EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06535938
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2017
• Case Number: F-2014-00925

Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Al2 Section III
MERGENCY PROCEDURES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
3-3
Use Of Checklists 3-3
Definitions Of Landing Situations
3-3
GROUND OPERATION
3-3
Engine Fire
3-3
Brake, Steering, Or Tire Failure
3-5
Abandoning The Aircraft
3-5
Emergency Entrance
3-5
TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES
3-7
Propulsion System
3-7
Abort
3-10
Engine Failure
3-7
Drag Chute Failure
3-12
Double Engine Failure
3-9
Fuel System
3-12
Afterburner Failure
3-9
Fuel Pressure Low
3-12
Afterburner Nozzle Failure
3-9
Landing Gear and Tires
3-13
Fire
3-10
Main Or Nose Gear Tire Failure
3-13
Fire Warning-Takeoff Refused
3-10
Emergency Gear Retraction
3-13
IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES
3-15
Emergency Escape
3-15
Emergency Descent
3-19
Before Ejection
3-15
Fuel Dumping Procedures
3-20
Ejection
3-15
Normal Fuel Dumping
3-20
After Ejection
3-16
Emergency Fuel Dumping
3-20
Parachute Landings
3-16
Forward Fuel Transfer and
Bailout With Seat Inoperative
3-17
Fuel Dumping
3-21
Fire
3-18
Forced Landing Or Ditching
3-21
Fire Warning In-Flight
3-18
Smoke Or Fumes
3-18
Electrical Fire
3-19
3-1
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued
Propulsion System
3-21
Inlet Duct Unstart
3-21
Airstart
�3-31
Inlet Control Malfunction
3-25
Glide Distance
,3-31
Automatic Spike Control
3-25
Engine Shutdown
3-32.
Automatic Forward Bypass Control
3-26
Single Engine Flight Characteristic
333
Operation With Manual Inlet Control
3-26
Single Engine Air Refueling
3-34
Inlet Unstable
3-26
Single Engine Cruise
3-34
Failure Qf Spike To Schedule
Afterburner Flameout
3-34
Or Unstable
3-27
Afterburner Cutoff Failure
3-35
Compressor Stalls
3-27
Afterburner Nozzle Failure
3-35
Acceleration And/Or Overtrim
3-27
Oil Pressure Abnormal
3-36
Compressor Stalls In Descent
3-27
Oil Temperature Abnormal
3-37
Engine Flameout
3-29
Fuel Control Failure
3-37
Double Engine Flameout
3-29
Fuel Hydraulic System Failure
3-37
Other Systems
3-38
Fuel System
3-38
Flight Control System
3-42
Fuel Quantity Low
3-38
Flight Control Emergency Operation
3-43
Fuel Pressure Low
3-38
A Or B Hydraulic Failure
3-43
Fuel Tank Pressurization
3-38
A And B Hydraulic Failure
3-43
Fuel Boost Pump
3-39
SAS Emergency Operation
3-43
Fuel Sequencing
3-39
Trim Failure
3-50
Fuel Management With Engine Shutdown
3-39
Air Data Computor
3-51
Emergency Fuel
3-40
Pitot-Static System
3-51
Electrical Power System
3-40
Air-Conditioning and
Single Generator Failure
3-40
Pressurization
3-52
Double Generator Failure
3-41
Cockpit Depressurization
3-52
AC Generator Underspeed
3-41
Cockpit And Ventilated Suit
Transformer-Rectifier Failure
3-41
Abnormal Temperature
3-54
Inverter Failure
3-41
Q-Bay Abnormal Temperature
3-53
Hydraulic Power System
3-41
Oxygen System And Personal
Primary System Failure
3-42
Equipment
3-54
Utility System Failure
3-42
Pressure Gage Indication
3-54
Personal Equipment Indication
3-54
LANDING EMERGENCIES
3-55
Single Engine Landing
3-55
Gear Emergency Extension
3-56
Simulated Single Engine Landing
3-55
Partial Gear Landing
3-57
Single Engine Go-Around
3-55
Main Gear Flat Tire Landing
3-58
Landing Gear System Emergencies
3-56
Nose Gear Flat Tire Landing
3-58
Gear Unsafe Indication
3-56
Heavy Weight Landing
3-58
3-2
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
INTRODUCTION
This section provides recommended procedures for use in the event of
emergency or abnormal operating 'conditiOns. *It does not cover multiple
emergencies. Pilots must recognize that ,single malfunctions will often
affect operation of other aircraft system:s and require corrective actions
in addition to those contained in a specific emergency procedure.
Use of Checklists
Critical emergency checklist items are
those actions which must be performed im-
mediately if an emergency is not to be ag-
gravated. These steps appear in CAPITAL
letters to permit immediate identification.
They must be committed to memory to per-
mit accomplishment without reference to the
Abbreviated Checklist.
ENGINE FIRE
ENGINE FIRE DURING GROUND START
Definitions of Landing Situations
The terms "landwhen practicable" and
"land as soon as possible" are not used
interchangeably. The direction to "land
when practicable" means to land at home
base or other suitable alternate. Air re-
fueling is allowed when necessary in order
to reach the suitable destination. Alteration
of the original flight plan may or may not be
required, depending on the flight limits
which are imposed because of the emergency
or abnormal operating situation.
The direction to "land as soon as possible"
means land at the nearest suitable facility.
GROUND OPERATION
If there is evidence of fire during ground
start, attempt to keep the engine rotating
until the fire is out. Apply chemicals from
outside the engine only as a last resort.
If a fire is evident during a start, or on
notification:
1. THROTTLE - OFF.
Z. CONTINUE CRANKING ENGINE.
NOTE
Continue motoring the engine when
the starter remains engaged and
fire is contained in the tailpipe. If
the starter unit has disengaged, it
can not be re-engaged until the
engine has come to a complete stop.
3. EMERGENCY FUEL SHUTOFF
SWITCH - FUEL OFF.
4. Battery switch - OFF.
5. Abandon aircraft.
3-3
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III A-12
EMERGENCY OVER THE SIDE EGRESS
PULL TO UNLATCH
65)IlL
. I
0 UNLATCH OR JETTISON CANOPY
0 RELEASE LAP BELT
LIFT TO RELEASE
0 RELEASE PARACHUTE (3 PLACES)
LIFT TO RELEASE
PULL TO JMISONS
0 PULL KIT RELEASE HANDLE
0 UNLATCH SPURS (OR PULL 0-RING ON HEADREST)
0 UNCLIP AND RELEASE EMERGENCY OXYGEN HOSES
Figure 3-1
0 STAND UP TO RELEASE LEADS TO HEADSET
SUIT VENT CONNECTOR AND OXYGEN HOSES
1-200-98(2)
3-4
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
ENGINE FIRE AFTER SHUTDOWN
Use applicable steps of Engine Fire During
Ground Start procedure.
ABANDONING THE AIRCRAFT ON THE
GROUND
In an emergency requiring ground abandon-:
ment, the primary concern is to leave the
immediate area of the aircraft as soon as
possible. The following procedures should
be used when fire or explosion are probable.
Salvaging emergency and survival equip-
ment has not been considered. These pro-
cedures provide the fastest means of aban-
doning the aircraft and they should be ac-
complished as rapidly as possible after the
decision to abandon the aircraft is made.
This procedure may be initiated while the
aircraft is in motion; however, the lap belt
should remain fastened until the aircraft is
stopped.
To accomplish an emergency exit on the
ground, proceed as follows;
1. Ejection seat safety pin - Install if
time permits.
2. Survival kit release handle - Pull.
3. Seat belt and shoulder harness - Re-
lease.
4. Personal leads - Disconnect.
5. Parachute harness attachments - Re-
lease.
6. Foot spurs - Manually release, (use
cable cutter if otherwise unable to re-
lease spurs).
7. Canopy - Unlatch or jettison as appli-
cable.
8. Evacuate aircraft.
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
BRAKE, STEERING, OR TIRE FAILURE
SECTION III
Without anti-skid operating, extreme cau-
tion must be utilized to prevent wheel skid,
as skidding is hard to detect due to aircraft
size and weight. Tires may fail before a
skid condition can be recognized and cor-
rected. A main landing gear tire blow-out
may be sensed by the pilot as a thump or
muffled explosive sound.
If the ANTI-SKID OUT warning light illum-
inates or anti-skid braking is not effective:
1. Brake switch - ANTI-SKID OFF.
If normal brakes and/or nosewheel steering
are not effective, or if L system hydraulic
pressure is not available:
2. Brake switch - ALT STEER AND BRAKE.
NOTE
If both engines are shut down with
the aircraft moving, the brake switch
should be left in the ANTI-SKID OFF
position and steady brake pressure
applied to a complete stop. The
brakes should not be pumped, as
accumulator pressure would be
lost.
At landing weights, the aircraft can be
taxied safely so long as one tire per main
gear remains inflated. At takeoff weights,
taxi distance should be minimized if one or
two tires per main gear are flat in order to
minimize the probability of further tire
failures. Taxiing as necessary is permitted
to clear a runway with all tires failed on a
main gear, as the massive tire bead tends
to protect the wheels for some distance.
EMERGENCY ENTRANCE
In the event that qualified ground personnel
are not available, emergency entrance to
the aircraft can be accomplished using the
procedures illustrated by figure 3-2.
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
3-5
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III A-12
CRASH RESCUE PROCEDURES
0 INSERT TOOL INTO ONE-HALF INCH SQUARE
DRIVE OPENING AND ROTATE CLOCKWISE TO
OPEN
0
OPEN FACE DI ATE
PUSH BUTTON DOWN
UNHOOK PILOT'S PERSONAL EQUIPMENT
PULL SURVIVAL KIT HANDLE
REMOVE JETTISON ACCESS COVER (A)
BY PRESSING QUICK DISCONNECT.
REMOVE PULL HANDLE. UNCOIL EXCESS
CABLE, APPROX. 6 FEET
OR
0
Figure 3-2
WARNING
DO NOT APPLY PRESSURE TO CABLE
UNTIL FULLY UNCOILED. PULL SHARPLY,
PILOT'S CANOPY WILL JETTISON IMMED -
LATELY
SEVER BALLISTIC LINES
THREE MEN ARE REQUIRED
TO REMOVE PILOT
ONE ON EACH SIDE AND ONE
ASTRIDE THE COCKPIT IN FRONT
OF PILOT
F200-100
3-6
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
PROPULSION SYSTEM
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
ILMLEMEM I
SECTION
A-12
TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES
1. THROTTLES - MAXIMUM THRUST.
The components considered as parts of the
propulsion system include the main engines,
afterburners, inlets, nozzles, tailpipes,
fuel controls, and fuel-hydraulic, lubrica-
tion, and ignition systems. If abnormal op-
eration of any of these components is indi-
cated prior to reaching the acceleration
check distance, the takeoff should be abort-
ed. Refer to ABORT procedure, this sec-
tion. The following procedures apply after
satisfactory completion of the acceleration
check.
THRUST FAILURE DURING TAKEOFF,
TAKEOFF REFUSED
If the acceleration check speed is marginal,
or if the thrust of either engine decays or
fails, and conditions permit:
1. ABORT.
Refer to abort procedure, this section.
ENGINE FAILURE IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF
If an engine fails immediately after takeoff
and the decision is made to continue, main-
tain Maximum thrust on the operating en-
gine. Lateral and directional control can
be maintained when airspeed remains above
the minimum single engine control speed.
See figure 3-3. However, ability to main-
tain altitude and to accelerate or climb de-
pends on weight, drag, altitude, airspeed,
and temperature. Refer to the appendix for
takeoff climb capability data. When at
heavy weight for the existing air temper-
ature, dumping fuel may reduce weight
sufficiently to remain airborne.
If able to maintain altitude or accelerate:
Recheck position of both throttles to
assure that maximum power is being
obtained.
2. LANDING GEAR LEVER - UP.
3. CROSSFEED SWITCH - PRESS ON.
4. Fuel dump switch - DUMP (if neces-
sary).
III
Fuel dumping in addition to consumption
by operating engine lightens the
aircraft at an appreciable rate. If
turning at sufficient speed, the inop-
erative engine will also discharge fuel
from its afterburner.
5. Rudder trim - As necessary.
Bank and sideslip toward the operating
engine as necessary to maintain di-
rectional control and minimize drag.
7 to 9 degrees of rudder trim with bank
and sideslip as needed to maintain
course yields minimum drag in the
critical speed range from 220 to 250
KIAS.
6. Throttle (failed engine) - OFF.
WARNING I
Positively identify the failed engine
before retarding the throttle.
If not mechanical failure:
7. ATTEMPT AIR START (refer to Air
Start Procedure this section).
For obvious mechanical failure:
8. Emergency fuel shutoff switch - FUEL
OFF.
3-7
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
SINGLE ENGINE MINIMUM AERODYNAMIC CONTROL SPEED
100
80
1.1
� 60
1.J.1
40
1.1
20
0
1
10,000
8,000
1.1
st
6,000
4,000
1.1
CL
2, 000
S. L.
SINGLE ENGINE MINIMUM AERODYNAMIC CONTROL SPEED
� YJ-1 ENGINES
ONE ENGINE - MAX THRUST
ONE ENGINE - WINDMILLING
20� RUDDER DEFLECTION
5� SIDESLIP
BASIS-ESTIMATED DATA -
FROM REVISED W/M DRAG ESTIMATE,
FLT TESTS, AND JJ ENGINE DATA
ANGLE
OF� ATTACK
=
19.�
\
,6:s 06
\ \
0�40�
\
\
\\
\
�46.
86� F
\ \
\
GEAR
DOWN
\I
0� SIDESLIP
GEAR
UP OR
DOWN
/\
1
1
\
GEAR
UP
\
\
\
\
.
\
\
1
\
\
I
I
1
N?
-\''
N`?
- '4'
#
0
4-
c,
�^���
4500 FT�
�6.-
-...-**
4-.1
1
�O'
c.)
� Zi''''
4'7.
4?
�\,
Nci?
- t
rLS'
`..k.
*
re
#
e/
F200-92
3-8
Figure 3-3
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
DOUBLE ENGINE FAILURE IMMEDIATELY
AFTER TAKEOFF
If a double engine failure occurs, proceed
as follows:
1. IF GEAR IS DOWN AND CONDITIONS
PERMIT - LAND STRAIGHT AHEAD.
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
AFTERBURNER NOZZLE FAILURE
2. IF GEAR RETRACTION HAS BEEN
INITIATED OR CONDITIONS DICTATE-
EJECT.
WARNING 1
Decay of engine rpm will result in
rapid loss of A and B hydraulic
system pressure and subsequent
loss of aircraft control.
AFTERBURNER FAILURE DURING TAKEOFF,
TAKEOFF CONTINUED
If an afterburner fails before leaving the
ground and a decision is made to continue,
control failed, engine as follows:
1. THROTTLE - MILITARY.
2. THROTTLE - MAXIMUM THRUST.
SECTION III
Nozzle failure maybe: indicated by nozzle
position, excessive rpm fluctuations, or
failure of the engine to control to scheduled
speed. This may be accompanied by com-
pressor stall and exhaust gas overtempera-
ture. Engine shutdown may be necessary.
Nozzle Failed Open Immediately After Takeoff
In the event of a nozzle failed open indi-
cation:
Affected engine:
1. Throttle - Afterburner range.
2. RPM & EGT - Maintain within limits.
NOTE
In the event of extreme engine over-
speed, if flight condition permits,
retard throttle below Military or
shut down.
3. Land as soon as practicable.
If unable to light afterburner:
Nozzle Failed Closed
In the event of a nozzle failed closed con-
3.
THROTTLE - MILITARY.
dition:
4.
Trim - As necessary.
