INTEREST OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONSULTANTS IN STAYBEHIND ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06308719
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 30, 2024
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2023
• Case Number: F-2022-00955
• Publication Date: June 8, 1956

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JUN 8 19561
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Interest of the President's Consultants
in Staybehind Activities
1. As a result of the interest shown by the President's Consultants
in our staybehind activities, you asked that you be furnished two memo-
randa prior to the next meeting with the Consultants, one explaining our
activities in the staybehind field in general and the other dealing with our
staybehind arrangements (b)(1)
(b)(3)
2. Attachment A summarizes our general activities in the staybe-
hind field, and Attachment B describes our specific staybehind activities
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
2 Attachments
,ALAA_AAPLAA
RANK G. WISNER
y Director (Plans)
grylle--�/
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STAYBEHIND ACTIVITIES
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STAYBEHIND ACTIVITIES
DESCRIPTION
The purpose of staybehind planning and implementation is to insure a
continuing operational 'capability in intelligence collection and covert opera-
tions in an area which is now accessible but which may be denied by enemy
action, either of a political or military nature. A staybehind feature may be
built into a clandestine operation or, in some cases, an operation is mounted
for the purpose of providing a staybehind mechanism. Such a mechanism
may be composed of:
a. Agents who have been trained or who are currently engaged
in training for staybehind operations;
b. Agents who are now in place and conducting intelligence or
other cold war activities, but for whom there exists a definite sur-
vival potential under denial conditions and for whom definite responsi-
bilities are planned under such conditions;
c. Indigenous groups developed and trained in unconventional
warfare tactics for activation and expansion in the area after its denial.
Staybehind operations are designed to meet the following situations: a long-
term general war; short-term local war situations; and a denial situation
created by enemy political action. They may be developed unilaterally by
CIA or by agreement with and participation of friendly governments. By and
large, our effort has been directed through the friendly government agree-
ment approach, which affords the added advantage of increased liaison activ-
ity with the intelligence and security services of the host country during the
cold war period.
AUTHORITY
Preparation for staybehind activity is an integral part of the perma-
nent over-all responsibility of CIA to provide for clandestine intelligence and
operations coverage abroad regardless of prevailing political or military
conditions and of operational contingencies existing at any given time. The
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basic authority for such preparation is found in the National Security Act
of 1947 and in subsequent implementing actions contained in NSC 5412/2 for
covert operations and NSCID 5 for clandestine intelligence operations. In
addition to this basic obligation, NSC 5412/2 assigns to CIA the further re-
! jsponsibility for developing Covert assets for unconventional warfare which
may provide a base for military expansion in time of war, and specifies
that plans for these covert operations will be in consonance with and corn-
-9 plementary to approved plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. .As wartime re-
,quirements are received from the Joint Chiefs, the covert assets developed
fh-iis far by CIA vii.111)-e assigned to wartime tasks and further assets will be
initiated where needed.
IMPORT
The critical importance of developing emergency assets as a form of
insurance for survival to continue the CIA mission is particularly apparent
from Soviet annexations of the past few years. The lack of adequate stay-
/ behind elements in Czechoslovakia, China, North Korea, and North Vietnam
underlines the need for timely preparation for emergency contingencies in
the critical areas of the Free World which could become denied to us in the
future. Global war is not the only contingency for which we have to make
adequate preparation. In local military aggression such as occurred in
Indochina or in political aggression as occurred in Czechoslovakia, clandes-
tine capability is relatively more significant than in the case of global war.
EXTENT
CIA's total available assets at the outbreak of war will consist of all
assets which we are able to develop prior to such an outbreak. A few CIA
projects are developed in the cold war period which are specifically designed
to generate assets for use in a general or local war situation. Most projects,
flowever, are developed to carry out cold war objectives, with an accompany-
ing plan for converting the project's assets to use in a general or local war.
In planning for staybehind, consideration must be given to those contingencies
which may deny critical areas of the Middle East, Far East, and Europe.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
During the past seven years CIA has placed its main effort in this field
toward a gradual build-up of staybehind mechanisms in the most critical
-2-
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areas. Our potential for stayability still requires substantial expansion.
j` The need for additional assets independently managed by CIA is urgent in
certain areas.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
\ Many of the existing staybehind mecha-
nisms have been inexpensive in that they are developed and partially sup-
ported by the host country, (b)(1)
The percentage of the CIA budget used for purposes of staybehind is very (b)(3)
small, \
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
-3-
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
SEC
(2)
RTT
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,
b)(1)
b)(3)
(3)
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