germany's use of radios, tanks, close air
support aircraft, and airborne troops in the
blitzkrieg invasions of the 1939-41 era or the
rapid development by the US Navy and Marines
of amphibious landing ships and craft, naval
gunfire support, and close air support before
and during World War II.
Tactical or doctrinal innovations that
make one or more existing military systems
more effective, such as the US development of
amphibious warfare doctrine in the 1930s or
the use of B-29s�originally designed as a
high-level daylight "precision" bomber�in
low-level incendiary bombing missions against
Japanese urban areas.
In most cases, military-technological
surprise usually involves one or more new or
adapted technologies coupled with tactical or
doctrinal innovations and improved command
and control to maximize their effectiveness.
JA radar operator of the UK Women's Auxiliary
Air Force watches her cathode ray tube monitor for
signals of incoming enemy aircraft during World
War II. The Royal Air Force's (RAF) development of
an integrated air defense network, centered around
early warning radar facilities, allowed the RAF to
detect inbound German bomber formations early in
their missions and to vector RAF Fighter Command
planes to intercept them in a timely and efficient
manner. Britain's superior early warning system
and air battle management capability surprised
German commanders and played vital roles in the
United Kingdom's victory in the Battle of Britain
in 1940-41.
Rn.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
I. Sudden Hostile Action
JAN 13 OREA 12-306INDD(462648) (b)(3)
9
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Figure 3
The Dimensions of Strategic Military Surprise
Page 1 of 2'
SOVIET DECLAIM WAR
ATTACKS MANCHURIA.?
ATOM BOMB LOOSED a
Effective use of military surprise maximizes the likelihood of operational success and
reduces the costs of an operation�in time, resources, and blood�to the attacker. Surprise attacks
that succeed typically exploit multiple dimensions of surprise: To achieve surprise, would-be
attackers often conduct extensive denial and deception operations to keep their intentions, plans,
and capabilities secret from the target-actor and the international community.
.,,,,'
perspeetw , would-be,34;
� defender)
-

4 ' T -;
(to the woula be attacjcen)
,hr
gSSI. 1 i
Stategic siii=, fis
attacks;onNorway(194O) :,ii`
, (1941) Japan dns3attac .cir0 Pearl Harbor
i.North KoreasiriviSion,O, South Korea
50 � Arabs - spe iy,War',(19,56;,,19,67,-:anii:y..
.. ,
r cntitiainVaidn'..tif UK Falkland
Islands 198
a �tde 4it 'a ipitiateA*0.1,e ;
:'. ,,,,=1,24,..--,, ,,,�..-'-:
be, eVa'S' atm ecause,,t, they �..ca
.exploitll them ,cndimensions i of
:int 1 ar, sui Os'
7,
. e et a,-,:p�ntial
d versary will attak
..
Scale: How
The would-be attacker�
invasion of Japanese-occupied
Manchuria (1945); China's intervention in the
Korean war (190); North Vietnam's Tet offensive
(1968); the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001
on US Homeland
widespread and intense the
attack will be
particularly at the outset of a
conflict�can try to calculate
how much to risk and how many
strategic resources to commit to
an attack.
i',-',1�!;i5.77:
frrnn e
r
,.-....q��=, 4
*'erien? ;Can
Germany sfinVasiornn ,:Fraike,;� ow q-Oti,r,*s
40 ;' 2 641-1,94:bqr;Me�teen Allies, 4
. ., ,
111�Vagitny,.0N;Cornian01(1.944.);',ChinaaSSanlVon,
Indian for00962
.
.the '"a ac NI hoccp
. , .. . , ,
'
concentrate
C p,,,,time , picking
.,.
;�z.,Win ow,MOSta Vanta etins,to
"e'prospects 'ot.i. success such
,, ___
a limn a' erjo4Otrjij#4,ym ,
1749-, .1 Aptici4,4p, .,',-044A-10.'s-c or ,
�Cii.NPI.g a i'arijfi:ijkiia16:i-i
_
oh a, or aa. : y.ofres
Location: Where
An enemy can
German army attacks through the
"impassable" Ardennes Forest (1940 and 1944);
the D-Day invasion at Normandy (1944); the
US invasion at Inchon, South Korea, (1950);
Vietnamese communist assault on French base at
Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam (1954)
concentrate in space to achieve
local superiority against the
defending force; lack of intelligence
on the location of the attacker's
military forces obliges the defender
to disperse its defensive systems.
the attack will occur
JAN 13 OREA 12-303INDD(462112)
10
I. Sudden Hostile Action
11,1AI 11C.1� elk11%,
UNCL
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Figure 3
The Dimensions of Strategic Military Surprise [continued]
(b)(3)
Page 2 of 2
fend
irogssza
attack will
,
eattac erYea
;newtacties;',4-iew
octtineS',..Of'ile*ziAieapOns.td
thaximize the iectivene'sfe,
Nfr:7% A�4:;;;Af.,..,,=5. `..-t
anapit them agqinst a:
.eneiny,s*ea nes'se�
.� .
eisnlanyi"sluse-o
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u
ial torp� does4n i r: piercing shells as
DutchTibs�against US UK and nava forces
41 42) Pkistans tr _
t* n si-Ra 'corees
ltry and irregular forces disguised
�a-
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999 the hijacking in 11
2001
,
SttVotritt,; passenger ,..,
,mitsa,,,--sA 4
je
f;simultaheduslyand
Novel
Capabilities: Whether and
how the enemy will employ
new or untested military
technologiesa
A subset of novel means
of attacking; use of new weapons
can be devastating because the
victim state's forces have no
experience against them or training
to counter or defeat them.
nThe UK Royal Air Force's use of radar against
the German air force in the Battle of Britain
(1940-1941); Germany's use of jets, V-1 and V-2
missiles (1944-1945); US use of the atomic bomb
to end the war in the Pacific (1945); US use of
reliable precision-guided munitions against Iraq
(1991) and Serbian forces (1990s); use by al-Qdida
and affiliates of well-trained, well-equipped
suicide bombers in multiple simultaneous
attacks (late 1990s to present); Iraqi insurgents'
widespread use of reliable improvised-explosive
devices, delivered and detonated by multiple
means (2004-08)
a Use of novel weapons and military technologies is a subset
of the dimension of means�how an attack will transpire. It is listed here
separately because the operational and strategic effects of new military
technologies, effectively employed, can be devastating.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Source: Based on a review by a senior CIA analyst of (b)(3)
unclassified accounts of more than two dozen cases of strategic military
surprise experienced by the United States, Great Britain, France, Israel, the
USSR, and other powers between 1939 and 2010.
JAN 13 OREA 12-303INDD(462112) (b)(3)
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rECLUra:=ZEVin=,===...aat
nhe Strategic Effects of a Successful
Surprise Attack
Gen. Charles de Gaulle in his postwar
memoirs described how French leaders crumbled
under the weight of the German panzer thrust
across France in the campaign from May to June
1940 that precipitated his country's surrender. His
account stresses the role of shock�intellectual,
psychological, emotional, and moral�in a
successful surprise attack. The devastating shock
that de Gaulle describes, which leads to the
cascading failure of the target's entire defensive
system, remains the holy grail of planners of
surprise attacks.
The crumbling of [France's] whole
system of doctrines and organizations, to
which our leaders had attached themselves,
deprived them of their motive force. A sort of
moral inhibition made them suddenly doubtful of
everything, and especially of themselves. From
then on, the forces of disintegration were to show
themselves rapidly.),
Gen. Charles de Gaulle, in his postwar
memoirs, The Call to Honor
Coup d'Etats. This subtype of surprise, sometimes
referred to as a putsch, is the sudden, illegal ouster of
an incumbent state leadership by elements of the armed
forces or security services�often by force or the threat
of force�in order to replace it with another group, either
civil or military.b Coups were especially prevalent in
Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Turkey during
and after the Cold War era.
Examples of coups include the following:
Jr he overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq
by a nationalist army general and his followers in the
14 July Revolution" in 1958.
� he toppling of the Greek Government by a group
of rig htwing army colonels in 1967.
Massive Police Crackdown or Martial Law.c
Authoritarian states pressed by demands for democracy
or threatened by lawlessness or insurgencies will
sometimes resort to a show of overwhelming force or
to a massive crackdown on opposition to maintain their
grip on power. Typically such events are preceded by
secret planning for "emergency rule," the preparation
of propaganda justifying the repression, and the quiet
US battleships at Pearl Harbor under attack by Japan on
7 December 1941. The telltale wakes of Japan's new shallow-
running aerial torpedoes can be seen. US planes caught on
the ground at Hickam air base burn in the distance.
..-zenamarn..
dispersion of police and security forces to key sectors
in the capital and other cities. Government security
forces will then move rapidly to seal the borders, arrest
dissidents and opposition journalists, and occupy
opposition strongholds, such as universities or public
squares. Coups are often followed quickly by crackdowns
or the imposition of emergency rule or martial law.
Examples include the following:
� LlJrhe bloody quashing of the Tiananmen Square
prodemocracy movement by the Chinese army and
police in 1989.
� he Polish army's imposition of martial law in
December 1981 in response to the rise of the Solidarity
labor opposition movement and to intense Soviet
pressure to quell unrest.
Diplomatic Surprise. This includes any
unexpected diplomatic move that has a major impact on
the regional or global balance of power.
b Political scientist Samuel P. Huntington in his 1968 book,
Political Order in Changing Societies, identified three classes of
coup d'etat:
1. A breakthrough coup, in which revolutionary elements of
the armed forces�often led by junior officers�overthrow the
traditional government and creates a new ruling elite, such as
occurred in Egypt in 1952.
2. A guardian coup, in which the avowed goal of the coup
plotters�typically more senior army commanders�is to "save"
the state from disorder, party strife, violent opposition, or
foreign foes.
3. A veto coup, in which the army blocks democratic
participation in the affairs of state. Usually led by senior
commanders, this last type of coup often result in violent
confrontations and suppression of civil opposition, such as
occurred in Chile in 1973 and in Argentina multiple times during
the 20th century.
a The temporary use of martial law can be a legitimate tool of
civil government in bona fide cases of civil or natural disasters,
when civil authorities alone are unable to maintain order, or provide
basic services.