Affected engine:
5.
Abort mission.
1. Throttle - Military or below, as
required.
Do not attempt to relight the after-
burner as the engine may flameout
(after which it cannot be restarted
clue to reduced rpm).
2. RPM and EGT - Maintain within limits.
Compressor stall is likely, and EGT
will probably rise.
3. Land as soon as practicable.
3-9
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
FIRE
ENGINE FIRE DURING TAKEOFF - TAKEOFF
REFUSED
If either fire warning light illuminates be-
fore leaving the ground and the takeoff is
refused:
1. ABORT.
Accomplish ABORT procedure, this
section, as necessary.
Z. THROTTLE - OFF.
Affected engine only.
Positively identify the affected engine
before retarding the throttle.
3. EMERGENCY FUEL SHUTOFF
SWITCH - FUEL OFF.
4. Shutdown operating engine after
stopping.
5. Seat pin - Insert if time permits.
6. Abandon aircraft.
ABORT
The abort procedure assumes that a deci-
sion to abort will be made before rotation
speed is reached. Aborts from above ro-
tation speed are not prohibited, but the
risks associated with aborting from such
a high initial speed at takeoff weight must
be balanced against1hose of continuing a
takeoff when making the decision. In gen-
eral, after rotation speed is reached, the
most reasonable course of action is to con-
tinue rather than abort unless the emer-
gency is such that the aircraft can not fly.
Engine Management
Both throttles should be retarded to IDLE
and the brakes applied with the nose down
as soon as the decision to abort is made.
Reaction time and residual thrust will usu-
ally cause airspeed to continue increasing
until engine rpm begins to decrease. The
planned rotation speed may be exceeded as
a result; however, the nosewheel should be
kept on the runway to take advantage of
nosewheel steering in combination with
rudder control. Shutdown of one engine will
shorten the stopping distance, but shutdown
is not necessary unless the drag chute does
not operate properly. In the event of chute
failure, shutdown the right engine after
both are idling, or complete the shutdown of
a failed or flamed out engine.
WARNING I
Wait until rpm and EGT show that
both engines are idling or that one
engine is failing before selecting
the engine to shutdown. Loss of
both engines may result in loss of
hydraulic pressure for braking.
Aircraft Attitude, With Decision to Abort
Lower the nose and energize the brakes sim-
ultaneously with nosewheel contact. When
rotation is well advanced, the aircraft may
accelerate beyond takeoff speed and lift off
before rotation can be checked. In this
case, hold the aircraft off sufficiently to
regain control and then touch down without
sideslip if possible. Fly the aircraft back
to the runway, attempting to regain the
center.
3-10
Changed 15 March 1968
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
Page 3-10 Aircraft Attitude, With Decision to Abort
Delete the present text and replace with the following:
SECTION III
Page 2 of 3
TDC No. 8
15 March 1 968
Lower the nose and energize the brakes simultaneously with nosewheel
contact. When rotation is well advanced, the aircraft may accelerate
beyond takeoff speed and lift off before rotation can be checked. In this
case, hold the aircraft off sufficiently to regain control and then touch
down without sideslip if possible. Fly the aircraft back to the runway,
attempting to regain the center.
Page 3-11 Chute Deployment
Delete the present text and replace with the following:
The drag chute requires 4 to 5 seconds for deployment after drag chute
actuation. It is permissible to actuate the deploy handle while deceler-
ating in anticipation of reaching 210 KLAS; however, premature deploy-
ment can result in destruction of the chute. Actuation of the chute system
so as to reach 210 K1AS simultaneously with loading of the chute is not
recommended unless the risk is justified by a very marginal distance re-
maining situation.
Page 3-11 ABORT PROCEDURE
Step 4 DRAG CHUTE DEPLOY
Change to 210 KIAS (was 190 K1AS).
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION ILI
Chute Deployment
The drag chute requires 4 to 5 seconds for
deployment after drag chute actuation. It
is permissible to actuate the deploy handle
while decelerating in anticipation of reaching
210 KIAS; however, premature deployment
can result in destruction of the chute. Ac-
tuation of the chute system so as to reach
210 KIAS simultaneously with loading of the
chute is not recommended unless the risk
is justified by a very marginal distance re-
maining situation.
Brake Switch
The normal ANTI-SKID ON brake switch
setting provides nosewheel steering and
braking power from the L hydraulic system
and anti-skid protection. It is not necessary
to change the switch setting unless the left
hydraulic pressure has failed or anti-skid
off is desired. Selection of ANTI-SKID OFF
or ALT STEER & BRAKE causes the ANTI-
SKID OUT warning light on the annunciator
panel to illuminate.
ABORT PROCEDURE
WARNING I
Do not unfasten the lap belt or
shoulder harness until the air-
craft haa come to a stop.
The landing gear should be left
in the extended position. �
1. THROTTLES - IDLE.
Retard both throttles to IDLE. Do not at-
tempt to shut down either engine immedi-
ately unless failure to do so would vitally
endanger the aircraft.
2. NOSE WHEEL STEERING - ENGAGE.
3. BRAKES - OPTIMUM BRAKING.
For dry runway: use moderate to
heavy brake pressure.
For wet runway: use light to
moderate brake pressure.
4. DRAG CHUTE - DEPLOY.
The limit airspeed for drag chute
deployment is 210 KIAS.
5. BRAKE SWITCH - As required.
Set the brake switch to ALT STEER
& BRAKE when the L hydraulic
system is below normal pressure
due to system or left engine failure.
Selection of ALT STEER & BRAKE
changes the source of brake pres-
sure from the L to the R hydraulic
system and disables the anti-skid
system.
6. Shut down one engine (if necessary).
Shut down of one engine is considered
necessary in the event of drag chute
failure.
If drag chute fails to deploy, use
DRAG CHUTE FAILURE Procedure,
this section.
Shut down the right engine if both
engines are idling or if the right
engine has failed.
Shut down the left engine if it has failed.
WARNING II
Positively identify the failed engine
before attempting engine shutdown.
Changed 15 March 1968
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
3-11
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
DRAG CHUTE FAILURE
If the drag chute should fail to deploy and
stopping distance is critical, proceed as
follows:
Dry Runway
1. LOWER NOSE IMMEDIATELY.
2. NOSEWHEEL STEERING - ENGAGE.
3. BRAKES - AS REQUIRED UP TO MAX-
IMUM BRAKING.
4. RIGHT ENGINE THROTTLE - OFF, IF
REQUIRED.
5. HOLD AS MUCH UP ELEVON AS POS-
SIBLE AND STILL KEEP THE NOSE-
WHEEL ON RUNWAY FOR DIREC-
TIONAL CONTROL.
Wet Or Icy Runway
1. LOWER NOSE.
a. LANDING - AT 110 KIAS
b. ABORT - IMMEDIATELY AT 190
KIAS.
2. NOSEWHEEL STEERING - ENGAGE.
3. BRAKES SWITCH - NORM.
4. BRAKES - MAXIMUM PRESSURE.
5. RIGHT ENGINE THROTTLE - OFF.
6. HOLD AS MUCH UP ELEVON AS POS-
SIBLE, BUT KEEP THE NOSEWHEEL
ON THE RUNWAY FOR DIRECTIONAL
CONTROL.
NOTE
This wet or icy runway technique
will probably blow the tires early in
the landing roll; however, direc-
tional control can still be maintained
and the blown tires will remain on
the wheels. Additional pedal pres-
sure will be required as each tire
blows. Maximum wing aerodynamic
braking is more effective than wheel
braking on a wet or icy runway until
the nose is lowered but the nose up
attitude must not be held to a point
that the nosewheel will slam onto
the runway. Use of maximum
possible up elevon after the nose
is lowered while keeping the nose-
wheel on the runway provides aero-
dynamic drag and additional down
load on the main wheels.
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL PRESSURE LOW WARNING
If one or both FUEL PRESS LOW warning
lights illuminate during takeoff, abort if
airspeed and runway length remaining per-
mit. If airborne or if an abort is not pos-
sible:
1. CROSSFEED - PRESS ON.
2. Tanks with fuel - Press on.
3. Analyze difficulty and attempt to re-
store normal sequencing.
Illumination of both fuel pressure low
warning lights indicates loss of all
boost pumps. This can only result
from multiple failures. If this occurs
during takeoff, tank pressurization will
supply sufficient fuel to the engine dri-
ven pumps to maintain engine operation.
WARNING
Fuel can not be dumped with com-
plete boost pump failure. Use
caution and observe operating limits
of Section V if a heavy weight land-
ing is required.
After fuel pressure restored:
4. Crossfeed - Press off.
If normal operation can not be restored:
6. Land as soon as possible.
3-12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
With crossfeed on, more fuel may 'tend to
feed from the forward tanks and cause an
aft c. g. shift. Before landing, c. g. should
be checked carefully.
LANDING GEAR AND TIRES
MAIN OR NOSE GEAR TIRE FAILURE
Failure of a main gear tire during takeoff
will overload the remaining tires on that
side when takeoff weight exceeds 120,000 lb.
This may be precipitate additional tire
failures before normal takeoff speed can be
reached or before the aircraft can be stop-
ped, depending on speed and the time of
failure. As each main gear tire loss de-
creases the available brake energy capa-
city by one-sixth, ability to stop from high
speed is largely dependent on effectiveness
of the drag chute.
Failure of a nosewheel tire is not expected
to generate a second tire failure, but it
may not be possible to determine immedi-
ately whether a nose or main gear tire has
failed. In either case, engine or structural
damage may be sustained from tire fragments.
Depending on the airspeed attained and
whether or not engine damage is indicated,
a takeoff may be preferable to aborting.
The following procedure is recommended
when a main or nose gear tire failure is
suspected during the takeoff run:
1. ABORT /F SPEED PERMITS.
2. ANTI-SKID OFF.
Set the anti-skid switch OFF prior to
brake application. Brake with steady
application of pressure to avoid spin-
up of the blown tire.
If takeoff is continued:
3. DO NOT RETRACT GEAR until checked.
4. Brake switch - NORM-SKID OFF.
Anti-skid off must be selected in
order to stop the wheels rapidly after
takeoff, as braking is disabled with
anti-skid ON when gear down selected
and there is no weight on the gear.
5. Brake wheels to a stop.
The blown tire(s) must be stopped in
order to minimize the possiblility of
damage to the aircraft.
6. Request confirmation of tire and air-
craft condition.
The gear should not be retracted until
a visual check has been made by
another aircraft or by ground personnel.
If loss of one or more tires is verified,
the gear should be left extended and a
landing made as soon as practicable.
7. Land when practicable.
EMERGENCY GEAR RETRACTION
If the gear lever cannot be moved to the UP
position after takeoff:
1. Gear override button - Press and hold.
2. Landing gear lever - UP.
This overrides the solenoid which is nor-
mally actuated by the landing gear switch.
WARNING
Improper use of this procedure
may cause gear retraction while
on the ground.
Once energized, the gear lever must be
recycled to the DOWN position in order to
bring the ground safety switch back into the
circuit.
3-13/3-14
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES
EMERGENCY ESCAPE
Escape from the aircraft in flight should be
made with the ejection seat. The following
is a summary of ejection expectations:
a. At sea level, wind blast exerts only
minor forces on the body up to 525
KIAS; appreciable forces from 525 to
600 KIAS; and excessive forces above
600 KIAS. The aircraft limit airspeed
is below these speeds.
CAUTION
Flights with oxygen mask and re-
gulator are restricted to below
FL 500 and below 420 KEAS because
of wind blast forces anticipated in
the event of ejection. Before actual
ejection,air speed should be reduced
to subsonic and as slow as conditions
permit.
b. Ejection at 65 KIAS and above during
takeoff or landing run results in suc-
cessful chute deployment.
c. The free fall from high altitude down to
15,000 feet with drogue chute stabili-
zation will result in stabilized descent
in the quickest manner.
During any low altitude ejection, the chance
for success can be greatly increased by
zooming the aircraft to exchange excess
airspeed for altitude. Ejection should be
accomplished while the aircraft is in a level
or climbing attitude. A climbing or level
attitude will result in a more nearly vertical
trajectory for the seat and crew members,
thus providing more altitude and time for
seat separation and parachute deployment.
The zero altitude capability of this aircraft
should not be used as a basis for delaying
ejection if ejection is necessary. Aircraft
accident statistics emphatically show a
progressive decrease in successful ejec-
tions as ejection altitude is decreased be-
low 2000 feet; therefore, whenever possible,
eject above 2000 feet.
BEFORE EJECTION
Before ejection, when time and conditions
permit:
1. Altitude - Reduce so that the pressure
suit is not essential to survival.
2. Airspeed - Reduce to subsonic and as
slow as conditions permit.
3. Head aircraft toward unpopulated area.
4. Transmit location and intentions to
nearest radio facility.
5. IFF - EMER position.
6. Lower helmet visor.
7. Green apple - Pull if above 15,000 feet.
EJECTION
To accomplish an emergency escape using
the ejection seat proceed as follows:
1. ASSUME PROPER BODY POSITION.
Sit erect with head against head rest.
If possible, cross arms to pull ejection
ring to assist in keeping arms close to
body.
2. PULL EJECTION "D" RING.
If seat fails to eject after normal delay, con-
tinue with the following:
3-'15
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
. JETTISON CANOPY.
Use canopy jettison handle. If canopy
still does not jettison, open canopy and
allow it to blow off into the air stream.
4. PULL EJECTION T-HANDLE.
WARNING
Do not pull the T-handle with the
canopy still in place.
Keep elbows close to sides and
feet firmly against seat while
pulling the ejection T-handle since
the foot retractors and knee guards
will not actuate.
AFTER EJECTION
After clear of aircraft if not automatically
separated from seat:
1. Manual cable cutter ring - Pull.
Z. Seat belt - Open.
3. Kick loose from seat.
4. Parachute arming lanyard - Pull.
If at high altitude after drogue chute sta-
bilizes free fall:
5. Extend arms to control spinning.
When drogue chute releases:
6. Feet together.
After drogue chute separation,
backward tumbling tendency oc-
curs. Feet together prevents pilot
chute deployment between legs.
PARACHUTE LANDINGS
After main chute opens:
Over Land - High Altitude
a. At approximately 2000 feet,release your
survival kit. Pull handle completely
free of the kit.
b. At approximately 1000 feet, roll - safety
Rocket Jet roll bars up.
c. Prepare to land.
d.
After landing,release one side of your
parachute to prevent being dragged by
winds.
Over Land - Low Altitude
a.
Release kit immediately after parachute
opening shock.
b. Prepare to land.
Over Water - High Altitude
a. Open face plate and extend microphone
boom to hold open.
b. Disconnect emergency oxygen hose
leads.
c. Loosen chest strap.
WARNING
Failure to loosen chest strap be-
fore inflating flotation gear may
result in inability to breathe.
d. Pull out life vest oral inflation tube and
check open valve.
e. Disconnect vent hose.
f.
Inflate life vest - time permitting, close
oral inflation valve.
3-16
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
1500 to 2000 feet, release survival kit.
SECTION III
A-12
BAILOUT WITH EJECTION SEAT INOPERATIVE
h.
Roll riser release safety bars to the up
If the seat fails to eject, the followi.ng pro-
position (RI releases).
cedure should be used to leave the aircraft.
i.
Place left forearm through the "V"
formed by the left risers.
1.
Airspeed - 250 to 300 KEAS.
i�
Place right hand on left riser release,
feet together and knees slightly bent.
2.
3.
Green apple - Pull.
Foot spurs - Release.
k.
Push up on the left riser release on
contact with water, releasing canopy.
4.
Personal leads - Disconnect.
Disconnect oxygen supply hoses at the
1.
m.
Release other (right) side of the canopy.
