THE GENERALS TAKE COMMAND IN TURKEY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06464723
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: May 30, 2024
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2024
• Case Number: F-2012-01748
• Publication Date: September 1, 1980

14
NationsApproved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Foreign
Assessment
Center
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18'C06464723
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
NOFORN (NF) Not releasable to foreign nationals
NOCONTRACT (NC) Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
PROPIN (PP) Caution�proprietary information involved
NFIBONLY (NO) NFIB departments only
ORCON (OC)
Dissemination and extraction of information
controlled by originator
REL...
FGI
This information has been authorized for release to...
Foreign government information
All material on this page
is unclassified.
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Sccrct
Summary
The Generals Take Command
in Turkey: Problems
and Prospect
Because of exasperation with the growing anarchy, economic malaise,
and political immobilism that threatened the very foundations of the Turk-
ish state, the military took control of the government on 12 September.
The military commanders probably will stay in power as long as it takes
to restore order, to stabilize the economy, and to make some fundamental
political and constitutional changes.
The new regime faces major obstacles, but in the short term, it is likely
to bring a measure of order and economic equilibrium while keeping
Turkey on a solidly pro-Western course. It is also likely to succeed in
imposing a more orderly democracy that emphasizes a strong presidential
form of government, fewer political parties, and a more restrictive con-
stitution.
The goal of securing long-term social, political, and economic health within
the context of a democratic state will be more difficult to achieve. The
commanders are not likely to eliminate the causes of political violence,
which will almost certainly reemerge when they withdraw from politics.
The economy's structural deficiencies will leave it susceptible to severe
gyrations. And those groups adversely affected by the military's institu-
tional reforms are bound to resist
The result may be that Turkey's military chiefs will not be able to restore
full civilian rule in the one- to two-year time frame they envisage. Rather,
they risk getting bogged down in managing Turkey�either directly or
indirectly�for such an extended period that institutional democracy, rela-
tions with Turkey's allies, and their own professionalism will be severely
damaged.
This memorandum was requested by the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe.
It was prepared by Office of Political
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for Western
Europe. Information available as of 22 September 1980 was used in its preparation.
Comments and questions are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
SC\Aci
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Chief of Staff Gen. Kenan Evren,
leader of new regime
Scent
11
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Sccrer
Background
The Generals Take Command
in Turkey: Problems
and Prospects
The overthrow of the civilian government and the assumption of power
by the National Security Council comes exactly two decades after the
direct takeover in 1960 and nine years after the so-called "coup by memo-
randum" in 1971.1 As with the previous interventions, it was preceded
by a period of political and economic disorder and growing military dis-
illusionment with civilian leaders.
For three years, Turkey has been gripped by skyrocketing inflation that
peaked last winter at an annual rate of over 100 percent. One-fifth of
the work force is idle, and an acute foreign exchange shortage has drastically
curtailed imports and production. Moreover, civil war appeared to be
on the horizon as the toll of political violence rose to 15 lives a day
this summer. The bureaucracy, including policemen and teachers, was
polarized into leftist and rightist camps, and the country was pockmarked
by so-called liberated areas that were off limits to state authorities. The
general atmosphere that characterized both elite and mass populations
was heavy with despair and foreboding
The politicians, meanwhile, continued to pursue narrow, partisan interests,
eschewing cooperation for the national good. Particularly galling to military
leaders was the growing audacity of the Islamic-oriented National Salvation
Party�strategically positioned between the forces of the left and right�
which sponsored a religious rally last month where both Ataturk and
the Turkish national anthem were insulted
This was anathema to Turkey's proud military, which has traditionally
viewed itself as guardian of the nation and guarantor of the ideals of
� modern Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk called for
a strong, independent, secular, and Westernized state characterized by
social cohesion and class harmony.
' The National Security Council consists of Chief of Staff Gen. Kenan Evren (Chairman),
Ground Forces Commander Gen. Nurettin Ersin, Air Force Commander Gen. Taksin
Sahinkaya, Navy Commander Adm. Nejat Turner, and Gendarme Commander Gen. Sedat
Celasun. Gen. Haydar Saltik is secretary general of the Council. The commanders on
21 September appointed a civilian cabinet of technocrats, retired officers, and centrist
politicians headed by retired Adm. Bulend Ulusu that will handle the day-to-day affairs
of government.
