NARCOTICS SUPPRESSION IN EASTERN TURKEY: PROSPECTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06464721
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: May 30, 2024
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2024
• Case Number: F-2012-01748
• Publication Date: October 6, 1980

Amur Amur einow
pproved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
..wasuc. Ansamor ANgsimmir
ROUTING
TO:
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
3
4
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
(Security Classification)
CONTROL NO.
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
(Security Classification)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL.. This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
(b)(3)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
6 October 1980
MEMORANDUM
NARCOTICS SUPPRESSION IN EASTERN TURKEY:
PROSPECTS
Summary and Key judgments
Turkey presents a complex narcotics control problem.
First, as the traditional land bridge between Europe and the
Near East, Turkey is a major transit point for opiates origi-
nating in Southwest Asia. Second, Turkey is a principal
Southwest Asian center for narcotics refining and processing,
supplying heroin to the West European drug market. Until at
least last year, morphine base processed in Turkey supplied
illicit Italian laboratories producing heroin for the US market.
nevertheless, we
believe that Turkey is central to the transit of raw opium and
morphine base to the Levant.
Most illicit narcotics activity in Turkey occurs in the
Kurdish-dominated eastern provinces, an area the Turkish Govern-
ment considers politically explosive. Prior to the coup,
elements of the military proposed harsh measures against the
Kurdish separatists.
memmandum wa4 pkepalLed by the Nationat Foneign
Az4e44ment Centet oi the Cent/Lat. InteLeigence Agency. It wa4
neviewed by Aeptezentativeso the DepaiLtment o4 State and the
DAug EniMcement AdminiztAation who alLe in gene/Lat agAeement
with it4 conctuzion4.
Copy No. y of
PA M 80-10442C
DEftiVATIVECLBY
.0 DEMI] REVVI ON 6 o
,DEnivED Fnom. Multiple
�91707 SECRE
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
(b)(3)
A US effort to enlist the participation of the Turkish
Government in an aggressive narcotics control program has
potentially serious drawbacks if pursued at the present time.
Pressure on the new government could antagonize the military
regime. Even if it acceded to a US demarche, intensive govern-
ment operations against the Kurds could precipitate political
unrest in the eastern provinces.
Should this happen,
human rights issues could seriously complicate existing US
narcotics control programs in Turkey.
A number of other considerations also work against the
effective implementation of a major new narcotics control
initiative in Turkey:
--During this period of heightened tension to the south
and east, the Turkish military is preoccupied with external
threats and may be disinclined to focus on narcotics sup-
pression.
--Turkey's borders are highly porous and difficult to
patrol.
--Processing labs are located in remote areas, are of a
temporary nature, and thus are difficult to detect.
--Turkish police forces (the National Police and the
Jandarma) are presently targeted against internal terrorist
activity and probably reluctant to be burdened with drug
control;
On the other hand, the Turkish Government has strong
reasons of its own to attempt to suppress narcotics trafficking
and production and probably would be responsive to quiet US
encouragement of its anti-narcotics efforts and to continuing
-2-
TOP EECRET
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
mnn
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
(b)(3)
US bilateral aid directed at upgrading its police and customs
capabilities. The Turkish Government perceives a functional
linkage between narcotics activities, arms smuggling, and
political violence: its belief is that without the profits
from narcotics production and trafficking, terrorists and other
political extremists could not afford weapons. If the military
and police are to take more vigorous action, the current state
of nationwide martial law affords an ideal opportunity for
employing their resources to the fullest.
Turkey relies heavily on the US pharmaceutical industry
as a market for its licit opiate production, which without
adequate markets could be diverted to the illicit traffic.
Turkey has been insistent that US policy, presently under
review by the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), exclude
new suppliers (such as Australia and France). United Nations
resolutions, cosponsored by the US, support the Turkish
position. Preferential access to the US market might
strengthen Turkey's efforts to control narcotics production in
general and provide a positive incentive for increased
cooperation on other narcotics control issues.
The Narcotics Situation in Eastern Turkey
Eastern Turkey is the major transshipment/staging area
and a heroin refining area for opiates from the Golden Crescent
(Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) bound for the European market.
