DETAINEE REPORTING PIVOTAL FOR THE WAR AGAINST AL-QA'IDA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06253416
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2018
• Case Number: F-2017-02530
• Publication Date: June 3, 2005

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Key Findings (U)
Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War
Against Al-Qa�ida (SAM,
Since 11 September 2001, detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar of
US counterterrorism efforts, aiding intelligence and law enforcement
operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots,
and advancing our analysis of the al-Qa`ida target. In addition, detainees
have been able to clarify and provide context for information collected
from other sources; they also have provided unique insights into different
aspects of the terrorist organization, including its leadership attack
strategy and tactics, and CBRN capabilities and ambitions.
the reporting is disseminated broadly within the US
Govermnen
tge
Detainees have given us a wealth of useful targeting information on
al-Qa`ida members and associates; in fact, detaineeg have played some
role�from identifying photos to providing initial lead and in-depth
targeting information�in nearly every capture of al-Qa`ida members and
associates since 2002, including helping us unravel most of the network
associated with the now detained 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad (KSM). KSM provided information that set the stage for the
detention of Hambali, lead contact ofJemaah Islamiya (JI) to al-Qa`ida,
and most of his network.
� Detainee information was also key to wrapping up such important
al-Qa`ida members and associates as operative Issa al-Hindi, facilitator
Abu Yasir al-Jaza`iri, shoe bomber Richard Reid's one-time partner
Sajid Badat and US operatives Jose Padilla and Iyman Faris.
EFF)
One of the gains to detaining the additional terrorists has been the
thwarting of a number of al-Qa`ida operations in the United States and
overseas. Jose Padilla was detained as he was arriving in Chicago with
plans to mount an attack. Similarly, Walid Bin `Attash (a.k.a. Khallad)
was captured on the verge of mounting attacks against the US Consulate in
Karachi, Westerners at the Karachi Airport, and Western housing areas.
(SFAMT)
Since 11 September, the capture and debriefing of detainees also has
transformed our understanding of al-Qa`ida and affiliated terrorist groups,
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providing increased avenues for sophisticated analysis. Before the capture
of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002, we had significant gaps in knowledge
concerning al-Qa`ida's organizational structure, key members and
associates, intentions and capabilities, possible targets for the next attack,
and its presence around the globe. Within months of his arrest, Abu
Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa`ida's organizational structure, key
operatives, and modus operandi. It also was Abu Zubaydah, early in his
detention, who identified KSM as the mastermind of the 11 September
attacks.
� In the nearly four years since 11 September 2001, successive detainees
have helped us gauge our progress in the fight against al-Qa`ida by
providing updated information on the changing structure and health of
the organization, its preferred safehavens, and the identities of new
"rising stars." (SH
Despite the unquestionable utility of detainee reporting, uncorroborated
information from detainees must be regarded with some degree of
suspicion. Detainees have been known to pass incomplete or intentionally
misleading information; moreover, wc assess that each detainee very likely
has information that he will not reveal, in order to protect an at-large
associate or an operational activity that was underway at the time of his
arrest.
� Experience shows that detainees are more likely to budge if the debriefer,
using information from another source, can demonstrate that the detainee
possesses knowledge of the particular subject. (#81 NW)
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Detainee Reporting Pivotal for
the War Against Al-Qa`ida
Since II September 2001, reporting from high value
al-Qa`ida detainees has become a crucial pillar of US
counterterrorism efforts, contributing directly and
indirectly to intelligence and law-enforcement
operations against the al-Qa`ida target. In addition,
detainees have been able to clarify and provide
context for information collected from other sources;
they also have provided unique insights into different
aspects of the terrorist organization, including its
leadership, attack strategy and tactics, and CBRN
capabilities and ambitions.
� Detainee reporting since early 2003 has been a
major foundation for much of the Intelligence
Community's analysis on al-Qa`ida, both in terms
of current intelligence publications and of more
in-depth intelligence assessments.
detainee reporting is disseminated
broadly among US intelligence and law-
enforcement entities
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Helping Target Other Terrorists Weir
High and medium value detainees have given us a
wealth of useful targeting information on al-Qa`ida
members and associates, including new details on the
personalities and activities of known terrorists.