Pull raft to you for additional support.
quick disconnect, and suit vent hose at
the controller.
n.
Disconnect the survival kit lanyard
5.
Trim full nose down, roll inverted.
from the right side of the parachute
harness.
6.
Lean forward.
o.
Remove spurs before boarding raft.
7.
Release seat belt (and control stick,
simulataneously) and drop out.
Spurs must be removed to prevent
puncturing raft.
p. Remove parachute harness before
boarding raft.
q. Board raft.
Over Water - Low Altitude
a. Immediately inflate outer garment
after parachute opens.
b. Release survival kit.
c. Roll Rocket Jet release roll bars up.
Jettison canopy upon contact with water.
d. Follow standard procedures in water.
When clear of aircraft:
8. Pull parachute arming lanyard.
9. Prepare for landing.
Preparations for landing are the same
as for ejection procedure.
3-17
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
FIRE
NOTE
FIRE WARNING IN FLIGHT
Illumination of a FIRE warning light indi-
cates a nacelle compartment temperature
above approximately 1050 F. An immedi-
ate check should be made for abnormal
EGT and, if possible, for trailing smoke or
any other indication of fire. In case of
doubt, assume that a fire does exist and
proceed as follows:
1. THROTTLE - MILITARY (AFFECTED
ENGINE).
If light remains on:
2. THROTTLE - IDLE ABOVE MINIMUM
CONTROL SPEED.
If light still remains on:
3. THROTTLE - OFF.
If fire warning light extinguishes
while shutting down the engine,
do not attempt a restart.
4. EMERGENCY FUEL SHUTOFF SWITCH-
FUEL OFF.
WARNING
Shutting off the fuel if speed above
approximately Mach 2.2, may cause
engine oil to overheat and result
in engine failure. Shutting off the
fuel may also cause additional emer-
gencies due to loss of the associated
aircraft cooling systems. Reduced
Mach number decreases cooling
requirements because of lower en-
vironmental temperatures.
If it is the left engine which is sus-
pected and has been shut down, the
cockpit air switch should be placed
in the EMER position.
5. CHECK FOR OTHER INDICATIONS OF
FIRE.
At pilot's discretion, if fire confirmed or
confirmation not possible and light remains
on:
6. EJECT. Attempt to descend from
extremely high altitude prior to
ejection.
If there is no fire:
7. Land as soon as possible.
SMOKE OR FUMES
The pilot cannot detect fumes when wearing
a pressure suit. The helmet oxygen system
is independent of the cockpit and suit air
supply. Smoke can be eliminated promptly
by dumping cabin pressure unless smoke is
entering the cockpit from the air condition-
ing system.
WARNING
Cockpit depressurization will occur
at an extremely rapid rate and the
pilot will be dependent on his
pressure suit for altitude protection.
If the smoke is introduced by the cockpit air
supply system, switch the cockpit system
to EMERG. The defog system should be off
at all times when not required.
If smoke is entering the cockpit from the
air conditioning system:
1.
Cockpit air switch - EMER.
3-18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
2. Defog switch - OFF if not required.
If smoke or fumes cannot be controlled:
3. Initiate emergency descent.
ELECTRICAL FIRE
The pilot must depend on visual detection
of electrical fire when wearing a pressure
suit since he cannot smell the characteristic
odor.
1. Isolate the malfunction.
Turn off electrical systems in order to
isolate the malfunction(s). If neces-
sary, deactivate suspected systems
by pulling circuit breakers. The
battery and one generator may be
turned off without adverse effect on
essential systems; however, both
generators should not be off simul-
taneously unless absolutely necessary
as this would shut down all fuel boost
pumps.
2. Leave failed system off.
If required:
3. Cockpit pressure dump switch - DUMP.
4. Land as soon as possible.
EMERGENCY DESCENT
If extreme conditions require a rapid
descent:
1. THROTTLES - IDLE.
2. RESTART SWITCHES - BOTH
(SIMULTANEOUSLY)
3. AFT BYPASS SWITCHES - OPEN.
Setting this configuration provides the least
probability of asymmetric unstart, high
drag, and the best means for avoiding inlet
roughness during the descent.
Set the aft bypass CLOSED if
engine speed is maintained at or
near the Military rpm schedule.
Engine stalls will occur below
Mach 2.6 if the forward and aft
bypass are open with rpm at or
near Military speed.
4. Airspeed --Adjust between 350 to 400
KEAS.
WARNING I
Do not exceed 450 KEAS or 1.6 g
load factor.
If necessary, reduce rate of descent
to maintain positive fuel tank pressure.
Increase rpm if high suit inflow
temperatures are experienced.
5. Forward transfer switch - FWD
TRANS.
For rapid descents during which aircraft
control has become or may become critical
(i. e., pilot emergency, aft c. g. location
with boost pumps inoperative) a minimum
use of flight controls is recommended.
This may include non-turning flight until
lower speeds are attained. If aircraft control
is not a critical consideration (i.e., low
ON oxygen quantity) a spiral descent is very
effective in providing a more rapid loss of
altitude.
When initial CIT is high, engine
damage can be expected as the
deceleration Mach rates specified
in Section V will be exceeded.
In descending through the transonic region,
the nose will be between 10 and 30 degrees
below the horizon.
3-19
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
Turns causing appreciable load
factor should be avoided while
descending through the 50,000
foot level as the pitch SAS gain
switching will cause a transient
"bump" which may increase load
factor to near limit value.
When subsonic:
6. Landing gear lever - DOWN. (Below
gear limit speed.)
WARNING
Gear extension at supersonic speeds
is forbidden.
If the landing gear is extended
above 300 KEAS or Mach 0.9,
the landing gear doors will be
damaged if sideslip exists.
Extending the landing gear at speeds above
Mach 2.3 may cause heat damage to tires
and result in a hazardous landing condition.
With gear extended, a large nose-up pitch
moment occurs in the speed range of Mach
1.6 to 0.9. Full nose-down elevon will be
insufficient to maintain 1-g flight at high
KEAS and/or aft c. g. in this area.
FUEL DUMPING PROCEDURE
Normal fuel dumping provides a means of
reducing gross weight rapidly in the event
of an emergency. All tanks containing fuel
except for tank 1 will empty in the normal
fuel tank usage sequence. Tank 1 will not
be dumped, as its boost pumps are held off
by actuation of the fuel dump switch and
manual actuation of the tank 1 boost pump
selector turns dumping off. When the fuel
dump switch is in the DUMP position, fuel
dumping will continue only until the fuel
level in tank 4 reaches 5000 pounds. When
the EMER position is selected, dumping will
continue until all fuel excluding tank 1 is
expended. To increase the dump rate, man-
ually select boost pumps for all tanks con-
taining fuel (except tank 1).
NORMAL FUEL DUMPING
Accomplish normal fuel dumping as follows:
1. Fuel dump switch - DUMP.
2. Fuel quantity - Alternately monitor
TOTAL fuel and tank 4 fuel.
3. Fuel dump switch - OFF when 5000
pounds remain in tank 4.
EMERGENCY FUEL DUMPING
If the fuel level in tank 4 has prematurely
reached the 5000 pound level and dumping
is required (excessive fuel in tanks 3, 5 or
6), proceed as follows:
1. Fuel dump switch - EMER.
2. Tanks 3, 5 or 6 containing fuel - Press
on.
3. Forward transfer switch - FWD TRANS
(if required).
4. Fuel quantity - Alternately monitor
tanks 1 and 4.
When tank 1 quantity reads 4000 pounds:
5. Forward transfer switch - OFF.
When required amount of fuel remains:
6. Fuel dump switch - OFF.
3-20
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
WARNING
The boost pumps in tank 1 are in-
operative until the EMER dump is
turned OFF or tank 1 pumps are
selected manually. The EMER
dump must be turned to OFF or
DUMP to assure automatic avail-
ability of fuel remaining in tank 1
at termination of fuel dumping.
FORWARD FUEL TRANSFER AND FUEL
DUMPING PROCEDURE
Forward fuel transfer and fuel dumping may
be accomplished simultaneously as follows:
1. Fuel dump switch - DUMP.
2. Forward transfer switch - FWD TRANS.
3. Fuel quantity - Alternately monitor
tanks 1 and 4.
When tank 1 fuel quantity reads 4000 pounds:
4. Forward transfer switch - OFF.
5. Fuel dump switch - OFF when 5000
pounds remain in tank 4.
FORCED LANDING OR DITCHING
Ditching, landing with both engines inoper-
ative, or other forced landing should not be
attempted. Ejection is the best course of
action. All emergency survival equipment
Is carried by the pilot; consequently, there
is nothing to be gained by riding the air-
plane down.
IRUMMEMEUM 1
SECTION III
At least one engine must be operating if a
forced landing is to be attempted. All forced
landings should be made with the landing
gear extended regardless of terrain. High
airspeed or nose high angle of impact dur-
ing landings with gear retracted causes the
aircraft to "slap" the ground on impact,
subjecting the pilot to possible spinal injury.
It is recommended that a gear up landing
not be attempted with this aircraft; EJECT
instead.
PROPULSION SYSTEM
The following procedures are to be accom-
plished in the event of abnormal operation
or failure of a propulsion system component,
i. e. , inlet, engine, afterburner, nozzle,
fuel control, or lubrication, fuel-hydraulic,
or ignition system.
INLET DUCT UNSTART
Inlet duct unstarts can only occur after
supersonic speeds are reached and an inlet
has been "started", that is, supersonic flow
conditions established inside part of the in-
let. Normally, the supersonic flow region
extends from the cowl entrance to a position
near the inlet throat when inlet flow condi-
tions are optimized. A shock wave is
formed at the boundary between supersonic
and subsonic flow conditions in the inlet.
When an inlet unstarts, the internal shock
wave is expelled and a "normal" shock wave
forms ahead of the cowl. Flow within the
inlet becomes subsonic and pressure in the
inlet decreases. When an inlet alternately
starts and unstarts rapidly, the change in
inlet pressure which occurs results in
severe airframe roughness.
Shock expulsion, or unstart, may be caused
by inlet airflow becoming greater than
3-21
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
engine requirements and duct bypass capa-
bility, spike position too far aft, or abrupt
aircraft attitude changes. Improper spike
or door positions can result from inlet
control error, loss of hydraulic power, or
electrical or mechanical failure. Unstarts
are usually associated with climb or cruise
operations above Mach 2 when at normal
engine speeds; however, they may be en-
countered during reduced rpm descents at
speeds above Mach 1.3. Between Mach 1.3
and 2.2, when near Military rpm, recovery
procedures using the restart switch ON
'position may result in compressor stall.
Unstarts are generally recognizable by air-
frame roughness, loud "banging" noises,
aircraft yawing and rolling, and decrease of
compressor inlet pressure toward 4 psi.
Fuel flow decreases quickly and the after-
burner may blow out. EGT usually rises,
with the rate of increase being faster when
operating near limit Mach number and ceil-
ing altitudes. A distinct increase in drag
and loss of thrust occurs because of in-
creased air spillage around the inlet and re-
duced airflow through the engine.
The aircraft yaws toward the unstarted inlet
during an unstart. This yaw causes a roll
in the same direction. Pitch rates are not
developed by the inlet unstart, but pitch
control problems can occur during associ-
ated maneuvering and will be accentuated
by aft c, g., high Mach numbers and any
pitch rate which existed prior to inlet un-
start. During the unstart, primary em-
phasis must be placed upon maintaining
pitch control in order to prevent nose up
pitch rates and angles of attack in excess of
eight degrees. Thrust asymmetry should
be reduced as soon as possible.
Aileron effectiveness is reduced at high
altitudes and high angles of attack. Roll
control may become critical if the unstart
occurs on the inboard inlet during a bank.
At altitudes above 75,000 feet, aileron con-
trol may be ineffective in controlling roll
during an unstart unless the angle of attack
is immediately reduced. Aileron effective-
ness increases rapidly as the angle of
attack is reduced and only moderate aileron
inputs will be required to control the roll.
An excessive nose down attitude may re-
sult in an over speed in KEAS and Mach if
the inlets are restarted during a recovery
maneuver. Therefore the restart switches
should remain on until speed and attitude
are fully under control.
The roughness usually clears after the for-
ward bypass doors open and the spikes are
started forward manually or automatically;
however, as much as five to eight seconds
may be required for the spikes to reach the
full forward position. Roughness may per-
sist until the spikes are fully forward dur-
ing restarts at design Mach number.
Inlet pressure should be checked during re-
covery. Moderate CIP increases will occur
as the inlet "clears" or restarts, and when
the spike retracts to form the inlet throat
farther aft. Return of the forward bypass
doors to their normal operating schedule
should result in a further CIP increase to
normal operating values.
In automatic operation, unstarts which are
caused by improper spike scheduling limit
aircraft speed to Mach numbers below that
for the unstarted condition. Manual sche-
duling procedure is necessary if the air-
craft is to be accelerated further. If an
unstart results from marginal bypass sche-
duling however, it may be possible to con-
tinue at speed by adjusting the forward or
aft inlet bypass doors to positions which
maintain stable flow conditions. In general,
if engine speed is maintained, less bypass
area is required as limit Mach number is
approached.
Figure 3-4 shows the operating conditions
where airframe roughness will occur due to
unstable inlet airflow conditions. The un-
start boundaries are a function of Mach num-
ber, engine speed, and spike and bypass
door positions. The smallest roughness
area occurs below the idle rpm range with
the forward and aft bypass doors open and
spike full forward. A more extensive area
occurs with the bypass doors open but with
3-22
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
INLET UNSTART BOUNDARIES
SPIKE: FORWARD
FORWARD BYPASS: OPEN
OR
RESTART: ON
ROTOR SPEED - RPM
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
din gr,
121111311111111=BUR
111011111101=MMIIIIMI
uncommunateinnlii
InItg
NMIME
11,-fiataat
ME
smasW passi._
MEW�
NAM
MVP 1M
ejaan
ENGIN
0
05
STANDARD DAY -
Based On Mach And FAT
For Std. Day At 400 KEAS
NOTE: Unstart boundaries will increase
approximately 150 RPM for each 10�C
temperature increase above ambient
standard day temperature.
Unstart Boundaries Indicate The Minimum RPM Obtainable
Without Unstart For A Specific Mach And Inlet Configuration
NOMINAL MILITARY SPEED - 400 KEAS
1.0
15
MACH NUMBER
Figure 3-4
(Sheet 1 of 2)
4
20
YJ ENGINES - YJ-1 ENGINES
WITH HAMILTON STANDARD
MAIN FUEL CONTROL
FWD BY PASS,- OPEN-AFT - CLOSED E
' . .
4!1-FT - OPEN-110:
. �4:x:
2.5
30
3-23
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III A-12
NLET UNSTART BOUNDARIES
STANDARD DAY -
Based On Mach And FAT
For Std. Day At 400 KEAS
Unstart boundaries will increase
approximately 150 RPM for each 10�C
temperature increase above ambient
standard day temperature.
Unstart Boundaries Indicate The Minimum RPM Obtainable
Without Unstart For A Specific Mach And Inlet Configuration
NOMINAL MILITARY SPEED - 400 KEAS''
ENGINE INTERNAL BLEED SCHEDULE
YJ ENGINES - YJ-1 ENGINES
WITH HAMILTON STANDARD
MAIN FUEL CONTROL
FWD BY PASS - CLOSED�AFT - CLOSED
FWD BY PASS OPEN.-AFT - CLOSED
AFT - OPEN
Unstarts Will Occur At Any RPM Lower
Than The Levels Defined By These Curves
3-24
Figure 3-4
(Sheet 2 of 2)
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
the spike moving in accordance with the
automatic schedule. In both cases, the on-
set of inlet airflow instability occurs earlier,
i.e., at higher engine speeds, with the by-
pass doors closed. At windmilling rpm,
heavy roughness will occur in the speed
range above Mach 1.3 regardless of spike
and door positions.
