COLUMN BY MARGUERITE HIGGINS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06346655
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: September 12, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 26, 2023
• Case Number: F-2020-00509
• Publication Date: September 16, 1965

Approved for Release: 2023/02/17 C06346655
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'UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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FORM NO. 237 Use previous ed VI;pnronv'ed for Release' 2023/02/17 CO6346655 (40)
2-61 PRINTING OFFICE 1961 0-587282
Approved for Release: 2023/02/17 006346655
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Approved for Release: 2023/02/17 006346655
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Approved for Release: 2023/02/17 C06346655
E.-496,980
SEP" 14 1965
I �
i .. . Marguerite Higgins
I
Putting the Record..Sttaigit
� ...
.,
�,
,
1.�
, On Singapore Cj.........AS114r1.
r ', , � 1;
I. . t
(, .WASHiNQTON � Isn't all'Unfortunately, �getting . caught Washington's Will but was im- f
t, this moralizing about the Cen-
itral Intelligence Agency affair
rin Singapore unbecoming the
I conduct of a sophisticated na-
tion crucially engaged in cold ,
and hot wars with Communist i
enemies whO proudly proclaim
I that any means�.however dirty
�justify the end? ���
� Aside from the large quo-
;tient of hypocrisy, the moral- .
:izing is. doubly insufferable ,
�because it appears' in great I
part based on insufficient in-:.
formation as to what CIA_ is.;
fall about.
"[editorials across the land, and
( indeed, around the globe, the
Singapore affair is being used
, as is take-off point for scolding
:the 'CIA for all sorts of alleged
-
as acting
contrary
� to the pOlicv of the U.S. gow
'ernment. jeopardiiing relation's
with a country in defiance of
the will of the U.S. ambassador
. on the scene, to name just a
few recent charges. '
But, in fact. a reasonably
cool look at the. Singapore
incident discloses that the CIA
is guilty of just one thing. lt
-.guilty of /getting caught.
_
In a sense, 'Singapore Primele.
'Minister Lee Kuan Yew picked
a highly satisfactory target in
this 'outburst against the CIA
'even if he was suddenly reviv-
ing an incident that took place
five years ago. For the CIA
.cannot talk back.
, -
Judging by the spate of
is one :of the risks of, the ,
espionage trade, and nobody
is going to give, 'fact. .and
figures to prove that the ratio
of faiures to, success is 1,000
10%1.
TO PUT the Singapore af-
fair in perspective, one of the 3
mandates of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency is to penetrate'.
foreign intelligence netwo`rks::
both in Communist areas and'!
in particularly sensitive places .1
�
�
.� In 1960. Malaysia was just
beginning to be organized.
� The h d
re a been considerable
enetration of nit Malay. pen-
, sula by Red -Chinese- agents.
d Indonesian agents (a fore-..
inner of Sukarners co.nfronfa-
tfon policy). A Vol "that date,
the United State knew very
little .about the Cast of official
�characters in' Malaysia. Since'
lit was becoming a very sensi-,
� tive area.. the U.S. government
not the eIA� decided to
make a special - intelligence-
gathering effort on the Ma-
layan peninsula.
It can be stated on author-
ity that the decision to give
priority. CIA's. attention to the
Malayan area was discussed
and apprOved by 'the National
Security Counccl of that era.
-Therefore: far from , free-.
Wheeling, the CIA agent who
tried'-ln..p.enetrate Singapore's
SpeeiaL,Brancli Intolligence net
contrary. to
plementing U.S. sovernmenC,
policy.
WITH REGARD to 'Singe-,
pore, even Prime Minister- Lee')
(who was not 'then interested5
in using anti-U.S. tirades is a.
stepping stone to membership�
in the Afro.- sian bloc) did
not tak;:the affairyery
.ously at the time and let the .elinate� an -erneiciortfiel
arrested agent- out of jail after
a letter of apology from Dean
Rusk.
'Hopefully, in' light of Lee's
flirtations with the' Communist
bloc', some other American
agents �have succeeded �in pen-
etrating the Singapore
gene ,net even if the first at-
tempt failed. � .
There willprobably be an-I
other' outcry at the. involvement
of. the CIA in an attempt to
persuade ' the Dominican Re-
public's military strongman.
. Gen. Wessin y Wessin to leave
. l- .,
the country, especially since
�
- � the .n ego ti a t i ons � involved a
''certain amdunt of cash (this
t
. 'time the. CA offered to 'buy
4 the 'general's 'house and' sonic
prices). ,
'Ar But it was inch the CIA's
to send Gen. Wessin\ into
,exile. It was the decision of
.the U.S. government that the
sacrifice of Wessin y. Wessin
might "e nh ance Dominican
sI'ability. since �:*ii, would
property at � rather :inflated
�. �
�
leftists and thus possibly induce,
the rebels to accept eompro--,4,
misc. The OA . was 'merely
doing as 'Washington ordered: ;
THE MYTH that the CIA1
runs U.S. foreign policy over-
looks the fact that it is account-1
able to the President and the
National Security. Council'and;
�
is. closely and periodically re-
-viewed by the Foreign Intel-
ligence Advisory Board headed
by Clark Clifford. Other watch
dogs include the special con-
gressional committees and the
Budget 13ureau. .
The myth of CIA insubor;�
`thilatio3) should have died lone
sago: like, for instance, during'
the' Bay of :Pigs. For at that.%
lime the CIA canceled an air.
Isirike against Castro's forces
at President ;Kenne-dy's direc-1
tam -even though the agency.1
aotally ..and, urgently opposed .
(his citncellation.
' And, as it turned out, the
CIAP loyalty 'to Presidential
orders helped to seal the doom
of the. Cuban brigade's expe-
cliti9n to the Bay of Pig�a'i
failure that.,..stirred an outcry)
at the CIA.. .
Approved for Release: 2023/02/17 C06346655