ALLEGATION OF MISLEADING CONGRESS <SANITIZED>

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06230389
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 90
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2017
• Case Number: F-2014-00278
• Publication Date: November 17, 2000

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...71Alts, a tins
Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General
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Pir:CORD COPY
NO7' RamovE
OFFICAL FILE -
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(U) ALLEGATION OF MISLEADING CONGRESS
L. Britt Snider
Inspector General
17 November 2000
Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations
Investigators:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
1
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS
3
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES
6
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
7
FINDINGS
8
WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM "INTERNAL TAXES" WTHIGNI CIA? 8
WHAT ARE CIA's RESPONSIBILITIES IN DEALING WITH CONGRESS? 10
How DID THE AGENCY PRACTICE WITH REGARD TO DISCUSSION OF
"INTERNAL TAXES" WITH CONGRESS EVOLVE? 12
WHAT GUIDANCE WAS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY ON 25 FEBRUARY 2000 CONCERNING THE DISCUSSION OF
"INTERNAL TAXES" WITH CONGRESS? 24
DID THE 25 FEBRUARY 2000 GUIDANCE CONFLICT WITH CIA's
OBLIGATIONS AND POLICY IN DEALING WITH CONGRESS? 47
Dm SUPERVISORS RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBLE
MISINTERPREATION OF THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN THE 25 FEBRUARY
2000 LOTUS NOTES E-MAIL AND TAKE AIVY ACTION TO CORRECT IT? 51
WHAT DID THE CM EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR SAY TO CONGRESS ON 16 AND
23 MARCH 2000 ABOUT AGENCY POLICY ON DISCUSSIONS OF INTERNAL
TAXES WITH CONGRESS? 53
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WAS THE EXECU'TIVE DIRECTOR'S 23 MARCH 2000 LETTER TO THE SSCI
STAFF DIRECTOR ACCURATE? 62
WHAT HAS BEEN THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE LOTUS NOTES E-MAIL
WITFBN THE DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY? 67
CONCLUSIONS 73
RECOMMENDATIONS 79
EXHIBITS:
A - Employee Bulletin�ExDir Reminds All Employees of
Agency Policy on Dealing with Congress
B - Lotus Note froM ODDS&T, Subject
Cautionary Note: Discussion of Internal Taxes
� C - Letter to Mr. Nickolas Rostow from David W. Carey,
dated 23 March 2000
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS STAFF
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
ALLEGATION OF MISLEADING CONGRESS
17 November 2000
INTRODUCTION
1. (U//AIU0) In May 2000, an Agency employee who
requested confidentiality approached the Inspector General (IG) with
secondhand information that CIA Executive Director (ExDir) David
Carey misled Congress when he testified before the House
Permanent Select Committee Si Intelligence (HPSCI) and also in a
letter Carey sent on 23 March 2000 to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) Staff Director. The employee claimed he
represented a group of senior Agency officers who were afraid to
approach the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for fear of retribution.
The employee said the Senior Intelligence Service officers were
unwilling to come forward on their own to report the allegation
because they feared their names would become known to senior
Agency management and they would suffer adverse career
consequences.
. 2. (U//AlUO) The employee said he was told by another CIA
officer that in February 2000, Carey chaired a meeting attended by,
among others, Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology
(ADDS&T) James Runyan. Runyan attended the meeting as a
substitute for Joanne Isham, the Deputy Director for Science and
(b)(3)
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Technology (DDS&T). The employee learned, after this meeting, that
Runyan reported Carey was "furious" and said the Agency was not
going to talk to Congress about its policy concerning "internal
taxation." Carey reportedly said the Agency is to "close ranks" on the
issue of not discussing its internal taxation policy with Congress.
The employee explained that the term "internal taxes" refers to fees
levied on CIA components by Agency corporate management to
fund other programs and needs.
ni(11/ /AKIO) The employee learned that
�who served in the Office of the Directorate of Science and
Technology (DS&T) as the Chief of the Planning and Resources
Group�was instructed by Runyan to communicate with certain
officers within the DS&T to "dose ranks" and tell them that internal
taxes are an internal matter that is out of bounds for discussion with
the Congressiorin elligence oversight committees. The employee
understood tha afted a Lotus Notes e-mail message to this
effect and showed it to Runyan in draft. Runyan approved the
message, saying that it reflected what Carey said, and it was sent.
The employee sakI is suffering retribution for this incident.
4. (U/ /AIU0) According to the employee, Carey appeared at
a 16 March 2000 HPSCI hearing and denied any knowledge of the
existence of the e-mail message; denied that its statements
represented Agency policy; and denied that any subject was out of
bounds for discussion with the intelligence oversight committees.
Subsequently, Carey sentretierlo the Staff Director of the SSCI
dated 23 March 2000 wi message attached. In the letter,
Carey wrote that the e-mail message "does not accurately articulate
our policy on dealing with Congress." The employee believes this is
a false statement.
5. (U/ /AIUO) The employee explained that he did not wish to
invoke "whistleblower" provisions to report this matter to Congress
because he did not have firsthand knowledge of the matter.