The area probably still refines and/or transships some morphine
base to heroin processing labs in Italy that supply the US
market. Despite Turkish efforts to halt the smuggling of
narcotics through their country, the flow appears to be increas-
ing. It is uncertain whether refining activity is also increas-
ing.
Cultivation
Prior to the ban on opium cultivation in 1972, Turkey was
the major source of raw material for the French labs processing
heroin for the European and US markets. Licit opium production
in Turkey was instituted in 1975 under strict government control;
little, if any, of this opium makes its way to the illicit
market. Some illicit cultivation of poppies does occur in the
eastern provinces, but the Turkish Government is able to detect
and destroy most of this production
While some cultivation undoubtedly escapes
-3-
TOP EECRET
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Guinea
Southwest Asian Opium Traffic
Greenlanor
Norwegian Sea
Iceland
130 Oted
Ireland
Cast Coast
To U.S.
North
-,
Atlantic Ocean
('------7"--
PortugJI . 0-
Spain
Mor
a. a
Western
Sahara
)Mauritania
Cape Verde-.. sen� gal
The Gambia-.'.
Guinea
Bissau
Sierra
Leone N.
Liberia
KingdO
w.
Lay. 7 GeT.
France
Italy
oen4k
Algeria
Mali
Upper
Volta
pan, -
Tog boy
Sea
Poland
Finland
omania
'Yugoslavia
Bulga
Sicik
UlliSia Mediterranean Sea Ter?,
South
Atlantic Ocean
Benin
( 'Nigeria
CD Major opium growing area
� Major concentration of morphine/heroin
processing laboratories
""*-- Known smuggling route
---Suspected smuggling route
0
2000
Kilometers
Libya
�1-O
Jordan
07r
Egypt \
Sudan
ego Rwan
Zaire
Angola
Zambia
otswana
Soviet Union
) Iran
uwah
. 0 atlail
A
Saudi U.A E
Arabia
Oman/
b 092
Ethiopia
Uganda
Kenya >1
urund
Tanzania
. Swaziland
South()
Africa--"I_e'soihr,
Seychelles
,C011101"05
Madagascar ,
Mauritius
China
lepal
Bangladesh
India �
Sri Lanka
Indian Ocean
628207 10-130 CIA
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
(b)(3)
detection, it is probably negligible compared to the large
amountscomma' into Turkey from the countries to the east.
Trafficking
Turkey is the land bridge between the producing countries
of the Golden Crescent and the consumer countries in the West,
and traffickers on both sides of the border have profited
from this situation. The raw material--opium and morphine
base--supplying the labs in eastern Turkey originates in the
Kurdish and Azari areas of western Iran and perhaps in the
tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This material enters
eastern Turkey by animal carrier through the mountains or con-
cealed in vehicles through the border checkpoint at Bazargan.
The mountainous, sparsely populated border between the
two countries is an extremely difficult area to patrol and
control adequately, and neither the Turkish nor the Iranian
Government has ever had much success halting cross-border
smuggling. Movement through the narrow valleys and passes
croSsing the border is limited generally to animal carrier.
During the winter months movement is virtually impossible
because of heavy snows.
A variety of methods and modes of transport are employed
to move opiates through and out of Turkey. After processing,
heroin 'and morphine base are moved to various cities in south-
eastern Turkey for distribution to Europe. Narcotics traffickers
in these cities sell to other traffickers in Istanbul or export
the narcotics directly to Europe. Some unprocessed opium is
also shipped by sea and overland--via Syria and other Arab
countries--to Egypt
Refining in Turkey
Most of the opium and morphine base that enters Turkey is
probably refined in temporary labs scattered throughout the
Kurdish areas of eastern Turkey. This region, with its rugged
terrain, offers innumerable safehavens for the simply equipped
but high-quality labs that are a trademark of Turkish chemists.
The labs are put into operation, usually in a remote village,
only when a chemist has been contracted for and the chemicals
-4-
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721_
TOP r'ECRET
(b)(3)
and hardware procured. The preponderance of heroin reaching
Europe appears to be manufactured in these labs. However the
source of supply for morphine base destined for the Italian
heroin laboratories appears to be increasingly diversified,
7
coming not only throu h Turkey, but also through Lebanon and
Syria.
