MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT ALONE, OCTOBER 21, 1962.
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
06265647
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 28, 2022
Document Release Date:
August 3, 2017
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2012-01096
Publication Date:
October 21, 1962
File:
Attachment | Size |
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memorandum of discussion [14877368].pdf | 58.67 KB |
Body:
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06265647
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06265647
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06265647
. [V atilg
44*
October 21, 1962
MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT ALONE,
OCTOBER 21, 1962. (Approx. 4:30 p.m.)
On my report of my discussion with General Eisenhower at
my residence this morning, the following information was given
later to the Attorney General. It is not to be given to anyone else.
After briefing by Lundahl, General Eisenhower and I engaged
in a long discussion concerning the proper procedure to be followed.
Eisenhower's conclusions are as follows:
1. Any military action would be inconclusive and therefore
inadvisable unless it employed invasion and occupation of Cuba.
Eisenhower gave this opinion on a basis of his experience in war
in countless examples of air strikes which though most effective,
were never completely conclusive.
2. From a military point of view a surprise attack would
be most effective and most desirable if followed in a minimum
time by invasion.
3. However, from a broader point of view, he opposed
surprise attack because of the indictment, the resulting tensions,
and the fact that such action by the United States would license
other countries to resort to violent military action without notice.
4. Therefore Eisenhower would accept the handicaps from a
military point of view, of warning or notice, and therefore would
follow the suggested plan of initiating a blockade, conducting intense
surveillance, and announcing the intention of taking military action
if the Soviets and the Cubans either maintained the status quo of
their missile installations or continued the construction of theil
missile bases. The military action he envisaged would be air
strikes and invasion.
TV SECRET
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5. General Eisenhower emphasized he was giving his opinion
based solely on intelligence and without the benefit of a study of the
war plans or the most recent diplomatic exchanges with Castro,
Khrushchev-, our allies, etc. It seemed fair to conclude that his
views as expressed above represent a flash judgment rather than
a considered judgment arrived at with all facets of the problem
laid before him.
John A. McCone
Director
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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06265647