Detainees also divulge, either wittingly or
unwittingly, details about terrorists who are unknown
to us. As is information from other collection
streams, detainee reporting is often incomplete or too
general to lead directly to arrests; instead, detainees
provide critical pieces to the puzzle, which, when
combined with other reporting, have helped direct an
investigation's focus and led to the capture of
terrorists.
� A key al-Oeida facilitator provided information
about the location in the Shkai valley, Waziristan,
Pakistan, of safehouses of specific al-Qa`ida senior
leaders. Although we had a body of reporting
ndicating that senior
This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterronst Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
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al-Qa`ida targets were congregating in the Slikai
valley in 2004, the detainee's confirmation and
critical narrative helped counterterrorism officers
focus their efforts on this area.
� Detainees have been useful in identifying photos of
al-Qa`ida figures,
I Given the high
use and frequent changes in nonts de guerre, a name
alone is insufficient for determining a terrorist's
identity. ($1 ig41
Unraveling Hambali's Network
In March 2003, al-Qa`ida external operations chief
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) provided
information about an al-Qa`ida operative, Majid
Khan, who he was aware had recently been captured.
KSM--possibly believing the detained operative was
"talking"�admitted to having tasked Majid with
delivering a large sum of money to individuals
working for another senior al-Qa`ida associate.
� In an example of how information from one
detainee can be used in debriefing another detainee
in a "building block" process, Khan�confronted
with KSM's information about the money�
acknowledged that he delivered the money to an
operative named "Zubair" and provided Zubair's
physical description and contact number. Based on
that information, Zubair was captured in June 2003.
� During debriefings, Zubair revealed that he worked
directly for Hambali, who was the principle Jemaah
Islamiya (JI) conduit to al-Oeida. Zubair provided
information
\ive used the
information Zubair provided to track down and
arrest Hambali.
� Next, KSM�when explicitly queried on the
issue�identified Hambali's brother, 'Abd al-Hadi
(a.k.a. Rusman Gunawan) as a prospective
successor to Hambali. Although we were
previously aware of 'Abd al-Hadi, KSM's
identification of his role as Hambali's potential
SeCRE111
successor prioritized his capture. Information from
multiple detainees, including KSM, narrowed down
'Abd al-Hadi's location and enabled his capture in
Karachi in September 2003.
� Bringing the story full circle, 'Abd al-Hadi
identified a cell of JI operatives whom Hambali had
sent to Karachi for training. When confronted with
his brother's revelations, Hambali admitted that
some members of the cell were eventually to be
groomed for US operations�at the behest of
KSM�possibly as part of KSM's plot to fly
hijacked planes into the tallest building on the US
west coast.' (SY pie
Identifying the "Other" Shoe Bomber
Leads provided by KSM in November 2003 led
directly to the arrest of shoe bomber Richard Reid's
one-time partner, Sajid Badat, in the UK. KSM said
that Badat�whom he knew as "Issa" (a.k.a. lssa
al-Britani, a.k.a. lssa al-Pakistani)�was the operative
slated to launch a simultaneous shoe-bomb attack
� with Richard Reid in December 2001.
� Using the intelligence from KSM on Badat,
debriefers queried KSM's nephew, detainee Ammar
al-Baluchi�a key operative in KSM's US, UK, and
South Asia plots and facilitator for the
11 September attacks�who provided additional
information about the UK operative.
Bringing New Targets to Light
A variety of detainee reporting has provided us initial
information about individuals having links to
al-Qa`ida and has given us insight into individuals
about whom we had some reporting but whose
'See Appendix A: Capture of Al-Qa`ida's Southeast
Asian Chief Hambali (cPx1r) (Q//Ml)
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al-Qa`ida involvement was unclear. For example,
detainees in mid-2003 helped us build a list of
approximately 70 individuals�many of whom we
had never heard of before�that al-Qa`ida deemed
suitable for Western operations. We have shared this
list broadly with US intelligence and law
enforcement, and nearly half of these operatives are
now detained themselves.2
� KSM also provided the first lead to an operative
known as Issa al-Hindi (a.k.a. Dhiren Barot) while
other detainees gave additional identifying
information.3 Issa al-Hindi�who was arrested in
2004�was involved in plots in the UK and in early
2004 briefed casing reports on US targets to
al-Qa`ida senior leaders in Pakistan. Issa was well
known in jihadist circles because he penned a book
about his time fighting in Kashmir under his
"al-Hindi" nom de guerre.
