GROWING RISK TO ETHIOPIAN JEWS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06554238
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-01488
• Publication Date: April 23, 1991

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SUBJECT: Growing Risk to Ethiopian Jews
April 1991
Distribution:
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DISTRIBUTION
April 23, 1991
EXTERNAL
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Central Intelligence Agency
VVashingionll C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 April 1991
Growing Risk to Ethiopian Jews
Summary
Tigrean rebel gains since February raise new risks
for the 15,000 Ethiopian Jews--called Falashas by the
Ethiopians--who are still gathered in Addis Ababa
awaiting emigration to Israel. The paralysis or
collapse of President Mengistu's regime--which has
allowed a sporadic and controlled trickle of
emigration--could temporarily close off exit routes for
Falashas and spark widespread public unrest and looting
by Ethiopians resentful of the Falashas' relatively
better living standards. A subsequent rebel takeover
in Addis Ababa would almost certainly delay Falasha
emigration, even though the Tigrean insurgents, who
vocally oppose Israeli assistance to Mengistu in recent
years, probably would not directly target Falashas for
retaliation; indeed, rebel spokesmen have expressed
support for free emigration. Mengistu has long
rejected a large-scale Falasha exodus that would
attract widespread international attention, but the
Tigreans' intentions concerning an exodus of that size
are unknown. A new Tigray-dominated regime, however,
This typescript was prepared by Africa Division,
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa
Division, ALA, on
ALA M 91-20029
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would probably be willing to consider controlled
Falasha emigration if it believed such a policy insured
Western aid and goodwill.
The Falasha Emigration
About a year ago, nearly 20,000 Falashas, or more than 90
percent of the Jewish population of Ethiopia, abruptly left their
ancestral homes in Gonder Province and headed to Addis Ababa for
emigration to Israel that various Jewish organizations promised
to facilitate for the Falashas. The large numbers of migrants
initially strained the resources of US and Israeli charitable
organizations in Addis Ababa, and poor sanitation and housing led
to an increase in Falasha deaths from disease. Their living
conditions soon improved, however, through better coordination
and logistics by assistance groups.
The number of Falashas granted permits to emigrate each
month has been a source of tension between Tel Aviv and Addis
Ababa. The pace of emigration has fluctuated due to changing
bureaucratic procedures in both Israel and Ethiopia, as well as
Mengistu's desire to use Falasha emigration to induce Tel Aviv to
provide military assistance and to gain diplomatic favor in
Washington. During 1990, the number of Falashas entering Israel
monthly ranged from a low of 30 to a high of nearly 600.
Emigration reached almost 1,000 per month in January and February
this year, but stopped abruptly in early March as rebel military
successes mounted. Israeli officials told Washington that the
cut-off was due to Israel's refusal of Ethiopia's requests for
military aid, while Addis Ababa alleged that Israel attempted to
help the Falashas skirt certain exit regulations. Emigration
resumed following both US and Israeli diplomatic pressure on
Addis Ababa. Although Israel has apparently settled for a
departure rate of 1,000 per month, an Israeli official said
recently that Tel Aviv had a plan to bring the remaining 15,000
Falashas out of Addis Ababa in five days.
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Text Box
The Falashas
The Ethiopian Jews call themselves Beta Esrael or "House of
Israel," but are usually referred to as Falashas--"exiles" or
strangers"--by other Ethiopians. They practice a unique form of
Judaism based on the Bible, certain books of the Apocrypha, and
other post-biblical scripture, but uninfluenced by the ancient
and medieval rabbinic traditions that shaped European and Middle
Eastern Judaism. In the last century contact with Jewish
travelers and organizations broke their isolation and introduced
the Falashas to modern Judaism. Their original settlements were
principally in southern Gonder Province around Lake Tana, but
many also lived in northern Gonder and in Tigray Province; some
of these original Falasha communities were broken up during
Mengistu's villagization--relocation of peasants from scattered
rural homesteads to newly created villages nearby--efforts. In
1973, a Chief Rabbi of Israel officially recognized the Falashas
a Jews, making them eligible for immigration to Israel under the
Law of Return.
In their home areas, the Falashas were farmers or craftsmen,
whose work in pottery and blacksmithing was usually looked down
upon by other Ethiopians. In the last two years, Falashas in
Gonder had been periodically harassed and had property taken by
non-Jews who believed the Falashas were about to depart. In
early 1990, encouraged by Jewish charitable organizations, most
of the Jewish population of Gonder migrated to Addis Ababa. They
lived in the capital illegally at first in very poor rental
housing with open latrines and cooking areas and had considerable
difficulty adjusting to urban life. By late last year, however,
their living conditions--although still spartan--had improved
somewhat as support groups provided increased medical care,
housing assistance, and educational facilities. Israel provides
a monthly stipend and funding for emigration expenses, according
to the US Embassy.
This information is
Would Mengistu Permit an Emergency Evacuation of Falashas?
In our judgment, the Mengistu regime will continue to oppose
a massive airlift or other large-scale departure of the Falashas,
for fear of losing potential leverage in securing Israeli
military aid. Israel has previously supplied limited quantities
of arms directly to Addis Ababa to facilitate the Falasha
emigration, despite denials of a direct linkage, and lately
Ethiopian officials have been desperately canvassing potential
donors for assistance as the government's military situation has
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deteriorated. Ethiopian pressure on Israel and other sympathetic
governments for increased military aid almost certainly will
intensify as the rebel successes continue.
What is the Risk to Falashas if Law and Order Break Down?
