PRESIDENTIAL MEETING ON VIETNAM, 10 SEPTEMBER 1963

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06265859
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: July 11, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2022
• Case Number: F-2015-01188
• Publication Date: September 12, 1963

Executive Registry
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting on Vietnam,
10 September 1963
PARTICIPANTS: The President
State:
Defense:
USIA:
AID:
The Attorney General
Secretary Rusk
Under Secretary Harriman
Assistant Secretary Hagman
Ambassador Nolting
Mr. Mendenhall
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Gilpatric
General Krulak
� Mr. Murrow
Mr. Mecklin
Mr. Bell
Mr. Phillips
White House: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Forrestal
Mr. Smith
CIA:
Mr. Mc Cone
Mr. Colby
1 2 SEP 1963
1. The meeting opened with a briefing by General Krulak of his
conclusions from his weekend visit to Vietnam. He stated that he had
talked to eighty-seven U. S. advisors and some Vietnamese. Ills
conclusions were that the war is going ahead at an impressive pace
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although there is a lot remaining to fight, especially in the Delta. He
said that Vietnamese officers are aware of the Buddhist political-
religious problem but are essentially detached from it and that there
is no effect in terms of religious division within the military units.
He stated that the army leadership is essentially obedient despite
some dissatisfaction in the middle and upper ranks with Nhu, whose
departure would be hailed. There is no significant change in US/
1 ARVN relationships. He concluded that the Viet Cong war will be won
if current U. S. military and sociological programs are continued,
"despite the wretched regime", and that ARVN will not take steps
necessary to change the regime. He limited his comments to the situation
in Vietnam and excluded international and U. S. domestic implications.
2. Mr. Mendenhall then gave the results of his visit commenting
that there was a complete breakdown of the Saigon civilian government,
that the ministers are inactive and fearful and have few U. S. official
contacts. There is an atmosphere of fear and hatred in Saigon of Nhu,
to a greater degree than there was of the Viet Cong at the time of the
Taylor Mission in 1961. He stated that this had gone to the degree of
convincing many GVN officials that the Viet Cong war was secondary to
the danger posed by the regime itself. Dean Thuc commented on the
possibility of an explosion of a religious war between the Buddhists and
the Catholics. Most of this is aimed at Nhu but there is some identifi-
cation of Diem with Nhu among the students. Mr. Mendenhall also
visited Hue, Danang and Nha Trang and commented that they had the
same atmosphere of fear and hatred. He stated that the security situation
had deteriorated badly in the Northern Provinces of Quang Nam and
Quang Tin and that in Thua Thien the people were turning toward the
Viet Cong because of the repression of Buddhism. He summarized that
Nhu must go or we cannot win the war as the people are turning to the
Viet Cong in preference, adding that DCM Trueheart and Consul Helble
in Hue concur with this.
11 3. The President asked whether the two gentlemen had visited the
f same country and why there was such a difference in their appraisal.
General Krulak commented that the difference was one of the metropolitan
against the national picture. He took issue with the statement that there
was a deterioration of security in the Northern Provinces. Ambassador
Nolting commented that Mr. Mendenhall had advised him of the same
atmosphere of fear and hate when he arrived in 1961. Ambassador Nolting
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agreed that there is more now but commented that the atmosphere of
1961 had been reduced because of the success in developing the govern-
ments strength.