� Ja'far al-Tayyar first came to the FBI's attention
when Abu Zubaydah named him as one of the most
likely individuals to be used by al-Qasida for
operations in the United States or Europe. Key
al-Qa` ida 11 September facilitator and Heathrow
Airport plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shibh and KSM
provided additional details, such as a description of
Ja'far's family in the United States, that was key to
uncovering Ja 'far's true name.
Aiding US Law Enforcement Efforts (S//NF)
Many actionable leads provided by detainee reporting
have assisted the efforts of the FBI, local law
enforcement, and the Department of Defense. Such
information has led to arrests, helped in questioning
suspects, and may ultimately be used in a judicial
process. ittg
Soon after his arrest, KSM described an Ohio-based
truck driver whom the FBI identified as Iyman Faris,
and who was already under suspicion for his contacts
with al-Qa`ida operative Majid Khan. The FBI and
CIA shared intelligence from interviews of KSM,
Khan, and Faris on a near real-time basis and quickly
ascertained that Faris had met and accepted
operational taskings from KSM on several occasions.
Faris is currently serving a 20-year sentence for
conspiracy and material support to a terrorist
organization. alf
KSM's revelation in March 2003 that he was plotting
with Sayf al-Rahman Paracha�who also used the
name Saifullah al-Rahman Paracha�to smuggle
explosives into the United States for a planned attack
in New York prompted the FBI to investigate
Paracha's business ties in the United States. The
investigation also involved questioning Paracha's
son, Uzair Paracha, in New York and resulted in
designating in May 2003 Sayf al-Rahman Paracha an
enemy combatant. Sayf al-Rahman Paracha entered
into US custody in July 2003, and Uzair was indicted
in the Federal Court in Manhattan. Say! al-Rahman
Paracha remains in detention at Guantanamo Bay.
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Revealing Plots, Potential Targets (10/Pif-)
Detainee reporting has helped thwart a number of
al-Qa`ida plots to attack targets in the West and
elsewhere. Not only have detainees reported on
potential targets and techniques that al-Qa`ida
operational planners have considered but arrests also
have disrupted attack plans in progress.
� Information on al-Qa`ida's modus operandi is
particularly important, since the group's past
behavior suggests a preference for returning to
pre-established targets and attack methods when
planning new attacks. 1091
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In response to questions about al-Qa`ida's efforts to
acquire WMD, KSM also revealed he had met three
individuals involved in al-Qa`ida's program to
produce anthrax. He apparently calculated�
incorrectly�that we had this information already,
given that one of the three�J1 operative and
al-Qa`ida associate Yazid Sufaat�had been in
foreign custody for more than a year for unrelated
terrorist activity.
� After being confronted with KSM's reporting,
Sufaat eventually admitted his principal role in the
anthrax program and provided fragmentary
information on his at-large assistants. Ultimately,
the information from Sufaat and KSM�when
added to our other holdings�led to the capture of
Sufaat's two assistants in the anthrax program.
4S1
US Targets Here and Abroad
Abu Zubaydah was the first of several detainees to
reveal a significant quantity of general threat
information against targets abroad and in the United
States�including the White House and other US
symbols.
� Reporting from Abu Zubaydah has been used as a
baseline for debriefing other senior detainees, such
as KSM and senior al-Qa`ida operative Khallad,
who have shed additional light on al-Qa`ida's
probable targets and methods for attacks in the
United States. itai
IDIP)
Debriefings of mid-level al-Qa`ida operatives also
have reported on specific plots against US interests.
