CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/10/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06232623
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: October 27, 1958

Approved for
0
a 3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
27 October 1958
Copy No. C 59
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I. I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO'. -2 tbi 6
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH-
DATE.
REVIEWER:
-TOID-SECRET'
Aor.dr...Ar'.........0,AFA,A.Ar
iApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 C062326237
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232623
��
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232623
Pre% ri et minr ry or_
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232623
27 OCTOBER 1958
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait - Chiang Kai-shek
reporting willing to discuss cuts
in island garrisons. Peiping to
shell Chinmens only on alternate
days, provided US escorts not re-
sumed.
Nuclear test at Novaya Zemlya on
25 October is 16th in current series.
Chinese Communists complete with-
drawal of all major units from North
Korea. r
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Burma- Peiping may use border inci-
dents to put pressure on new Ne Win
government.
Algerian rebels publicly reject De
Gaulle's conditions for further cease-
fire negotiations.
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232623
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232623
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 October 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
� Taiwan Strait situation: Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang
Kai-shek, stated on 25 October that his father has no objec-
tions to discussing a plan designed to reduce the size of the
garrisons on the offshore islands and at the same time increase
the defensive firepower of the remaining troops.
Chinese Communist Defense Minister Peng Te-huai's 25 Oc-
tober "message to Taiwan compatriots," limiting to alternate
days the shelling of the wharf, landing beaches, and airfield on
Chinmen, enables Peiping to claim that the Nationalists are able
to maintain themselves on Chinmen only at Communist suffer-
ance. The Communists retain flexibility to fire or not to fire
without appearing to accept American proposals for a de facto
cease-fire and without risking expanded hostilities or American
involvement. Peiping also hopes to lend greater persuasiveness
to subversive overtures being made to the Nationalists. The
limited cease-fire is conditioned on the absence of American
convoy activity. (Page 1)
Soviet nuclear test: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee made the following announcement at 1600 on 25 Octo-
ber:
"The Atomic Energy Detection System has re-
ported that an explosion occurred at 0821 GMT (0321 ,
EST) on 25 October 1958 in the vicinity of Novaya
Zemlya.
*Comment: This is the 16th explosion in the current phase of
Soviet testing Which began on 30 September, On 20 September
a large area of the Barents and Kara Seas which included the
TOP SECRET
4Apjmostfor Release:2020/01/23 CO6232623
A
. . 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 "C06232623
TOP SECRET
,
27:r,
islands of Novaya Zemlya was closed to shipping and air-
craft through 25 October. There is at present no evidence
that the Soviet Union has rerrened the area nr that nuelear
testing has been suspended.
Communist China - North Korea: The last Chinese Com-
munist troops have withdrawn from North Korea, according
to a Chinese Communist announcement. This move completes
on schedule the plan of withdrawal announced early this year.
the withdrawal of all
major Chinese Communist units from North Korea as of 19
October. About 300,000 Chinese Communists were withdrawn
in three stages of about 100,000 troops each. The Chinese
Communists are capable, however, of deploying about six ar-
mies, or 300,000 troops, to forward areas of North Korea
within two weeks to reinforce as required the 338,000-man
North Korean Army.
b\
Burma- Communist China: Burmese-WIZ ar
unrest among the tribal peoples on both sides of the Sino-
Burmese frontier may give rise to an increase in border in-
cidents and they are probably concerned that these might pro
vide Peiping with opportunities to apply pressure on the new
Ne Win government. Pressure of this sort already may have
been applied. The Chinese Communist ambassador in Rangoon
on 23 October made a belated but strong protest concerning an
August attack on a Chinese border check-point by a tribal group
fleeing China. Peiping demands that the leader of the attack be
extradited.
� Aigeria-rrance: The recent series oi secret French
Algerian rebel meetings presumably led to Premier de Gaulle's
offer for the rebel leaders to come to Paris under a safe-con-
duct to negotiate a cease-fire. The rebel government, objecting
27 Oct 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
TOP SECRET
� 7/2 /// '22;;70:-
� ,i/11&/ AteRroyeSfor Rel ease: ,2,020/01/2,
ver
4Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232623
to the conditions proposed, has publicly rejected the offer,
apparently in an effort to broaden any future discussions to
include the political status of Algeria. De Gaulle maintains
that the future of Algeria can be discussed only with the rep-
resentatives the Algerian people will elect to the French
National Assembly on 30 November. (Page 4)
27 Oct 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
TOP SECRET
A
Mt i r t I" "Nil r* rY
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232623
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait Situation
The Chinese Nationalist foreign minister has received two
more letters from representatives of the Chinese Communists
recommending a negotiated settlement between Peiping and
Taipei. Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's elder son, has
stated that both letters have been reported to the generalissimo
and that Nationalist policy is to ignore them entirely.
� Chiang Ching-kuo stated on 25 October that his
father has no objections to discussiug a plan designed to reduce
the size of the garrisons on the offshore islands and at the same
time increase the defensive firepower of the remaining troops.
The President indicated that acceptance of such a plan would de-
pend on the extent of the proposed reduction and the ability of
the Nationalist Government to win popular support for the idea.