In the event of an unstart, accomplish only
those of the following steps which are neces-
sary to clear the inlet and return to normal
operation.
Shut down the engine if an EGT
overtemperature exists for more
than five seconds, then restart the
inlet and the engine as soon as
possible.
In the event an inlet duct unstarts, proceed
as follows:
1. SIMULTANEOUSLY DISENGAGE AUTO-
PILOT, REDUCE ANGLE OF ATTACK,
AND SELECT BOTH RESTART
SWITCHES ON.
WARNING I
Do not attempt to clear the un-
started inlet by placing only one
restart switch on.
BOTH THROTTLES - MILITARY.
3. MAINTAIN ATTITUDE CONTROL -
OPTIMIZE PITCH AND ROLL.
4. AIRSPEED - ADJUST TOWARD 350
KEAS. DO NOT EXCEED MACH 3.1.
- SECTION III
If roughness does not clear after 10
seconds:
5. AFT BYPASS switch - OPEN.
When roughness clears:
6. Aft bypass switch - Normal schedule.
7. Restart Switches - FWD BYPASS
OPEN (individually)
8. Restart switches - OFF (individually).
After inlet starts:
9. Fuel derichrnent arming switch -
Recycle below 790�C EGT if derich
actuated.
10. Throttles - As required.
If unstarts repeat or inlet roughness does
not clear:
11. Engine and inlet instrument and hy-
draulic pressure - Check.
12. Repeat procedure.
If unstarts persist:
13. Attempt inlet restart and operation
using manual inlet controls.
INLET CONTROL MALFUNCTION
Automatic Spike Control Malfunction
Manual spike control is necessary if an
automatic spike control manfunctions. In
this event, the spike and forward and aft
bypass must be operated manually as pre-
scribed in the schedule table. Use of the
AUTO forward bypass setting results in
open forward doors when manual spike
positions are selected.
3-25
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
Automatic Forward Bypass Control
Malfunction
With the automatic spike control operating
normally, there are two options available
for control of the forward bypass doors in
the event their automatic control malfunc-
tions. The manual bypass schedule table
may be used, or, if the opposite side inlet
controls are operating normally, the for-
ward bypass manual setting may be adjusted
to provide CIF) which is at least 1 psi below
the normal side indication. Note that dur-
ing automatic spike and manual bypass op--
eration, bypass position is controlled only
by the pilot, and bypass position is not af-
fected by spike position. Therefore, it is
necessary to anticipate changes in flight
speed or attitude which affect matching of
the CIP indications.
Operation With Manual Inlet Control
Maximum allowable speed is Mach 3.0.
Manual inlet scheduling must not be used
above 80,000 feet.
To increase longitudinal stability, sufficient
fuel should be transferred forward to obtain
at least 0o pitch trim. This decreases the
possibility of making inadvertent attitude
changes which would affect CIP matching.
Nose down pitch trim is an indication of ad-
verse cg for this condition. However, the
need for forward transferring should be
weighed against the decrease in ceiling and
range capability associated with increased
pitch trim requirements at forward c. g.
Maximum bank angles of 30 degrees are
permissible at speeds up to Mach 3.0. How-
ever, when a small heading change is de-
sired, using a smaller bank angle will re-
duce the possibility of an unstart.
When 20 degrees bank angle will be exceed-
ed, the forward bypass should be adjusted
to one position number lower than specified
in the manual schedule; then the spike should
be adjusted to 0.1 Mach number position less
than indicated by the TDI. After completion
of the turn, the inlet controls may be read-
justed to the manual schedule. The spike
should be reset first, then the forward by-
pass.
MANUAL SPIKE SCHEDULE
The following schedule must be used when
automatic scheduling is ineffective.
Acceleration - Lag Mach number by
0.1 Mach
Cruise - Match Mach number.
Deceleration - Lead Mach number by
0.1 Mach (e.g., spike at
1.9, Mach setting at
2.0 Mach on TDI).
MANUAL BYPASS SCHEDULE
The following schedule must be used with
manual spike scheduling. It is optional
when the spike and opposite inlet are op-
erating normally.
Condition Mach Fwd Byp. Aft Byp.
Acceler- Above
ation & 1.7
Cruise
Acceler- Above
ration & 2.8
Cruise
Pos. B
Set at least
1 psi CIP
below the
stripped CLOSED
pointer.
Deceler- ALL Open
ation
INLET UNSTABLE
CLOSED
Unstable inlet conditions which produce inlet
and airframe roughness occur at supersonic
speeds when an inlet alternately unstarts
and restarts rapidly, usually during decel-
eration at reduced rpm. Inlet unstart pro-
cedures are used first, except that the
3-26
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
throttle normally is reset to provide Mili-
tary rpm instead of afterburning thrust
after the unstart is cleared. Subsequent
settings may be made as desired. Refer to
procedure for compressor stalls in descent.
Failure of a Spike to Schedule or Inlet Spike
Unstable
A combination of unsymmetrical thrust and
low compressor inlet pressure on one side
when accelerating between Mach 1.6 and
Mach 2 indicates that a spike has failed to
move aft on the proper schedule. This may
be caused by failure of the spike forward
lock to disengage above 30,000 feet altitude.
Spike instability is reflected by fluctuations
of the respective hydraulic pressure gage.
If spike oscillations are of large amplitude
the gage fluctuations will be several hun-
dred psi and will be indicated on the spike
position indicators. If an unstable spike or
failure to schedule is suspected, proceed
as follows:
1. Spike position - Check while between
1.6 and 2.0 Mach number.
2. Spike control - Cycle FWD then return
to AUTO.
If condition continues:
3. Forward bypass control - Manual
schedule.
4. Spike control - Manual schedule.
As higher Mach number is reached:
5. Spike and forward bypass controls
AUTO.
If condition recurs or continues:
6. Operate per spike and bypass manual
schedule.
COMPRESSOR STALLS
Acceleration and/or Overtrim
These stalls usually result from EGT up-
trim and are most prevalent during throttle
application at subsonic speeds and low com-
pressor inlet temperatures. They may also
occur with constant throttle settings at
or below Military at any airspeeds. Re-
tarding the throttle should result in the fast-
est stall recovery. Downtrim and readjust-
ment of the throttle should result in proper
engine operation.
1. THROTTLES - RETARD UNTIL STALL
CLEARS.
2. EGT trim switches - HOLD DOWN 1 to
3 seconds.
3. THROTTLES - As desired.
4. If stall persists repeat above procedure.
5. If stall cannot be cleared - Land as
soon as possible.
Compressor Stalls in Descent
The airframe roughness characteristics
felt during compressor stalls at supersonic
speeds are very similar to those which oc-
cur during inlet unstarts. If roughness is
encountered, an unstart condition is more
likely while above Mach 2.5 when spike
scheduling is at fault. A compressor stall
condition is more likely at lower super-
sonic speeds when at or near Military rpm
with excessive bypass door opening. The
normal descent procedure tends to avoid
conditions which may result in compressor
stalls, but excessive rpm reduction or
spike too far aft precipitates unstarts. (See
figure 34.) It is best to employ the un-
start procedure first in the event of inlet
disturbances until it is apparent that the
spike is scheduling and that spike forward
3-27
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III A-12
STALL BOUNDARIES
SPIKE: FORWARD
FORWARD BYPASS: OPEN
OR
RESTART : ON
ROTOR SPEED - RPM
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
STANDARD DAY -
Based On Mach And FAT
For Std. Day At 400 KEAS
Stall Boundaries Indicate The Maximum RPM Obtainable
Stall-Free For A Specific Mach And Inlet Configuration
417+
IVY
iLE NOMINAL MILITARY SPEED -.4110 KEAS
0
0.5
1.0
t.
YJ ENGINES - YJ-1 ENGINES
WITH HAMILTON STANDARD
MAIN FUEL CONTROL
Stalls Are Probable At Any RPM Higher
Than The Levels Defined By These Curves
�'AFT ' BY PASS - CLOSED
'''' . .............
. '
�
15
MACH NUMBER
2.0
2.5
444 : : : :���
-1:14t;
:
3.0
3-28
Figure 3 - 5
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION LII
A-12
is ineffective in clearing the roughness.
The throttle should then be retarded slowly
to the idle stop if necessary, until roughness
stops and the compressor stall is cleared.
Maintain this configuration for the remain-
der of the descent until subsonic airspeeds
are reached.
1.
Restart switch - ON.
2. Throttle - Reduce rpm slowly until
stall clears.
When subsonic:
3. Restart switch - OFF.
ENGINE FLAMEOUT
Windmilling operation at speeds between
Mach 1.5 and 2.3 may result in heavy inlet
roughness as illustrated by figure 3-4. If
an immediate air start cannot be obtained
before the engine stabilizes at windmilling
speeds, adjust airspeed to obtain 375 KEAS
or at least 7 psia CIP before making further
attempts. Engine flameout with afterburners
on or off should be treated identically except
for -initial throttle positioning after the flame-
out occurs. If flameout occurs with after-
burners ON, the throttles should be re-
tarded to minimum afterburner position to
reduce thrust asymmetry. If afterburners
, are OFF at flameout the operating engine
should be set to the thrust required by flight
conditions. When an engine flameout is con-
firmed by crosschecking EGT, fuel flow,
rpm and EN?, proceed as follows:
1. THROTTLES - AS REQUIRED,
2.. DETERMINE FLAMED OUT ENGINE.
3. ACCOMPLISH AIR START PROCEDURE.
If start is not successful - Failed engine:
4. Throttle - OFF.
5. Generator - TRIP.
6. CROSSFEED light - Check on.
7. Compressor inlet pressure normal
range - Check above 7 psia.
8. Throttle - Half open. (Check TEB re-
maining).
NOTE
If necessary, continue air start
attempts as long as TEB supply
remains unless an obvious me-
chanical failure has occurred.
After start:
9. Throttles and cockpit switches - As re-
quired.
If mechanical failure obvious or unable to
start engine:
10. Throttle - OFF.
11. Failed engine inlet air forward and aft
bypass door controls - OPEN above
Mach 1.4.
12. Cockpit air switch - EMER if left
engine failed.
13. Establish single engine cruise.
DOUBLE ENGINE FLAMEOUT
When altitude permits:
1. ATTEMPT AIR START.
When altitude is critical, or engines will
not start:
2. EJECT.
3-29
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
WINDMILLING GLIDE DISTANCE
A-12
PRESSURE ALTITUDE - 1000 FT
90,
CONDITIONS
BOTH ENGINES WINDMILLING
60,000 LB GROSS WEIGHT
SPIKES*; FORWARD
FWD & AFT BYPASS OPEN
CONSTANT MACH NO. DESCENTS
3.20
3.05
6.5
80,
70
60
50
2.90
6
4
375 KEAS
413.'
304
20
1101
TIME TO 10,000 FT - MIN.
01 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
DESCENT DISTANCE - NAUTICAL MILES
3-30
Figure 3-6
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
AIRSTART PROCEDURE
NOTE
The reason for initial engine shut-
down must be considered prior to
Initiation of restart.
The recommended condition for airstarts
at any Mach number is 375 KEAS with CIF'
7 psi or greater. Air starts should not be
attempted at lower inlet pressures, and
airspeeds in excess of 400 KEAS should not
be required in obtaining 7 psia. Conditions
for airstart are more favorable when stable
Inlet condition exist; however, starts have
been obtained while in roughness. Monitor
rpm, EGT and fuel flow while making the
start attempt. Allow 15 seconds, after ad-
vancing the throttle, for rpm and EGT rise
as an indication of successful start. The
recommended procedure for airstarts is as
follows:
1. THROTTLE - OFF.
2. AIRSPEED - ADJUST TO OBTAIN
7 PSIA CIP.
3. FORWARD BYPASS SWITCH - OPEN.
4. CROSSFEED - ON.
5. THROTTLE - HALF OPEN.
After start:
6. Throttle and cockpit switches - As re-
quired.
If start unsuccessful (after 30 seconds):
7. Throttle - OFF.
8. Repeat AIRSTART attempt (check TEB
counter).
. The engine shall not be intentionally
windmilled at subsonic conditions
when CIT is less than 15�C (60�F).
If it is necessary to windmill the
engine for more than five minutes
the engine should not be restarted.
If the engine must be restarted dur-
ing an in-flight emergency after
windmilling in excess of the above
limit maintain as high an airspeed
as possible to raise the inlet air
temperature prior to starting. The
engine should then remain at idle
until there is an indication the oil
has warmed up either by extin-
guishing of the oil temperature
warning light if it has illuminated
or by a normal response of oil
pressure to throttle movement to
slightly above IDLE.
If, following windmill operation in
excess of the above limit, the engine
must be restarted and operated at �
high thrust levels while the oil tem-
perature light is illuminated, dur-
ation of such operation shall be as
brief as possible.
GLIDE DISTANCE-BOTH ENGINES INOPERATIVE
The windmilling Glide Distance chart, figure
3-6, shows zero-wind distances with both
engines win.dmilling. The glide speeds are
in the same range as for air start. Some-
what slower speeds provide greater range,
but reduced capability for successful air-
starts. There is sufficient engine rpm for
adequate hydraulic pressure to approxi-
mately 10,000 feet.
WARNING
Landing with both engines inoper-
ative should not be attempted.
Changed 15 March 1968
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
3-31
SECTION III
ENGINE SHUTDOWN
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
3. RESTART SWITCH - ON (in roughness).
Engine shutdown should be accomplished in
the event of complete engine failure such as
seizure or explosion, or in the event of
mechanical failure within the engine or en-
gine accessories in order to avoid or delay
complete engine failure. Mechanical failure
situations include uncontrollable oil tem-
perature, EGT, or rpm, and abnormal oil
pressure, fuel flow, or vibration. Complete
failure probably will not permit normal wind-
milling operation but, if the engine continues
to rotate, cooling fuel will circulate through
the engine and aircraft cooling loops with
the throttle OFF. An airstart should not be
attempted since doing so can result in fire
or explosion. Normal windmilling speeds
can be expected after shutdown for mechan-
ical failure and fuel cooling will continue
unless the fuel is shut off. In some cases,
airstart may be attempted after mechanical
failure when conditions are favorable for
control of oil temperature or pressure or
EGT.
WARNING I
Positively identify the failed engine
before employing the engine shut-
down procedure.
If engine shutdown is necessary:
1. AFT BYPASS SWITCH - OPEN.
For the affected engine, select the
OPEN position of the inlet aft bypass
switch in order to delay onset of
roughness or inlet unstart when the
engine is shut down.
2. THROTTLE - OFF.
As the throttle is retarded, pause
momentarily at the Military and Idle
positions.
Set the Restart switch for the affected
engine inlet ON when roughness en-
cou.ntered.
This causes the forward bypass to open
and the spike to move forward. Rough-
ness will be encountered at approxi-
mately Mach 2.4 and may persist to
low supersonic speed. If an engine is
shut down at subsonic speed, setting
the Restart switch ON only opens the
forward bypass as the spike is already
forward.
4. Generator switch (affected engine) -
OFF.
Setting the generator switch OFF be-
fore the automatic cutout feature op-
erates avoids the possiblity of electri-
cal transients which might affect the
navigation system.
5. Emer fuel shutoff switch - Fuel off if
necessary.
Fuel shutoff stops flow through one fuel
cooling loop system. Depending on ex-
isting circumstances, this step may
not be desirable or necessary.
WARNING I
Shutting off fuel to a windmilling
engine while at high Mach numbers
may cause additional emergencies
due to loss of cooling fuel for the
engine and aircraft systems.
