SOVIET OBJECTIVES AT THE SUMMIT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06567859
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-01278
• Publication Date: April 28, 1972

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Soviet Objectives at the Summit
Setiet,
24
28 April 1972
No. 0860/72
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.WARNING
This. document contains information affecting the national
defense of. the United States, Within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793. and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
OROUP 1
txcLuorn /110114 AUTOMATIC
DOWNONADINO AND
OCCLAMPICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 April 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Soviet Objectives at the Summit
1. The main purpose of the summit meeting,
�in Soviet eyes, is to lift US-Soviet relations onto
a more amicable and more stable plane. This in
turn is intended to promote three Soviet objec-
tives: heading off the dangers that the USSR per-
ceives in the Sino-US rapprochement; promoting the
process of detente in Europe; and obtaining cer-
tain specific benefits in bilateral relations with
the US. At the same time, the summit poses two
dangers for Moscow: the chance of a failure, which
would not only compromise the USSR's objectives
but also discredit its leadership, and the risks
of shaking established dogma and alliance rela-
tionships which are inherent in close dealings
with the main imperialist rival.
2. This paper does not analyze the Soviet
interest in the various bilateral negotiations
scheduled to culminate at the summit. It is worth
noting, however, that the Soviet leaders have a
-real political need for a fair measure of success
in these agreements. A visible failure would in-
crease the criticism that has been expressed by a
small element of the population, would threaten to
derail Soviet detente projects in Western Europe,
and would make Chinese diplomacy appear as an even
more formidable danger. But for the same reasons
the USSR, while it wants specific bilateral agree-
ments, cannot afford to be seen to "lose" in the
negotiation of their terms.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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China
3. Several considerations have made a summit �
meeting desirable to the Soviets; China has made, it
virtually necessary. Moscow has been worried about
the possibility of improved Sino-US relations since
the. end of the Culttral Revolution in 1969 ushered
in a new phase of Chinese foreign policy. It was
nevertheless taken by surprise by the :rapid progres-
sion in 1971 from ping-pong diplomacy to a Presi-
dential visit. From the Seviet standpoint, Peking
is capable of any perfidy, And Moscow is also dis-
mayed at the unpredictability it perceives in US
behavior abroad. Some pride probably had to be
swallowed when the Soviets chose to follow the.
Chinese in inviting the President, but this seemed
leas important to them than the need to enter the
competition and to demonstrate to the US that im-
portant interests could be advanced or damaged in
relations with.the USSR. .
4, One Soviet objective at the summit will
be to probe the US about the state of its relations
with China and its further intentions there. Brezh-
nev's keen interest showed through in his speech on
20 March, when he said of Sino--US relations that
"the future, perhaps the near future, will show
'us how matters stand." This will be a delicate
matter, in which the Soviets will not want to ap-
pear overanxious, but they will surely listen at-
tentively to anything the President or his advisers
may volunteer about what transpired in Peking. If
they receive little satisfaction, they may pose di-
rect questions. Beyond that, their concern is so
great that it is not impossible that they will take
occasion to warn their visitors about the dangers
of closer dealings with China. They have already
tried to persuade various Americans of the frus-
trations in .store for anyone expecting reasonable
behavior from Peking, citing their own experience.
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5. In the past, the Soviets have doubtless
canvassed among themselves possible agreements
with the US that could be given an anti-Chinese
appearance. While such devices would suit them
admirably, they can have no expectation that the
US, at this stage of its relations with China,
would cooperate. They nevertheless expect that
a generally successful summit, in and of itself,
will manifest a degree of understanding between
the superpowers that will offset some of the rise
in Peking's prestige.
Western Europe
6. Europe will be an area of priority concern
to the Soviet leaders. during their talks with the
President. Their most immediate and pressing objec-
tive is to secure West German ratification of the
Soviet - West German treaty, and the Soviet mood in
late May will be influenced in large degree by the
outlook for ratification at that time. This is par-
ticularly true because of Brezhnev's close personal
association with the treaty. He reportedly told
Willy Brandt last fall that, if the treaty ran into
trouble, things would be "difficult" for him person-
ally. In any event, the Soviets can be expected to
try to use the summit to influence internal debate
on the treaty within West Germany. Beyond citing
the meeting as a palpable sign of improved East-West
relations, the USSR may make-various efforts to en-
list the President's help in stimulating favorable
West German parliamentary action on the treaty. It
may seek, for example, to elicit strong Presidential
endorsement of the treaty, in the hope that this
would have the desired effect in the Federal Repub-
lic.
7. One likely topic will be a Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Moscow
will press to obtain a clear US commitment to early
actions to convene a CSCE. Moscow holds the US largely
responsible for the delay in movement toward such
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a conference, as Kosygin made clear in a remark to
the Canadian ambassador on 14 April. He added that
at the summit, the Soviet leaders hope to "persuade
Mr. Nixon to adopt a more forthright attitude."
