NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06496683
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-01415
• Publication Date: March 13, 1987

Approved for Release: 2016/03/23 C06496683.
Directorate of
Intelligence
(b)(3
Near East and
South Asia Review
13 March 1987.
go'
Se t
NESA NESAR 87-007
13 March 1987
(b)(3
COPY 328
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India: Rajiv Gandhi Adjusting
Foreign Policy Tactics
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is frustrated by
the lack of progress in implementing his foreign policy
goals�particularly vis-a-vis Pakistan and Sri Lanka,
but also the United States and the Soviet Union. He
has had only limited success in attracting advanced
technology from the United States, the Soviet Union
did not make firm public pledges of support for India
in its recent confrontations with Pakistan and China,
he has been unable to improve relations significantly
with Pakistan, and his Sri Lankan mediation effort
appears stalled. Gandhi's frustration has led to some
angry outbursts during recent crises and abru t
firings of senior foreign policy officials
Because he has few attractive alternatives, Gandhi
remains personally committed, in our judgment, to
strengthening relations with the United States while
maintaining close ties to the USSR. He also is
dedicated to securing New Delhi's preeminence in the
region by using diplomacy to reduce tensions with
India's neighbors. The growing influence of Gandhi's
personal advisers and military and intelligence
officials over foreign policy matters�combined with
his impatience to get things accomplished�probably
presages a period of more hardline tactics with India's
neighbors. The United States should be prepared for a
period of high-risk Indian brinkmanship in April and
May over the China-India border dispute if military
and intelligence officials call the shots. Indo-Pakistani
relations have improved somewhat following the
recent border crisis, but India will be looking for
concrete steps from Pakistan to improve relations and
help control the Sikh problem. India may also become
less understanding concerning delays in the provision
of advanced US technology. A harder line toward
Pakistan and difficulties with the United States may
not, however, translate into Soviet gains, since New
Delhi is also likely to be looking for firm evidence of
Soviet support, particularly if Sino-Indian relations
deteriorate this spring
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Gandhi shows signs of being worn down by the
responsibilities of leading India both in foreign affairs
and in solving domestic problems:
� He appears frustrated by his inability to improve
relations with Pakistan and to get Islamabad to
curtail its support for Sikh separatists, slow its
nuclear weapons program, and reduce its requests
for sophisticated US military equipment. His harsh
public claims in January that Pakistani military
deployments threatened India suggest he is inclined
to think the worst of Pakistan.
� His recent abrupt firings and public criticism of
senior politicians and government officials involved
in foreign policy reflect his growing exasperation
with their failure to advance his goals.
� Domestically, Gandhi is under growing criticism for
his failure to solve the Sikh problem and faces
criticism for mismanaging the recent border crisis
with Pakistan.
� On the personal level, his predilection for fast
driving and a recent experiment with parasailing to
escape his bodyguards suggest he is frustrated with
his job as well as with the security restrictions
required after his mother's assassination and the
attempt on his own life last October
Feeling the Pressure
Gandhi's intemperate reactions over the past six
months to three incidents involving Pakistan�the
Indo-Pakistani war scare in January 1987, the
attempt on his life in October 1986, and the hijacking
of a Pan Am airliner in Karachi in August 1986�
demonstrate his frustration with his inability to
improve bilateral relations. Gandhi's visceral response
to the alarms of Indian intelligence that Pakistan
intended to invade India, disregarded the safety of
Indian passengers caught in the hijacking, and backed
Se
NESA N SAR 87-007
13 March 1987
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RaJiv Gandhi
India Today
the assassin in New Delhi was to lash out against
Pakistani President Zia or to give the green light to
military commanders eager to counter Pakistani troop
movements with more deployments of their own.
Gandhi's initial reactions during each crisis have been
softened and glossed over by a resumption of
conciliatory comments, but they suggest that he is
prone to erupt angrily at the onset of crises.
The growing impatience of Gandhi with the
performance of Cabinet and senior government
officials in foreign policy has resulted in several
abrupt firings and resignations in recent weeks,
lessening the influence of longtime professional
diplomats in the Ministry of External Affairs. He has
drastically reduced his contacts with the Indian
foreign policy establishment,
apparently deciding that few in
these circles have vision or can be trusted to represent
his views. Gandhi has on short notice dismissed one
foreign minister, one foreign secretary, and fired
G. Parthasarthy, his mother's principal foreign policy
confidant
Gandhi also appears to be turning to high-risk
physical activities�probably to escape his tight
security and the frustrations he feels in his job as a
result of failures in foreign and domestic policy. He
has told the press that he misses his privacy and time
with his family and resents the intrusion of security
officers and procedures. Press reports say he enjoys
driving at excessive speeds to outrun his bodyguards,
and, in early January, on the spur of the moment and
over the objections of his security officers, he tried
parasailing at a local airfield. He seems to savor, if
only for the moment, being free of restraints.