Political Considerations
Turkey's top military leaders took over the government on
12 September to stem what they saw as a slide toward anarchy
and civil war. The politicians were perceived as unable to
push aside their ideological and personal differences and work
together for the good of the country, despite repeated warn-
ings from the military to do so. Both Justice Party leader
Demirel and Republican People's Party chief Ecevit headed weak
and factional coalition governments over the last decade that
were unable to deal with the social and economic inequities,
primarily due to rapid modernization and urbanization, that
fueled domestic strife. Increasing extremist violence was
fueled by sectarian and ethnic divisions that polarized
society.
The first priority of the military leaders is to restore
public order and stability. They have imposed martial law
over the entire nation and are now intent on cracking down on
extremists. The civilian interim government that was installed
by Chief of Staff Evren and the five-man National Security
Council is tasked with running the country and promulgating
laws that would speed the return to order and restore democratic
rule.
Eastern Turkey and the Kurds
It will be particularly difficult to restore order in
eastern Turkey. Ankara's authority has traditionally been
weaker there than elsewhere in Turkey. The region is inhabited
by about 12 million Kurds--one quarter of the population--who
dwell in a rugged, mountainous area that comprises one-third
of the national territory. The Kurds are considered "mountain
Turks," set apart from the rest of the population both geo-
graphically and psychologically.
Kurdish traditions--culture,
-5-
Tor SECRET
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Kurdish Areas and Probable Major Opiate Refining Areas
Mediterranean Sea
628206 10-80 CIA
Probable major morphine/heroin refining area .
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Approved for Release: 2024/63/18 C06464721
(b)(3)
language, social mores--and political rights are generally
restricted or proscribed.
Moreover, Kurdish allegiances follow tribal or family
lines, compounding the control problems faced by any central
government in the region. Because tribes are spread across
borders into Iran and Iraq, there has also been an historic
movement of people across national boundaries. The Kurds
disdain central governments, and over the decades, the Kurdish
aspiration for at least cultural autonomy has fostered a
separatist movement. Historically, the Kurds have fought one
another as fiercely as they have the central governments.
Practically all Kurds in Turkey view the large military
presence in eastern Turkey--the only real element of central
government authority--as an occupation army. Conversely,
elements of the military view Kurdish separatists as nnlitirAl
extremists.
the military is preoccupied with governing the country and
watching the Iran-Iraq conflict. Nonetheless, the military
may have begun arresting troublesome Kurdish tribal leaders,
an action that could precipitate the very goal it seeks to
avoid: political unrest in eastern Turkey.
Constraints
A US initiative so soon after the military takeover could
embarrass the government and, if public, cause popular indig-
nation among the Turks. Pressing the Turkish Government to
cooperate on narcotics could risk undermining the pro-Western
military regime by fueling nationalist and leftist allegations
that the US was responsible for the September military inter-
vention. Indeed, US encouragement of Turkish military
governments in the early 1970s to eliminate poppy cultivation
created anti-US feelings that contributed to a rescinding of
the cultivation ban in 1974.
-6-
TOP SECRET
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
lur CXi
(b)(3)
The military commanders are also likely to resent any US
approach' focusing solely on the processing of narcotics.
Although Turkish officials recognize that they have a problem
with narcotics transiting their country, they are only slowly
coming to admit the existence of processing and refining
activity that takes place inside Turkey. Indeed, Ankara views
the entire issue of narcotics as part of a broader, more
serious smuggling problem. The military leaders are convinced
that weapons purchased with funds acquired from narcotics
production and trafficking have contributed to the political
violence that has cilagued the country for the last five years.
Turkish-US narcotics relations have not been harmonious
in recent years. Indeed, the first US-Turkish bilateral
narcotics agreement, providing $500,000 in assistance to the
Turkish National Police (TNP), was concluded in 1980; this
agreement provides foreign exchange funds for equipment,
training, and fuel to the TNP. While the Turkish Government
would probably be receptive to US offers of additional support
to enhance their narcotics enforcement capabilities, a specific
US request to launch a campaign to eliminate narcotics
processing and trafficking in eastern Turkey would probably
receive a cool reception, particularly aiven the politiral
situation in eastern Turkey.
