LETTER TO HENRY CABOT LODGE FROM JOHN A. MCCONE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06593402
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: July 31, 2024
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2024
• Case Number: F-2014-01314
• Publication Date: September 19, 1963

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19 September 1963
The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
The Ambassador of the United States
Saigon, South Viet Nam
Dear Cabot:
I am taking this means of communicating with you in the
interests of privacy knowing that the use of the CIA channel,
restrictive as it is, would mean that a few people on both ends would
have access to my message to you.
I was told by Dean Rusk that you had proposed that General
Lansdale come out to assist you and, in order to provide needed staff
for contemplated operations, to replace Richardson as Chief of Station.
Rusk explained that you spoke most highly of Richardson and therefore
I assume that your suggestion was not because of dissatisfaction with
John but more because you felt his relationships with the regime,
and most particularly with Nhu, made it difficult for him to direct the
organization in accordance with your wishes, which I assume to mean
you feel a "change" in South Viet Nam government a must.
First, Cabot, I wish to emphasize that the Agency will reorient
the Saigon station in any practical way to meet your desires. Personnel,
including the Station Chief, can be replaced; the station can be
expanded or contracted and particular operations can be accelerated or
stopped altogether. However, our Chiefs of Station must work in greatest
intimacy with, and for that matter be directed by, a very large and
experienced staff under Mr. Helms, who are experienced in, and
understand the techniques .of, directing field operations in such activities
as positive intelligence, counterintelligence, covert political action,
paramilitary training and operations, etc- To have a Station Chief in
as an important a station as Saigon who is unacceptable to this organiza-
tion would be unmanageable. Unfortunately General Lansdale would not
be acceptable to the organization or to me personally. I will not go
into details as to why this is true but some time when we are together
I can tell you. Suffice it to say at this time that General Lansdale's
use in the manner you propose in your letter would create insurmountable
problems and therefore I must advise against it..
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I want to be abundantly clear however on Richardson. Despite
Dean's scatement that you hold John in high regard, I have reason to
believe a problem might exist out there. My reaaon is that I have
received the following report from a source that I consider responsible
and absolutely dependable and I quote - -Mike Dunn, Special
Assistant to Ambassador Lodge. had told Mr. Conein of our station
that Ambassador Lodge was going to get rid a Richardson. Dunn has
apparently spoken to other medium-level members of the station along
the same line. In short. Dunn's conduct has been designed to give our
station the impression that Mr. Richardson is a 'short-termer.' On one
occasion, Dunn asked Conein ?Do you think that Dave Smith (Richardsonrs
deputy) can run the station for a temporary period while a new Station
Chief is being sent out here? I - - -"
This kind of talk apparently is accepted as being true in both
the station and within our building here. I believe this most unfortunate,
God knows it is difficult enough to deal with the various agencies and
Interested parties in the complicated matters we are dealing with in
South Viet Nam without this kind of talk. Perhaps a word to Dunn on
this matter would be in order. Also a word to Richardson, if you have
the confidence in him which you apparently expressed.
Although I do not resist a change of Station Chief, I would
counsel against precipitous action if we intend to try to work out
any kind of an arrangement with the present regime even though on a
short range basis. Richardson has valuable contacts and the confidence
of some individuals in the regime, particularly Nhu, as well as certain
generals, and these might be lost with his departure. However if the
decision is to abandon all hope of working with the regime, then
Richardson probably should be replaced. I think he is pretty firm in
his mind that we must work with the regime for a period of time
becauie, in the first place, there is no apparent means of replacing
them and in the second there is no leadership on the horizon to take
over which would guarantee an improvement over our present situation.
In addition Richardson is a man of great experience. He has
been an area chief here (which is a position of very considerable
importance) and he has been Station Chief in such important places as
and elsewhere. However we do have a man
of satisfactory experience who has served with glat skill in other
trying situations and whom I would propose as a replacement for
Richardson if you desire Zolux removed.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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(2.;:a.Alayn 22,3 L
With reapect to general Lansdale, I would counsel against
sending him to Saigon unless it was for the purpose of conducting
a series of friendly meetings with Diem based upon the background
of Lansdale's personal relationship of many years' standing with Diem
and .a general recognition in Viet Nam and elsewhere that Lansdale
was Diem's "maker and advocate". However final decision on this
is yours and the Department's, not mine.
I am more disturbed over the situation that has developed in
South Viet Nam than any recent crisis which has confronted this
government. Neither I nor the Agency, nor the Intelligence Community,
harbor any fixed policy position. This is not our business. We do feel
it is our business, however, to analyze all available intelligence and to
estimate the prospects of success of a course of action under considera-
tion by the policy makers. We have no current intelligence nor
resulting estimate in hand which would lead us to the conclusion that
the present regime can be disposed of or that there exists a replacement
regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup
might not occur even before you receive this letter. Coup plotting is
reported almost daily and has been for the last 18 months. However,
my experience in this field tells me that coups that you hear about
usually donit happen.
A sample of our experience with your problem is contained in
the attached few pages of a review of our analysis of the pOlitical
situation in South Viet Nam since June, 1962, which I appended to my
daily report of yesterday to the Executive Committee.
On a personal note, I have just had a long visit with Ike and
reviewed the Viet-N-aro-situation in. Opine detail. kle realizes the problems
as he lived for many years with Diem's intransigence and his manner of
governing his people he felt would come to_no good -end. However he
urges great care and deliberation, redognizing as we all do, the carrying
off of a coup is no small task and even if successful the aftermath has
its own special problems. He is distressed over the violent press and
feels this in itself might make careful, objective appraisals difficult
as was the case in Cuba in 1958. **
With warm personal regards, and again let me assure you
of my desire to help you with your most trying and difficult task and of
my friendship,
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Attachment
Sincerely*
/S/
Join:. Iv/eConv.
Director
**Handwritten in here: Ike bleeds for you - hclillefpend - an,
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