WORLDWIDE THREAT - CONVERGING DANGERS IN A POST 9/11 WORLD TESTIMONY OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GEORGE J. TENET BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06517093
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-00894
• Publication Date: February 6, 2002

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Worldwide Threat:- Converging. Dangers in a Post 9/11 World
Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence
� � .George J. Tenet
I-A71
. � � .Before The
-Senate Select Committee on intelligence .
6 February 2002
� (U) Mr. Chairman, I appear before you this year der
circumstances that are extraordinary and historic for r asons I need
not recount. Never before has the subject of this threat
briefing had more immediate resonance. Never b ore have the
dangers been more clear or more present.
(U) September 11 brought together brought
home�literally�several vital threats to e United States and its
interests that we have long been aware f. It is the convergence of
these threats that 'I want to emphasiz with you today: the
connection between terrorists and � er enemies of this country; the
weapons of mass destruction the seek to use against us; and the
social, economic, and political nsions across the world that they
exploit in mobilizing their fo swers. September 11 demonstrated the
dangers that arise when th e threats converge�and it reminds us
that we overlook at our o peril the impact of crises in remote parts
of the world.
(U) This con ergence of threats has created the world I will
present to you to y�a world in which dangers exist not only in
those places w re we have most often focused our attention, but
also in other .;eas that demand it:
� In plac e Somalia, where the absence of a national government
has ated an environment in which groups sympathetic to
al Oa have offered terrorists an operational base and potential
ha en.
� In places like Indonesia, where political instability, separatist and
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Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistan ml
the belief that its nuclear det
counterattack.
retaliate with strikes of own in
ent would limit the sc � - of an Indian
� Both India and -1 tan are publicly d� � playing the risks of
nuclear co .4i ct in the current cris. . e are deeply concerned,
howev that a conventional �once begun�could escalate
int. - nuclear confronta.0'.
(U) Let me turn now to Iraq. Sadd.am has responded to our
progress in Afghanistan with a political and diplomatic charm
offensive to make it appear that Baghdad is becoming more flexible
on UN sanctions and inspections issues. Last month he sent Deputy
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz to Moscow and Beijing to profess Iraq's
new openness to meet its UN obligations and to seek their support.
(U) Baghdad's international isolation is also decreasing as
support for the sanctions regime erodes among other states in the
region. Saddam has carefully cultivated neighboring states, drawing
them into economically dependent relationships in hopes of further
undermining their support for the sanctions. The profits he gains
from these relationships provide him the means to reward key
supporters and, more importantly, to fund his pursuit of WMD. His
calculus is never about bettering or helping the Iraqi people.
(U) Let me be dear; Saddam remains a threat. He is
determined to thwart UN sanctions, press ahead with weapons of
mass destruction, and resurrect the military force he had before the�
Gulf war. Today, he maintains his vise grip on the levers of power
through a pervasive intelligence and security, apparatus, and even his
reduced military force�which is less than half its pre-war
size�remains capable of defeating more poorly armed internal
opposition groups and threatening Iraq's neighbors.
' . .
(U) As I said earlier, we continue to watch Iraq's involvement in
terrorist activities. Baghdad has a long history of supporting
terrorism, altering its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals.
It has also had contacts 'with al-Qa'ida. Their ties m.ay be limited by
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to Iran.
� Chinese firms have in the past supplied dual-use CW-related
production equipment and technology to Iran. We remain
concerned that they may try to circumvent the CW-related export
controls that Beijing has promulgated since acceding to the CWC
and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
(Ti) North Korea continues to export complete ballistic missiles
and. production capabilities along with related raw materials,
components, and expertise. Profits from these sales help
P'yongyang to support its missile�and probably other
WMD--development programs, and in turn generate new products to
offer to its customers--primarily Iran, Libya, Syria, and Egypt. North
Korea continues to comply with the terms of the Agreed Framework
that are directly related to the freeze on. its reactor program, but
P'yongyang has warned that it is prepared to walk away from the
agreement if it concluded that the United States was not living up to
its end of the deal.
� (U) Iraq continues to build and. expand an infrastructure
capable of producing WM:). Baghdad is expanding its civilian
� chemical industry in ways that could be diverted quickly to CW
production. We believe it also maintains an active and capable BW
program; Iraq told UNSCOM it had worked with several BW agents.
We believe Baghdad continues to pursue ballistic missile
capabilities that exceed the restrictions imposed by 'UN
resolutions. With substantial foreign assistance, it could flight-test
a longer-range ballistic missile within the next five years. It may
Aso have retained the capability to deliver BW or CW agents
� using modified aircraft or other unmanned aerial vehicles.
-� We believe Saddamnever abandoned his n-uclear weapons
program. Iraq retains a significant number of nuclear scientists,
program documentation, and probably some dual-use
manufacturing infrastructure that could support a reinvigorated
nuclear weapons program. Baghdad's access to foreign expertise
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could support a rejuvenated program, but our major near-term
concern is the possibility that Saddam might gain access to fissile
material.
(13) Iran remains a serious concern because of its
across-the-board pursuit of WMD and Missile capabilities. Tehran
may be able to indigenously produce enough fissile material for a
nuclear weapon by late this decade. Obtaining material from outside
could cut years from this estimate. Iran may also flight-test an ICBM
later this decade, using either Russian or North Korean assistance.
Having already deployed several types of UAVs---in.duding some in
an attack role�lran may seek to develop or otherwise acquire more
sophisticated LACMs. It also continues to pursue dual-use
equipment and expertise that could help to expand its BW arsenal,
and to maintain a large CW stockpile.
(U) Both India and Pakistan are working on the doctrine and
tactics for more advanced nuclear Weapons, producing fissile
material, and increasing their nuclear stockpiles. We have continuing
concerns that both sides may not be done with nuclear testing. Nor
can we.rule out the possibility that either country could deploy their
most advanced nuclear weapons without additional testing. Both
countries also continue development of long-range nuclear-capable
ballistic :missiles, and plan to field cruise missiles with a land-attack
capability.
(u) As I have mentioned in years past, we face several unique
challenges in trying to detect WMD acquisition by proliferant states
and non-state actors. Their use of denial and deception tactics, and
their access to a tremendous amount of information in open sources
about WMD production, complicate our efforts. So does their
exploitation of space. The unique spaceborne advantage that the US
has enjoyed over the past few decades is eroding as more
� countries�induding China and India�field increasingly sophisticated-.
reconnaissance satellites. 'Today there are three commercial
satellites collecting high-resolution imagery, much of it _openly
marketed. Foreign military, intelligence, and terrorist organizations
are exploiting this�along with commercially available navigation and
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