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nExamples of diplomatic surprise include the following:
�Lllilhe Nazi-Soviet "nonaggression" pact in
August 1939, which led to Germany's surprise attack
on Poland one week later and the USSR's forcible
annexation of eastern Poland by late September of that
year and the Baltic states in 1940.
� F-1-he US rapprochement with Chairman Mao
Zedong's China in the early 19705 after three years
of secret diplomacy, which blindsided the Taiwan
Government and rattled Soviet leaders.
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's "electric shock
diplomacy," including his sudden expulsion of Soviet
military advisers in 1972 and his peace offer to Israel
in 1977.
Political Assassination. This type of sudden
hostile action involves the premeditated killing of any
influential political actor in or out of power by a person
or group motivated by a political grievance. It excludes
assassins motivated by psychotic impulses. Assassins
can be "lone wolves" or members of a conspiracy.
Examples of political assassination include the
slayings of the following:
Egypt's President Sadat in 1981.
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.
Pakistani presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto
in 2007.
Violent Escalations by Revolutionary or Terrorist
Movements. Such movements tend to start as small,
cell-like clandestine organizations and gradually build
their strength through clandestine measures. However,
once they reach a critical mass of personnel, resources,
weapons, and training, such groups will typically
initiate political, guerilla, and/or terrorist campaigns to
destabilize the state.
� xamples include the Bolshevik party in czarist
Russia, the Viet Minh and Viet Cong in Vietnam, the
FARC in Colombia, and al-Qa`ida in the Middle East
and North Africa.
Even after these groups launch their initial wave
of attacks and declare war on the state, they will
continue to exploit the tactical advantages of surprise
in follow-on hostile actions, such as raids, robberies,
kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings.
Initiation or Escalation of Major Human Rights
Abuses. Extremist actors and governments tend to
shroud the full scope of their plans to persecute and kill
political foes and ethnic and religious minorities. They will
The Fait Accompli:
g Tool for Radical Leaders
ii
Decisive unilateral acts that create new facts
on the ground and catch foreign actors�including
intelligence services�unprepared are a favorite
tool of action-oriented actors seeking to upend the
status quo. Intelligence scholar Michael Handel
notes, for example, that Adolf Hitler made repeated
use of faits accomplis to catch opponents off
guard and hinder opposition actors from mobilizing
against him. Handel notes that Hitler established
early on the pattern behind his frequent use
of surprise.
The preparatory stage of deception was
intended to divert attention from his actual goal and
reassure potential opponents that he did not intend
to do what they feared he might. The fait accompli
was then followed by a flood of new assurances
that since Germany desired peace, this was the
last such act of its kind; in this manner, he allayed
fears and set the stage for his next move.))
F7�Intelligence scholar Michael Handel, in
The Diplomacy of Surprise, 1981
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often covertly distribute orders, weapons, and rewards
to the militants carrying out the violence in order to (b)(3)
minimize the ability of the victimized group to resist and
of outside actors to intervene.
Examples include the following:
Nazi Germany's escalations in its campaign
to harass, persecute, and ultimately exterminate
European Jews between 1933 and 1945.
�JThe Khmer Rouge's "autogenocide" during its
rule from 1975 to 1979, carried out through mass
executions and the starvation of more than 1 million
Cambodians deemed corrupted by Buddhism, foreign
influence, money, property, or education.
� Multiple rounds of "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans
during the 1990s, the worst of which occurred during
the Bosnian war of 1992-95, when more than 2 million
people were displaced and tens of thousands killed.
� he Rwandan genocide, in which the Rwandan
military and Hutu militia groups killed more than
500,000 Tutsis in 1994.
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I. Sudden Hostile Action
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Barriers to Early Perception of
Type I Surprise
(U//FOU0) There are several barriers to early perception
and timely warning of Type I surprise. Secrecy on the
part of the aggressor-actor planning to surprise an
unprepared foe is foremost.
Denial and Deception by Smart, Adaptive Actors.
e goal of would-be attackers is to conceal hostile
plans and preparations from onlookers and prevent the
intended victim or the third parties from taking effective
counteraction. The ability of US enemies�from Imperial
Japan and Mao's China to North Korea and al-Qa`ida�
to conceal preattack plans and preparations has been
amply demonstrated.
F�Scholars of surprise observe that even rudimentary
denial and deception efforts often work in thwarting
timely warning and response by the target actor. These
efforts can include the following:
�
Publicly denying aggressive intent.
Lying about the purpose of prestrike activities.
Announcing "routine" military training maneuvers to
mask preattack staging.
Publicly demobilizing token numbers of reservists.
Feinting in another direction.
Intimating that the prestrike activities are merely
a bluff.
Heralding bogus eleventh-hour peace initiatives or
offering to enter into negotiations.
Sound operational security and standard
military cover, camouflage, and concealment of hostile
forces can go a long way to countering even the
most sophisticated intelligence collection systems,
judging from unclassified assessments of surprise and
intelligence failure.
Bold, Resourceful Enemies. The sheer
audacity of a surprise attack can catch an adversary
unprepared. Roberta Wohlstetter�the doyenne of
intelligence surprise studies�discussed in her 1962
book, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, the inability
of US officials to conceive of a radical Japanese
response to its military quagmire in China and escalating
tensions with the United States. Wohlstetter identified
the US officials' "poverty of imagination" as the root
cause of US vulnerability to a surprise attack at Pearl
Harbor. Racist stereotypes also played a part: many
US Navy commanders could not believe that the Imperial
Japanese Navy could pull off such an ambitious and
complex strike operation so far from Japan.
6thCIA1eadthIip
in an essay on profihn
This pattern�disbelief that an actor would
embark on a course of action that was potentially
catastrophic�was repeated before the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 1962: US officials knew that the Kremlin was
increasingly anxious about the strategic balance and
about US pressure on Cuba, but few in the ICd believed
that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would risk a
nuclear war by secretly emplacing nuclear weapons 90
miles off Florida.
The 9/11 Commission Report makes
clear that the key organizations involved in US air
safety�the Federal Aviation Administration, the North
American Aerospace Defense Command, and the
airlines�were utterly unprepared for foreign terrorists
to take over US civilian passenger jets and use them
as weapons.
hen Director of CIA John McCone was an exception. He
r.easoned that the Soviets were building surface-to-air missile sites
in western Cuba�which US intelligence had confirmed�in order
to protect covertly deployed Soviet nuclear forces rather than to
defend Cuba from US invasion, an assessment that turned out to
be accurate. Proceeding from rational unitary actor assumptions,
Sherman Kent�then the head of the CIA's Office of National
Estimates�and much of the rest of the IC judged such a course of
action too risky and out of character for the Soviet leadership.
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Oenial And Deception In
Cases Of Mass Atrocities
Anticipating the initiation of mass
human rights abuses and comprehending their
scale and intensity as they occur are difficult
analytic challenges. Past cases of mass atrocities
demonstrate the ability of hostile actors to
conceal their intentions and plans and deceive
outside observers until it is too late to thwart or
mitigate their violence against the victims. A
policy planning handbook on responding to the
dangers of mass atrocities recently published by
the US Army notes, for example, that:
II Perpetrators decide to conduct mass
atrocities, mobilize their resources, draw up
"death lists" or otherwise identify intended
targets, and possibly segregate victims into
ghettos or camps. A pretext for such actions may
be arranged, or an unforeseen event may spark
these measures. Additional preparations may
include transportation of victims, identifying
locations for mass killing, and determining
means of disposing of bodies. Perpetrators will
also take measures to disguise their actions or
deceive both victims and outsiders as to what will
occur (e.g., victims may be relocated and collected
together in order to "protect" them). The many
individuals involved in the actual conduct of the
mass atrocities may need to be convinced of the
legitimacy of the actions as well as the need for
secrecy ... Perpetrators will attempt to obfuscate
mass atrocity situations, blame the incidents on
the victims or deny their occurrence. They will
impede external efforts to determine the truth of
events. Strong denial may presage future waves of
mass atrocities. . . Fr
RFrom Mass Atrocities Prevention and
;onse Options: A Policy Planning Handbook,
published by the US Army Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute in 2012
The infamous Arbeit Macht Frei�work makes
you free�gate to Auschwitz concentration camp.
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"He Had a Gambler's Heart":
Adm. Yamamoto's Bias for Action
nalysts can evaluate the risk
tolerance and bias for action of key actors. A
leading US scholar of the attack on Pearl Harbor
in 1941 provides a glimpse into the mentality of
one particularly bold actor. Gordon W. Prang�
author of the 1991 book, At Dawn We Slept:
The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor�wrote of
Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku, Commander in Chief
of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet
at the time of the attack:
nil Yamamoto's temperament also had much to
do with the strategy he eventually conceived [for
attacking Pearl Harbor]. Some of his maxims . . .
reveal his turn of mind: 'An efficient hawk hides
its claws'; 'A cornered rat will bite': 'If you want
the tiger's cubs, you must go into the tiger's lair'
. . . An inveterate gambler, he enjoyed nothing
more than a competitive round of chess, poker, or
bridge . . . 'In all games Yamamoto loved to take
chances just as he did in naval strategy,' explained
[one of his favorite staff officers] Capt. Yasuji
Watanabe. 'He had a gambler's heart'',
Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku.
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The Soviet
Union successfully tested
an atomic bomb in August
1949�five years before the
IC judged it to be likely.
Soviet leader Josef Stalin's
implacable determination
to acquire the bomb and
the resourcefulness of Soviet
research and development
efforts�abetted by Soviet
espionage penetration of
the Manhattan Project
during World War II�
enabled the USSR to greatly
accelerate its program to
build, test, and deploy
atomic weapons.
Mirror-Imaging a "Rational" Actor. In the history
of surprise, zealous alpha actors with outsized appetites
for power, tolerance for risk, and biases for action�Adolf
Hitler, Gamal Nasser, Khrushchev, Sadat, Saddam
Husayn, Kim II-Sung, and Kim Jong-II�have sought to
seize the initiative against their presumed foes. Often,
such actors tend to pit their own audacity against the
normal human tendency to assume that "tomorrow will
look like today," that "the other guy" thinks the way "we"
do, and that dramatic departures from the status quo
are impossible. Assumptions about the permanence of
the status quo and the presumed "rationality"�often
narrowly defined or confused with reasonableness�of
hostile actors increase the victim's vulnerability to denial
and deception efforts by crafty, adaptive enemies.