Moreover, Ankara is dissatisfied with the US position on
other issues in US-Turkish narcotics relations. The Bolvadin
poppy-straw processina plant Imilt
to
halt illicit opium production, is designed to process Turkey's
licit production into concentrate for sale on the international
market. Although scheduled to go into production in 1981,
the factory lacks the necessary capital and equipment to begin
operation. The Turks may ask for further assistance or
threaten to return to the incision method of harvest which is
difficult to control and could open up licit production to
large-scale diversion into the illicit market. Indeed, the
Turkish Government has insisted that the US give preferential
market access to Turkish opiate exports to the exclusion of
newer supply countries such as Australia and France.
-7--
r,
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
(b)(3)
On the broader level, Turkey might press for greater
economic and military aid from both the US and OECD countries
and might use the occasion of a US initiative on narcotics
to bolster its arguments. At a time when Turkey has become
increasingly frustrated in its attempts to secure from the US
the type and level of military assistance it believes is its
due as a faithful NATO ally, the Turkish General Staff is
almost certain to view pressure from Washington to undertake
narcotics suppression duties with a jaundiced eye. If the
generals were willing to cooperate at all, they would demand
a substantial increase in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits
and reinstitution of grant aid as a quid pro quo for their
cooperation. The Turks might also expect the US to finance
the entire program.
Economic Considerations'
The government's economic stabilization program has
brought some improvement to Turkey's precarious financial
situation. The inflation rate has been cut in half and
shortages have been largely eliminated, contributing to the
decline of the once-flourishing black market. The foreign
trade deficit has improved somewhat, and workers' remittances
are up. Unemployment, however, remains high, industrial
production is down, and public finances are severely strained.
Thus,. Ankara probably cannot afford large expenditures for
narcotics-related equipment, training, maintenance, and
operations.
The eastern section is by far the poorest region in
Turkey, and economic development in the region has not kept
pace with the rest of the country. Though eastern Turkey has
almost 15 percent of the population, it receives less than
10 percent of national income. A cross-border trade in cattle,
arms, narcotics, and other contraband has long afforded some
Kurds a source of livelihood.
Military and Police Capabilities
Any move by the Turkish Government to seize processing
laboratories and interdict the flow of narcotics into the
eastern provinces could involve as many as four organizations:
the Turkish National Police (TIP), the Jandarma, Customs, and
the Army. A preoccupation with internal security matters,
TOP SECRET
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
(b)(3)
and severely limited capabilities
all work against any of these organizations assuming a new or
expanded narcotics suppression role. Furthermore, as the
military government purges the civil service of extremist
sympathizers, existing capabilities may decline somewhat for
a period of time.
The TNP
is the
principal narcotics enforcement agency.
The high incidence of terrorist activity has also reduced the
numbers of officers assigned to narcotics duties.
The Jandarma is a
paramilitary force responsible for law enforcement in rural
areas, border patrol, and smuggling control. Already over-
burdened with the extensive internal security duties involved
in enforcing martial law, it would probably have problems in
expanding its relatively narrow narcotics role. Limited police
training and equipment shortages are also problems. The Turkish
Customs has no authority to conduct narcotics investigations;
it only interdicts.
The Turkish Army is organized, equipped, and trained
primarily to defend the country against a Warsaw Pact attack.
At present, the military is also preoccupied with governing
the country and monitoring the Iran-Iraq conflict for any
spillover into eastern and southeastern Turkey. It is not
designed, equipped, or trained for narcotics suppression.
In addition, the Army, like the Jandarma, has been drawn
increasingly into martial law enforcement duties, and Army
commanders would probably be unenthusiastic about the addition
of narcotics suppression to a list of ancillary responsibilities
that they see as keeping them from their primary mission:
defending the country against external military threats.
In sum, these four organizations probably cannot now
take on a more active narcotics suppression role. They are ill-
suited for criminal investigations and intelligence-gathering,
particularly against targets hostile toward the central
-9-
TOP SECRET
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
� Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721
(b)(3)
government. Finally, the rugged terrain and poor road system
of eastern Turkey would require the Turkish Government to
substantially upgrade their ealipment, such as helicopters and
heavy vehicles.
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
-10--
TOP 3ECRET
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C06464721