Gandhi's Staff and Decisionmaking Style
From the beginning Gandhi has been an impulsive
decisionmaker on foreign policy who prefers to act
promptly on reading a briefing paper or after hearing
a presentation,
As a consequence of his growing impatience with the
Ministry of External Affairs and other members of
the foreign policy establishment, Gandhi is consulting
only a handful of people on his personal staff and in
the military and intelligence organizations for advice
on key foreign policy questions and appointments,
The
Secretariat staff members most frequently mentioned
as being close to Gandhi include G. K. Arora, recently
named "Special Secretary," according to US
Embassy reports; Satish Sharma, a crony from airline
days; and Mani Shankar Aiyer, his public relations
specialist. Junior Cabinet officials Natwar Singh,
P. Chidambaram and Raiesh Pilot are also identified
as enjoying Gandhi's
confidence. Officials in military and intelligence
circles, who also have Gandhi's ear, have tended, in
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Sec
our judgment, to take a hard line on India's relations
with its neighbors, believing that the projection of
military power and covert action can advance
Gandhi's goals of reducing tension in the region and
asserting India's preeminence.
former
Foreign Secretary Venkateswaran lost his job when
he refused to defer to Arora. According to the Indian
press, Venkateswaran complained about the growing
influence of the Prime Minister's staff and the
Research and Analysis Wing, India's external
intelligence service, in foreign policy matters.
Gandhi's staff convinced the Prime Minister that
Venkateswaran's angry confrontation with Defense
Ministry officials, who excluded the Ministry of
External Affairs entirely from the initial briefing on
Endo-Pakistani border deployments, merited his
dismissal
Gandhi's Foreign Policy Goals Unchanged
Despite his foreign policy problems, Gandhi shows no
signs of abandoning his basic goals�strengthening
relations with the United States while maintaining
longstanding ties to the Soviet Union and securing
India's preeminence in the region. Gandhi probably
sees no attractive policy alternatives, given what New
Delhi views as encouraging but limited success in
attracting technology from the United States. He also
values Moscow's promises of continuing support for
New Delhi but is concerned about Soviet overtures to
Islamabad and Beijing.
We believe that Gandhi may begin using new tactics
to achieve these foreign policy goals. His impatience
with traditional channels of communication on foreign
policy matters suggests he may turn more frequently
to hardliners in the Research and Analysis Wing and
the military to help get things done, particularly when
dealing with neighboring states. At the same time, we
believe he will stick with his preferred personal style
of nonconfrontational diplomacy. Gandhi's appeals to
senior US officials to use their influence with
Islamabad one week before the Indo-Pakistani
mobilization and his invitation to Pakistani President
Zia to attend a cricket match in February indicate
that he prefers personal diplomac conducted in a
nonconfrontational manner.
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Outlook
Gandhi's frustrations are unlikely to cause dramatic
changes in Indo-US relations, but we believe India
may become more impatient with what it regards as
US delays in supplying advanced technology,
particularly in regard to US participation in India's
Light Combat Aircraft project. New Delhi is
signaling the United States either to make concrete
offers or back out of the project. At the same time,
Gandhi probably is buoyed by US offers to advance
the launch date for India's INSAT 1-D
communications satellite and by progress in the sale
of a US-made supercomputer.
Relations between India and Pakistan have improved
as a result of the recent disengagement agreement,
but India will be looking for Pakistan to take
additional steps to improve relations. Gandhi would
be especially encouraged by progress in implementing
the agreements on trade and antinarcotics measures
that he and President Zia discussed during their
meeting in late February or in measures to control
Sikh infiltration. If there is no improvement in
relations over the coming months, we believe Gandhi
will become increasingly susceptible to those advisers
who favor supporting dissidents in Pakistan
We should be prepared for a period of high-risk
brinkmanship over the Sino-Indian border this April
and May, given Gandhi's behavior and the rising
influence of the military and the external intelligence
service at the expense of professional diplomats. We
expect that Indian military officers will advise taking
an aggressive stand against the Chinese along the
contested border. The new Foreign Secretary, K.
Menon�most recently Ambassador in Beijing�
probably will have few fresh proposals to break the
negotiating deadlock. lithe situation gets too hot,
Gandhi may ask the United States to provide both
sides with detailed satellite maps of the contested
border to defuse the crisis.
Difficulties in India's relations with the United
States, Pakistan, or China will not necessarily
translate into gains for the Soviets
New Delhi is disappointed with what
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it views as inadequate Soviet diplomatic support
during recent tension with Pakistan and China. If the
Sino-Indian border heats up this spring, the Indians
are likely to look to Moscow for strong public support
that the Soviets may not be willing to provide
Gandhi's frustrations are increasingly likely to color
diplomatic exchanges with the United States�and
others�during crises or periods of uncertainty. We
can anticipate impulsive, angry outbursts from
Gandhi in a future crisis as doomsayers in the
military and intelligence services outline worst case
senarios or bring him reports that outsiders�
including the United States�wish him ill. Gandhi's
impatience with Ministry of External Affairs
bureaucrats suggests that the United States probably
will have to continue to depend heavily on contacts at
the highest level of Gandhi's administration to
maintain and strengthen ties. Institutionalizing
improved relations will be a slow process as long as
Gandhi continues to fire and shuffle top foreign policy
officials.
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