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However, the employee considered this matter to be an "urgent
concern" that he wanted to bring to the attention of the 1G concerning
a false statement to Congress.'
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS
6. (S) "Internal taxation" is a term used within CIA to describe
the reprogramming or realigning of funds allocated for one program
to another program or need. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2000, internal taxes
have been levied on all Directorates, components within the
Directorates, and on individual programs. The overall magnitude of
taxes has been substantial. The Directorate of Operations (DO)
reported it began FY2000 by realigning over of
operational funds to support DO infrastructure vrozrams that were
inadequately funded, and paid more than as the DO's
share of Agency taxes.
7. (S) In late 1999 and early 2000, Congressional and staff
delegations visited CIA stations abroad. During this period, some
Agency officers from the DO reported that their operational
capabilities, especially in agent operations, were being hampered
because of a lack of funds. In particular, they noted there was a
downturn in their funds compared with the previous year. At the
1 (U) "Whistleblower Protection for Intelligence Community Employees Reporting Urgent
Concerns to Congress," Title VII of the Fiscal Year 1999 Intelligence Authorization Ad, provides
ways an intelligence community employee or contractor may submit a complaint or information
to Congress. An "urgent concern" is defined in 50 U.S.C. �403q (d)(5)(G)(1) to mean any of the
following: (I) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order, or
deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operations of an intelligence activity
involving classified information but does not include differences of opinions concerning public
policy matters; (II) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an
issue of material fad relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence
activity; (III) An action, including a personnel action described in section 2302(a)(A) of Title 5,
United States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection
(e)(3)(B) in response to an employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this
paragraph.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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time, similar expressions of concerns were being voiced to Congress
by officers in Headquarters about the impact of internal taxes on
their programs.
8. (U/ /AIUO) In early 2000, accounts of "complaints" raised
during the Congressional visits and comments made by other
Agency officers about the impact of taxes on their programs were
registering with senior Agency management. They expressed
dismay and concern that some Agency officers were speaking to
Congress about budgetary issues without full knowledge of the
complex issues involved. Guidance was sent to the field which, in
part, explained the situation with programs that had been
insufficiently funded and the need to tax the DO and the other
components.
9. (U/ /AIUO) By Agency regulation, the Chief Financial
Officer (CFO) serves as the "principal interface" with Congress on
resource matters, and employees are required to refer Congressional
inquiries to Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) and the CFO prior
to responding. Field Stations were explicitly instructed not to
comment on Directorate or Agency budget-related matters. A
22 March 2000 statement by the CFO "reminded" all employees that
budget realignment questions should be referred to the CFO and
OCA. On 27 March 2000, ExDir Carey "reminded" employees to
respond fully to Congressional inquiries regarding programs and
activities, including budgetary and fiscal matters, following
established Agency procedures in responding to Congressional
questions. Senior Agency managers confirm that CIA policy on
discussing budget matters, including internal taxes, was that
personnel should coordinate with the CFO's office before responding
to Congressional questions. ExDir David Carey explains that to
avoid offices going to Congress to plead their own case, the CFO
served as the one definitive source of information to Congress on
budget matters.
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10. (U//A1U0) On 25 February 2000, after a morning staff
meeting where there were remarks by ExDir
Carey, and DCI George Tenet about CIA officers "complaining" about
the budget to Congress, Carey met with the Deputy Directors,
including ADDS&T Runyan. Following that meeting, Runyan
instructed a senior DS&T officer to pass on Carey's concerns
regarding these budget issues to DS&T office-level personnel.
11. (U//MUD) The DS&T officer,
sent a classified Lotus Notes e-mail message to DS&T budget and
plans officerateril�tat day. In all, 18 DS&T officers�including
Runyan and supervisor, DS&T Chief of Stafi
received the Lotus Note. It said in part that the "7th floor" had
recently become aware that some CIA officers were talking to
Congressi about the impact of internal taxes on their
programs.
Lotus Note said that CIA considered internal
taxes to be "out of bounds" for discussion with Congress; internal
taxes often reflected poorly on Agency performance; and DS&T
personnel were instructed not to discuss taxes "even if prodded" at
briefings or during Congressional visits.
12. (UHAIU0) isserts that she prepared the Lotus
Note with points Runyan had provided to her, based on the
25 February meeting he attended .n7 says she provided Runyan
with a draft of the Lotus Note, which he approved, and sent the note
the evening of 25 February to the 18 recipients, including Runyan
and contends she is being made a scapegoat for drafting
the guidance provided, and later reviewed, by Runyan.
(b)(3)
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(U/ /ARJO) Runyan contends the guidance he asked
r13
o disseminate was "to coordinate with the Comptroller before
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down to the
Hill." He cannot explain
why that message was
(b)(7)(c
going
not embodied ix
1Lotus Note, and no
witnesses
to their
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conversation have
been identified. Neither
Runyan
nor made
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any effort to correct the guidance issued b
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14. (U//AIU0) On 16 March 2000, Lotus Note was
cited without attribution by the HPSCI Chairman during a CIA
budget hearing attended by Carey and the Deputy Directors. Carey
testified that the contents of the note did not represent Agency
policy, and he and the other attendees were not previously aware of
the Lotus Note. Carey sent follow-up letters a week later to six
HPSCI members and to the SSCI Staff Director repeating this
position. In the letter to the SSCI Staff Director, Carey stated that
neither he nor any member of his "senior management team" was
aware of the Lotus Note before the hearing.