�
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Scud
The commanders moved only after several warnings to civilian leaders
to unite in behalf of the national interest. Their demarches last January
and February emboldened the minority rightist government of Prime Min-
ister Demirel to enact sweeping economic reforms and to propose new
internal security legislation recommended by the military. The warnings
also temporarily intimidated the opposition Republicans and Demirel's
erstwhile partner, the National Salvation Party, to mute their criticism
and be more cooperative. This truce was soon broken, however, and the
parties were unable to elect a new president after six months and more
than 110 ballots. Nor were the parties able to agree on additional military-
requested internal security legislation.
Forging a New Order
CLI
Indeed, the economy was showing
signs of recovery. Substantial foreign assistance pledges totaling more
than $3 billion this year combined with Demirel's bold economic measures
had all but eliminated shortages of essential goods; the annual inflation
rate had been cut in half; and the balance-of-payments deficit was nar-
rowed.
The level of violence, however, continued to rise. There were more than
600 killings in July and August, including prominent political and trade
union leaders as well as military officers and policemen. The last straw
for the military appears to have been the new political offensive unleashed
by the Republicans and Salvationists to bring down the Demirel government
that began with the no-confidence vote against its Foreign Minister. The
commanders apparently concluded that the politics-as-usual approach by
civilian leaders would continue indefinitely as the country, crippled by
the absence of a permanent president, headed toward civil war.
The commanders' intervention�their suspension of Parliament, the Con-
stitution, and political parties, and the arrest of over 100 politicians�
underscores their intention to make fundamental changes before they re-
store civilian rule. Initially, they are likely to try to suppress terrorist
groups by imposing a harsh martial law regime that could include trying
extremist politicians for crimes against the Constitutiorl. They will also
try to accelerate the economic recovery
2
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Scent
The military also is likely to revise the country's Constitution in the
name of placing the needs of the community over the individual and
order over liberty. They will probably also forsake proportional representa-
tion in favor of the majority system in an effort to eliminate the political
fragmentation that has produced a succession of weak governments in
recent years. Overall, they seem determined to create a political system
that remains democratic but is better equipped to handle the stresses
and strains of Turkey's transition from a rural to an urban society.
In foreign policy, the new military government will pursue a pro-NATO
and pro-US course. Almost all of the top leaders have had some training
in the United States, and they are known to value Turkey's membership
in the Alliance. At the same time, they will be looking for a measure
of understanding and support for their effort to place the country on
an even keel. Coolness by the Allies at this critical time could sour relations
very quickly. The commanders, who still resent the arms embargo imposed
on Turkey after its invasion of Cyprus in 1974, will be especially sensitive
to the US attitude on military aid.
Difficulties and The military regime will encounter a number of obstacles in trying to
Advantages forge a new order. Some of these are unique to Turkey, others are inherent
in the act of military men becoming governors. The difficulties all seem
to be greater than when the military tried to govern the country directly
in the early 1960s and indirectly in the early 1970s.
To restore order, they must control the many armed terrorist groups
on the left and right that are well-organized, highly disciplined, and strongly
committed to disrupting Turkish society. The economy also is at a critical
juncture. It can either revert to the triple-digit inflation, growing un-
employment, and the acute shortages of last winter, or it can continue
the recovery prompted by the civilian government's free market�oriented
economic reforms and huge inflows of foreign assistance. Much will depend
on whether the commanders will follow through on those reforms�which
run counter to the state capitalism espoused by Ataturk�and be responsive
to the advice of foreign aid donors.
r\�;
Although the military is united in a common purpose and morale is high,
the choices and decilsions that lie ahead�how to deal with terrorism,
what shape to give the new Constitution and electoral law, how to respond
to external pressures, and when to withdraw from politics�may place
severe strains on military, unity. Finally, the generals must operate within
an international environment far more sensitive to human rights violations
3
Approved for for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
�Secret
and far more suspicious of military rule than was the case in 1960 or
even 1971. The result could be a reluctance by some countries to contribute
to large aid packages in the future.