4. Mr. Rubs Phillips then commented on his personal associations
with Vietnamese and President Diem and his initial favorable outlook
toward victory with Diem. He stated, however, that Nhu had completely
turned away the confidence and respect of the officers and civil servants
who would not support the GVN if they had an alternative. He stated that
there is a crisis of confidence in the U. S. as it has supported the GVN
and that Vietnamese are looking for American leadership as any Vietnamese
individuals who stand up are eliminated by Nhu. Despite this, he said
there are Vietnamese with the courage to move. He recommended that
the U. S. initiate a regular campaign under General Lansdale (stating
that Ambassador Lodge had approved this recommendation) with the
objectives of isolating the Nhus and building the strength of opposition
elements, with the hope, however, of keeping Diem. He commented that
General Krulak's comments were limited as American military advisors
are barred from discussing politics. The President asked what specific
actions he would recommend and he suggested: (a) cutting aid to Colonel
'rung which would be viewed by the Generals with much enthusiasm and
as an indication of a vigorous American position, (b) ensuring that the
motion picture center produces no more films praising the Nhus, (c)
insisting that any new aid agreements contain a clause that they must not
be used to repress the Buddhists or support the: Nhus and (d) covert
actions such as character assassinations of Dinh, Tung, etc. These
would be aimed at splitting Nhu from Diem. The President asked whether
the GVN would not fight such a campaign by pulling back on the Viet Cong
war in order to put pressure on us to resume aid. Mr. Phillips replied
that the Army would not permit this and that the U. S. could support the
Provinces directly. Mr. Phillips stated that the war was still progressing
in I, II, III Corps but that in IV Corps very substantial setbacks have
occurred in recent weeks. He said sixty per cent of the strategic hamlets
in Long An Province have been destroyed, although this has not been
connected with the political situation. General Krulak commented that his
military ac,lyisors are merely reporting whether the war is being won, not
politics o'AF-p-atace intrigue, and that thjx_say the war is going well. In
the IV Corps it is a tough situation but ARVN is bringing more strength to
bear in this area.
SEDIE-A
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5. Secretary Rusk commented that Brigadier Thompson had
suggested that the Viet Cong might be moving against the cities as
distinct from the country. Mr. Phillips replied in the negative and
said there are large Viet Cong forces in the Delta. He emphasized
that this is not a military war but a war for men& minds and that if
these are lost the war will be lost.
6. Mr. Meeklin indicated that he concurred with Mr. Phillips and
particularly commented that the U. S. image is in deep trouble with
politically conscious Vietnamese. He stated that the military effort
will inevitably be affected. He stated, however, that Mr. Phillips'
program would be not enough and that we must be willing to go the
whole way as the family would not yield to aid cuts. Since a complete
cut of aid would create a chaotic situation, Mr. Mecklin stated that the
U. S. must make the decision that it is prepared to use U. S. forces to
move in back of a complete break with the entire government as we do
not know what we will get in such a situation and may need U. S. forces
to retain some order.
7. Secretary Rusk stated that these differing opinions should be
digested and recommendations prepared for the President. He suggested
that the focus should be on what happened in July and August which
reversed the optimistic judgments in May and June. He identified Nhu
as the key to this and also said that Ambassador Lodge is having a difficult
time talking to Diem. Governor Harriman commented that Mr. Jordan
had predicted that the regime would face real trouble as early as March.
Mr. Mc Cone pointed out the National Estimate in May, which indicated
that we could win, followed by a Special Estimate on 10 July stating that
GVN relations with its public and the U. S. are deteriorating and that
victory is doubtful if not impossible. The DCI then talked from a
personal telegram he had received from Mr. gichardson which took a
less pessimistic view of the situation, expressed the belief that the regime
and the army will be able to get together and recommended against any
cut in aid.
8. The President expressed appreciation for these reports and
their directness. He requested the following actions: (a) A program be
prepared for him by State in coordination with AID, DOD and CIA for
phased cuts in aid which could be imposed. (b) He emphasized the
necessity that different agencies not express differing views on the situation,
quoting various press stories to this effect. He stated that it is necessary
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to bring our government together to speak as one government. (c) He
requested consideration of appropriate Congressional action which
should be sought. He understood that Senator Church was amenable to
discussion and he did not wish to be tied down by a firm Congressional
position unless we needed it. (d) He requested that a message be
prepared to ask President Diem to silence Madame Nhu while she is in
the U. S.
William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Divis
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