CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/11/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06232630
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: November 4, 1958

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4 November 1958
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
9 DOCUMENT NO.
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LATE ITEM
Chtiese Communists Claim Nationalists U� d Poison Gas
In 3"1,4k:)vember Bombardment
On 4 ovember the official Chine ,le Communist News
Agency sen the following announce ent in English Morse
to Pyongyang:
"During e artillery eattle at 3 P. M. on
Nov. 3 between "the ener4 and people's liberation
army troops on tii Fukien front, the troops on
Quemoy used poison s shells to bombard pLA
troops': It has bee / f nd that persistent poison
gas was used, and y14 p I troops were affected."
"It has to be pointed out at this new military
provocation by/he Kuomintang 'hops took place af-
ter the Chiang'-Dulles talks and th supply of large
amounts of a/mmunition by the Unite States to the
Kuomintandtroops. Therefore, it is �extremely
serious in/cident. The spokesman of the inistry of
national/defense has been authorized to ma e the fol-
lowing erious statement: The Chinese peopl 's libera-
tion / my expresses the greatest anger over th* crime
of the United States and of the Kuomintang troops.
Shold the Kuomintang troops dare to continue to ub
p son gas shells, our troops will reply with severe"
nitive action."
,
The above charge is the first of its kind to appear in con-
nection with the off-shore island situation and may mark a new,
more virulent phase in Chinese Communist propaganda directed
against both the Nationalists and the United States. Together
with the more intensive Communist shelling of 3 November, it
raises the possibility of increased military pressure on the is-
lands.
4 Nov 58
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4 NOVEMBER 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
JAEIC statement on Soviet explosion
of 3 November.
Chinese Nationalists attempt to coun-
ter rumors of negotiations with Pei-
pg. 2
ping.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Israeli naval operations may cause
incidents with UAR.
USSR has responsibility for "execu-
tion" as well as "technical study" of
Aswan Dam project.
,
0 Iraq- Qasim turns down Aril's request
for permission to return.
� Algerian rebels seek further shipment
of arms from Iraq.
EIDER)
� Laos - Government's position precari-
ous.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 November 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
JAEIC statement: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee made the following announcement at 1400 hours
on 3 November:
"The Atomic Energy Detection System has re-
ported that an explosion occurred at about 0929
GMT on 3 November 1958, in an area centered
at 49.50 Notth, 480 East (approximately 100
nautical miles northeast of the Kapustin Yar
rangehead). Signals have been reported from
three acoustic stations. Additional signals may
be expected at a later time."
Nuclear confirmation
cannot be expected prior to 9 November 1958."
"Additional evidence on 1 November test: Five
low-amplitude electromagnetic signals at 1009:-
16.6 GMT have been obtained for the previously
reported event of 1 November. This evidence,
together with the event on 3 November at about
the same location, definitely establishes the 1
2civernber event as a nuclear explosion. The
height of burst of the 1 November test may have
been anywhere between a few thousand and 100,-
000 feet."
--TOP�SE�RE-T�
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Taiwan Strait situation: The Chinese Nationalists are
attempting to counter rumors of negotiations between Pei-
ping and Taipei. Vice President Chen Cheng is soon to
make a speech denouncing these rumors as a Communist
plan "to sow the seeds of distrust" between the United
States and the Chinese Nationalists.
(Page 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
The Arab-Israeli situation: The Israeli Navy plans
extensive operations at sea this week. It may operate in
waters within a 12-mile limit which the Egyptians have
sought to enforce off the Mediterranean coast of Sinai.
In early October an Egyptian attempt to capture an
Israeli vessel seven miles out from Gaza was thwarted
by the arrival of Israeli aircraft. Further similar
intidents seem likely.
/
4 Nov 58
DAILY BRIEF
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Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim has denied a request from
Vienna by former Deputy Premier Arif for permission to
return to Baghdad and has ordered him to proceed to his
post as ambassador in Bonn
The Qasim regime apparently believes that the return of
the pro-UAR Arif might further threaten the government's
stability
Arif has been expected by his supporters to return
this week.
Algeria-Iraq:
the Algerian rebels have "urgently" asked Baghdad
to ship by air certain weapons and ammunition--including
bazookas, antitank grenades, and pistols. The "remainder"
of the arms allotment, of unspecified size, was to go by
sea to Alexandria. Two Iraqi military transport aircraft
arrived in Bengasi, Libya, on 21 October with an earlier
arms shipment which was almost certainly destined for
Algeria. Iraq has extensive stocks of British-ma small
1
weapons and ammunition.
Ry, Laos: me precariousness oi grime minister pnours
position is highlighted by recent reports of factional in-
triguing and loss of confidence within his own party. His
role as champion of reforms which are bitterly resisted
by elements within conservative ranks is causing him to
question the viability of his government.