The difficulty of comprehending the full psychological,
cultural, political, and organizational context in which
would-be hostile actors operate compounds the problem.
� The head of Israeli military intelligence in 1973
could not conceive that Sadat would initiate a war
that Egypt could not win militarily. The intelligence
chief assumed that the Egyptian armed forces would
wage war the way that Israel would�by first seizing
air superiority over the region�which the Egyptian air
force clearly lacked the capability to achieve. '
�r�lks then chief of the CIA's Office of National
Estimates, Sherman Kent wrote after the Cuban
Missile Crisis to explain the IC's failure to anticipate
Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons to Cuba, "no
estimating process can be expected to divine when
exactly the enemy is about to make a dramatically
wrong decision. We [in the IC] were not brought up
to underestimate our adversary [in this case, Soviet
leader Khrushchev]."
Aids To Anticipating Type I Surprise
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Timely, accurate intelligence reporting on the (b)(3)
hostile intentions, strike capabilities, and secret plans of
would-be hostile actors remains the surest aid to analysts
trying to avert Type I surprises. However, if the history
of intelligence failures experienced by all major powers
since the onset of World War II is any guide, conclusive
intelligence reporting on an adversary's plans and
decision to attack will remain the exception, rather than
the rule. Therefore, while developing and maintaining
close ties to intelligence collectors remain essential,
analysts should assume that critical intelligence
collection gaps will persist and that analysts will need
other means to bolster their ability to anticipate possible
hostile action.
These supplemental approaches and tools attempt to: (b)(3)
Identify patterns of sudden hostile action
based on historical case studies and help analysts
to determine how similar current situations may be to
historical analogues.
Get into the heads of would-be hostile
actors in realistic, sophisticated ways and anticipate
their possible moves using methods that reduce the
dangers of mirror-imaging.
Assess the vulnerabilities of would-be
victims of sudden hostile action in analysts' areas
of responsibility.
Assess an Actor's Commitment and Hostility,
Not Just "Rationality." This approach requires a deeper
focus on actors' motives and intentions in analytically
sophisticated ways. It seeks to fix analysts' attention on
would-be hostile actors who may be motivated by pride,
fury, revenge, aggrandizement, and ideology. Such
actors are subject to opaque psychological, political,
and organizational pressures to act. They often receive
flawed, politicized intelligence. These actors will often
seek to change the rules of the game or to destroy the
old game completely and replace it with one of their
making via sudden hostile action (see figure 4).
For examples, Adolf Hitler sought to overturn the
post�World War I Versailles Treaty order in Europe
as a prelude to his campaign of genocidal expansion;
Josef Stalin to project Soviet power into and
communize the states of Central Europe and to subvert
liberal democracies in Western Europe; Fidel Castro
to check US "neocolonialism" and promote radicalism
in the Western Hemisphere; and Usama Bin Ladin to
oust the United States from the Arab-Islamic world and
depose "apostate" regimes in the region.
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A US expert on strategic warning during the Cold
War era, Cynthia Grabo, noted that would-be hostile
actors miscalculate for various reasons: misjudgments
of an adversary's strength, ideological fixation, hubris,
domestic pressures, nationalist hysteria, pique, or just
plain desperation. Under the spell of such pressures, an
actor may embark on an imprudent or even disastrous
course of action.
Scrutinizing assumptionse about the
full range of factors that can influence an actor's
behavior�including personal, professional,
organizational, and social Pressures�and tracking
them over time can help analysts account for zeal,
folly, honor, revenge, and malice in forecasting leaders'
actions and determine the trend in an actor's extremist
rhetoric and actions.
Using well-crafted red teams to consider
alterative explanations for adversaries' behavior
and to simulate would-be hostile actors' calculus for
employing surprise can help analysts draw on deep
expert insights in ways that avoid mirror-imaging,
rational actor assumptions, or caricatures.
APPLICATION
�PatwArdmievaal
Analysts�working individually or in analytic
teams�can identify who the possible alpha actors are in
their, areas of responsibility, study the political pressures
acting on them, assess their timeline for action, track
their rhetoric and behavior over time, and anticipate
their possible recourse to various options for sudden
hostile action.
Recognize Historic Patterns of Surprise. Sudden
hostile actions sometimes resemble historical precedents
for surprise action or follow discernible patterns. Such
actions are rarely what leading intelligence scholar
Richard K. Betts in his 1982 book, Surprise Attack, calls
"bolts from the blue."
The author noted that "... there are no significant
cases of bolts from the blue [that is, a major surprise
attack not preceded by an earlier political crisis] in
the 20 century. All major sudden attacks occurred
in situations of prolonged tension, during which the
victim state's leaders recognized that war might be on
the horizon."
Instead, sudden attacks tend to occur during or
after an escalation in tensions that is often observable
to intelligence organizations.
Analysts should be aware of the relevant
historical precedents for surprise action under various
circumstances in their areas of responsibility. Studying
such precedents can help analysts expand their
intellectual inventory of relevant historical analogies and
aid in early pattern detection and recognition.
A senior Japanese naval aviator who helped plan
the attack on Pearl Harbor told US interrogators after
the war that he was dumbfounded that the United
States had not studied Japan's use of strategic surprise
to initiate its 1904-05 war against Russia.
Political and military analysts would benefit
from being proactive in assessing the risks of surprise
attacks as tensions escalate, even if reporting on force
postures and deployments is scarce or recourse to a
military "solution" seems unfeasible or reckless.
Another critical development for analysts to
watch for is mobilization in all its forms. Large-scale
national mobilization of military power that imposes a
high opportunity cost on the civilian economy remains
the best'predictor that a state is preparing to undertake
major military operations, according to a leading scholar
of surprise.
Political analysts will usually have the lead
responsibility for recognizing the rise of radical factions
and leaders, analyzing escalating tensions, identifying
the breaching of possible strategic "red lines," and
warning of the rising urgency and extremism of the
political or diplomatic dialogue.
Military analysts, by contrast, will have the
lead in closely monitoring shifts�real or perceived�in
the interstate balance of power and balance of threats
as well as indicators of preparations for sudden action
by the military and/or security forces.
In similar fashion, terrorism analysts can gain
insight by closely tracking the substance and tone of
extremist groups' public communications. Increasingly
aggressive rhetoric that employs violent imagery, blunt
threats, and apocalyptic visions to spur psychological
mobilization, demonize enemies, and legitimize mass
killings are often indicators of a looming escalation
of violence.
APPLICATION
) Analytic teams can study the academic and
intelligence literature on a potential adversary's past
uses of strategic surprise and assess its current doctrine
arious models and premises have been used to describe
and justify models that attribute rationality to actors. The basic idea
is that actors try to maximize benefits, minimize costs and risks,
and weigh options for action via some form of cost-benefit-risk
analysis�however crude, intuitive, or informal. In shorthand usage,
rationality has often been confused with "common sense"
or reasonableness.
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Figure 4
A Spectrum For Measuring an Actor's Extremism
. ` . '
11 -
' " .�
'Rational" Status_ .. Actor'
�
,,,441:-.. . , -
� L',- ' 0.Tommitted HostileAdor
' OLIAIL IF, ' - ' V
. _ .
....
Strategic Goal Content
Feasible Attarnablevl in
I Radicala Safel:incompatible oqi i
.,-1.f '-'�,',:v744...,,idi=4:1s ,
prevailinginclude'.stirateOlariaseaTeP',Examples
total offrcon4uestrano erl,Stale;,wnoCide.of
group otal(tarianzule:ovena.country
,,J,:,,$- -.4-,..'9 .,,,.= ' � - '---=' ',,,,elv--� ,,,,,,-.:-
�
-,incrementalgoals.minority
-,cx.).�.0.4g,,systgposuc as maintaining
--.,,,� ,:-:-,-...,,..-,-,?;:,------,
statiis,q004a 1:6(..in, irmoderate or
Strategic Goal
Measured. Actor willing to settle for
Intense. Actor is "fanatical"; adheres
Commitment
less than maximal goals.
stubbornly to maximal goals.
Tolerance of Risk i
ow -Ctorc-isi prudent;-,pcnse on
.1. ,...
i Actor,, rope- Q a, ven urism. high -ris
Pursuing Goals
,.. , .,;:i,,..mx,.._i'�.:::,,:--;', ,
risk avoidance or minimization
tions,acce acceptable
Means-Goal
Instrumental. Actor desires to be
Delinked. There is a disconnect between
Relationship
rational, minimizes costs, links means to
goals, adheres to at least some norms.
goals and means. Actor fixates on goals, ignores
costs, exalts "sacrifice," distrusts calculus that
subverts ideology.
,.
Degree of Slf..,Ciiiitrol,:,
� e atively high Personalgrievances
Low Pride;,fury resentmentrevenge;t exert
Emotional Stability
endettas do not drivetstrategic : behavior:
sizableinfluence onv ' `:nierii.;4Ctinns
aHThis matrix is derived from the model of "crazy actors" developed
by Professor Yehezkel Dror, an Israeli scholar of political science at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem in the 1970s. It modifies some of Dror's
definitions and nomenclature.
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on surprise. Teams can also monitor, evaluate, and
track over time a would-be hostile actor's strategic "red
lines"�actions by rival players that an adversary would
deem hostile to vital interests and, therefore, as a cause
for war. Similarly, "tacit understandings" between the
opposing parties in enduring strategic rivalries�for
example, China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, Georgia
and Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan�should be
examined and evaluated over time because breaches of
them can lead to crises that typically increase the risk of
war and surprise.
An-o,eteetwee.m.egunsmakum,,,g,,w1z.o.rmas...,sce,warar......r,,,,nroemmentrussesessano.cugm.
Apply Theories of Surprise Action. Awareness of
the academic theories of surprise, which are principally
based on historical case studies, can also help IC
analysts assess increasing risks of Type I surprise.
These theories tend to focus on two key conditions as
particularly salient risk factors for surprise attack!
The first is an actor's acute sense of strategic
vulnerability, particularly if communicated by warnings
of encirclement or fears of extinction.