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� A key Somali operative working with al-Qa`ida and (b)(3)
al-Ittihad al-Islami in East Africa, Hassan Aluned
Guleed (a.k.a. Hanad) told his US debriefer soon
after his capture in March 2004 that East African
al-Qa`ida leader Abu Talha al-Sudani planned to
attack the US military at Camp Lemonier in
Djibouti using explosive-laden water tankers.
� Bothand Hanad enabled us to identify a (b)(1)
number of Somalis in Mogadishu directly (b)(3)
supporting Abu Talha al-Sudani's cell and
deepened our understanding of al- eida's presence
in Somalia and East Africa. hir)
Heathrow Airport Plot
Shortly after his capture in March 2003, KSM
divulged limited information about his plot to use
commercial airliners to attack Heathrow Airport and
other targets in the United Kingdom. He discussed
the plot probably because he suspected that key
al-Qa`ida 11 September facilitator and Heathrow
Airport plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who had been
detained six months previously, had already revealed
the information.
� Debriefers used KSM's and Bin al-Shibh's
reporting to confront Walid Bin `Attash (a.k.a.
Khallad) and Ammar al-Baluchi, who were caught
two months after KSM. Khallad admitted to having
been involved in the plot and revealed that he had
directed cell leader Hazim al-Sheir to begin
locating pilots who could hijack planes and crash
them into the airport. Khallad said he and operative
Abu Talha al-Pakistani had considered some 10
countries as possible launch sites for the hijacking
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� Khallad's statements provided leverage in
debriefings of KSM. KSM fleshed out the status of
the operation, including identifying an additional
target in the United Kingdom�Canary Wharf.
it* $F
Revealing the Karachi Plots
When confronted with information provided by
Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad admitted during
debriefings that al-Panda was planning to attack the
US Consulate in Karachi, Westerners at the Karachi
Airport, and Western housing areas. 481 ban
Aiding Our Understanding of Al-Qa`ida (S//NF)
Since II September, the capture and debriefing of
HVDs has significantly advanced our understanding
of al-Qanda and affiliated terrorist groups. Before
the capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002, we had
significant gaps in knowledge about al-Qanda's
organizational structure, key members and associates,
capabilities, targeting doctrine, and its presence
around the globe. Within months of his arrest, Abu
Zubaydah provided details about al-Qanda's
organizational structure, key operatives, and modus
operandi. Early in his detention, his information on
al-Qanda's Shura Council and its various committees
added to what we were learning from recovered al-
Panda documents and other detainees.
� In addition, Abu Zubaydah's identification early in
his detention of KSM as the mastermind of
11 September and al-Qanda's premier terrorist
planner and of `Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri as another
key al-Panda operational planner corroborated
information from separate debriefings and other
sources.
Since 11 September, successive detainees have
helped us gauge our progress in the fight against
al-Qa`ida by providing updated information on the
changing structure and health of the organization.
KSM, Hassan Ghul, and Sharif al-Masri chronicled
al-Qanda's handling of its financial problems,
beginning in 2003 and continuing throughout 2004.
seetteti
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After his capture in early 2004, Hassan Ghul provided
considerable intelligence on al-Qanda's senior
operatives in Waziristan and elsewhere in the tribal
regions of Pakistan. Ghul's reporting about his
months spent with al-Panda military commander
'Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi in the Shkai valley provided us
our clearest view, at the time of his arrest, of the
senior al-Panda leadership's activities. Ghul
divulged precise location information on mid- and
senior-level al-Qanda members�including al-
Panda's finance chief Shaykh Sand, operations chief
Abu Faraj al-Libi, and external operational planner
za Rabi` a
� Ghul has not provided�and probably was not privy
to�specific location information on Bin Ladin and
Ayman al-Zawahiri, but his reporting on couriers
and other individuals with access eaders
is assisting the hunt for them.
Ghul's debriefings brought instant credibility to a
body of fragmentary information from multiple
sources and at least one other detainee identifying the
Shlcai valley as a safehaven for al-Qa`ida and
associated mujahidin before his capture and added
minute details to what had previously been a murky,
nascent picture. Ghul helped us assess that this
valley, as of December 2003, was not just one haven
for al-Panda in Waziristan, but the home base for al-
Panda in the area and one that al-Panda was
reluctant to abandon.