They may offer limited concessions and clarifications
on other issues--possibly a gesture with regard to
starting talks on force reductions, or a specific
understanding on the relationship between CSCE and
force reductions--in order to obtain a definite US
commitment to beginning CSCE. In making their pro-
posals for an early start to CSCE discussions the
Soviets will probably call attention to the Warsaw
Pact's expressed readiness to appoint representatives
to begin active preparations.
8. The Soviet leaders may well try to put off any
efforts to pin them down on some of the more difficult
procedural and substantive aspects of a CSCE on
grounds that they are flexible. This seems to be
basically true, although we know
that Brezhnev has expressed
or a particular CSCE format. In the sequence en-
visioned by Brezhnev, multilateral preparations
would be followed by a conference of foreign ministers
that would establish various commissions and working
groups. In the final stage the CSCE would be recon-
vened "at the highest accepted level." The Soviets
also hope that a CSCE would establish permanent
bodies to continue its work. These Soviet concepts
are calculated to complement French positions--part
of the "special relationship" Brezhnev feels he has
established with France. The Soviets, however, prob-
ably are not wedded to any particular method of con-
ducting a conference, provided certain minimum stand-
ards are met, chiefly the inclusion of East Germany
and 'stress on the inviolability of European bounda-
ries.
a preference
9. The only remaining formal obstacle to be-
ginning CSCE preparations is NATO's insistence that
a Berlin agreement, interpreted to include signature
of the Final Quadripartite Protocol, comes first.
This will present no problem to the Soviets if their
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--greRra
treaty with Bonn seems likely to be ratified. If
ratification looks like a sure thing after the 4 May
Bundestag vote, the Soviets may even begin to probe
the US on the possibility of signing the Protocol �
in a ceremony which could be linked to the President's
visit. They might suggest, for example, that Heath
and Pompidou be invited to Moscow for this purpose
at the conclusion of the summit.
� 10. The Soviets do not have much enthusiasm
for the subject of mutual balanced force reductions
(MBFR), which they view primarily as a Western pre-
condition for other detente moves. Initially they
will probably take the line that MBFR is something
for "us" to settle. Only when they are persuaded
that this approach is unprofitable are they likely
to undertake to engage in substantive discussions
of MBFR. To date, Soviet thinking on procedures for
conducting talks on MBFR has been even less clear
than on CSCE. Their preference appears to be for
MBFR to be handled by one of the working groups to
be set up by the CSCE--and therefore to be subordinate
to CSCE--but their attitude on this is probably not
rigid.�
11. At present, MBFR is at a procedural stale-
mate because of Soviet unwillingness to receive
Brosio, NATO's designated "explorer." In return
for concessions, in other areas, such as CSCE, the
Soviets may offer a way out of this impasse. Since,
in a sense, President Nixon will be replacing Brosio
as explorer, the Soviets may make some sort of com-
mitment that will enable MBFR to get on the track,
perhaps even agreeing to receive Brosio afterward.
The Soviets may make various other proposals as a
way of instilling life into MBFR discussions. One
such possibility is some sort of limitation on mili-
tary exercises, especially in East-West border areas.
Brezhnev reportedly raised this possibility at the
Warsaw Pact meeting last January in Prague. Such a
proposal would have the advantage of reducing ten-
sions without actually changing force levels and
without requiring complicated negotiations.
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The Middle East
12. The Soviets do not expect that real prog-
ress toward a Middle East settlement can be achieved
at the summit. .They will want to keep this problem
subordinate to their interests in bilateral rela-
tions, China, and Europe. They see no profit in
pushing their Arab clients to make further conces-
sions and no hope that the US can be induced to push
the Israelis. While making a record of fidelity to
the Arab cause, however, they may propose some way
of giving new impetus to the negotiating process.
13. The USSR has been concerned that the Egyp-
tians might conclude that only the US is capable of
�inducing some flexibility in the Israeli position
and that Cairo must therefore turn to Washington
for a settlement. The Soviets have been sensitive
to US efforts to facilitate an interim settlement
and proximity talks, and they are suspicious of the
implications of renewed dialogue between Cairo and
Washington. It is important for Moscow to have--
and to be seen to have--a major role in delibera-
tions affecting the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence
the Soviets may try to use the siimmit to return to
bilateral discussions on the Middle East, seeking
to foster the impression among the Arabs that some
new diplomatic momentum has begun. They may put
some scheme of this kind in the context of a pro-
posal for regular US-Soviet consultations, which
is discussed below.
14. The Soviet leaders will be prepared for
a US suggestion on mutual restraint on arms ship-
ments to the Arabs and Israelis. They. will probably
consider themselves in a rather good debating posi-
tion on this issue in view of the decline in Soviet
military deliveries to Egypt over the past several
months. The current pace of arms deliveries, higher
than the level prior to the June war in 1967, sug-
gests that Moscow is not appreciably increasing
Egyptian capabilities, but only maintaining them
at roughly their current level.