� Jhe second condition is an actor's heightened
sense of its own offensive capacities via the
possession of elite strike arm�such as Imperial
Japan's carrier battle group, Nazi Germany's
armored forces, Israel's air force, or al-Qa`ida's
suicide bombers.
''-k--ziaredavasas,
nAPPLICATION
Analysts can assess whether these
preconditions for sudden hostile action�the presumed
advantages of near-term offensive action or the
perception of adverse long-term strategic trends�apply,
as seen from the optic of an increasingly desperate or
zealous actor or actors. If so, these conditions would
suggest higher risks of sudden hostile action than would
otherwise be the case. Military journals and doctrine,
formal strategy pronouncements, warnings via diplomatic
channels, and political rhetoric can all shed light on
aspects of foreign thinking on these strategic matters.
Conduct "Forensic" Analysis of Possible Hostile
Actors. Analysts can examine which actors possess the
motives, means, constraints, and opportunities to engage
in various options for hostile action against foreign or
domestic actors.
Motive refers to the intentions, ideology, and
animating beliefs of a potentially hostile actor, particularly
as they define his threat perceptions and enemy images.
It also covers incentives to act suddenly, such as the
desire to seize a neighbor's resource-rich territory or
"redress" specific grievances, such as the loss of territory
to a neighboring state in a previous-war or concern
about a rival's threats or military capabilities, as he
perceives them.
Means refers to the totality of capabilities for
a major hostile action, including preventive war, surprise
attack, a coup, or genocide. These means can be at
hand or in development. Development of costly means of
attack remains a key guide to an actor's possibly hostile
intentions. The trend line�whether these capabilities
for surprise action are increasing or decreasing�are as
important as their level at any given point in time.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Opportunity refers to the feasibility and (b)(3)
practicality of sudden hostile action in obtaining the goals
sought by the actor, such as the ouster of a hated or
inept leader, the elimination of a despised minority group,
or the neutralization of a rival state's deterrent forces.
The focus is on the opportunities that the would-be
actor perceives as he surveys the relevant operating
environment. Opportunities cover environmental
factors that may create a more permissive environment
for sudden hostile action. Factors leading to a more
permissive environment might include the following:
LIIiA rival actor's focus on domestic upheavals,
events in another theater of war, or an ongoing
military campaign. For example, Fascist dictator
Benito Mussolini of Italy and Imperial Japan both took
advantage of Germany's crushing defeat of France in
1940 to seize French territories; Husayn's Iraq sought
to exploit Iran's postrevolution instability to seize
contested territory in 1980.
� he international community's preoccupation with
grave economic conditions or with another crisis.
Examples include the Suez Crisis in 1956, which
distracted Western powers from the Soviet Union's
preparations to suppress the Hungarian uprising
against communist rule; and Iraq's seizure of Kuwait
in August 1990, when Western states were trying
f Offense-defense theory and offensive realism are hypotheses
from international relations and strategic theory that seek to explain
the outbreaks of war. Offense-defense theory posits that war
becomes more likely when great powers judge that:
1. Conquest is relatively more feasible than in other periods.
2. Their own strategic offensive capacities are greater�or are
deemed greater�than those of a rival power or powers.
3. They are vulnerable�or fear that they are�to strategic
attack from one or more foreign powers. It also holds that
false evaluations of points 1, 2, and 3 are relatively common
on the part of great powers because of ideological distortions,
poor intelligence, faulty net assessments, and the influence of
expansionist interest groups.
Offensive realism posits that great powers will seek to maximize
their absolute and relative power vis-a-vis other states and will seek
to do so by expanding their military capacities and by seeking to
expand and achieve dominance when the opportunity avails itself.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Academic Theories of Surprise Attack
One scholar of intelligence affairs, Professor
James J. Wirtz, summarizes the theory of surprise
in three propositions.
�
�
�
Surprise temporarily suspends the
reciprocally antagonistic nature of the
battlefield by catching the enemy when he is
unprepared to resist effectively. A military
organization in a state of unreadiness is more
akin to a large peacetime bureaucracy in
custody of scarce commodities (weapons and
ammunition) than it is to a combat force that is
ready to fight.
Strategic surprise will be an especially
enticing option to the militarily or economically
weaker party in a strategic rivalry. The
advantages of surprise offer the weaker side the
prospect of achieving decisive results against
a stronger opponent that would probably be
unobtainable in a war of attrition. The party
that is clearly stronger, by contrast, often hopes
displays of might can deter a foe or intimidate
him into making concessions without having to
resort to war.
Strategies based on strategic surprise
appear to all concerned parties as extremely
risky before the attack and often turn out to be
reckless and ill advised. The very "unthinkable"
nature of an audacious plan of attack makes
it more likely both to achieve success�
surprise�in the short run and to infuriate and
unify the victim of surprise in the long run, if
he can absorb the initial blow.
Other scholars note that the risks of surprise
attack are particularly high in two cases.
When one side judges that long-term trends
in t e strategic balance are unfavorable because
of inferior geographic position (often perceived
as "enemy encirclement"), economic decline,
or slower population growth; in such cases, an
actor�such as a Adolf Hitler or the leadership
of prewar Japan�is strongly tempted to seize
the initiative via decisive action to head off
what he fears will otherwise be a protracted
deterioration in his strategic position.
LIIIWhen military planners judge that the
attacking side holds a decisive advantage
because offensive action would allow the
attacker to seize the initiative, maximize the
presumed superior elan on the part of the
attacking force, and exploit the advantages that
current weapons, doctrine, and tactics may hold
for the attacker.
nThe charred west facade of the
Pentagon; days after the terrorist strike on
11 September 2001. The attack killed all 64
people on board American Airlines Flight
77�including the five al-Qdida hijackers�
� as well as 125 people who were at work in
that portion of the building.
he remnants of two Egyptian jets destroyed
on the grbithd'during-the Israeli Air Force's
surpriSe'attaek at the-Oid.set Ofthe Si.k-Day �:
War. The Israeli air dttaek, Operation FocuS,
achieved total surprise, eliminated Egypt's air
force from the war, and assured Israel of air
supremacy for the duration of the 1967 conflict.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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to manage German unification and the collapse of
communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
In the case of a potential coup, a leader already
weakened by ill health or declining popularity.
MOOR- ,S1V.aTe
APPLICATION
Examining these forensic factors enables
analysts to do a quality of information check regarding
the reporting available on each of these criteria (motives,
means, and opportunities) and to develop signposts
to help warn of new developments�such as a hostile
actor's decision to heavily invest in strike weapons,
evidence of a more permissive strategic environment, or
increased incentives to act against a historical foe.
To conduct this type of forensic analysis,
terrorism analysts should stay particularly close to
collectors�including domestic law enforcement�and do
various types of link and network analysis to gain a fuller
appreciation of the structures, plans, and operations of
extremist organizations.
AloseliewrlYttlal,... � Cr ..-1611.2atr�
Vulnerability Assessments. Vulnerability
assessments, sometimes called defensive casing,
can improve analysts' understanding of hostile
actors' priorities among various potential targets for
surprise attack.
This technique focuses on the would-be
target's vulnerabilities. It involves a structured effort
by a diverse team of experts.to brainstorm various
categories of potential targets�a state, military
force, security force, specific leader, or critical
infrastructure�and assessing the relative merits,
drawbacks, and risks of each potential target from the
perspective of a would-be attacker.
APPLICATION
Prospective targets of possible hostile action�
particularly in cases of strategic military surprise and
terrorism�can be assessed, categorized, and ranked
from multiple perspectives. One perspective is that of
the potential victim: how might he "objectively" rank his
own strategic centers of gravity, essential infrastructure,
economic core, and renowned religious or historic sites
in terms of importance, vulnerability, and symbolic value.
This exercise could be repeated from the perspective of
prospective attackers: how might they assess a would-be
victim's possible targets in accord with these criteria.
How might they rate a would-be victim's readiness and
resilience in the event that surprise action is successful?
004(foi P.8 the thotivation,-- means
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Red Teaming. This technique relies on a
rigorous, systematic effort to zero in on the strategic and
tactical calculus of would-be hostile actors. Ideally, red
teams include participants who can accurately represent
the ethos, intentions, structures, and capabilities of a
hostile actor or organization.
For example, red teams could help estimate
terrorist group's relative priorities for target selection.
Red teams cannot be expected to divine plans for
a specific attack, which still requires timely and
accurate intelligence.
Empathy as an Analytic Tool. One intelligence
commentator, psychology professor Ralph White,
recommends that analysts cultivate empathy to hone
their understanding of foreign actors "from the inside
looking out, not merely from the outside looking in." To
foster empathy, White advises analysts to continually
pose such questions as the following:g
� How would I feel if I were facing the situation
they pre facing now?
� How would I feel if I had been through the
experience I know they have been through?
� How should I correct my first answers to
those questions on the basis of what I know about the
differences between their political culture and mine?
g Psychology professor Ralph White draws a sharp contrast
between empathy as a tool for understanding an opponent and
sympathy, which he characterizes as "sharing (or agreeing with)
the thoughts and feelings of others."
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I. Sudden Hostile Action
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Analysts can hone White's technique to
counter biases and stereotypes and to zero in on how
foreign actors might rate the attractiveness of various
options for sudden hostile action.
APPLICATION
Well-composed red teams could also assist
in generating, expanding, updating, and monitoring the
list of specific, observable indicators�signposts�for
prestrike activities by insurgent or terrorist groups,
including in such areas as target casing, bonnbnnaking,
personnel deployment, and movement to the target.
An unclassified JASON report for The MITRE
Corporation that discusses the use of red teaming
to anticipate catastrophic terrorist attacks notes the
importance of recruiting team members immersed in both
the foreign culture and the "professional culture" of the
terrorist group�its mission, history, beliefs, and tactics�
that the red team wants to mirror.
This immersion into the terrorist group that
is being assessed should include deep insight into the
group's experiences, education, skills, training, contacts,
and past targets.
23.-1,1261,17-.JG36.4lIA.VERS=.-VS,
) Exercises, War Games, and Simulations. These
tools are intended to simulate the dynamics of actual
strategic interactions, including combat operations.