If left engine shutdown:
6. Cockpit air switch - EMER.
7 Hydraulic system - Review SAS and
hydraulic services available.
Refer to procedures for SAS, flight
control system, and hydraulic system
emergencies for operating procedures.
3-32
,Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
8. Control c. g.
Refer to use of forward transfer and
crossfeed as described under fuel
system emergency operating pro-
cedures to control c. g. during single
engine operation.
9. Land as soon as possible.
SINGLE ENGINE FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
The aircraft design is such that no flight
system is dependent on a specific engine;
therefore, the loss of an engine will not
result in subsequent loss of all hydraulic or
electrical systems. If an engine fails at
low speed just after takeoff, the large
amount of asymmetric thrust may require
bank toward the good engine and full rudder
for directional control. Refer to figure 3-3
for minimum single engine control sNeedso
After regaining control, however, 7 to 9
rudder trim with bank and sideslip toward
the good engine provide minimum drag dur-
ing acceleration to climb-out speed. Charts
showing single engine climbout capabilities
are included in the performance data ap-
pendix. Acceleration to climb speed and
climb to landing pattern altitude can be ac-
complished with Maximum thrust on the op-
erating engine when a climb capability exists
for the operating condition. During single
engine cruise, or after climbout, reduction
to zero rudder trim and use of bank and
sideslip to maintain course provides mini-
mum drag. Up to 10 bank toward the good
engine may be required.
Pitch trim changes can be expected while
dumping fuel due to shifting center of gravity
as the tanks empty. Directional trim is
quite sensitive to changes in airspeed and
power settings during landing pattern op-
eration.
At high speed, engine failure or engine
flameout could cause yaw angle to become
critical at high rates if an effective damper
were not operating. Temporary thrust re-
duction on the good engine helps to counter-
act the asymmetric thrust condition. Fol-
low-up rudder action is necessary. If large
yaw angles develop, inlet duct airflow dis-
turbances may cause the other engine to
stall or flame out.
� Roughness, if encountered, is more intense
with increasing KEAS and Mach number.
The maximum structural loads imposed are
severe, but are well below design limits.
If airstart attempts are unsuccessful, or if
engine failure has occurred, a descent to
intermediate altitudes will be necessary.
The spike should be forward and bypass
doors open on the windmilling engine to de-
lay onset of roughness. Note the effect of
Mach number and engine rpm on inlet rough-
ness as shown by the Inlet Unstart Bound-
aries chart, figure 3-5. Descent range can
be extended by decelerating with minimum
afterburning or Military thrust on the good
engine. Base the choice on the power con-
dition to be used for single engine cruise.
When no airstart is to be attempted, decel-
erate at 300 KEAS until subsonic cruise
altitude is reached. A bank of up to 10 de-
grees with zero rudder trim should be used
to achieve best cruise performance.
Fuel management during protracted engine
out operation should be directed toward
maintaining optimum center of gravity con-
ditions, making all of the fuel available to
the operating engine and, when possible,
continuing the fuel cooling of necessary
systems. Improper c. g. conditions will
be indicated by abnormal pitch trim re-
quirements.
Changed 15 March 1968
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
3-33
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
Single-Engine Air Refueling
Single engine air refueling may be accom-
plished using either normal or alternate
refueling procedures. Approximately the
same control trim and forces as for single
engine cruise may be used with bank angles
up to 10 . Afterburning on the operative
engine will be necessary when near 30,000
feet at normal refueling speed, and a to-
boggan may be necessary after approxi-
mately 15,000 pounds of fuel are on board.
Refuel hook-up may be accomplished with
the operative engine near Military power
at low altitudes, although lack of excess
thrust will make the hook-up more difficult
and a continued descent may be necessary
as fuel is onloaded.
NOTE
. Trimming EGT up toward limit
values improves refueling alti-
tude capability.
If the left engine or the left hy-
draulic system is inoperative,
right hydraulic pressure may be
used by placing the brake switch
in the ALT STEER & BRAKE
position.
When using minimum afterburner
at intermediate altitudes or with
small quantities of fuel remaining,
it may be necessary to hook-up
while climbing in order to avoid
overrunning the tanker.
SINGLE ENGINE CRUISE
Minimum A/B thrust and Military thrust
provides the best levels of single engine
cruise performance. Military provides the
best range performance, but penalizes the
aircraft in altitude capability especially at
heavy gross weights. Minimum A/B pro-
vides good range performance with an ample
altitude capability. The Maximum A/B
single engine cruise has ,poor range per-
formance and should be only used in cases
where the required cruise altitude is higher
than the minimum A/B cruise capability.
Since hot temperatures adversely effect
aircraft ceiling, an altitude capability
lower than shown on the charts must be
expected on a Hot Day.
Refer to Appendix Part IV for single engine
cruise performance.
AFTERBURNER FLAMEOUT
Afterburner flameout can be expected as a
result of engine stall or abnormal inlet op-
eration, or insufficient airspeed at altitude.
Afterburner flameout may be detected by a
loss of thrust and by comparison of nozzle
position indicators. The flamed-out after-
burner nozzle will be noticeably more
closed. Fuel will continue to flow from the
spray bars until the throttle is retarded to
MILITARY. Correct the inlet, engine, or
airspeed and altitude condition before at-
tempting afterburner relight. At high Mach
numbers, the minimum airspeed necessary
for afterburner operation is lower with auto-
matic scheduling than with spike forward.
In the event of afterburner flameout, attempt
to relight as follows:
1. Throttle - Retard to Military.
2. Throttle - A/B midrange.
Note TEB shot counter number and
fuel flow increase.
3. Nozzle position - Check.
Check for more open nozzle position.
3-34
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
8. Control c. g.
Refer to use of forward transfer and
crossfeed as described under fuel
system emergency operating pro-
cedures to control c. g. during single
engine operation.
9. Land as soon as possible.
SINGLE ENGINE FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
The aircraft design is such that no flight
system is dependent on a specific engine;
therefore, the loss of an engine will not
result in subsequent loss of all hydraulic or
electrical systems. If an engine fails at
low speed just alter takeoff, the large
amount of asymmetric thrust may require
bank toward the good engine and full rudder
for directional control. Refer to figure 3-3
for minimum single engine control seeds.
After regaining control, however, 7 to 9
rudder trim with bank and sideslip toward
the good engine provide minimum drag dur-
ing acceleration to climb-out speed. Charts
showing single engine climbout capabilities
are included in the performance data ap-
pendix. Acceleration to climb speed and
climb to landing pattern altitude can be ac-
complished with Maximum thrust on the op-
erating engine when a climb capability exists
for the operating condition. During single
engine cruise, or after climbout, reduction
to zero rudder trim and use of bank and
sideslip to maintain course provides mini-
mum drag. Up to 10 bank toward the good
engine may be required.
Pitch trim changes can be expected while
dumping fuel due to shifting center of gravity
as the tanks empty. Directional trim is
quite sensitive to changes in airspeed and
power settings during landing pattern op-
eration.
SECTION III
At high speed, engine failure or engine
flameout could cause yaw angle to become
critical at high rates if an effective damper
were not operating. Temporary thrust re-
duction on the good engine helps to counter-
act the asymmetric thrust condition. Fol-
low-up rudder action is necessary: If large
yaw angles develop, inlet duct airflow dis-
turbances may cause the other engine to
stall or flame out.
Roughness, if encountered, is more intense
with increasing KEAS and Mach number.
The maximum structural loads imposed are
severe, but are well below design limits.
If air start attempts are unsuccessful, or if
engine failure has occurred, a descent to
intermediate altitudes will be necessary.
The spike should be forward and bypass
doors open on the windmilling engine to de-
lay onset of roughness. Note the effect of
Mach number and engine rpm on inlet rough-
ness as shown by the Inlet Unstart Bound-
aries chart, figure 3-5. Descent range can
be extended by decelerating with minimum
afterburning or Military thrust on the good
engine. Base the choice on the power con-
dition to be used for single engine cruise.
When no airstart is to be attempted, decel-
erate at 350 KEAS until subsonic cruise
altitude is reached. A bank of up to 10 de-
grees with zero rudder trim should be used
to achieve best cruise performance.
Fuel management during protracted engine
out operation should be directed toward
maintaining optimum center of gravity con-
ditions, making all of the fuel available to
the operating engine and, when possible,
continuing the fuel cooling of necessary
systems. Improper c. g. conditions will
be indicated by abnormal pitch trim re-
quirements.
3-33
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
Single-Engine Air Refueling
Single engine air refueling may be accom-
plished using either normal or alternate
refueling procedures. Approximately the
same control trim and forces as for single
engine cruise may be used with bank angles
up to 10 . Afterburning on the operative
engine will be necessary when near 30,000
feet at normal refueling speed, and a to-
boggan may be necessary after approxi-
mately 15,000 pounds of fuel are on board.
Refuel hook-up may be accomplished with
the operative engine near Military power
at low altitudes, although lack of excess
thrust will make the hook-up more difficult
and a continued descent may be necessary
as fuel is onloaded.-
NOTE
.. Trimming EGT up toward limit
values improves refueling alti-
tude capability.
If the left engine or the left hy-
draulic system is inoperative,
right hydraulic pressure may be
used by placing the brake switch
in the ALT STEER & BRAKE
position.
When using minimum afterburner
at intermediate altitudes or with
small quantities of fuel remaining,
it may be necessary to hook-up
while climbing in order to avoid
overrunning the tanker.
SINGLE ENGINE CRUISE
Minimum A/B thrust and Military thrust
provides the best levels of single engine
cruise performance. Military provides the
best range performance, but penalizes the
aircraft in altitude capability especially at
heavy gross weights'. Minimum A/B pro-
vides good range performance with an ample
altitude capability. The Maximum A/B
single engine cruise has poor range per-
formance and should be only used in cases
where the required cruise altitude is higher
than the minimum A/B cruise capability.
Since hot temperatures adversely effect
aircraft ceiling, an altitude capability
lower than shown on the charts must be
expected on a Hot Day.
Refer to Appendix Part IV for single engine
cruise performance.
AFTERBURNER FLAMEOUT
Afterburner flameout can be expected as a
result of engine stall or abnormal inlet op-
eration, or insufficient airspeed at altitude.
Afterburner flameout may be detected by a
loss of thrust and by comparison of nozzle
position indicators. The flamed-out after-
burner nozzle will be noticeably more
closed. Fuel will continue to flow from the
spray bars until the throttle is retarded to
MILITARY. Correct the inlet, engine, or
airspeed and altitude condition before at-
tempting afterburner relight. At high Mach
numbers, the minimum airspeed necessary
for afterburner operation is lower with auto
matic scheduling than with spike forward.
In the event of afterburner flameout, attempt
to relight as follows:
1. - Throttle - Retard to Military.
2. Throttle - A/B midrange.
Note TEB shot counter number and
fuel flow increase.
3. Nozzle position - Check.
Check for more open nozzle position.
3-34
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
If relight not successful:
4. EGT - Increase trim.
For CIT above 5oC, trim toward 805oC
EGT.
For CIT below 5oC, trim toward 825o
to 845�C EGT range.
Uptrim to the 825� - 845�C EGT
range carefully due to possibility
of engine surge.
If relight by catalytic igniters not success-
ful:
5. Igniter purge switch - On for two
seconds.
The TEB supply will be depleted
rapidly if the igniter purge switch
is held on for more than two sec-
onds.
If relight not successful:
6. Throttle - Military.
AFTERBURNER CUTOFF FAILURE
If the afterburner does not cut off when the
throttle is retarded to Military, an attempt
can be made to vary the thrust by retarding
the throttle below Military. The engine
should be shut down if thrust cannot be
modulated satisfactorily. The fuel may
have to be shut off if the flowmeter indicates
that the afterburner is dumping fuel.
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
AFTERBURNER NOZZLE FAILURE
SECTION III
Nozzle malfunctions may be indicated by
the nozzle position indicator, excessive
rpm fluctuations, or failure of the engine
to control to schedule speed. This may be
accompanied by compressor stall and ex-
haust gas overtemperature. Precautionary
engine shut down may be necessary.
A nozzle failed open condition will be more
difficult to recognize at high altitude during
afterburner operation near limit KEAS be-
cause open nozzle position is normal in
these conditions. As altitude increases and
KEAS decreases, the nozzle gradually
closes to 60 to 80% open as limit altitude is
approached. A failed open nozzle will re-
sult in abnormally high engine speeds under
these conditions. An increase in after-
burning throttle position or a reduction in
cruise altitude while maintaining cruise
Mach number (increasing KEAS) may permit
cruise to be continued until the scheduled
descent point is reached. Nozzle position
and rpm of the normally operating engine
can be used as a guide in selection of the
lower cruise altitude range where an open
nozzle position is normal. Be prepared to
use less than Military throttle when the
afterburner is shut down.
At intermediate altitudes, the nozzle failed
open condition may be recognized by re-
duction of thrust and an increase in rpm.
At low altitude and Mach number it will be
necessary to rapidly retard the throttle to
a point midway between IDLE and MILI-
TARY to keep rpm within limits. The
same procedure will apply when altitude
and Mach number are decreased and the
nozzle failure is detected. If the thrust
requirement is critical, such as for take-
off, it may be practical to retain Maximum
thrust, even with engine over speed, until
safe airspeed and altitude are attained.
3-35
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-l2'
A nozzle-closed failure can, in most cases,
be detected by referring to the nozzle posi-
tion indicator on the instrument panel and
by analyzing engine symptoms. There are
no obvious symptoms of a nozzle failed
closed without afterburning because the
nozzle is already closed, or nearly so, at
Military thrust. EGT and rpm may fluc-
tuate together. Either down trim the engine
or retard the throttle slightly and check for
rpm suppression or ENP change. A nor-
mally functioning nozzle will open slightly
to maintain engine rpm. In the case of the
nozzle failing closed, do not attempt to light
the afterburner because the engine may
flame out (after which it cannot be restarted
due to reduced rpm). If the nozzle fails
closed with afterburning, rpm suppression
will occur, probably unstarting the inlet
shock wave. Compressor stall and after-
burner flame out are extremely likely and
EGT will probably rise.
Nozzle Failed During Cruise
When a reduction in thrust or rpm is de-
sirable or nozzle failed closed:
1. Throttle - MILITARY or below, as re-
quired.
2. RPM and EGT - Maintain in limits.
3. Land as soon as practicable.
OIL PRESSURE ABNORMAL
Low Oil Pressure
A low oil pressure generally indicates an oil
system malfunction. If the malfunction
causes oil starvation of the engine bearings,
the result will be a progressive bearing
failure, loss of oil, and subsequent engine
seizure. Bearing failure due to oil starva-
tion is generally characterized by rapidly
increasing vibration. If this occurs in con-
junction with gage indication of pressure
loss, reduce Mach number and altitude and
do the following:
1. Throttle - OFF.
2. Land as soon as practicable.
High Oil Pressure
High oil pressure does not necessarily in-
dicate a hazardous engine operation condi-
tion unless accompanied by high oil tem-
perature; however, the high pressure con-
dition must be reported after flight and the
landing should be accomplished as soon as
practicable.
3-36
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
OIL TEMPERATURE ABNORMAL
Abnormal high or low oil temperature is in-
dicated by illumination of the OIL TEMP
warning light. It is unlikely that low oil
temperature will occur in flight with the en-
gine operating, and a high oil temperature
should be assumed. Abnormally high oil
temperature could be caused by deficient lu-
brication flow or insufficient fuel/oil cooling.
Abnormally low oil temp may be indicated
before start or after extended windmilling
operation at subsonic speeds. In the event
of an L or R OIL TEMP warning light il-
lumination in flight, proceed as follows:
1. Oil pressure - Check for normal indi-
cation.
