NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06460904
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-01950
• Publication Date: March 26, 1982

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National Intelligence Daily
Friday
26 March 1982
CO NID 82-071.IX
10 marcn irerr
.Copy 252
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
EL SALVADOR: Election Outlook
The voter turnout on Sunday could be substantial, but neither
of the two leading contenders--junta President Duarte 's liberal
Christian Democrats and Roberto D'Aubuisson's ultraconservative
National Republican Alliance--appears to have better than a remote
chance of gaining a majority. Thus, the balloting will likely lead
to intense rivalry by both parties to form a ruling coalition in
the new constituent assembly.
Although the extreme left and its foreign supporters
will denounce the results, their failure to stop the elec-
tion will be a severe psychological blow. This would be
magnified by a large voter turnout and by wide acceptance
of the result as legitimate. Such an outcome would reduce
international and domestic support for the auerrillas and
threaten their already fragile unity.
Nevertheless, the election presents additional chal-
lenges to the stability of the ruling structure. A re-
formist administration headed by the Christian Democrats
has the best chance of reaching a political settlement
with the insurgents, but for this reason it will remain
vulnerable to a military coup. A regime dominated by
ultraconservatives would heighten polarization, alienate
international backers, and ultimately face a greater
guerrilla challenge more strongly supported by foreign
governments.
Mechanics and Atmospherics
The balloting, which will end a half century of gov-
ernments dominated by the military, is for a 60-member
constituent assembly. It will be empowered to appoint
a provisional government, draft a new constitution, and
set dates for subsequent presidential elections.
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Interest appears high among the estimated 1.5 mil- -
lion voters. To enhance turnout, the nonpartisan Central
Elections Council is permitting voters to cast ballots at
any of 300 polling stations. Measures have been taken to
protect voter anonymity because of guerrilla threats.
Insurgent propaganda has complicated the junta's
effort to give the election credibility abroad, but at
least 20 nations and the OAS are sending official ob-
servers. They will be given military protection and
permitted to witness the balloting at any location they
choose. The Central Elections Council, meanwhile, has
instituted measures to prevent fraudulent voting and
irregularities in the tabulation.
The Campaign
The major competition--too close to call--pits the
reformist record of the Christian Democrats against the
personal and nationalistic appeal of D'Aubuisson. He
has used substantial funding and simple law-and-order
themes to extend his party's appeal beyond its natural
constituency of rightist military officers, landowners,
businessmen, and peasants aligned with the old order.
His promises of swift victory over the guerrillas appar-
ently have been persuasive with both urban and rural
workers, who increasingly suffer the economic effects
of insurgent violence.
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In contrast, the Christian Democrats have until
recently been content to rely on their political orga-
nization and record of reforms. Concerned, however,
that their appeal is being eroded by the right wing's
constant reminders of escalating guerrilla attacks and
continuing economic deterioration, they are publicly in-
sinuating D'Aubuisson's involvement in the assassination
of Archbishop Romero in 1980. They have also designated
junta President Duarte--whose personal popularity is
unrivaled--as their candidate for provisional president,
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26 March 1982
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Four other parties are fielding candidates in each
of the country's 14 departments. Of these, the old
center-right National Conciliation Party--which held
power from 1962 until the overthrow of General Romero
in 1979--retains significant support and is likely to
be most prominent in any coalition government.
Conflicting signals from National Conciliation Party
leaders. however
underscore
the uncertain nature of postelection maneuvering. The
campaign's bitter invective will further complicate
efforts to form a coalition.
The Military
Relations between the military and the Christian
Democrats have deteriorated during the campaign. The
Christian Democrats are upset by the armed forces' re-
fusal to share responsibility for the economic disarray
and the continuing violence. They also are upset that
some military elements are supporting D'Aubuisson.
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The generally conservative officer corps fears that
a reformist civilian government would threaten its inde-
pendence and prerogatives. Although the military is en-
joined from participating in the election, at least some
elements are likely to facilitate rightist balloting while
hindering voters suspected of being unsympathetic.
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Possible Results
If the turnout is substantial and the balloting
appears fair, the most stabilizing outcome would be a
Christian Democratic alliance with moderate elements
from one or more of the rightist parties. Such a result
would reduce-the military's concerns about its institu-
tional survival and would receive strong backing from
at least some Western democracies.
Such support might persuade the leftist insurgents
to moderate their demands for a power-sharing arrangemerlt
and a restructuring of the military. In time, the armed
forces might even be encouraged to engage in a dialogue
with the left that could eventually establish the basis
for a political settlement.
A landslide victory by the Christian Democrats would
increase strains with the military, which would be appre-
hensive about efforts to impose civilian control over the
armed forces and to make concessions to the guerrillas.
Although the military has shown itself willing to continue
supporting democratic processes as long as its critical
interests are not threatened, civilian initiatives of
this kind would increase the chance of a coup.
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A D'Aubuisson-dominated government would cause re-
form programs to be abandoned, indiscriminate counter-
terrorist violence to intensify, and world opinion to be
overwhelmingly negative. Such an outcome would repudiate
Western support for peaceful political evolution and
human rights. Over the long term, only the extreme left
would benefit.
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