Such efforts to game out the possible outcomes of
force-on-force encounters often come with high startup
costs in resources, planning hours, and personnel�
but they can also help simulate the conditions and
pressures conducive to sudden hostile action. Military
exercises have multiple purposes, including measuring
the temptation for the "red" team�the postulated hostile
actor�to undertake a surprise attack and revealing
weaknesses in the "blue" team's defenses and
force posture.
In 1932, nearly 10 years before the Japanese
strike on Pearl Harbor, for example, approximately
150 US Navy carrier-launched planes successfully
"attacked" the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl
Harbor on a Sunday shortly before dawn in a war
game exercise.
Navy umpires initially declared the attack
a total success, news of which was reported in The
New York Times days later. However, according
to one academic assessment, Navy commanders
failed to absorb and disseminate the lessons of the
widely publicized 1932 exercise, whereas Japanese
intelligence personnel and military planners appear to(b)(3)
have closely studied the exercise.
(b)(3)
APPLICATION
(b)(3)
Military Indications and Warning. The collection (b)(3)
and assessment of data about the intentions and
capabilities of foreign military forces has been the basis
for warning of war in the modern era and can also
enhance the effectiveness of war games. Since World
War II, the major powers have spent enormous sums�
the majority of their intelligence budgets�to augment
their ability to collect data on the military strength,
weaknesses, operations, training, and weapons of hostile
(b)(3)
and potentially hostile states. The collection of military
indicators will remain one of the linchpins of strategic
warning for three reasons:
(b)(3)
Military preparations are a necessity for war. (b)(3)
Many of these military preparations are discernable (b)(3)
or at least potentially discernable to outside states
seeking the information.
(b)(3)
any,of these preparations are costly and (b)(3)
disruptive to the civilian economy, so states do
not undertake them lightly, purely for purposes of
political theater, or bluff. For that reason, they tend
to be reliable indicators of seriousness of intent and (b)(3)
readiness to act.
Checking for Vulnerability to Coups. Anticipating (b)(3)
military coups based on intelligence reporting alone
is rare because the coup plotters�unless they are
seeking the approval of outside powers�have a powerful
incentive to maintain secrecy to achieve their aims.
However, examining five preconditions that correlate
closely with increased odds of military coups may help
analysts to anticipate their risks, if not their actual timing.
Class privilege. To what degree does the military� (b)(3)
particularly its officer corps�draw from a privileged
element of society? Is the officer corps perceived as
a societal elite�such as the Prussian Junkers, who
controlled the German army before World War I�at
odds with other elements of society, such as the
middle class or workers?
Historical role. Does the military have a special
or historical role in upholding the constitution or
preserving the domestic order, such as the Turkish
army has had since at least 1960? Does it view
itself as the custodian of the state or as a state
within a state, as the Japanese army did in
pre�World War II Japan?
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
I. Sudden Hostile Action
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ecurity crisis. Does the country face a difficult
national security challenge, such as a serious domestic
insurgency, revolutionary activism, or a menacing
strategic rival? Are the commanders of armed forces
preoccupied with domestic "enemies," such as Chile's
were before the 1973 coup led by General Aug usto
Pinochet against President Salvador Allende?
�nCivil-military strife. Is the military at odds with the
civilian leadership, such as the Chilean army was
during Allende's presidency in the early 1970s?
Does the military tend to distrust democratic or
civilian elements of the government? Is there a
sizable civilian element�landowners or privileged
classes�that support the military's vision against
that of the government?
^ olitically ambitious officers. Is the military led
by "alpha actors" contemptuous of civil authority
or threatened by militant junior officers who are
antagonistic to existing political conditions, such as
those in Japan in the mid-1930s? Is there a cohort
of junior officers who equally disdain their senior
commanders or political leaders?
nAPPLICATION
Evaluating civil-military relations by these
criteria�and comparing them with the available
reporting�can help analysts identify situations that are
relatively more likely to lead to ruptures in civil-military
relations, including Coups. Such evaluations should also
cover the national police and domestic security and
intelligence forces�particularly if they are uniformed
or politically influential. Assessments should be tracked
over time to monitor the trends in civil-military ties
and determine if the factors conducive to coups are
worsening or abating.
(1211
Stealthy Surprise? Sudden Hostile
Actions Using Novel Methods
(UHFOU0) Surprise attacks have traditionally had one
positive consequence for the decisionmakers of the
targeted actor: they afford the benefit of strategic clarity.
Once the attack occurs, the victim state in most cases
has a general idea of what has happened, who the
enemy is, what his intentions are, and how the enemy is
going to pursue them. Future cyber and biological attacks
might not afford such clarity.
� The vast majority of such attacks will almost
certainly employ surprise to maximize effectiveness.
However their nature and goals will probably not be
immediately obvious, even after the attack has been
launched and it is harming the victim state's population,
economy, or IT infrastructure.
� Biological warfare attacks, for example, may
be masked, at least initially, as the onset of natural
epidemics. Targeted cyber attacks may be impossible
to distinguish from the work of hackers or of individual
lone wolves or spontaneous networks.
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I. Sudden Hostile Action
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I. Sudden Hostile Action
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"A Fatal Lethargy of Mind": A Wartime
Commander's Take on Preparedness and Surprise
n the first major naval engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign�just eight months
after the Pearl Harbor attack�the Imperial Japanese Navy surprised and routed US and
Allied surface combatants guarding the Marine beachhead on Guadalcanal. The Battle of
Savo Island, which took place on 8-9 August 1942, resulted in the sinking of one Australian
and three US Navy cruisers, with the Japanese sustaining only light damage in return. In
his after-action report, Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of US Naval amphibious
forces in the Pacific, observed the following:
. . . The [US] Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental
superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence of enemy capabilities, most of our
officers and men despised the Japanese and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters
under any circumstances. The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind, which
induced a confidence without readiness and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime
standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor, as a cause of our defeat, was
even more important than the element of surprise.rf
.--,:agf,maimummugg
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Rfi Checklist 2
A Checklist of Key Warning Indicators
F�Pynthia Grabo, a leading DOD warning officer during the
Cold War, boiled down her extensive research on strategic warning
into the following five risk factors for surprise attacks:
Intentions:
Feasibility:
Capabilities:
Options:
Perceived
risk:
actorthe mmit e 0 so,MP'
that,goa
ideological obession?
Is that objective obtainable via military or coercive means, at least under certain
optimal circumstances that the potential actor thinks achievable?
Do other options exist short of military or coercive means to achieve
the objectives?
(U) These five risk factors can be condensed into two sets of questions
that analysts and IC teams can pose regarding potentially hostile actors
in their areas of responsibility.
(1)
Goal
fixation:
(2)
Mobilization:
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
s the presumed objective prompting the possible use of hostile action a national (b)(3)
o session? Examples of national goal fixation include France's desire to regain the
lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from Germany before World War I or Josef
Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev's desire to weaken the West's ties to Berlin in 1948-61,
before the construction of the Berlin Wall.
Note: From Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (pp. 100-103), by Cynthia M. Grabo, 2004.
(b)(3)
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Type II Surprise:
SYSTEM SHOCK
Demonstrators demand the ouster of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
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Type II Surprise:
System Shock
(b)(3)
System shock involves the abrupt failure or
rapid transformation of one or more complex systems.
It includes sudden transitions from stability to instability,
from order to disorder, from boom to bust. In Type II
surprise, the focus is not on any unified actor but on a
system or set of systems (see figure 5).
�nA system can be a nation, a political
arrangement, a country or regional economy,
or a multi-ethnic community.
sn It can also be a multilateral organization, alliance,
or empire, such as communist Yugoslavia or the Soviet
bloc during the Cold War.
he action in Type II surprise is the result of manifold
human actions and reactions, but the outcomes are not
the result of design by any one actor.
In contrast to the action in Type I surprise, system
shocks usually take place in a more geographically
diffused place (a country or a region) in a somewhat
longer period of time�weeks, months, or even
years�but the rate of change is much faster than in
"normal times."
In Type II surprise, once-stable regimes and
systems can quickly unravel after a long period of
apparent solidity.
Subtypes and Examples of
System Shock
Theilverthrow of a Government. Such shocks result
in to the ouster of a political leader, rather than the
he term "butterfly effect" is one of the terms used to
describe sensitive dependence on initial conditions in chaos
theory. The term gained popularity after its use in the early 1960s
by mathematician and meteorologist Edward Lorenz, who used
it to explain the drastic, nonlinear changes in weather forecasts
generated by his computer model of weather patterns. Lorenz
attributed these large differences in forecasts to slight variations in
his initial model settings, which he surmised could be caused in the
real world by the flapping of a butterfly's wings.
.(b)(3)
Defining a Complex System (b)(3)
A complex system can be defined as any whole (b)(3)
or entity consisting of diverse, interdependent,
interacting components that exhibit properties
not evident in the behavior of the individual (b)(3)
members�a trait known as emergence.
Relationships among the parts contain both
negative (dampening) and positive (amplifying)
feedback loops. They are nonlinear, which
means a small disturbance of the system may
result in big changes (the so-called butterfly
effect),h a proportional change, or no change at
all, depending on particular conditions, which
makes prediction even more difficult. Examples of
complex systems include ecological communities,
economies and social structures, global climate, � (b)(3)
living organisms, regional and global strategic '
relationships, and modern infrastructures, such as
telecommunications or energy.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
transformation of the social, political, or economic order. (b)(3)
Examples include the ouster of President Ferdinand
Marcos in the Philippines in 1986, the fall of President
Mobutu Sese Seko in then Zaire in 1997, and the
toppling of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan (b)(3)
in April 2010. (b)(3)
The Failure of a State. Such failures are caused by the (b)(3)
state's weakness and inability to adapt after one or more
shocks, such as acute sectarian or ethnic strife. Such
state failures are often associated with widespread social(b)(3)
dislocation and hardship as well as with other types of
system shock, including revolutions and civil wars.