� Ghul also provided our first knowledge of Pakistani
operatives trained in seclusion at the behest of
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Sharif al-Masri also provided invaluable insights in
more than 150 reports that have aided our analysis of
al-Qa'ida's current organization, the personalities of
its key members, and al-Qa` ida's decisionmaking
process. His reporting has contributed to our
understanding of the enemy, how al-Qa`ida members
interact with each other, how they are organized, and
what their personal networks are like.
Hamza Rabi'a in a safehouse in Shkai. Ghul then
supplied detailed insight into the nature of their
training, including the al-Qa`ida trainers involved
and the location of two training facilities in Shkai.
We learned later through debriefings of Abu Talha
al-Pakistani�who helped recruit the Pakistanis�
that one of the operatives, Affan Leghari, was
attempting to apply for a US student visa in October
2004.f
� Sharif revealed several aspects of al-Qa`ida's top
explosives expert Mu 'Abd al-Rahman
al-Muhajir's potential operational plans, providing
new insights into his burgeoning role as a manager
of operations aimed at the US Homeland.
� A long-time mujahid with professional and personal
ties to some of al-Qa`ida's most prominent
members, Sharif also has provided unique reporting
on senior leaders and associated individuals. In
particular, he was able to give insight into the
mental state, security, and counterintelligence
measures of operations chief Abu Faraj al-Libi, that
assisted in our targeting the now detained al-Qa`ida
senior manager. He also provided details about al-
Qa`ida's paramilitary structure and relations with
the Taliban and other non-al-Qa`ida fighters, and
about Iran's detention of al-Qa`ida members.
ISO Dif)
Ahmed Khalfam Ghailani (a.k.a. Haytham al-Kini,
a.k.a. Fupi) a Tanzanian al-Qa`ida member who was
indicted for his role in the 1998 East Africa US
Embassy bombings, has provided new insights into
al-Qa`ida's skills and networks. As a facilitator and
one of al-Qa`ida's top document forgers since the 11
September attacks, with access to individuals across
the organizations until his arrest in July 2004, he has
reported on how he forged passports and to whom he
supplied them.
IGhailani has revealed details about
meetings in Shkai, Pakistan, and the presence there
of senior leaders and operatives. He has provided
information on operative Abu Munthir al-Magrhibi,
Abu 'Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir, associates of Abu
Faraj al�Libi, and others, including a group of
Pakistani al-Qa`ida trainees. Ghailani also has
reported on possible candidates for an al-Qa`ida
Shura council in Waziristan, Pakistan and provided
insights into the contact procedures for Hamza
Rabi'a.
� Ghailani also provided details on the bombmalcing
materials he observed at the residence of al-Qa`ida
trainer Abu Bah al-Suri, Muhajir's interest in the
design of electrical circuit boards, and Muhajir's
attempts to detonate gas cylinders, aiding our
analysis of al-Qa` ida's recent operational interests.
� Ghailani's information on Muhajir's travel to Mir
Ali, Pakistan in March 2004 to meet with Hamza
Rabi'a helped flesh out our understanding of the
importance of Mir Ali as a replacement for Shkai as
a nesting area for al-Qa`ida.
� He has also described the activities of the East
African al-Qa`ida cell, including the letter he
translated for Hamza Rabi'a from operative Saleh
Nabhan that mentioned unspecified training camps
in Somalia and explosives, which Ghailani
surmised were meant for a terrorist attack.
kg
Detained al-Qa`ida technical experts�some of whom
had very focused roles in the organization�have
provided unique insights into the origins of the
group's efforts to develop conventional weapons and
the technical limitations of key al-Qa` ida personnel.
