WORLDWIDE THREAT - CONVERGING DANGERS IN THE POST 9/11 WORLD TESTIMONY OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GEORGE J. TENET BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06517094
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-00894
• Publication Date: March 19, 2002

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TO RE're
Worldwide Threat � Converging Dangers in the Post 9/11 World
Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence
George J. Tenet
Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee
19 March 2002
r. Chairman, I appear before you this year under circumstance that
are �rardinary and historic for reasons I need not recount. Never bef� - has
the subject of this annual threat briefing had more immediate resona Never
before have the dangers been more clear or more present.
The threats I will outline today demand our ut
are at war. This requires vigilance, determination, and full
resources. I want to assure you that the entire Intellige
embraced this mission and is wholeheartedly devote
various threats today, I will be telling you precisel
challenges that confront us.
ost response. We
obilization of our
e Community has
o it. As I address the
hat we are doing to meet the
September 11 brought tog or and brought
home�literally--several vital threats to e United States and its interests abroad
that we have long been aware of, an. ong been warning. None of the threats I
am going to outline for you is new. or is the convergence between them new.
But it is this convergence that I nt to emphasize upfront, because this above
all is what September 11 dem strated to us.
* Terrorists are threaten' to use against us weapons of mass destruction and
cyber warfare--things ave long cited as threats in themselves.
*Terrorists areal exploiting threats in other parts of the world that I have cited
in past years as dependent dangers to the United States. These include the
slowdown in t world economy, our dependence on vital transportation and
communica ens infrastructures, unstable or unreliable governments among our
allies and lends, and resentment of US power in the developing world.
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� Turning now to Iraq, Mr. Chairman: Saddam has been watching
our operations in Afghanistan, and he is nervous. He is eager to stave off military (b)(3)'
action against his regime, and has mounted a political and diplomatic charm
� offensive to make it appear that Baghdad is becoming more flexible on UN
sanctions and inspections issues. -
* Saddam told a gathering of Iraqi diplomats in January that keeping Iraq safe
would require greater "opennese with Arab and non-Arab countries, and the
possible return of inspectors.
* Last month Baghdad allowed the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights to
visit Iraq, after having refused his visa requests for nearly a decade.
* lEarlier.this month, Iraq's Foreign Minister met with UN Secretary General
�Annan for first time in over a year to discuss resolutions pertaining to Iraq,
and agreed to meet 'again next month. Saddam then quickly dispatched senior
officials�to the region to drum up support for Baghdad.
* Iraq has allowed IAEA inspectors to examine stockpiles of low-enriched
uranium�but not aspects of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
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Li That said, Saddam is compromising neither his anti-US message
nor his key goals of thwarting UN sanctions, carving out a leadership role in the
Arab world, and pursuing weapons of mass destruction.
* Baghdad's anti-American rhetoric remains virulent, and Saddam is one of the
most vocal supporters of the Palestinian intifadah in the Arab world. Early this
month he rejected a Saudi peace proposal and urged Arab countries to support
the intifadah with money, men, and weapons.
* There is no sign that Saddam will accept the intrusive UN weapons inspections
that we demand. His strategy appears to be to string out negotiations with the
'UN for as long as possible, hoping that In the meantime intemational.support for
military action against Iraq will dissipate.
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'Saddam is focused on preserving his WMD capabilities in part
because his conventional military capability has declined due to the UN arms
embargo and damage inflicted by coalition military operations. Iraq's military
today is less than half its pre�Gulf War size�down from 1 million to 350,000
troops.
* Only about 60 percent Of the Iraqi Air Force's 300 fighter aircraft are either fully
or partially mission-capable because of inadequate spare parts and maintenance.
* Even these reduced forces, however, are more that sufficient to defeat
opposition groups, which are more poorly equipped. Saddam's forces also
remain large enough by comparison to overrun Kuwait absent Western
intervention.
Saddam maintains his grip on power through a layered and
over ammo security infrastructure headed by his younger son Ousay.
* Baghdad, however, has not faced major unrest from the majority Shia
population since after the February. 1999 death of prominent Shia leader
Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, and the northern Kurdish parties still pose no direct
threat to Saddam's military and security services.
Saddam separately has been buoyed by the
progressive decrease in Baghdad's international isolation. As the peace process
spirals down and engaging Iraq commercially becomes more appealing, other
states in the region appear to be losing the political will to support the sanctions
regime.
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Infighting in northern Iraq could give Baghdad an excuse to move
against the Kurds. Saddam has harbored the goal of retaking northern Iraq since
the Gulf War, and he undoubtedly intends to do so at a time of his choosing.
That said, he appears to have adopted a measured approach that emphasizes
exploiting intra-Kurdish tensions and maintaining ties with all regional actors,
including Turkey and Iran.
* Baghdad last fall probably struck a deal with the Kurds to reconnect
Kurdish-controlled areas to the Iraqi electricity grid. It has also warned that it is
ready to retake control of the north if the Kurds allow the US to use it as a staging
ground for attacks.
We continue to watch for any signs of Iraqi involvement in terrorist
activities. Baghdad has a long history of supporting terrorism, altering its targets
to reflect changing priorities and goals. Over several decades, Iraq has evolved
from an indiscriminate sponsor of anti-Western terrorism to more narrowly
�focused efforts, targeting primarily Saddam's political opponents and local
recilonal foes.
* Although terrorism is one of many tools Saddam has at his disposal, his main* �
focus recently has been on moving away from a foreign policy defined by UN
sanctions and toward an agenda that centers on Iraq's reemergence as a
dominant Arab player. Baghdad's strategy to isolate Washington in'the region
and in the Security Council would be severely undermined if the regime were
implicated in terrorism against the West.
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, Baghdad's connections to al-Qa'ida are tenuous, but
the a ear to have maintained a mutual wa relationshi � for nearl a decade.
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�'Mr. Chairman, I move next to Iran, where pressure for social and
political change is building:
* Discontent with the current situation is widespread and cuts across the social
spectrum. Complaints-focus on the lack of pluralism and government
accountability, social restrictions, and poor economic performance.
Iranians�particularly the burgeoning number of educated youth--face grim
economic prospects, including chronic unemployment, high inflation, and a
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