2. Speed and altitude - Reduce as required
if at high Mach number.
3. Fuel flow - Maintain over 12,000 pph
(if practicable).
If temperature can not be controlled:
4. Throttle - OFF.
5. Land as soon as possible.
NOTE
If L or R OIL TEMP warning light
illuminates after extended windmill-
ing operation, refer to AIR START
procedure, this section.
FUEL CONTROL FAILURE
If a fuel control malfunction is suspected,
minimize throttle movements and monitor
rpm and EGT closely.
SECTION III
FUEL-HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE
Fuel hydraulic system failure may be
caused by a failed pump or a broken line or
connector. A failed pump is indicated by
inoperative exhaust nozzle and start and
bypass bleed valves. Line failure is indi-
cated by excessive fuel flow.
If engine fuel-hydraulic system failure is
suspected:
1. Fuel flow - Check.
If fuel flow is excessive:
2. Throttle - Military.
Overspeed may occur.
3. ENP and rpm - Check.
If exhaust nozzle position indicator does
not reflect a more closed position:
4. Throttle - Between Idle and Military.
5. Fuel flow - Check.
A fuel flow of approximately 8000 to
9000 pph above normal will confirm
a broken line.
When below Mach 1.7:
6. Throttle - OFF.
7. Emergency Fuel Shutoff switch - Fuel
off.
3-37
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL QUANTITY LOW WARNING
If the fuel quantity low warning light comes
on with appreciably more than 5000 pounds
of fuel indicated remaining in tank 4, de-
termine total fuel from the individual tank
quantities. Monitor tank 4 quantity and land
as soon as practicable. Quantity indications
are affected by pitch attitude and longitudinal
acceleration. Total quantity indication is
also affected by the fuel distribution in the
individual tanks.
If the fuel quantity low warning light does
not come on with less than 5000 pounds of
fuel indicated in tank 4, test warning light
and land as soon as possible.
FUEL PRESSURE LOW
If one or both FUEL PRESS LOW warning
lights illuminate:
1. CROSSFEED - PRESS ON.
2. Tanks containing fuel - Press on.
3. Analyze difficulty and attempt to re-
store normal sequencing. The difficulty
may be due to low rpm while transfer-
ing or dumping.
When fuel pressure is restored:
4. Crossfeed - Press off.
If pressure cannot be restored:
5. Land as soon as possible.
FUEL TANK PRESSURIZATION FAILURE
Fuel tank pressurization failure is indi-
cated by the tank pressure gage and illum-
ination of the TANK PRESSURE LOW warn-
ing light. It may be confirmed by liquid
nitrogen quantity remaining gage indications.
Impending failure is indicated by illumi-
nation of the N QTY LOW warning light.
No corrective action is possible after both
liquid nitrogen systems are depleted except
to limit rates of descent to minimize the
difference between fuel tank and ambient
pressures. In descent, the fuel tank suction
relief valve in the nose wheel well opens
when slightly negative tank pressures occur.
Rates of descent should be limited so that
tank pressure does not become less than
-1/2 psi.
WARNING
Limit tank pressure is -1/2 psi.
This limit is based on structural
capabilities of the fuselage tanks.
To descend:
1. Descend so that minimum tank pres-
sure limit is not exceeded.
Adjust power and airspeed as required.
If flight included cruise over Mach 2.6:
2. Loiter at subsonic long range speed
for 10 minutes if possible.
3738
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
If loiter not possible:
3. Descend from FL 400 to FL 350 as
slowly as possible.
4. Continue descent so that minimum tank
pressure limit is not exceeded.
NOTE
Cooling will be accelerated and
pressure may be relieved faster
after reaching subsonic speeds
If the nose gear is extended.
FUEL BOOST PUMP FAILURE
Loss of all boost pumps can only result
from multiple failures. It would be indi-
cated by illumination of both fuel pressure
low lights.
WARNING I
Fuel cannot be dumped with com-
plete boost pump failure. Use
caution if heavyweight landing is
required.
Partial boost pump failure may not be indi-
cated by the fuel pressure low lights. In-
correct fuel sequencing and center-of-
gravity shift may be the first indication.
Proceed as directed for Fuel Sequencing
Incorrect. Crossfeed may be required;
however, when crossfeed is on, more fuel
will tend to feed from the forward tanks
which have boost pumps operating. This
could cause an aft c, g. shift which might
be hazardous when operating with a failed
pitch SAS.
A-12
FUEL SEQUENCING INCORRECT
SECTION III
Incorrect automatic fuel sequencing is indi-
cated primarily by the fuel boost pump
lights. (A light may illuminate out of normal
sequence, or fail to illuminate on schedule.)
In this event, control the boost pumps man-
ually until correct automatic sequencing re-
sumes or a landing is made. It is possible
that faulty fuel sequencing may manifest it-
self by secondary indications, such as a fuel
low level light coming on prematurely, or
an abnormal adjustment required in pitch
trim due to c. g. change by faulty fuel dis-
tribution. Note that forward c. g. requires
increased power to maintain speed and alti-
tude. If normal sequencing does not resume,
and manual sequencing is either inconvenient
or impossible, turn crossfeed on or transfer
fuel to ensure that any available fuel will get
to the engines.
Do not permit a manually selected
fuel boost pump to continue running
in an empty fuel tank. The boost
pump will be damaged.
NOTE
Crossfeed may be required to pro-
vide fuel to both engines during
fuel sequence malfunctions.
Fuel System Management With Engine Shutdown
During single engine operation with the left
engine failed, the crossfeed valve should be
opened after tanks 5 and 6 are emptied by
right engine consumption. If the right
engine has failed, empty tanks 5 and 6 by
successive forward transfer operations.
This accomplishes the dual purpose of
maintaining c. g. and using all available
fuel.
3-39
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A712
NOTE
Fuel transfer capability is lost
when operating on battery power
and the crossfeed valve position
cannot be changed. An aft c. g.
shift can be expected as fuel is
consumed.
Fuel cooling is continued automatically when
the inoperative engine is windmilling unless
its emergency fuel shutoff switch is actuated.
Crossfeed should never be used during for-
ward transfer when fuel remains in tanks 5
or 6. If it were, most of the fuertra.ns-
ferred would come from the operating tank(s)
of group 2, 3, or 4 because of the aircraft
nose up attitude and lower fuel pressure
head these pumps would have to overcome.
Only a small forward c. g. shift would re-
sult.
EMERGENCY FUEL OPERATION
The design and specification operating en-
velope of the JT11D-20 engine necessitates
operation with a fuel having special char-
acteristics. During high Mach number op-
eration the fuel serves not only as the
source of energy but is used in the engine
hydraulic system and serves also as a heat
sink for cooling the various aircraft and
engine accessories heated by the high am-
bient air temperatures. This requires a
fuel having high thermal stability so that it
will not break down and deposit coke and
varnishes in the fuel system passages. A
high luminometer number (brightness of
flame) is required to minimize transfer of
heat to the burner parts. Other items are
also significant, such as the amount of
sulphur impurities tolerated. An advanced
fuel1PWA 523E, was developed to meet the
above requirements.
In addition to the fuel requirements,a special
lubricity additive is used with PWA 523E to
insure adequate lubrication of fuel and hy-
draulic pumps.
Fuels such as JP-4, JP-5, and JP-6 may
be used only for emergency requirements
such as air refueling when standard fuel is
not available and air refueling must be ac-
complished or risk loss of the aircraft.
Air refueling procedures with JP fuel are
the same as for the approved fuel.
When these JP fuels are used, operation
should be restricted to a maximum speed
of Mach 1.5.
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM FAILURE
SINGLE AC GENERATOR FAILURE
Failure of one ac generator will be indicated
by illumination of the warning light. One
generator in normal operation is sufficient
to support the entire electrical load. In the
event of generator failure, proceed as fol-
lows:
1. Generator switch - RESET then re-
lease.
If the generator fault has been corrected,
the generator will be reconnected to the
system and the warning light will go out.
If the light remains on:
2. Failed generator switch - TRIP.
3. Land as soon as practicable.
If flight is continued with an inoperative
engine or generator:
4. Affected generator - TRIP.
If EWS equipment is operating:
5. TACAN - OFF.
3-40
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
TRANSFORMER RECTIFIER FAILURE
. Do not manually select additional
fuel tank pumps.
. HF radio transmissions are limited
to one minute of any ten minute
period.
DOUBLE AC GENERATOR FAILURE
If both ac generators fail the dc monitored
bus will be dead, however, INS equipment
will continue to be powered by the INS bat-
tery. Manual trim will not be available.
The dc essential bus will automatically re-
ceive power from the emergency batteries.
The battery switch must be in the BAT posi-
tion to power the essential dc bus. Some
dc systems which may not always be es-
sential for flight cannot be turned off by the
pilot unless the circuit breakers are pulled.
These are difficult to reach when wearing
a pressure suit. The UHF radio should be
used only when absolutely necessary be-
cause its large power requirement will de-
plete battery power rapidly. With complete
generator failure, fuel boost pumps are in-
operative. Proceed as follows:
1. Battery switch - Check BAT.
2. Generator switches - RESET.
3. If only one generator resets - Land as
soon as practicable.
4. If neither generator resets - Conserve
batteries and land as soon as possible.
AC GENERATOR UNDERSPEED
The minimum windmill speed at which the
ac generators will supply power is approxi-
mately 2800 rpm. If the left engine is be-
low approx 4500 rpm the HF and TACAN
radio will be inoperative. The left gen-
erator may be tripped to restore operation
if the right engine is above 4500 rpm.
SECTION ILI
One transformer rectifier will supply the
normal electrical demands. Variable fre-
quency ac power systems will continue to
operate normally. A double failure of the
transformer rectifiers removes power from
the dc monitored bus but the INS will be op-
erated from the INS battery. The batteries
will operate the dc essential bus and should
be managed as for double generator failure.
INVERTER FAILURE
The inverter powered systems operate from
separate inverters. Refer to Electrical
Power Distribution diagram, Section I.
No. 1 inverter is the most important with
No. 2 and No. 3 following in order of lesser
importance. The No. 4 inverter is installed
to serve as a backup in the event of failure
of any one inverter. It is placed in oper-
ation by turning the failed inverter switch
to the EMER position. If a second inverter
failure should occur the No. 4 inverter will
power the lowest numbered inverter bus
whose switch is in the EMER position.
If an inverter failure is indicated by illumi-
nation of an INVERTER OUT warning light,
proceed as follows:
1. Failed inverter switch - EMER.
Check that INVERTER OUT light extin-
guishes:
2. Illuminated SAS recycle lights - Press.
HYDRAULIC POWER SYSTEM FAILURE
With both engines out, the hydraulic pumps
provide sufficient flow for satisfactory
flight control system operation at windmill
speeds above 3000 rpm. Reduced control
system capability is available down to a
windmilling speed of approximately 1500
rpm. With one engine windmilling, all pri-
Changed 15 March 1968
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
3-41
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
mary and most utility services are supplied
by the operating engine hydraulic systems.
The windrnilling engine utility system pres-
sure and flow may be sufficient to supply
service until the engine is almost stopped.
PRIMARY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE
The loss of either A or B hydraulic system
will be indicated by the warning light on the
pilot's center console, the master caution
light, and the dual A and B hydraulic pres-
sure gage. Reduce speed to less than 350
KEAS if either A or B system fails and turn
Reserve Hydraulic Oil System switch on to
the operative system (A or B). This will
ensure a minimum of at least 3 hours of
flight control time remaining at high speed
cruise schedules.
Disengagement of the failed hydraulic sys-
tem SAS channels is necessary to maintain
full yaw and roll damping capability. As a
hydraulic system failure is not sensed by
the SAS equipment, it is necessary to double
the SAS signal gain of the operating channel
to give the equivalent control response in
yaw and roll. Airspeed reduction with a
single hydraulic system is a precautionary
procedure which allows for the reduction
in available hinge moment capability. Dis-
engagement of the failed system SAS pitch
channel is not mandatory, but it may be
more desirable to disengage all three chan-
nels than only the yaw and roll switches.
Monitor all system operations closely and
attempt to determine if a complete failure
is imminent. Be prepared for ejection
prior to complete failure.
UTILITY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE
The loss of L or R hydraulic system will be
indicated by the dual L and R hydraulic
pressure gage. If the pressure of the L
system falls below 2000-2200 psi, cross-
over for gear ietraction is automatic. The
manual release must be used to lower the
gear. Items which are affected by the L
hydraulic system are normal brakes, nose-
wheel steering, aerial refueling system and
the left inlet control actuators. Items
which are affected by the R hydraulic sys-
tem are right inlet control actuators, alter-
nate steer and brakes and air refueling sys-
tem.
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE
With both engines out, the ac generators
furnish rated electrical power at windmill
speeds above 2800 rpm. The emergency
batteries provide SAS operation at lower
windmill speeds. There is sufficient hy-
draulic flow to operate the control surfaces
at satisfactory rates above 3000 rpm and
operation at reduced rates is available to a
windmilling speed of approximately 1500
rpm.
NOTE
During single engine operation, a
windmilling engine may not develop
sufficient system hydraulic pres-
sure to maintain operation of its
associated SAS servo channels. To
avoid nuisance disengagement of
SAS channels, turn off all three
SAS channel switches for the wind-
milling engine hydraulic system
when lower than normal pressure
is indicated. Pitch and Yaw SAS
damping will continue on one
channel. The operative engine
SAS roll channel must be cycled
OFF then ON to maintain damping
in the Roll axis.
3-42
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
000821248
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION Lit
A-12
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE
With both engines out, the ac generators
furnish rated electrical power at windmill
speeds above 2800 rpm. The emergency
batteries provide SAS operation at lower
windmill speeds. There is sufficient hy-
draulic flow to operate the control surfaces
at satisfactory rates above 3000 rpm and
operation at reduced rates is available to a
windmilling speed of approximately 1500
rpm.
NOTE
During single engine operation, a
windmilIing engine may not develop
sufficient system hydraulic pres-
sure to maintain operation of its
associated SAS servo channels. To
avoid nuisance disengagement of
SAS channels, turn off all three
SAS channel switches for the wind-
milling engine hydraulic system
when lower than normal pressure
is indicated. Pitch and Yaw SAS
damping will continue on one
channel. The operative engine
SAS roll channel must be cycled
OFF then ON to maintain damping
in the Roll axis.
Changed 15 June 1968
3-42A13-423
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION ILI
A-12
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM EMERGENCY
OPERATION
If either the A or B hydraulic system fails,
the control forces will not change. Either
system will operate the control surfaces,
but at a slower rate and with some reduction
in control responsiveness at high KEAS and
Mach numbers.
If control difficulties are encountered:
1. Check A and B hydraulic system pres-
sures. If either A or B hydraulic sys-
tem has failed proceed as directed for
A or B hydraulic system failure this
section.
Z. Disengage autopilot and check control.
3. Check SAS warning lights. If SAS
failure has occurred, proceed as di-
rected under SAS Emergency Operation
this section.
-A OR B HYDRAUUC SYSTEM FAILURE
1. Reduce speed to less than 350 KEAS.
Do not exceed 350 KEAS with either
an A or B hydraulic system inop-
erative. If either system fails
above this speed, reduce speed as
soon as possible. Flight control
responsiveness will be reduced
during single hydraulic system
operation at high KEAS and Mach
numbers, and flight maneuvers
under these conditions should be
held to a minimum.
Z. Affected SAS yaw and pitch switches
OFF.
3. SAS roll switches - OFF.
4. Operative roll channel switch - ON.
NOTE
When one roll SAS channel is dis-
engaged or turned off the simplified
logic circuit will disengage the other
roll channel. The desired roll chan-
nel switch must be turned OFF and
then re-engaged to regain single
channel roll SAS operation.