Recent examples include mid-level al-Qa`ida
facilitator Saud Memon and al-Qa`ida bomb expert
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'AM al-Bari al-Filistini who along with Sharif
al-Masri
� Memon and Sharif al-Masri also reported tha
trained the bombmakers responsible for the
bombing of the US Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan,
in June 2002 and the assassination attempt against
President Musharraf in early 2002.\
� 'Abd al-Bari al-Filistini reported that al-Qasida
military commander 'AM al-Hadi
employed engineers associated with Pakistani
militant groups to attempt to overcome the efforts
by Coalition forces to jam the more reliable
improvised explosive devices. 413P
tal
Illuminating Other Collection (sons)
Detainees have been particularly useful in sorting out
the large volumes of documents and computer data
seized in raids. Such information potentially can be
used in legal oroceedin
/Some also can be used
in confronting detainees to persuade them to talk
about topics they would otherwise not reveal.
� For example, lists of names found on the computer
of Mustafa al-Hawsawi�a key al-Qa` ida financial
operative and facilitator for the 11 September
attacks�seized in March 2003 represented
al-Qa`ida members who were to receive funds.
Debriefers questioned detainees extensively on the
names to determine who they were and how
important they were to the organization. The
information�along with comments from other
detainees, such as Khallad, on additional seized
al-Qa`ida payroll lists�helped us to better
understand al-Oa'ida's hierarchy revenues, and
expenditures, as well as
funds that were available to families.
� The same computer contained a list of e-mail
addresses for individuals KSM helped deploy
abroad who he hoped would execute operations;
most of the names were unknown to us, and we
used the information in debriefings of KSM and
other detainees to unravel KSM's plots and track
down most of the operatives mentioned.
ite
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Challenges of Detainee Reporting (S//NF)
Detainees, by virtue of their circumstances, have an
adversarial relationship with their debriefers; they
often try pass incomplete or intentionally misleading
information, perhaps hoping that the volume of the
reporting will make it difficult to sort out the truth.
Khallad admitted outright that there were some
topics�most likely those regarding terrorist
operational activities�he would not discuss.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b) 3)
(b)
3)
ErEeRert
NEWeRNHMR-
(b) 3)
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SraraS4 Nefeftfrttrom
(b)(3)
� A detainee is more likely to budge if the debriefer,
using information from another source, can
demonstrate that we know the detainee possesses
knowledge on a particular subject. KSM provided
much more specific information on al-Qa`ida's
operational activities with the JI and the identities
of JI operatives only after he was confronted with
detailed questions deny from the debriefings of
Hambali. pri
Detainees sometimes provide sensational, false
information, perhaps because they think such
information will lead to wasted US and allied effort.
elaborated on his plan to crash commercial airlines
into Heathrow Airport; he may have assumed that
Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who was captured in
December 2002, had already divulged this plan.
1�V)
Refusing To Budge on Certain Topics (fritcPW)
We assess that each detainee very likely has
information that he will not reveal to protect either an
at-large associate or an operational activity that was
underway at the time of his arrest.
� KSM has alleged that al-Qa`ida, at the time of his
arrest, had neither active operatives nor sleeper cells
in the United States. He has denied knowing "Haji
Adam," who Abu Zubaydah insistedH
Hhas served as a deep-
cover operative for KSM in the United States since
the early 1990s.
� No detainee has provided actionable information on
Usama Bin Ladin's location, although we have
assessed that some detainees�such as KSM, who
was Bin Ladin's top subordinate in Pakistan�had
such information. (,871 INP)
� In June 2003, KSM admitted that he fabricated his
earlier statements that he tasked operative "Issa"
(a.k.a. Issa al-Britani) to recruit black American
Muslim converts in Montana. KSM may have
fabricated thc original reporting or may have
regretted providing the lead and decided to confuse
us by recanting. Vir
Detainees' information must be corroborated using
multiple sources of intelligence; uncorroborated
information from detainees must be regarded with
some degree of suspicion. Sometimes the detainee
gives information he calculates�rightly or
wrongly�that the debriefers already know.
� Uncharacteristic for most detainees, KSM almost
immediately following his capture in March 2003
SfierRLIT.
9
,ier-eftwittne
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Appendix B: Detainee Reporting on al-Otida {:17;,;1=1
2004 HUMINT Reporting On Terrorism 'i,3
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',.