Examples include Afghanistan during 1992-96 and(b)(3)
2001-02, Somalia during 1991-2004, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in 1997-2002, Bosnia in
1992-95, and Lebanon in 1975-90.
f11\11
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Figure 5
Anticipating System Shock
Abrupt failure or transformation of a complex system
or set of systems (such as a state, empire, or economy)
�
Rapid transformation of a complex system
or systems�a state, economy, or international
organization�or the rapid failure of a maladaptive
system (an empire, an alliance, or a war effort)
Bawler
0
System complexity, chaos, and randomness
-Perception
�
Inherent unpredictability of the tipping points that lead to nonlinear changes�the
effect
butterfly
�
Observer's tendency to make straight line extrapolations
�
Difficulty of timing the onset of a system shock
.os,tery.acji�,e,csensitnu
'`..' eardir81in
ous�Uecurrerices
Source: Based on a review by a senior CIA analyst of more than two dozen
cases of intelligence surprise experienced by US, British, French, Israeli, and Soviet services
between 1939 and 2010.
JAN 13 OREA 12-556INDD(466022)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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II. System Shock
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US Embassy personnel in Tehran--taken hostage by
Iranian militants shortly after the fall of the Shah of Iran�
are paraded in front of photographers. The collapse of the
Shah's regime in 1979 demonstrates the rapidity with which
system shocks can occur, as well as the lasting effects that
such shocks can inflict on a wider region for years and
decades to come.
The Onset of a Revolution. Revolutions that sweep
away an entire sociopolitical order and replace it with
something different are rare. They include the revolutions
in Russia, China, and Cuba; the uprising against the
Shah of Iran and the emergence of an Islamic state in
1978-79; the breakup of the Soviet empire in 1989-91;
and the dismantlement of the apartheid system in South
Africa in the early 1990s.
A Severe Recession or Grave Economic Calamity. In
the economy, a system shock can originate in a specific
market�the stock market, real estate, the financial
sector, a fast-growing industry�and spread to an entire
national or regional economy. The initial shock can be
induced by an asset bubble that bursts or by a physical
disruption of critical supplies because of war, embargoes,
or labor trouble.
Examples include the Great Depression and, on
a lesser scale, the global financial crisis. The twin oil
shocks of the 1970s�caused by pricing policy of the
OPEC oil cartel after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and
the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, respectively�are
examples of supply-origin shocks.
Environmental catastrophes�such as the accident
at the nuclear plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine, in the USSR
Famines caused by state actions that are motivated by
ideological ambition, such as the large-scale Ukrainian famine
of 1932-33 (early in Josef Stalin's rule) or Mao Zedong's Great
Leap Forward in 1958-61, are more akin to Type I surprise�
sudden hostile action�in their origins and in their effects on the
victim population.
Communal violence includes ethnic, tribal, linguistic, or
religious disturbances that involve violence or the threat of violence
and damage to property.
in 1986�or famines' because of natural disasters,
poor land use, or inept state policies can also trigger
system shocks.
Poor central bank management of the money (b)(3)
supply can lead to hyperinflations, such as the one that
plagued Weimar, Germany, during the early 1920s or
Zimbabwe in the 2003-08 period.
The Outbreak of Communal Violence. The outbreak (b)(3)
of communal violence may illustrate system shock
if it is primarily because of an unplanned flareup of
longstanding social or ethnic tensions sparked by a
random clash or incident, rather than to premeditated
action by states or armed groups, which may choose to
exploit the outbreak of communal violence as a pretext to
further their goals.
Examples of communal violencei include
intermittent Hindu-Muslim violence in India, the
Uighur-Han Chinese violence in mid-2009, the
anti-Uzbek riots in Kyrgyzstan in 1990, and the
anti-Chinese riots in Malaysia in 1969. Such
riots are usually localized and rarely lead to
state-backed genocide.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
The Collapse of an International Organization or (b)(3)
Alliance. The breakdown of an international organization
or alliance under mounting duress�unless it is the direct
result of hostile military action�is also an example of
system shock.
Some military alliances�the World War ll "Grand
Alliance" that defeated Nazi Germany, for example�
break up because they achieve their immediate
objective and then the member-states fall out over
postwar security arrangements.
Others, such as the Soviet-dominated Warsaw
Pact, crumble to the result of dramatic changes in
regime type or collapse of the dominant member.
Still others fall victim to irrelevance and poor
leadership, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization in the 1970s.
Barriers to Early Perception of
Type II Surprise
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
There are two key barriers to early perception (b)(3)
of Type II surprises, which tend to be obscured mostly by
the unpredictability and uncertainty inherent in complex (b)(3)
affairs, rather than by the secrecy of hostile actors.
Real-World Complexity, Chaos, and Chance.
Tumultuous events that engulf participants and
onlookers alike�such as revolutions, state failures, the
breakup of empires, and financial crises�result from
the unceasing interplay of countless diverse variables,
most of which are interdependent. The longer the list of
II. System Shock
30
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Patterns of Financial Bubbles:
One Economist's View
The features of. . . manias and financial crises are never identical, and yet there is a
similar pattern. The increase in prices in commodities or real estate or stocks is associated
with euphoria; household wealth increases and so does spending. There is a sense of 'We
never had it so good'. . .
. . Rational exuberance begins to morph into irrational exuberance, economic euphoria
develops and investment and consumption spending increase. There is a pervasive sense
that it is 'time to get on the train' . . . Asset prices increase further. The seers in the
economy forecast perpetual economic growth and some venturesome ones proclaim no
more recessions�the traditional business cycle .. . is obsolete.
. . . An increasingly large share of the purchases of these assets is undertaken in
anticipation of short-term capital gains and an exceptionally large share of these purchases
is financed with credit . . . Then the asset prices peak, and then begin to decline . . .
. . The decline in the prices of some assets leads to the concern that asset prices will
decline further and that the financial system will experience 'distress.' The rush to sell
these assets before prices decline further become self-fulfilling and so precipitous that it
resembles a panic .. . The implosion of a bubble has been associated with declines in the
prices of commodities, stocks, and real estate, and often these declines have been associated
with a rash or a financial crisis. Some financial crises were preceded by a rapid increase in
the indebtedness of one or several groups of borrowers rather than by a rapid increase in the
price of an asset or security. Yr
F7--Charles P. Kindleberger in Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial
Crises, 2005�three years before the 2008 financial crisis.
Economic analysts can assess the resiliency of an economic system's financial
sector, monitor early indicators of rapid inflation in assets prices, and brainstorm the broad
economic, political, and social consequences if an asset bubble were to burst.
JAN 13 OREA 12-312INDD(463892)
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Anticipating Irrationality?
An economic expert on financial crises, Charles
P. Kindleberger, once listed some phraseology
historically applied to speculative bubbles:
Ct.. . Manias.. . insane speculation.
blind passion . .. financial orgies. . . frenzies
... feverish speculation . . wishful thinking
. .. intoxicated investors. .. turning a blind
eye.. . a fool's paradise ... overconfidence. .
. overspeculation . overtrading . . . a raging
appetite .. . a craze. .. a mad rush to expand.il
Economic analysts have to be alert to
occasions when the strongly positive feedback
loops associated with the early stages of a bubble
develop, resulting in "herd behavior" that belies
assumptions about rational economic actors.
-.1205=VMarGarWrIfUg2M,11g.4.7i. ,2:1,12=7,20,,ONIWAX'St&reZVMMLIMM112d1=74a-LittelLa.
actors and factors at play, the harder it is for observers to
disentangle causal relationships or distinguish between
clues that are relevant ("signals") and those that are
not ("noise").
� Frequently, the causes and effects of accelerating
instability blur when one variable�such as economic
performance�is so tightly linked to other variables,
including labor peace, tax revenues, welfare state
outlays, and political stability.
.n Natural disasters, accidents, blunders, weather, and
chance further complicate strategic foresight by adding
a bewildering element of randomness.
Straight Line Extrapolations. Historical studies
of intelligence failures and recent research into cognitive
science both suggest that expectations that "tomorrow
will look like today" are deeply rooted. Most human
beings�including the foreign leaders and institutions
that analysts monitor�have an ingrained need for order
and predictability. On a day-to-day basis, analysts'
expectations that any change in the short term will be
modest and incremental will usually be borne out.
� Most organizations�state bureaucracies,
militaries, political parties�generally try to maintain
an orderly state of affairs and adhere to standard
operating procedures. The customs and protocols of
diplomatic relations and international organizations
channel and contain quarrels via orderly procedures
and established patterns of interaction.
�
The Search for Universal
Indicators of Political Instability
Intelligence organizations and political
scientists have long sought reliable indicators of
looming political instability that are valid across
systems and regions�so far with only modest
success (see figure 6). Many experts deny such
universal indicators even exist because of the
importance of national and local idiosyncrasies
and the sheer indecipherability of foreign actors.
However, a contributor to the CIA journal Studies in
Intelligence in the 1980s noted that, although the
existence of reliable, truly universal indicators is
doubtful, the presence of a youth bulge is often a
common denominator of political instability.
� The author observes that young
people are generally more volatile than older
people, have less in the way of vested interests
to lose, and are more willing to protest. Thus,
"if in the relevant population [nation, city, or
ethnic group], the youth bulge hits a certain
[undetermined] high percentage, a major
change becomes more likely." A youth bulge
skewed toward young males, especially in poor
countries, may be a particularly acute early
indicator of sociopolitical instability.
The same author notes the importance
of monitoring possible breaches of "implicit
promises and bargains"�expectations shared
by the leaders and the led regarding minimally
acceptable standards for national security and
honor, domestic order, economic well-being,
and state accountability. Breaches of such
understandings can, under the right conditions,
lead to a powerful backlash among hitherto
acquiescent populations.
(b)(3)
_azatrrazarwirgl
(b)(3)
(P) (3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
�._
Status quo�oriented leaders bent on keepinc(b)(3)
power have a vested interest in projecting an image
of strength, steadiness, and invulnerability�an image (b)(3)
that may influence both the local populations and the
IC analysts observing them.
Taken together, these factors often buttress (b)(3)
analysts' status quo assumptions, even as system
volatility is increasing.
II. System Shock
32
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figure 6
Triggers of Instability: The Importance of Precipitating Events
A trigger of political instability can be any catalyzing event that prompts significant numbers of once apathetic
or intimidated citizens to take action against a government. Such triggers can take a wide variety of forms, depending
on regime type, culture, popular grievances, and the state of civil society. Such triggers are usually unpredictable, driven
by tactical conditions, and not always unobservable to outsiders�especially foreigners. Most governments can usually
ride out one or two such triggers, unless they happen in rapid succession or the regime botches its follow-up response,
resulting in a radicalization of once apathetic citizens.