A senior Chinese Nationalist diplomat has admitted
there is a possibility that Taipei may reduce the offshore
island forces, but he noted that such a reduction must have the
appearance of being voluntarily accomplished on the initiative
of the Nationalists. Indications to the press by Nationalist mil-
itary officials on 25 October that their government has agreed
in principle to an American request, made prior to the offshore
island crisis, for a gradual one-third reduction in the armed
forces on the offshore islands with a corresponding increase in
firepower through modernization suggests Taipei could be may-.
ing toward decreasing the garrisons.
The message issued on 25 October by Peiping's Defense Min-
ister Peng Te-huai to Chinese "compatriots" suggests that, for
the time being, the Chinese Communists hope to move by means
of political tactics toward their objective of gaining control of
the offshore islands. Peng's message is in effect a declaration
of a limited cease-fire which "facilitates for a long time to come"
the entrenchment of the Nationalists on the Chinmens. Peng
states that troops on "the Fukien Front" have been ordered not
TOP SECRET
27 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232623
rim " 1.1 T'f �
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232623
to shell the Chinmen airstrip and the wharf, beach, and ships
at Liaolo Bay "on even days" and advises that Nationalist ships
and aircraft "should not come on odd days. hi this way; ,half
of each month will be free for transportation."
Chinese Communist artillery fired about 240 rounds at the
Chinmens on 26 October, an "even numbered day," but none
against the beach or airstrip. Peiping stated in a 26 October
announcement, however, that "today happens to be an even
date. Our military units on the Fukien Front, strictly abid-
ing by the order of the minister of national defense, did not
bombard the airfields in Chinmen or the wharf, beach, and ships
at Liaolo Bay when they shelled Chinmqn." The Communists ap-
parently do not intend to suspend shelling entirely "on even days"
but only to refrain from shelling those areas specifically men-
tioned in the 25 October order.
Peng's 25 October order enables Peiping to claim that the
Chinese Nationalist Government is able to maintain itself on
Chinmen purely by Communist sufferance. At the same time,
the Chinese Communists retain flexibility to fire or not to fire,
without appearing to accept American proposals for a de facto
cease-fire and without incurring the risk of expanded 1iost117--
ities or American involvement. The limited cease-fire is "still
conditional on not introducing American escorts." Peng thus
continues the regime's effort to disengage the United States from
any active military support of the Nationalists and to provide a
de facto American recognition of its claim to a 12-mile limit of
its territorial waters. Since American destroyers modified their
pattern of patrolling in the Matsu area on 22 October, Peiping
has not issued a "serious warning" against alleged American in-
trusions into Chinese Communist territorial waters.
Chinese Communist propaganda prior to 21 October, as
well as Peng's earlier cease-fire orders of 6 and 12 October
pointed to "political work" and "peaceful liberation" as the
principal methods to be used in the campaign to take over the
offshore islands and Taiwan. Peng's latest message makes it
clear that Peiping does not expect important defections in the
immediate future. Peng states, "We are not advising you to
break with the Americans right away; that would be an unreal-
istic idea." Peiping apparently does. expect, however, a lower-
ing of Nationalist morale, some grumbling against the Chinese
TOP SECRET
27 Oct 58
CFNTRAI INTFI I inFmrF RI III ETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232623
Page 2
rr"rt r, rirn
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232623
Nationalist authorities, and even defections during a prolonged
period of psychological pressures against the offshore islands
and Taiwan.
Peiping's propaganda continues to reduce the tone of urgency
regarding the offshore islands and to demand the total withdrawal
of American forces from the strait area as the only means of
permanently easing tension.
At least seven of eleven Soviet IL-12 transports which were
scheduled to fly from Chita to Manchuria on 23 October were
flying from
Manchurian bases to Peiping. These aircraft are subordinate to
the Soviet Air Force of Airborne Forces at Pskov in the western
USSR. The flight of these aircraft into Communist China was
request-
ing frequent weather reporting from airfields in Manchuria be-
tween Chita and Peiping. The significance of this activity can-
not yet be determined.
27 Oct 58
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232623
Approvedr1V:Illars172M77011t2 006232623
- IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algerian Rebel Government Rejects De Gaulle Proposal
The "Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic" on
25 October branded as a "request for unconditional surrender"
Premier De Gaulle's public offer of 23 OctoberIor leaders of the
rebellion to come to Paris under a guarantee of safe conduct to
discuss an Algerian cease-fire. By leaving the door open for
negotiations at a neutral location, rebel spokesmen made clear
they were rejecting the alternative methods proposed by De Gaulle
for making contact with the French Government but were willing
to continue the secret contacts which reportedly have taken place
during the past few months between the premier's representatives
and individual members of the rebel regime.
Regardless of developments on negotiations, the De Gaulle
government feels in a relatively strong position insofar as its
internal pre-election stand is concerned. De Gaulle's willingness
to talk with rebel leaders pleased liberal elements in France and
Algeria, and rightist extremists will now be heartened by the be-
lief that the Cairo announcement makes negotiations unlikely.
De Gaulle may be willing to forego the requirement he ex-
pressed for the rebels to send representatives to Paris. He would
be reluctant to sanction a neutral site which might imply recogni-
tion of the provisional Algerian government, but he might agree
to hold talks in Turlisia or Morocco, with a'view to cementing rela-
tions with two countries he still hopes to bring close to France in
the new French community. In no event, however, will he agree
to discuss the future status of Algeria until Algerian representa-
tives to the French National Assembly are elected on 30 Novem-
ber.
27 Oct 58
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232623
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232623
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232623
/p