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15. Moscow can be expected to call attention
to this and to stress the defensive nature of the
weaponry provided to the Arabs. The Soviets may
point out, for example, that Egypt's bomber inven-
tory remains smaller than it was prior to the war
in 1967. In fact, the Soviets have at this point
delivered, broadly speaking, all the arms Egypt can
absorb and more, while withholding advanced offen-
sive weapons that might touch off a new round of
major. fighting. Thus the Soviets are likely to
stress the common interest in holding down arms de-
liveries. While they will probably criticize US
arms commitments to Israel, they may be generally
receptive to suggestions for tacit restraint.
16. The Soviets would probably not be willing,
however, to agree to any proposal for a formal,,ex-
plicit, Soviet-US agreement on curbing arms deliv-
eries to the Middle East. Moscow would expect a
vitriolic Arab reaction to such an arrangement as
long as Israel is occupying Arab territory. The
USSR would be afraid that such a move could endanger
the advances that it has made in the area over the
past several years--gains made largely by virtue
of its role as arms supplier. It will therefore
not want to go beyond, at most, a general under-
standing that would stop well short of verifiable
commitments.
Vietnam
17. Brezhnev and his colleagues got involved
in Vietnam in early 1965. They originally increased
Soviet support for the North Vietnamese in an ef-
fort to place themselves in a better position to
compete with China for the allegiance of foreign
Communists and other "progressives," and to refute
Chinese charges that Moscow had sold out to "im-
perialism." Since last summer, however, Peking's
own overtures toward the US have dissipated the
sting of Chinese charges of "Soviet-US collusion,"
and it is now less important for the Soviets to be
able to disprove Chinese allegations. Thus Moscow's
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priorities are no longer what they were when it be-
came involved in Vietnam seven years ago, although
the Soviets' basic commitment to Hanoi remains in
force and cannot be easily abandoned.
18. This new situation affects how the So-
viets look at Vietnam, but it may not have much
early impact on what they feel they can do about
the situation there. In weighing the options open
to them, the Soviet leaders probably have already
concluded that even if they took the extreme meas-
ure of stopping military aid to Hanoi, the Chinese
would probably increase their assistance and the
North Vietnamese would be able to carry on much as
before. Moreover, curtailment of Soviet aid to
North Vietnam, or any form of public break with
Hanoi, would expose the USSR to charges of Soviet
perfidy and cowardice which, though less painful
than they might have been at an earlier stage,
would still be highly damaging, both at home and
abroad. Equally important, the Soviets would fear
that the US, viewing such concessions as a major
sign of weakness, would press its advantage in
other areas.
19. In discussing their arms aid to North
Vietnam, the Soviets will probably attempt to con-
trast what they have given Hanoi with what Saigon
has received from the US. They are likely to argue
that what,they have provided is primarily "defensive"
in character and to stress that Moscow has denied
Hanoi certain kinds of sophisticated weaponry that
have been made available to other Soviet clients.
The Soviet leaders will almost certainly refuse to
undertake any explicit commitment to curb their arms
aid to Hanoi. They may be willing to hold out some
hope, however, that if the present offensive ends
indecisively they will thereafter commend the re-
sumption of negotiations to their ally and hint that
their military support is not limitless.
A Continuing Formal Relationship with the US?
20. The present Soviet leadership has a pro-
pensity for formalizing its relationships with other
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powers in international documents. In the recent
past it has signed treaties with states it supports--
Egypt, India, and Iraq. It has also negotiated
protocols on regular bilateral consultations with
Western states with which it is not unfriendly--
France and Canada. The USSR evidently regards these
protocols as useful in providing continuing access
to other governments, in laying some inhibitions
on the other partner should it contemplate anti-
Soviet actions, and in signifying a shift in Cold
War alignments.
21. The USSR would see advantages in achieving
such a relationship with the US. For one thing, it
would permit them to tell their Arab clients that
they were dealing actively with the US on the Middle.
East problem. With respect to bilateral relations
themselves, the Soviets probably judge that regular
consultations would help to keep US-Soviet relations
in reasonably good repair. Moscow would also like to
have openchannels for discussing such issues of com-
mon concern to the superpowers as nuclear non-pro-
liferation and crisis management. The Soviets would
expect this arrangement to impress the Chinese with
the limits of their own potentialities. It would
also further the sense of detente in Europe, while
simultaneously causing US allies to worry about
American reliability. Last June, a senior Soviet
diplomat in Paris solicited the reaction of a US
diplomat to the suggestion that Moscow and Washing-
ton conclude such a protocol. If the Soviets find
the US reluctant, they might fall back to a proposal
that the joint communique endorse the principle of
regular consultations at a reasonably high level.
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