Although Tigrean
People's Liberation Front (TPLF) rebels are reluctant to engage
in a direct and probably bloody attack on Addis Ababa and instead
plan to provoke a regime collapse by severing supply lines into
the capital, TPLF strategists have
not ruled out a direct assault. The loss of vital food supplies
or essential services caused by a siege of the city, a direct
attack on it, or the internal disintegration of the Mengistu
government could trigger civil unrest in the capital. In the
event of unrest, the Falashas--whom poor Addis Ababans almost
certainly view as relatively privileged and well fed because of
aid from the charitable organizations--may become targets of
violence. Israeli officials say that some Falashas--who are
scattered throughout the capital in rental housing--have noticed
that their homes are being "marked" or cased by envious
Ethiopians.
What are TPLF Attitudes Toward the Falashas?
In our judgment, the TPLF rebel leadership and its allies in
the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
would not retaliate against the Falashas for Israel's aid to
Mengistu. According to the US Embassy, Falashas who arrived in
Addis Ababa last year from rebel-held areas in Gonder Province
reported few instances of harassment by the TPLF. Indeed, they
reported that in Gonder the insurgents generally left them alone
and were less of a threat than government troops. Since the
Tigray rebels gained control of all of Gonder last month,
however, we have had no further information on the treatment of
the approximately 3,000 Falashas who remain in the province.
A Tigrean-led government probably would not oppose Falasha
emigration, but they might slow or temporarily suspend
departures, partly to�punish Israel for aiding Mengistu. In
recent conversations with US officials, EPRDF representatives
criticized what they viewed as Mengistu's sale of Falashas for
weapons, but also asserted that the Falashas should be free to
leave. Nevertheless, the EPRDF political program calls for the
formation of a broad-based provisional government in which all
Ethiopian ethnic groups will participate; the sudden departure of
even a minor group like the Falashas, especially if carried out
in a high profile, well publicized manner, could be viewed as an
embarrassment to Addis Ababa's "liberators," and could cause them
to delay emigration. Moreover, a new government would probably
require time to formulate its general policy toward all Middle
Eastern countries before making decisions on the Falasha issue.
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What is the Near Term Outlook?
Continued, orderly evacuation of the Falashas from Addis
Ababa may become more difficult, if not impossible, within the
next several months. As rebel forces move in on the capital,
military activity around the city would likely close the nearby
airfields. A collapsing regime in Addis Ababa is unlikely to
make an extraordinary effort to facilitate a large scale Falasha
exodus, especially if the officials needed for the activity are
themselves trying to flee. Although overland travel to Djibouti
or Kenya might be possible, as an Arab League member Djibouti
probably would oppose large-scale and well-publicized Falasha
emigration across its territory. The Kenyan Government likely
would allow transit of the Falashas, but the distance to Kenya is
greater.
In our view, of the 15,000 Falashas now in Addis Ababa,
those who remain during the critical end-game period probably
will have no choice but to ride out an unstable period following
either the internal collapse of the regime or a rebel assault on
the capital. They would be most vulnerable during a concurrent
breakdown of law and order accompanied by widespread looting and
settling of scores. Even if a new government is able to
reestablish order quickly/ we judge it would suspend Jewish
emigration temporarily as it reconstitutes a bureaucracy and
formulates its foreign and domestic policies.
We believe a new regime would probably not declare a
wholesale end to Falasha emigration, recognizing that the issue
is important to Washington and other potential donors.
International attention to the Falashas' fate, meanwhile, would
likely bring pressure on a new government to insure that the
Falashas are not harmed. Washington's keen interest in the
Falashas, however, could cause a new regime to hold at least some
of them as bargaining chips for aid, allowing small numbers to
leave to satisfy Washington but blocking a rapid, large-scale
exodus.
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Appendix
Israeli Involvement in Facilitating Falasha Emigration
Several American Jewish organizations, Falasha activists in
Israel, and the Israeli Government have pressed the case for
Falasha emigration to Israel. Tel Aviv arranged for their
emigration in small groups during Haile Selassie's reign, and in
1978 reportedly arranged an arms deal with Mengistu in return for
Falasha emigration. Israel's public announcement of the deal
soon afterwards, however, caused Mengistu to suspend emigration.
In 1984 and 1985, Washington assisted Israel's clandestine
airlift of some 8,000 Falashas under "Operation Moses."
Publicity again stopped the flow until Israel stepped up
diplomatic and military contacts with Ethiopian officials in
1988, renewing diplomatic relations in late 1989., Prime Minister
Shamir reportedly has taken a personal interest in the Ethiopian
Jews, because he was held prisoner in Ethiopia during the 1940s
by the British.
Despite Tel Aviv's repeated denials,
Israel recently has supplied and may be continuing to
supply Ethiopia with military assistance to encourage Falasha
emigration.
Although Israeli officials deny a
specific linkage to the Falasha issue, early last year Israel, by
its own admission, provided Ethiopia with 15,000 obsolete rifles
after reaching an agreement on Falasha emigration, according to
the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv has repeatedly told
Washington that no Israeli soldiers have been posted to Ethiopia,
but Israel may also have provided
Addis Ababa with .a limited number of military advisers.
requested training for a small number of military
personnel in Israel, and we believe that some Ethiopians
subsequently entered training programs there. Israel also
reportedly delivered 30,000 rifles to Ethiopia last month to
encourage stepped up emigration but rejected Addis Ababa's
request for cluster bombs and napalm. -Tel Aviv continues to deny
that it is currently providing Ethiopia with any lethal aid.
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