Juxtaposed against these risks and obstacles are some important assets
the military can bring to bear. In a society wracked by the breakdown
of authority, the commanders have a monopoly of power as well as the
will to control terrorism and impose the sacrifices necessary for economic
recovery. In place of the opportunism and irresponsibility of political lead-
ers, they bring a steadiness that could help substantially to restore order
and develop a sound economy. The military leaders' strong domestic po-
sition, moreover, will make it easier for them to make tough decisions
on troublesome foreign policy issues such as the disputes with the Greeks
on Greek reentry into the military wing of NATO, Aegean rights, and
Cyprus.
Short-Term Prospects
Encouraging
Secret
On balance, Turkey's military leaders are likely to be largely successful
in achieving their immediate aims of restoring order, reactivating the
economy, and creating new political institutions without unduly disrupting
Turkey's relations with its allies.
Although they cannot completely eradicate political violence, the command-
ers should be able to bring it under control. If, as seems likely, the
terrorists seek to provoke harsh reprisals to discredit the regime abroad,
the military initially may try to avoid excesses. The commanders' first
priority, however, will be to establish order, and in the end they will
use whatever force they believe necessary. Many terrorist groups will
be broken up, while their leaders will go deeper underground and scale
down their activities.
The commanders, despite the military's state capitalist bias, show signs
of adhering to the austerity program and free enterprise orientation in-
troduced by Demirel. Moreover, the commanders are in a better position
than the Demirel government to see the economic reforms through. The
new regime, for example, can and probably will prohibit strikes and infla-
tionary wage increases.
Reofganizing Turkey's political institutions also is likely to prove man-
ageable. Political immobilism in recent years has led to a consensus among
most military leaders and some members of the civilian elite on the need
for a more orderly democracy. The new civilian cabinet of technocrats
headed by Prime Minister Ulusu appears well qualified to lead this effort.
4
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
I
Long-Term Outlook
Less Promising
International reactions so far to the commanders' takeover suggest that
Turkey's foreign ties will not be significantly disrupted. Most governments
have shown sympathy for the military's goals�even while publicly lament-
ing the necessity of the takeover and calling for a speedy return to demo-
cratic rule. Some governments and many left-of-center political parties
within NATO and the European Community may press for cooler relations
with the new regime, but in the short run their impact is likely to be
slight.
Barring widespread abuse of power and assuming clear if gradual moves
toward restoring democracy, most NATO and EC countries will support
Turkey's military rulers. Even Greek officials seem optimistic that they
will be able to establish a productive dialogue with the commanders over
longstanding bilateral differences. Preliminary statements by the command-
ers and their need to show good will toward the Western Alliance suggest
the Greeks may be right.
Even if the military can reduce violence substantially, further reactivate
the economy, and devise a more effective and centralized political system,
these would by no means ensure that Turkey will enjoy stable, democratic
government and economic prosperity.
The causes of violence in Turkey are derived from deep social divisions,
the dislocations and inequities accompanying modernization
The military leaders�like previous military-dominated
governments�are not likely to make much headway against these prob-
lems, and bloody confrontations between extremists are likely to resume
as soon as martial controls are lifted and full democracy is restored.
It also will take time to fill the void left in the nation's leadership by
the discrediting of most major political figures. At this point it is far
from clear where the new generation of leaders will come from or how
the political forces will align themselves in a new environment that strongly
discourages the proliferation of parties. Nor would economic recovery
preclude future crises requiring more international rescue efforts. Unless
future Turkish leaders can forgo grossly overvalued exchange rates, huge
budget deficits, and price and interest rate controls, Turkey could again
get into the same economic bind it is in today.
CIA
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
cCi
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
The new political institutions the commanders will form, moreover, will
obviously hurt some groups while they help others. Those whose interests
are adversely affected�such as the extreme right and left, the Islamic
fundamentalists, the universities, and the trade unions�are likely to seek
revenge. Their reactions could make it difficult for the military to extricate
itself from politics. And even after the military withdraw, renewed po-
larization could impel them again to intervene.
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723
Source of Copyrighted Photograph:
Page ii: Hurriyet, August 1977.
7 Seerct
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464723