:
k e of 'Rugger %
� - .
� ,, ,.:
� taA4.W.P
141 I dan Destabilize a PilliikalW
iDegree
a&stem - �
of Vteclictabihty 9
14
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Iirlg 11-,6 b eritiat o dsitiornStSi 1::,take ,.actio
Very crs,c-, esponse',1
i
e en e nt
�go_
d symbolic
act .0 rbte'S ,i..
�
ituatiop
Snowballing
Destabilizes regime; stretches or
Very low. Response is
local protest
strains local security forces; may provoke bloody
government crackdown.
situation dependent.
:,..
Eli td 'defections,t,Undercutsriartait'VeK)
- 4,, P{J.,s,i,4"ifq,,q,1-;',..1;:ii. - ,3s- .
O:Veintne
, E'. Coup plotters
Very ow
.:aid power,grabs 'r4-
,siiiciyding cou ,
unityi'llf.Vit pera i t itraets.sleb. leaders hi
.., .:
e en ,orrsecree for success
'
Natural or
Botched or ineffective response exposes
Low. Some weather-related
earthquakes are More
in terms of general location,
civil disaster
weak state capacity, ineptitude, or indifference
of leaders,
disasters or
predictable
vulnerability.
4. , f .:;
ec huff
q ,,,:' ,4,,;x,,, ,
Impedes1 (Weil:triter' -.ss.a...bilit. to act
Moderate-' Leadersten
health but enefal;effect�0 '
diseases are predictable
' ,,Ars,i.,zais- 5:, .
ect;4'raise0;, 0.1, 6 ',,about' ea er01 6ssttece*Orrs
rules"Jandcountry sfuture :4m rom ,ambitious
rivl elites o-take ',=action
rice ill
age and some,.
health" sudden e
of ea er "i n ,
Rigged or
�
orsentit
,rVA;
to,pdhpriS
Alffi,�?`-ei,rSYt'j4'4W4g',
- erceirye
,
Orl'e
Moderate. Presence of
NGOs in some countries
to hide.
Exposes government's lack of
stolen election
..,,
legitimacy; galvanizes people to take to streets;
may provoke external criticism or sanctions,
experienced
makes it harder
uts,,we ars,ian iye 1 od _v.o c104'enr,
0 erate,4y.ht c.onorrucr,-,
-
, ,p1,,,,,,N,- ,,t,
.econorriic'
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heealise o
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gpernr,hpri,
q0r0fta
'at risk; m increaS'eseiiSef:O es efationv,reduces'.
i';',WW''1141',07,Wr:-.'� '
'citizens toleranceelite':fofs t' corruption
t.aitbr�Tr:prtyateysctb.tact.9,rsTi4y.
signal?�approaching7.,tippingipdirir
Mismanaged
national
Exposes government's failure to fulfill
Moderate to high.
war effort;
security fiasco
its fundamental duty to protect the nation; strains
civil-military relations; may reveal shortcomings of
intelligence services.
ar
ressure
e'.'Se Cif�
an; emora tze:elites`-ran ,!embolden
,Moderate,,to'f;higb,:iFbreign*:
,inerea'se'iiii.
frontOilesi
outsiders,, oSSIO foreignpatron ot.the;iMpositionro
...
ontsi 'e,sanctions;:q , OW o lows'iri�l weakening
i'e' une:'
nhients!i,stateMents:and,aCtidns-:,
, n , _yerJ
mill:ofteptie,o1),seryOle:
JAN 13 OREA 12-552INDD(466025)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
33
II. System Shock
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Aids To Anticipating Type II Surprise
Traditional intelligence sources are often of
limited use in anticipating Type ll surprise, because
system shocks often result from cascades or "tipping
points"�when a system transitions rapidly from apparent
stability to instability�that not even the actors within the
system can accurately forecast.
Herd effects and reinforcing feedback
loops can rapidly destabilize or shatter a once-stable
system more quickly than the typical reaction times of
traditional intelligence reporting and analysis cycles.
Intelligence reporting that comes into the
analyst's work station is "old" news. Whether it was ,
collected only minutes, hours, months, or years ago, it
provides a picture of what once was�not necessarily
what will be.
Analysts' long-established mental models
and paradigms will no longer reflect the fast-changing
situation on the ground, as a tipping point looms.
IC analysts could therefore benefit from
supplementing scrutiny of intelligence reporting with other
means to enhance strategic warning of system shocks.
These approaches and concepts focus on improving
analytic anticipation of system shocks by:
Assessing the potential brittleness and
fragility of apparently stable systems.
Enhancing awareness of the signs of rapid
change in complex systems.
Applying far-domain analogies from other
fields, particularly the sciences, to anticipate phase
transitions in intelligence targets.
� Widening the range of imaginable outcomes.
nticipate System Shifts and Tipping Points.
ere is a growing body of scholarly and popular literature
on the dynamics of nonlinear change in various domains.
In journalism, academia, and intelligence, the use of such
terms as "tipping points," "phase transitions," and "black
swans" have become widespread. Awareness of even
the basics of complex adaptive systems�reinforcing
feedback loops, snowball effects, herd behavior,
nonlinearity�can help analysts get ahead of the curve,
without waiting for hard intelligence to come in after the
system shock has already occurred.
Although sophisticated mathematical
modeling is required to fully exploit the potential
of complex systems analysis, even a qualitative,
graphics-based approach to the actors and the
feedback channels can help analysts map a
system's interactions and assess its vulnerability to
system shock.
:
P
On Black Swans
Black swan" events�a term popularized by
author and philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb in
2007�are extreme events outside the realm of
popular expectations. They are difficult to model
and carry heavy impacts, such as the rise of the
Internet or the global financial crisis.
Complex systems that have artificially
suppressed volatility tend to become extremely
fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no
visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm
and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks
accumulate beneath the surface . .. These
artificially constrained systems become prone to
black swans�that is, they become vulnerable to
large-scale events that lie far from statistical norms
and were largely unpredictable to a given set of
observers.. . catching everyone off guard/3
Essayist and philosopher Nassim Nicholas
Taleb and scholar Mark Blyth in an essay
from 2011 in Foreign Affairs magazine on the
LArab Spring.
(p)(3)
(b)(3)
b)(3)
(b) (3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Analysts can pursue a complex systems
scoping analysis to identify the most important (b)(3)
actors in a system, the basic rules for modeling actor
behavior�such as maximizing profits for a company (b)(3)
or bolstering security for a small country�and the
system's most important and volatile networks. (b)(3)
This assessi-nent makes linkages explicit
and highlights those situations when herd behaviors
can intensify the effects of an initial perturbation in a
once-stable system.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Employ Far-Domain Analogies. Analogies from
the realms of engineering, medicine, and the sciences (b)(3)
can help IC analysts conceptualize sudden dramatic
departures from a seemingly stable equilibrium in the
regions or issues they follow. Such analogies should not
be transferred automatically across domains, but they
can spur creative thinking about possible discontinuities
in many analytic disciplines (see figure 7).
� For example, concepts such as the "butterfly
effect"�originally derived from meteorological
modeling�can illustrate the idea that small initial
changes may produce nonlinear results (or sensitive
dependence on initial conditions), such as was the
case in Tunisia when a minor altercation between a
fruit vendor and a low-level civil servant triggered the
unrest that deposed strongman Ben Ali in 2011 after
28 years in power.
Continued on page 38
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
II. System Shock
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Figure 7
Far-Domain Analogies: Aids To Anticipating Discontinuities
Page 1 of 2
Concepts for rapid change from other disciplines or domains can help spur analysts thinking about the ways
that discontinuities might crop up in the systems that they monitor. Simply brainstorming the types of "seismic forces"
that may build up under an autocratic government, for example, can help analysts think creatively about the forms that
a "phase transition"�a rapid transition from one state to another, from predictability to unpredictability�may take in
their areas of analytic responsibility. Similarly, employing the analogy of "brittleness" from materials science to diagnose
a maladaptive system�an alliance, an international organization, or an armed force under severe strain�may help
analysts to think about system vulnerabilities in a new way.
, ..., . ,. �,,,
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,
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�
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i IA *.t,,
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. --....., ., . .
Structural
failure
Engineering
Failure of subsystem or
system to adapt to new stresses placed
on it
se,,q ..!ar;regin*.!inrayelip
ire; such as the Soviet bloc
oslayia
Breakup of an alliance or international
organization; such as the collapse of the
League of Nations, SEATO
i'dtercb'd�dc
kaYnmzF):?_
s em,:;,
Failure ma
_
at:tsar:11w
qspiContagion/
lover effects
Epidemiology
Rapidly accelerating spread
of behavior
rpread of financial panics,
stock bubbles, pandemics, computer
viruses, fads
arthquake/
avalanche
Geology
Sudden unleashing of
formerly pent-up system strains or
tensions, resulting in system shock and
destabilization
e evolution of the global balance
ower; such �the system transition in'
ostcornmunist states
Onset of a revolution that ousts the old
regime; such as the revolutions in Russia
or China
ystem,such as communist in.
astern Europe and the of
seCulr,.,diC't:torsh'i.PS:hi:'Egypt. and Tunisia
efOre:201-1'�
JAN 13 OREA 12-553IND0(466024)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3);b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
35
II. System Shock
UNC1 IICC V
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igure
Far-Domain Analogies: Aids To Anticipatin
(b)(3)
Discontinuities [Continued]
A irialogy
Chigul#1
11117 ' 't.
Helpg , ystsltb Better
.. ,
, nderstand
Exfitriples.
A
Dolliam
Butterfly
Small initial changes
echnological innovation and I
effect/Snowball
effect
Meteorology
that lead to large variations in
long-term conditions
1
usion; crisis escalation
Perfect storm
:efeoiolti
areo' ..�. :.,,
f'cm inatiohs
'Tv.21.e.4.g.,
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nse o 614 a ,Tc, no o Ica
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as e erno Ifnuele
en
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Physics
i
Threshold number
Spread of the Internet, computer use,
chain
reaction
of people or
self-sustaining
agents to trigger a
phenomenon
social
races;
networking media; regional arms (b)(
mass unrest
FITV
-- 'Popular
Tipping
.