(Page 3)
4 Nov 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait Situation
The Chinese Nationalists are attempting to counter rumors
that negotiations are in progress with the Chinese Communists,
according to Chiang Ching-kuo, Nationalist security boss and
elder son of Chiang Kai-shek. They plan to have Vice President
Chen Cheng make a major speech charging the Chinese Commu-
nists with conduct of a widespread propaganda campaign through
letter writing, rumors, and other devices.
The Nationalists are expressing concern over the activities
of Chang Shih-chao, whom the Communists allegedly dispatched
recently to Hong Kong with large sums of money to influence
pro-Nationalist and Third Force Chinese leaders in the British
colony. They are apparently less concerned about the activities
of Tsao Chu-jen, a Hong Kong journalist who has passed rumors
of negotiations to the press and has written letters containing
alleged Communist "negotiation" offers to Chiang Ching-kuo and
other top Nationalist officials. The Nationalists believe Tsao to
be an opportunist and, unlike Chang, not a bona fide Communist
emissary.
Some Taiwan "liberal" and anti-Kuomintang newspapers
have begun to call for "realism" in admitting that a Nationalist
counterattack against the mainland cannot now take place. These
newspapers argue that in order to further political preparations
for the recovery_of the; mainland, such repressive measures
as the restrictive publications law should be repealed.
One newspaper, noting that in the past the government has
"shouted too much about counterattack," urged the convening of
an Anti-Communist National Salvation Conference, represent-
ing all free Chinese, to raise the morale of Overseas Chinese
and to discuss means of taking the political offensive against
the Communists. The American Embassy notes that this de-
mand probably stems from a liberal belief that the holding of
such a conference would somehow bring about an effective op-
position party to the Kuomintang.
The Chinese Communists continue to reject the idea of a
"cease-fire," describing it as a "vicious plot" which is not rel-
evant to the current Strait situation. A People's Daily commen-
tary of 3 November reiterates Peiping's standard formula that
4 Nov 58
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the principle of renouncing force is useful only in settling
international disputes and should never be used as an "in-
strument of interference" in the internal affairs of other
countries--a label it has applied to the Taiwan Strait issue.
The commentary singles out Foreign Secretary Lloyd's sup-
port of the United States and his praise of Chiang Kai-shek as
"glaringly hostile activities." In a relatively mild rebuke the
paper notes that Britain has diplomatic relations with Peiping,
yet continues to act "extremely unfriendly toward China."
Chinese Nationalist Vice President Chen Chen& references
on 1 November to an attack on the mainland probably prompted
Peiping to show the Nationalists the realities of the offshore is-
lands situation. A sharp outburst of shelling on 3 November
totaled over 36,000 rounds, according to the Nationalist Defense
Ministry. Besides attempting to emphasize the hopelessness
of a "return to the mainland," the shelling was probably intended
to dispel any notions that Peiping will allow tension in the area
to subside at this time. The Communists' warning from the
"Fukien Front' which preceded the 3 November outburst, re-
minded "compatriots" on Chinmen of the "odd day" and sug-
gested that Peiping hopes it can force the Nationalists to re-
supply only on Communist-designated dates.
On 2 November a Chinese Nationalist convoy landed 3,200
tons of supplies on Chinmen. This convoy was the first to reach
the island since the Communists resumed firing on 20 October.
Adverse weather has thwarted all other attempts, except for a
negligible amount delivered by air
4 Nov 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laotian Government's Position Precarious
Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone's role as champion of
reforms bitterly resisted by members of his own party--the
Rally of the Lao People (RLP)--is causing him to question
the viability of his government. Phoui attributes the failure
of the RLP to support him fully to the "unreconstructed" at-
titude of RLP deputies and the ambitions of former cabinet
ministers. He also is critical of young reformist members
of his cabinet for gratuitously antagonizing RLP deputies.
� Foreign Minister Khampan Panya has expressed serious
concern as to whether the government is able to withstand pres-
sures from disgruntled elements within the RLP. He observed
that most RLP deputies are in severe financial straits as a re-
sult of expenditures during the May electoral campaign and
resent the reforms, which ended the import license bonanza.
Khampan believes that the deputies are prepared to take out
their resentment on the Phoui government.
Illustrative of the precariousness of Phoui's position were
developments in the National Assembly on 31 October, when
two RLP deputies joined the opposition to bring about a vote of
22 to 20 for a seven-day extension of the assembly. Phoui re-
sponded to this challenge by forcing the cloture of the assembly
that day as previously scheduled. He has since received reports
that the assembly may be called back into extraordinary session
to allow dissatisfied RLP deputies an opportunity to join with the
opposition and topple the government.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of -the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
'Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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