5. Reserve hydraulic oil switch - To
operative system (A or B).
BOTH A & B HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS FAILED
1. EJECT.
WARNING
If both the A and B hydraulic sys-
tems have failed all flight controls
will be inoperative.
SAS EMERGENCY OPERATION
SAS emergency operating procedures and
the applicable flight limitations should be
used whenever there has been a channel
disengagement or a reduction in SAS effec-
tiveness. Disengagement may result from
failures of any of the following systems or
components: SAS gyro or electronics cir-
cuitry, flight control servos, or electrical
power supply. Disengagement or loss of
effectiveness may occur as a result of
complete or partial loss of A or B System
hydraulic power. Disengagement of any
channel is indicated by illumination of the
master caution light, the SAS CHANNEL
OUT light on the annunciator panel, and one
or more of the recycle indicator lights on
the SAS control panel.
3-43
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
MINIMUM AIRSPEED LIMITS WITH PITCH SAS INOPERATIVE
3-44
Figure 3-7
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
SECTION III
When a malfunction is indicated in any SAS
axis, initiate the following preliminary
actions:
a. A & B hydraulic system pressures-
Check normal. If hydraulic system
failure is indicated, follow A and/
or B Hydraulic System Failure
procedure, this section.
b. INVERTER OUT Warning Lights -
Check.
If illuminated, use Inverter Failure
procedure, this section.
c. Proceed to appropriate Pitch and
Yaw axis or Roll Axis Failure
procedures, this section.
A single failure or sequence of failures in
the pitch and yaw axes which leaves one A
or B channel operating in each of these
axes does not change the aircraft flight
characteristics. However, some undesir-
able cross-coupling in the pitch and yaw
axes may result from failure of one roll
channel. Characteristics which change as
a result of failures affecting both the A and
B channel servos in an axis are described
as second condition failures with the appro-
priate procedures. Also refer to the SAS
Warning Lights charts, Figure 3-8, lwhich
illustrate the probable causes of failure in-
dications, remaining capabilities, proce-
dures, and limits which apply after channel
disengagement.
Pitch and Yaw Axis Failures
A "first" condition failure exists after at-
tempts to extinguish one or more recycle
lights are ineffective and either an A or B
channel is operating (light Off) in each of
the pitch and yaw axes. A "first" condition
failure exists with a single A, B, or M
channel light illuminated or in some cases
after simultaneous or progressive illumi-
nation of two or more of these lights, as
Illustrated by the SAS Warning Lights Chart,
Figure 3-8, Sheets 1 and 2.
NOTE
Consider that no failure exits
when all pitch and yaw recycle
lights have been extinguished,
regardless of previous combin-
ations of illumination, if normal
operation of the recycle lights is
verified by depressing the SAS
Lights Test button.
Flight may be continued without restriction
when a first condition failure exists except
that maximum airspeed is limited to 350
KEAS in the case of combined channel fail-
ures due to low hydraulic system pressure.
A "second" condition failure is defined as
existing whenever the A and B recycle lights
In one axis remain illuminated after attempts
to extinguish them are ineffective. When a
"second" condition failure exists, flight
speed is restricted to Mach 2.8 and 350
KEAS. Transfer fuel as required to obtain
either Zo nose up trim or 4000 pounds in
tank 1.
NOTE
Each instance of recycle light illum-
ination presents a new situation and,
if the light(s) can not be extinguished,
the condition must be determined as
being a "first" or "second" condition
of failure in accordance with the
definitions provided above.
Logic override procedures are usable after
a "second" condition failure when the se-
quence of light illumination indicates that
a channel with operative servos is available.
Refer to After Second Failures, SAS Warn-
ing Lights Chart. When use of logic over-
ride is effective, flight characteristics are
the same as with SAS fully operational.
However as a precaution against subsequent
hardover failures signals, the autopilot must
not be engaged in that channel and second
condition failure limits apply.
3-45
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
If logic override is recommended,
use it only in the channels speci-
fied and only after decelerating to
second condition failure limit
speeds in order to prevent ex-
cessive structural loads which
could result from a hardover
failure at higher speeds.
Neither logic override nor BUPD
operation should be attempted with
either channel known to have a
failed servo.
BUPD plus logic override procedures are
available after a "second" condition failure
in the pitch axis. The BUPD is optimized
for operation at air refueling speeds, and
it should not be operated above 330 KEAS
or 0.85 Mach. It may or may not improve
flight characteristics at other flight con-
ditions.
Logic override or BUPD plus logic over-
ride may not be usable or effective after a
second condition failure in the pitch axis.
If neither can be employed, some longi-
tudinal overcontrol probably will occur when
at high Mach numbers. Observance of sec-
ond failure limits is required, and descent
to subsonic operating speeds is recom-
mended when practicable. Air refueling
and landing may present some difficulties in
maintaining precise attitude control. With
pitch SAS off and neutral c. g. there is no
tendency for the aircraft to return to a
trimmed attitude when a displacement oc-
curs at landing pattern speeds. However,
divergent speed and attitude tendencies oc-
cur slowly enough to be completely con-
trollable. Minimum airspeed limits with
pitch SAS inoperative (Figure 3-7) should be
observed.
If logic override procedures are not effec-
tive or possible after a second condition
failure in the yaw axis, tests at high Mach
numbers indicate that neutral to slightly
positive stability exists but that there is
little damping of yaw oscillations after they
commence. Automatic scheduling of the
inlet components may induce neutrally
damped directional oscillations while above
Mach 2.8. Directional and roll control
could become difficult in the event of an
unstart or flameout while above Mach 2.9
as a result of large bank angles generated
by yawing motion. Pilot rudder inputs
usually tend to aggravate this condition.
These conditions could also result in ex-
cessive rudder surface loads at airspeeds
above 400 KEAS. Use of both restart
switches is recommended while deceler-
ating in order to avoid asymmetric nacelle
drag conditions or unstarts..
1. Illuminated recycle light(s) - Depress
and release.
If light stays on or reiLluminates:
2. Channel switch - OFF.
No further action is required unless a
2nd condition failure exists.
If another failure should occur in the same
axis:
3. Illuminated recycle light(s) - Depress
and release.
4. If lights do not extinguish - Comply
with limits.
For second condition failure above Mach 2.8
or 350 KEAS:
5. Restart switches - ON (simultaneously)
except during climb.
NOTE
If climbing, bleed speed below
350 KEAS.
6. Throttles - Minimum A/B.
3-46
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
SAS WARNING LIGHTS CHART
PITCH OR YAW RECYCLE LIGHTS ON
IEMEE=EMMEME I
SECTION III
INDICATIONS AFTER FIRST FAILURE
P ITCH A
OR
YAW
B
Light(s) on
� 1st 0 2nd M
0
0
0
-
0
0
'
0
0
0
0

0
0O
0
SEQUENCE
OF
ILLUMINATION
FIRST
A
servo
B
servo
M
gyro
A
gyro
B
gyro
A
servo
B
servo
M
gyro
M
gyro
SECOND
M or A
gyro
M or B
gyro
A
servo
B
servo
CHANNELS
REMAINING
OPERABLE
B
A
A
and
B
B
A
B
A
B
A
ACTION: First try to
press light(s) off
No further action when first failure ugh s stay on
then 1110 A or B light is off
LIMITS
NONE
INDICATIONS AFTER SECOND FAILURE
P ITCH A
OR
YAW B
1 t 0 2nd M
0
0
0
0
411)
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
SEQUENCE
OF
ILLUMINATION
FIRST
M
gyro
A
gyro
B
gyro
A
servo
B
servo
A
servo
B
servo
SECOND
A or B
gyro
B or M
gyro or
B servo
A or M
gyro or
A servo
B
gyro
A
gyro
B
servo
A
servo
FUNCTIONS
OPERABLE
A or B
Channel
A servo's
possibly
B
'channel
B servo
possibly
A
channel
B
servo
A
servo
NONE
ACTION
First try then*
to press
lights off
If A and B lights
stay on
Note: Use of
Logic Override is
not mandatory
pitch
Try
A
or yaw:
Override
B I
A
If pitch
Try BUPD
plus
override
NO ACTION
or
B
Unless subsonic
then
BUPD
B
A
I
first
plus
pitch override
A
1 B
�
If Yaw
No Action
UNUSABLE
Itch
yaw SAS ,
To use pitch or yaw Logic Override:
A and B Channels off. Select A or B override.
Beep Channel switch ON.
To use BUPD:
A and B channels OFF. BUPD - ON
Select A or B Override. Beep one Channel on.
Channel off if no Improvement.
Do not use
Logic Override
or
BUPD
LIMITS
Mach 2.8 and 350 KEAS maximum.
Fuel transfer is necessary for 2� noseup trim up to 4000 lb.
With override - No autopilot that axis
With BUPD - Mach 0.85 and 330 KEAS
10-18-66
F200-56(3)
Figure 3-8 (Sheet 1 of 2)
3-47
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
SAS WARNING LIGHTS CHART
COMBINATIONS OF PITCH, ROLL AND YAW DISENGAGE LIGHTS
INVERTER OUT AND A OR B 'HYDRAULIC LOW
'WARNING LIGHTS ON
INDICATION
. .
ELECTRICAL FAILURE
HYDRAULIC FAILURE
PITCH YAW
A A
ROLL
B B
M M
00
0
00
00
0 0-
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
��
0
00
00
��
�
00
00
00
0
0�
00
No lights
on but
operation
poor
CHECK
INV 3
INV 1
INV 2
ANY TWO
A System
B System
BOTH
A and B
ACTION
1 Check circuit
breakers
a Inv 3 06-
SAS pitch-
yaw mon
b Ess DC bus-
SAS M
2 Inverter Switch
3 Press recycle lights
4 Recycle roll channel
if light is on
5 Do not use logic
1 Check circuit
breakers
a Inv 1 0B-
SAS yaw A
b Ess DC bus-
SAS A
- EMER
off
switch
override
1 Check circuit
breakers
a Inv 2 06-
SAS yaw B
b Ess DC bus-
SAS B
1 Check circuit
breakers
a Inv 1,2,3
b Ess DC bus-
SAS A,B,M
Note:
M Channels will
be inoperative
Channel off if pressure is low
With normal pressure:
1 Cycle roll channel switch
2 Press recycle lights off
Note: Any combination of A, B, and/or
roll lights may occur
0 Lights may illuminate simultaneously
� or progressively
LIMITS
NONE
2nd Failure 350 KEAS maximum
Figure 3-8 (Sheet 2 of 2)
When speed is stabilized below Mach 2.8
and 350 KEAS:
7. Restart switches - OFF.
8. Aft bypass switches - Normal schedule.
9. Throttles - As required.
10. Forward transfer switch - Transfer as
required to maintain at least Zo nose up
trim up to 4000 lb.
10-12-66
F200-56(2)
a. Pitch or yaw logic override switch-
A or B position depending on
failure analysis.
NOTE
Refer to SAS Warning Light Chart.
b. Appropriate A or B channel switch-
Beep ON.
Recycle light should extinguish.
If SAS lights indicate a good servo is avail-
able: c. If control does not improve -
Channel switch - OFF.
11. A or B logic override - Engage as i�
dicated by servo availability. d. Logic override switch - OFF..
3-48
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
v
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
For pitch axis second condition failure;
when speed is below 330 KEAS and 0.85
Mach:
12. BUPD - Engage as required.
a. Pitch SAS A and B channel
switches - OFF.
b. BUPD switch - ON.
c. Pitch logic override switch - A or
B position as indicated by servo
availability.
d. Appropriate A or B pitch SAS
channel switch - Beep ON.
Recycle light should extinguish.
e. If control does not improve -
Channel switch OFF.
f. Logic override switch - OFF.
g. BUPD switch - OFF.
h. Depending on failure analysis this
procedure may be repeated using
other SAS channel if indicated.
Roll Axis Failures
Illumination of the roll channel disengage
light shows that both roll channels and the
roll autopilot are disengaged. When there
is no apparent fault in the hydraulic systems
or electrical power supply which would
cause disengagement, check for a transient
disengagement as follows:
1. A or B channel switch - OFF, then ON.
A transient or intermittent fault existed if
the light then remains off. If the light does
not extinguish, or reilluminates while man-
euvering, a first condition failure exists in
the roll mode.
For a first failure:
2. A and B channel switches - OFF.
A-12
Unless the failure can be associated with a
specific hydraulic or electrical power sup-
ply, regain the use of one channel by the
following arbitrary step sequence:
3. A channel switch - ON.
NOTE
Be prepared to move the switch to
OFF immediately if a hardover
signal results, indicating that the
failed channel was inadvertently
selected.
Operation with only one roll
channel engaged results in over-
riding of logic circuitry. There
is no automatic protection against
inadvertent selection of a failed
channel, or against subsequent
failure of a properly operating
channel which has been engaged.
If a hard-over signal is obtained on engage-
ment or during subsequent operation, or if
no improvement is noted in flight character-
istics:
4. A channel switch - OFF.
5. B channel switch - ON.
NOTE
Be prepared to disengage the chan-
nel immediately if a hardover sig-
nal results.
If a hard-over signal is obtained on engage-
ment or during subsequent operation, or if
no improvement is noted in flight character-
istics, a dual or second condition failure
exists.
For a second condition failure:
6. Roll channel switches - Both OFF.
3-49
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
Some undesirable cross-coupling may occur
during single roll SAS channel operation.
This appears as small amplitude oscillations
in the pitch and yaw axes, as the elevons on
only one side of the aircraft respond to roll
signals during single channel operation and
compensation for the asymmetric roll sig-
nals is provided by pitch and yaw axis con-
trol operation.
Scheduled activity may be continued for the
remainder of the flight with a single roll
SAS channel operating. The roll autopilot
may be engaged and the automatic navigation
feature of the INS used as desired.
NOTE
Operation with both roll channels
disengaged is permitted if cross-
coupling about the pitch and/or
yaw axes prevents precise aircraft
control with one roll channel en-
gaged.
In the event of single engine failure
at low speed, or during single
engine landing, failure of one roll
SAS channel and simultaneous auto-
matic disengagement of the other
roll channel may occur due to loss
of hydraulic power from the wind-
milling engine.
To avoid changes in control characteristics
at a critical time during single engine land-
ings, either make the approach with both
roll SAS channels disengaged or with the
roll channel which is powered by the inop-
erative engine disengaged.
A second roll SAS channel failure while at
high speed will probably be indicated by ab-
normal pitch transients and small roll
transients without illumination of either
pitch or roll SAS indicator lights. The
symptoms may be difficult to attribute to
roll channel failure. When pitch transients
occur with one roll channel engaged, dis-
engage both roll SAS channels and check
for control improvement. If no improve-
ment is noted, the single roll channel may
be reengaged if desired.
Failure or intentional disengagement of
both roll SAS channels is expected to in-
crease pilot fatigue, reduce mission effec-
tiveness, and will disable the roll autopilot;
however, no hazard to safety should result
and there are no flight restrictions on con-
tinued operation.
TRIM FAILURES
Pitch, yaw or roll trim malfunctions may be
of the inoperative type or the runaway type.
Runaway trim failures in pitch may occur
at slow speed (0.15 /sec change in elevon
deflection) if due to automatic trim motor,
operation or at fast speed if due to manual
trim motor operation (1.5 /sec change in
elevon deflection). A low speed runaway
type of malfunction will be apparent by the
need for constant manual pitch trimming.
The runaway yaw trim rate is approximately
1.5 per second trim change. The roll trim
rate is approximately 1 /sec. Runaway
yaw trim will be accompanied by rudder
pedal deflections as the surfaces move:
Runaway pitch or roll trim will not be ac-
companied by stick movement due to sur-
face movement.