-
1 I
:N;,,,-.,:,--. b
a i ,adce er�6ns inThe
a &Ise 'of:a e iesSion,4riajor, 1
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on practices

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ppints,
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.
swans"/wild
cards
"Black
sociology
Popular
"Random or extreme,
Assassinations; extreme terrorism; I
hard-to-predict shocks
onset of World War I; diffusion of
disruptive technologies
Herd
-.
ljZoology/R4
id imitation or coied
Sread'o mangial
behaviors beliefs;.'coordinated to
Without planned directionrrimiitta.48719
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b)(3)
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)(i)
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(b)(3)
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)(3)
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(b)(3)
b)(3)
(b)(3)
JAN 13 OREA 12-553IN0D(466024) (b)(3)
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The term "contagion," originally from epidemiology,
is often used to describe the spread of financial or
political instability from one country or region to areas
previous thought stable (immune) from such volatility.
"Brittleness"�a concept borrowed from
materials science�can be applied to political systems
that have endured over time but that may yet be
vulnerable to unforeseen shocks. This far-domain
analogy is particularly applicable to personalist
authoritarian states that have not adapted to social or
technological changes and that may be vulnerable to
swift overthrow if a political challenge arises suddenly or
from an unseen direction. Analytic teams can brainstorm
the pillars of traditional authority in the countries or
institutions that they follow and examine the relative
degree of brittleness of each pillar, over time.
nAPPLICATION
Analysts can list or brainstorm in small
groups the possible discontinuities that may loom in
their areas of analytic responsibility. Using a handful
of far-domain analogies for massive discontinuous
change�earthquakes, perfect storms, "black swans,"
phase transitions�can spur creativity. Such metaphors
for big change can help analysts get past status quo
assumptions and dispel entrenched mind-sets
regarding the permanence of only linear or evolutionary
change. For example, analysts might regularly ask the
following questions:
What sorts of fault lines exist in my area
of analytic responsibility�such as the aspirations of
a rising social class versus the power and privileges
of an entrenched autocratic ruler, the enduring
enmity between two ethnic or religious groups, or
the irreconcilable goals of two parties locked in an
enduring strategic rivalry?
With these fault lines in mind, what keeps
the lid on? How strong are those forces for restraint?
Might these inhibitors be weakening?
What factors might bring those latent
antagonisms into open conflict? What might make
an "earthquake" more likely? What might trigger a
catastrophic event?
What might happen after such a catastrophe
occurs? The discussion should include the
nonobvious, indirect, and long-term effects, as well as
the more immediate, likely, or obvious ones.
(b)(3)
Conduct War Games or Crisis Simulations. Apart (b)(3)
from their utility in assessing the risks of sudden hostile
action, these exercises can also help analysts game out
a complex sequence of events. A war game or simulation
is a technique designed to model�either rigorously or
creatively�the operations and responses of a real-world
process, organization, or system over time. No other tool
is as helpful in scoping the dynamics and in bounding
the imaginable outcomes of multiple interactions among
many interdependent actors, such as those precipitated
by the launch of a separatist movement or the escalating
tensions caused by a radical state on the brink of
acquiring nuclear weapons.
Academic studies�amply supported by centuries
of military experience with simulations�demonstrate
that no other method consistently provides players with
a more realistic sense of the volatility, time pressures,
perceptions, and risks of unexpected moves by actors
in a strategic game environment.
Simulations can also provide players with a
laboratory to challenge assumptions, test the readiness
of actors for escalation and discontinuities, and explore
the effects of randomness, friction, and wild cards on
crisis scenarios.
APPLICATION
As a historian of technological failures, Charles
Perrow in the 1980s examined "normal accidents"�
his term for the "inevitable" failures of tightly coupled
technological systems, such as nuclear power
plants, space vehicles, and oil rigs. Other analysts of
technological systems speak of "cascading failure."
Perrow's concepts can be applied to
complex political and economic systems, such as
the EU, the Chinese Communist Party, or the global
financial system.
Analysts planning a simulation can ask,
"What are the 'normal accidents' waiting to happen?"
in their areas of analytic responsibility�such as the
inability of a stagnant authoritarian system to manage
a serious economic downturn. They can then examine
what other systems�economic, security, or military�
may be at risk of spillover effects should the political
system fail.
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37
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Identify and Monitor Breached Social Contracts.
Just as deep understanding of a potential foe's strategic
red lines is critical to assessing the risks of a surprise
attack, so is awareness of informal social contracts�the
unwritten expectations of accountability and obedience
between the rulers and the ruled�critical to the
assessment of political stability.
Implicit promises and bargains are key
elements of political stability. Such understandings
limit uncertainty and set ground rules, according to one
intelligence officer involved in instability analysis. When
a social contract is breached, it creates preconditions
for political instability.
Examples of such breaches might include
blatant electoral fraud, a policy blunder, flagrant
corruption, scandalous conduct by an unpopular
member of an autocrat's inner circle or family, or
unprovoked violence against unarmed protestors,
especially if such breaches are captured in visual
media that can be disseminated widely.
APPLICATION
Periodic reviews of the terms of various
country-specific social contracts and of possible signs of
a violation may tip off political analysts to an erosion of
legitimacy that often precedes a political system shock.
Analysts can ask, "Is country X now breaking
an implicit social contract, or is it likely to do so in the
near-term future?"
Seasoned substantive experts are the best
sources for identifying the terms of implicit promises
between the leaders and the led and for assessing the
indicators of a possible breach.
t ,=r.vmm.xuaaea,
Conduct "What If" and High-Impact Scenario
Analyses. Well-crafted scenarios and alternative futures
can also help analysts move beyond near-term tactical
assessment and straight line extrapolation. Academic
postmortems of various intelligence failures often point
to the penchant for single-point predictions�often (b)(3)
anchored around the yesteryear's status quo�as
the bane of sound strategic foresight. Well-depicted
scenarios that are based on valid key drivers and fleshed
out by multidisciplinary experts can widen readers' range
of imaginable outcomes.
APPLICATION
IMO
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(10)(j)
"What If" analysis involves postulating that (b)(3)
a possible discontinuity has already occurred. This
allows analysts to sidestep irresolvable debates over the
likelihood of the event and focus on the possible drivers,
proximate causes, and signposts of the postulated (b)(3)
event. Analysts can work backwards to, envision one or
more plausible paths to the event and reason forward to
assess its direct and indirect implications.
High-impact scenario analysis is similar. It (b)(3)
allows analysts to move beyond status quo assumptions
and expectations of small-scale change and focus on the
more worrisome discontinuities that could be looming.,
the probabilities of which are generally thought to be low
but are actually uncertain or variable. (b)(3)
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Unlike in the physical world, a shock in the
realm of human affairs does not typically result in a
swift return to a stable, if drastically altered, new status
quo. Instead, system shocks often lead to relatively long
stretches of grinding instability and unpredictability, as
various actors try to comprehend and cope with new
conditions, exploit or resist opportunities for further
change, and pick their way amongst the ruins of the old
order. Major wars, widespread regional unrest, and the
falls of empires are notorious for ushering in years and
decades of heightened instability in their turbulent wake. (b)(3)
Analysts working such intractable circumstances should
have little expectations of a rapid return to preshock
normalcy or stability.
Daisy Chains of System Shocks (b)(3)
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II. System Shock
38
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Type III Surprise:
TECTONIC TRANSFORMATION
nA Chinese high-speed train makes its way toward the main line.
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Type III Surprise:
Tectonic Transformation
(b)(3)
Tectonic transformation involves the alteration
of an entire domain or region, such as a continental
economy, a regional military balance, a belief system, or
technological network. Unlike sudden hostile actions or
system shocks, tectonic transformations are not discrete
events but extended historical processes, often lasting
years or decades (see figure 8).
They do not involve sudden or immediately
obvious change, but rather large-scale, cumulative
evolutionary changes that transform with gathering
momentum entire domains, along with the strategic,
political, and economic systems therein.
In Type III surprise, the main actor is a
national, regional, or global system�such as the
industrialized Western economies or the global security
system�made up of a huge number of interdependent
actors that include people, societies, states, and
institutions, none of whom control the domain. The
engine of change�for example, the emergence of
a revolutionary new technology, a compelling new
ideology, or a new global power�drives the gradual but
deep-rooted transformation of politics, society, economic
life, and military affairs.
�
In Type III surprise, the surprise is usually
not the main driver of change itselfbut rather the
social, political, economic, and military consequences
of that driver.
The widely distributed, cumulative nature
of tectonic change often eludes observers, including
intelligence organizations. The changes associated
with Type III surprise are usually imperceptible at first
and then deceptively inconspicuous�"hidden in plain
sight"�compared with the day-to-day "crises" featured
in much of the global media.
Subtypes and Examples of
Tectonic Transformation
Economic Transformations. Sustained,
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techniques vastly increase long-term labor productivity
and overall productive capacity. These gains, in turn,
permit large jumps in living standards, food production,
public health, state capacity, and military potential.
These transformations are invariably linked to dramatic
changes in business organization, working conditions,
and producer-consumer relations. Over time they also
transform politics, societies, and education. �
�Lilirhe Industrial Revolution that began in Great
Britain in the middle of the 18th century and that
made the United Kingdom the world's most powerful
state by the middle of the next century remains the
leading example.
Other examples include a unified Germany's
explosive industrial growth between 1870 and 1914,
the expansion of the aerospace industry in the
United States between 1930s and early 1970s, the
global revolution in information technologies since
World War II, and China's meteoric economic ascent
since 1979.
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accelerated improvements in tools, technologies, and
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Figure 8
Anticipating Tectonic Transformationa
(U) Sweeping changes in regional or global domains (such as
an interstate system, ideologies and religions, societal mores,
technology, or economy)
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Extensive long-term changes, fundamental
alterations of core technologies, economic systems,
demographic patterns, political allegiances, or
ideologies�often culminating in an epiphany, an event
that exposes the sweeping scale, significance of change
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The widely distributed nature of bottom-up change that is hidden in plain sight (b)(3)
The large scale of change�impossible for an observer to monitor in entirety
Scope, dimensions of change�too diverse, contingent to forecast accurately
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