NOTES ON MEETING - ABOUT 3:30 ON 29 OCTOBER - SITUATION ROOM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06246224
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01096
• Publication Date: October 29, 1963

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06246224
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29 October 1963
Notes on Meeting - about 3:30 on 29 October - Situation Room:
In Attendance: Secretary McNamara, Gen. Taylor, McGeorge Bundy,
William Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Helms, Mr. Colby
1. Draft cable --keep Lodge in place until Saturday.
2. Taylor expressed view that coup, if either successful or
unsuccessful, would have disastrous results.
3. McGeorge Bundy insisted we cannot reconsider our position
with respect to support of a coup but can merely ask Embassy for
further assessment.
McCone raised question of why not reconsider our support
position, stating it was extremely disturbing to him, that the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs had responsibility for military operations, and
for military advice to the President; expressed dissatisfaction that it
can not be reconsidered.
It was decided to send out a cable and get an appraisal of the
prospects of the success of the coup.
* * * * J. J. Je
n 01."1""Is 'I` 1, �T� �T� *1- �T� "I` el,
Notes on Meeting at 4:00 - Cabinet Room - re South Viet Nam
In Attendance: The President, The Vice President, Secretary Rusk,
Secretary McNamara, Attorney General, Gen. Taylor,
McGeorge Bundy, Gen. Krulak, Gov. Harriman,
William Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Alexis Johnson,
Mendenthal, McCone, Helms, Colby
Colby briefed on the attitude of the forces, using charts indicating
the disposition of forces, stating that about an equal number of key units
were in support of the coup as were in support of the Government, and
units totalling about 18,000 personnel were neutral. Colby also briefed
on the two coup groups, the Generals and the Can Lao group, and
indicated very modest interchange between the two.
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tIve *k. V. IS,
The President raised the question of the 1960 coup attempt.
Colby stated that our principal effort was to get the two sides
negotiating and to stop the fighting. The President expressed
concern over prospect of protracted fighting.- thought we should
have an evaluation from the Embassy.
Rusk spoke, stated we must assume that Diem and Nhu are
informed about the talks. Diem's talk with Lodge indicates Diem was
informed about coup talks. Rusk questioned whether we should be silent
and permit a coup to go forward and involve civil war. We should raise
the question with the coup leaders as to whether the coup could be
carried off without civil war. Lodge should pass this word on to Don;
should indicate we are not now convinced of the outcome, therefore should
demand their plans before indicating support. The President indicated
Lodge should stay on his schedule, that if his departure was delayed
and a coup would take place, it would be apparent that we were informed.
After discussion it was decided that Lodge could leave on Saturday- on
military aircraft and this was agreed to. Agreed that a cable be sent
to Lodge and Harkins asking for a detailed assessment of all questions
relating to the coup and also outlining command arrangements after
-Lodge's departure.
The Attorney General took a very positive position, questioning
the communication that was proposed and indicating grave doubts of the
wisdome of our proceeding with a program which seemed to spell defeat
because of failure of a coup or political confusion following a coup, if
successful. He thought the consequences of failure in Sloth South Vietnam
would be the loss of Southeast Asia to the communists. NOTE: He in
effect was repeating my statement to him at lunch last week. General
Taylor repeated his views which were to the effect that a successful
coup was no guarantee of succe ss.
I repeated what I had said on 25 October at my meeting with the
President, McNamara, Bundy, AG, and Taylor. A coup if attempted
might result in some form of civil war in which the Viet Cong would win
by sitting on the sidelines or, if successful, would result in an extended
period of political confusion during which time the war might be
adversely affected and possibly lost and furthermore a period of
political unrest would probably result in a second or perhaps a third coup.
JAM/mfb
(Helms or Colby to prepare full notes of the above mettings)
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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06246224
THE WP,TE HOUSE
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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06246224
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06246224
29 October 1963
MEMORANDUM
I. Diem.Lodge discussions produced no movement in the direction
of political action to satisfy our wishes. Also Diem insinuations indicate
his knowledge of U, S. officials familiar with coup planning.
Z. Knowledge of Generals' coup planning by at least two civilians
outside of government would indicate sufficient talking in Saigon so that
at least some of the plans fait are known to Diem and Nhu.
3. The security measures are an improvement.
4. Analysis of SVN forces in Saigon area indicate three groups;
neutral, pro-government t which La probably the largest and pro.-coup
which is smaller but still a larger force than ill August.
5. Discussion citcra.'ssessc, prospects of a coup. Qiiitprobable
that action will be postponed. from time to time for favorable developments.
On the other hand a coup attempt could be na de momentarily.
6. If successful political difficulties will follow and confusion
will exist for a protracted period.
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06246224