In the event trim runaway failure is sus-
pected, proceed as follows:
1. TRIM POWER SWITCH - OFF.
3-50
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
If circumstances permit:
2. Reduce speed to below 350 KEAS and
2.5 Mach number.
' With runaway nose up pitch trim:
3. Transfer fuel forward to reduce forward
stick force requirement.
WARNING
Do not transfer fuel if nose down
pitch trim has occurred.
When time and conditions permit:
4. Autopilot - ON. Check for control im-
provement.
5. Affected trim circuit breakers - Pull.
NOTE
Both A & C phase circuit breakers
must be pulled on the suspected
circuit.
Trim Malfunctions:
a. If runaway slow speed pitch trim -
Pull auto pitch trim circuit
breakers.
b. If runaway high speed pitch trim -
Pull manual pitch trim circuit
breakers.
c. If runaway roll or yaw trim - Pull
roll or yaw circuit breakers.
6. Trim power switch - ON.
With manual pitch trim inoperative and
auto trim available, engagement of the
pitch autopilot will gradually correct an out
of pitch trim condition. This will relieve
the pilot of a need for maintaining stick de-
flection to maintain attitude. The pitch
autopilot can also be used when the auto
trim motor is inoperative, but automatic
pitch trim synchronization will not be avail-
able.
Disengagement of the pitch auto-
pilot when not in trim may be ac-
companied by a considerable
transient.
If the trim malfunction is a runaway in the
roll axis, right or left stick deflection will
be required for the rest of the flight but
stick force will not be more than normally
required for the same amount of deflection.
If the malfunction was a runaway in the
yaw axis, rudder pedal force will be re-
quired to maintain neutral rudder pedal
position.
AIR DATA COMPUTER FAILURE
If malfunction or failure of the air data
computer (ADC) is suspected, proceed as
follows:
1. Cross check TDI instrument against
pitot-static operated airspeed and
altimeter.
If cross check shows TDI to be inaccurate:
2. Revert to use of pitot-static operated
instruments for aircraft control.
3. Autopilot - OFF.
PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM FAILURE
Under some conditions both of the pitot-
static operated systems may become in-
accurate or inoperative from a common
malfunction. Failure of the pitot heater
may simultaneously affect both normal sys-
3-51
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
terns in icing conditions. The pitot probe
could be plugged by a foreign body of suf-
ficient size. If both systems fail, proceed
as follows:
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
If cockpit altitude does not decrease:
3. Nose radio equipment UHF, HF and
IFF - OFF.
1. Attempt to restore operation by se- 4. Nose hatch seal lever - OFF.
lecting alternate static source.
2. Maintain aircraft control by use of atti-
tude and power indicating instruments.
3. Request escort aircraft for letdown
and landing.
AIR CONDITIONING AND PRESSURIZATION
FAILURES
LEFT ENGINE OR COCKPIT SYSTEM
INOPERATIVE
If the left engine is shut down:
NOTE
If cockpit repressurizes the pres-
surization loss is due to failure of
� the nose hatch seal and periodically
the nose air and desired radio may
be turned on for possible short time
usage.
WARNING
During this time the pilot will be
depending on the pressure suit
only for altitude protection.
1. Cockpit system switch - EMER. If cockpit still does not repressurize:
5. Nose air handle and nose hatch seal -
COCKPIT DEPRESSURIZATION ON.
Cockpit depressurization above approxi- 6. Suit ventilation boost lever - EMERG.
mately 35,000 feet will be indicated by pres-
sure suit inflation. If suit inflates, proceed 7. Reduce altitude if possible.
as follows:
1. Cockpit altitude - Check.
If increasing or at actual aircraft altitude:
2. Nose air - OFF.
When the nose air valve is OFF it
will shut off pressurization and
cooling air to the nose compartment
and possibly result in loss of UHF,
HF and IFF equipment. TACAN
and normal ADF equipment located
in the E-bay will still be available.
8. Radio equipment - ON only as neces-
sary after altitude is reduced.
COCKPIT AND VENTILATED SUIT ABNORMAL
TEMPERATURE
1. Defog switch - OFF.
2. Cockpit temperature indicator - Check.
If temperature indication is abnormal:
3. Cockpit auto temperature rheostat -
Rotate as desired.
3-52
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
NOTE
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
If suit temperature cannot be controlled by
the preceding steps:
The temperature control bypass
valves are motor operated and
travel from full hot to full cold
or vice versa in approximately
7 to 13 seconds.
If auto temperature control is not effective
and cockpit temperature remains too high or
low:
4. Cockpit temperature control switch -
HOLD in COLD or WARM as desired.
NOTE
In this position the temperature
control bypass valves take 7 to 13
seconds to travel from full hot to
cold or the reverse.
If no correction in temperature occurs in
30 seconds:
5. Cockpit system switch - EMER.
If cockpit temperature is still abnormal:
6. Q-Bay or emer cockpit auto temperature
rheostat - Rotate toward COLD or
WARM as required.
7. Suit flow valves - OFF.
SECTION III
8. Reduce altitude and speed as required.
Q-BAY ABNORMAL TEMPERATURE
If the Q-BAY temperature indication is ab-
normal, proceed as follows:
1. Q-bay auto temp control - Rotate to-
ward COLD or WARM as necessary.
NOTE
The above step should be accom-
plished in increments as there will
be a lag in the temperature indi-
cation.
If auto temp control is not effective and
Q-bay temperature remains abnormal:
Z. Q-bay and cockpit EMERGENCY AIR
switch - HOLD in COLD or WARM
position as necessary.
NOTE
The temperature control valve will
take from 7 to 13 seconds to travel
from full hot to full cold or the re-
verse.
If Q-bay temperature control system should
fail in the cold position and heavy cockpit
fog occurs:
3. Q-bay system - OFF.
4. Normal cockpit air control - Rotate to-
wards WARM as necessary to dissipate
cockpit fog.
3-53
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
OXYGEN SYSTEM AND PERSONAL
EQUIPMENT FAILURES
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
PERSONAL EQUIPMENT INDICATIONS
PRESSURE GAGE INDICATIONS
Rise of Pressure 100 to 120 psi range
1. System indicating normal pressure
range - OFF.
2.
Visor opening control - Depress 3-5
seconds. This allows increased oxy-
gen flow between visor and seal.
3. System indicating normal pressure
range - ON.
4. Repeat above steps if necessary.
No suit pressure when TEST IND button pressed
1. Descend below suit inflation altitude.
2. Land when practicable.
Reduced oxygen flow in helmet - (Both systems)
1. Green apple - Pull.
2. Descend to safe altitude.
3. Land when practicable.
If no correction noted:
Constant oxygen flow in helmet
1.
Both systems - OFF then ON.
5.
It is safe to continue flight if pressure
does not exceed 120 psi.
2.
One system - OFF.
If pressure rises above 120 psi:
3.
Visor control - Depress 3-5 seconds.
6.
Malfunctioning system - OFF.
4.
Both systems - ON
7.
Land when practicable.
5.
Repeat on other system if necessary.
Drop of Pressure Below 50 psi
1. Accomplish steps 1 thru 4 above.
If no correction noted:
Z. Land when practicable.
No Pressure on System
1. Both systems - ON.
2. Accomplish steps 1 thru 4 above.
If no correction:
3. Inoperative system - OFF.
4. Land when practicable.
If no correction:
6. Both systems - OFF.
7. Green apple - Pull.
8. Descend to safe altitude.
9. Land when practicable.
Green apple loose from snap (possible active
system)
1. Observe pressure gage on green apple.
If indicator shows full:
2. Replace green apple and continue flight
at pilot's discretion.
Poor or no communications
1. Check communications lead for acci-
dental disconnect.
3-54
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
A-12
LANDING EMERGENCIES
SINGLE ENGINE LANDING
A single engine landing is basically the
same as a normal landing, except that the
pattern may be entered at any point and is
expanded to avoid steep turns. Airspeed
is maintained above the normal value on
final approach. The outstanding difference
from normal landings is the noticeable
change in directional trim with power
changes. The most marked trim change
will occur as the throttle is retarded during
flare. This may be anticipated and rudder
trim set to neutral on the trim indicator
after final approach is established. Direc-
tional heading is maintained by rudder pres-
sure until thrust is smoothly reduced during
the flare. The landing gear may be lowered
after lining up on final approach with the
left hydraulic system operating; however,
at least 90 seconds must be allowed for
emergency gear extension if the left system
is inoperative.
1. Fuel - DUMP and TRANSFER as re-
quired.
2. Hydraulic system - Review services
available.
3. If left engine is inoperative, brake
switch - ALT STEER & BRAKE.
4. Inoperative engine SAS pitch and yaw
switches - OFF.
5. SAS roll switches - Both OFF.
6. Operative engine SAS roll switch - ON.
7. Landing gear lever - DOWN.
8. Establish steeper than normal final
approach.
SECTION III
9. Maintain 200 KIAS minimum until land-
ing is assured.
NOTE
If it is necessary to land with more
than 35,000 pounds of fuel remain-
ing increase minimum approach
speed 1 knot for each additional
1000 pounds.
10. Rudder trim - Neutral.
11. When landing assured - Retard throttle.
12. Make normal landing.
SIMULATED SINGLE-ENGINE LANDING
Directional trim changes will be more pro-
nounced during an actual single engine sit-
uation with one engine windmilling.
1. Retard one throttle to IDLE.
2. Follow Single Engine Landing procedure.
SINGLE ENGINE GO-AROUND
Make decision to go around as soon as pos-
sible and definitely prior to flare.
1. Throttle - As required.
2. Continue approach until go-around is
assured.
3. Landing gear lever - UP, as appro-
priate.
Delay gear retraction until there is no
possibility of contacting the runway.
4. Trim - As necessary.
5. Accelerate to 250 KIAS.
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
3-55
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
LANDING GEAR SYSTEM EMERGENCIES
GEAR UNSAFE INDICATION
An unsafe indication could be caused by low
L hydraulic system pressure or malfunction
within the landing gear extension or indi-
cating system. Upon detecting an unsafe
gear indication, proceed as follows:
1. Land gear control and indicator circuit
breakers - Check IN.
2. L hydraulic pressure - Check.
3. Recycle landing gear lever to down
position, repeat as desired and pull
emergency gear release handle if nec-
essary.
If landing gear still indicates unsafe:
4. Landing gear position - Request visual
confirmation.
5. If all landing gear appear fully extended,
make a normal landing on side of run-
way away from suspected unsafe gear.
Observe the following precautions:
a. Shoulder harness - Manually lock.
b. Hold weight off unsafe gear as long
as possible then allow gear to con-
tact runway as smoothly as pos-
sible. If nose gear is held off,
lower nose at approximately 110
KIAS.
c. Allow aircraft to roll to a stop
straight ahead, have downlocks
installed prior, to further taxiing
or engine shutdown. '
6. If any gear remains fully retracted,
use Emergency Extension procedure.
7. If all gear are not fully extended, refer
to Partial Gear Landing procedure,
this section.
NOTE
. Increasing airspeed may assist in
locking a partially extended nose
gear.
. Yawing aircraft may assist in
locking a partially extended main
landing gear.
GEAR EMERGENCY EXTENSION
The emergency landing gear extension sys-
tem unlocks the landing gear uplocks and
allows the landing gear to free fall to the
down and locked position. If R hydraulic
system pressure is available, the landing
gear handle must be placed in the DOWN
position or the landing gear control circuit
breaker must be pulled to permit emer-
gency extension. The time required for
emergency gear extension is 60 to 90 sec-
onds. The emergency landing gear handle
must be pulled approximately 9 inches for
full actuation. If it is not fully actuated,
one or more gear may fail to extend.
If the L hydraulic system has decreased
below 2000-2200 psi or normal gear ex-
tension is unsuccessful, proceed as follows:
1. Landing gear handle - DOWN.
2. Emergency landing gear release handle-
PULL.
3. Verify gear down and locked.
3-56
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
If L hydraulic system pressure low:
4. Brake switch - ALT STEER & BRAKE.
NOTE
Alternate nosewheel steering is
available when L system pres-
sure decreases below 2200 psi.
If landing gear remains retracted or landing
gear handle sticks in the UP position:
5. Landing gear control circuit breaker -
PULL.
6. Repeat steps 2 and 3 of this procedure.
Note
When the landing gear control cir-
cuit breaker is pulled nosewheel
steering will be inoperative.
The landing gear must not be re-
tracted if the manual release
handle is being held in the free fall
(full out) position as damage to the
system can result. The GEAR
RELEASE handle should be per-
mitted to return to the stowed
position before attempting to re-
tract the gear with the landing
gear lever.
PARTIAL GEAR LANDING
A landing with the nose gear retracted or
with all gear up should not be attempted.
Under ideal circumstances, a landing with
the nose gear extended and both main
wheels retracted may be possible. If this
configuration can be accomplished, base a
decision to land or eject on whether other
factors are favorable or not. Wind veloc-
ity and direction are important in selection
of the landing heading.
If a decision is made to land, conventional
final approach and landing speeds and atti-
tudes are recommended. This will result
in the tail touching while the nose is at less
than normal height. An attempt to hold the
aircraft off by using a higher pitch angle is
not recommended because of the greater
possibility of high impact loads as the nose
gear slaps down. An empty tank 1 condition
is desired.
1. Accomplish nose gear only configuration
if necessary as follows:
a. Landing gear CONT circuit breaker-
Push in.
b. Landing gear lever - Up.
c. Landing gear CONT circuit breaker-
Pull.
d. Manual landing gear release handle-
Pull to release nose gear only
(first lock releases nose gear).
Check nose gear down light - ON.
2. Do not transfer fuel forward.
3. Fuel dump switch - DUMP, if neces-
sary to reduce weight.
4. Igniter purge switch - Dump during
approach.
5. Battery switch - OFF.
6. Inertia reel lock lever - LOCK.
7. Canopy jettison handle - Pull, if
desired.
3-57
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938
SECTION III
A-12
NOTE
If the canopy is not jettisoned prior
to landing, it should not be unlocked
until the aircraft has stopped.
8. Make normal approach and landing.
9. Drag chute handle - Pull.
10. Use rudders for directional control.
11. Throttles - OFF, when directional
control is no longer possible.
12. Abandon aircraft as quickly as possible.
MAIN GEAR FLAT TIRE LANDING
Plan the landing for minimum gross weight
with touchdown to be made on the side of the
runway away from the flat tire. It is pos-
sible that only one or two of the three tires
has failed. If only one tire has failed, little
danger exists when landing at low weight be-
cause two tires have sufficient strength to
support the aircraft.
1. Touch down on good tires.
2. Drag chute handle - Pull, as soon as
possible.
3. Nosewheel - Lower.
4. Nosewheel steering - Engage.
5. Hold weight off bad side as long as pos-
sible using full aileron.
WARNING
Maintain IDLE rpm until fire-
fighting equipment arrives.
Engine shutdown allows fuel to
vent in the vicinity of the wheel
brake area, thus creating a fire
hazard.
NOSE GEAR FIAT TIRE LANDING
If it is necessary to land with a flat nose-
wheel tire or tires, avoid a forward c. g.
if possible and proceed as follows after
making a normal touchdown.
1. Drag chute handle - Pull.
2. Nose gear - Hold off.
Hold the nosewheel off as long as
practicable (approximately 110 KIAS)
and then lower gently to runway.
3. Use nosewheel steering and differential
braking to maintain directional control.
After stop, before shutdown:
4. Fuel - FWD TRANS.
HEAVY WEIGHT LANDING
Use normal procedure, observing operating
limits of Section V.
ABBREVIATED CHECKLIST
The emergency abbreviated checklist is
furnished separately.
3-58
Approved for Release: 2017/07/25 C06535938