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES
� 15. (U/ /AIUO) Twenty-two interviews were conducted
including all of the principals. A review of the guidance provided by
the Directorates of Administration, Operations, and Science and
Technology concerning policy on budget and taxes during the first
quarter of 2000 was conducted. Copies of pertinent documents have
been retained and selectively cited in the Report. Copies of the letters
sent to the Congressional oversight committees have been obtained,
and the testimony at the 16 March 2000 HPSCI budget hearing has
been reviewed. Copies of notes from DCI morning staff meetings
and the DS&T meetings around the time of the incident have been
reviewed. A legal analysis was conducted by the Counsel to the IC
to determine if the crimes reporting responsibilities imposed under
50 U.S.C. �403q(b)5 were implicated. Individuals who were
interviewed were afforded the opportunity to review and comment
on the factual accuracy of the OIG reports of interview.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
16. (U//A1U0) This Report of Investigation addresses the
following questions:
� What is meant by the term "internal taxes" within CIA?
� What are CIA's responsibilities in dealing with Congress?
� How did the Agency practice with regard to discussion of
"internal taxes" with Congress evolve?
� What guidance was issued by the Directorate of Science and
Technology on 25 February 2000 concerning the discussion
of "internal taxes" with Congress?
� Did the 25 February 2000 guidance conflict with CIA's
obligations and policy in dealing with Congress?
� Did a supervisors recognize the possibility
of misinterpretation of the guidance contained in the
25 February 2000 Lotus Note e-mail and take any action to
correct it?
� What did the CIA Executive Director say to Congress on 16
and 23 March 2000 about Agency policy on discussions of
"internal taxes" with Congress?
� Was the Executive Director's 23 March 2000 letter to the SSCI
Staff Director accurate?
� What has been the consequence of the Lotus Notes e-mail
within the Directorate of Science and Technology?
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FINDINGS
WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM "INTERNAL TAXES" WITHIN CIA?
17. (U/ /AIU0) Within CIA, the term "internal taxes" refers to
a mechanism for redistributing budget funds allocated for one
program to another program or need. Internal taxation requires
specific programs to remand a portion of their current year funding
(the tax) to a central pool of money which, in turn, is allocated to
other programs in order to increase the funding of those other
programs or new initiatives. Programs are "taxed" to raise money to
shift to other programs. The taxation is "internal" because the overall
budget of the Agency is not increased. The term "internal taxation" is
often used within the Agency in conjunction with phrases such as
"internal budget realignments" or "reprogramming of funds:2
18. (U/ /AIU0) Within CIA, internal taxes are imposed on the
Directorates, on components within the Directorates, and on specific
programs. Internal taxes are imposed for a number of reasons�for
example, to fund operations, maintenance, and support costs that
may not have been fully factored into a program when its original
budget was submitted and approved. Budget officers refer to this as
the imposition of internal taxes to cover "unfunded" or
"underfunded" programs or needs.
19. (S) A 29 February 2000 e-mail message from a Directorate
of Administration (DA) budget officer explains that "Fairshare taxes
are levied to pay for corporate CIA bills. The Comptroller's Office
spreads the tax Agencywide based on prorata shares of the budget."
Within CIA, specific internal taxes are sometimes named. For
example, one such "tax" is called the Executive Director's Reserve
Tax: These internal taxes are often referred to as corporate taxes
because they are imposed at the Directorate and Agency level.
2 (U/ /AIUO) The Agency's legal and policy authorities to realign funds will be addressed in an
Inspector General audit concerning Agency reprogramming of funds.
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20. (S) References to internal taxes are common within the
Agency. For example, all personnel in a Directorate of Intelligence
office were told in a May 2000 e-mail that
Taxes from the 7th floor almost always arise with very short
deadlines .... Because this year's taxes are even larger than
expected, the [office-level] funding set aside for this purpose is
already accounted for.... The flexibility to meet these tax
requirements is constrained because many budget line items are
fenced off by Congress.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Moreover, the magnitude of internal taxes can be substantial. For
example, a budget officer in a component of the DA asked a
Directorate-level budget officer in a 29 February 2000 e-mail about
the evied in taxes on his component in December 1999
and another assessment o in February 2000. The
DA-level budget officer responded that the taxes were paying for a
variety of Agency "unfunded" programs, including some within the
DA.
21. (S) By all accounts, the first half of FY2000 was a period of
tight budgets and a number of internal taxes. An 8 March 2000
memorandum by the DO's Operations and Resources Management
Staff (DO/ORMS) entitled "FY00 Internal DO Realignments"
explained that "At the beginning of the operating year, the DO
realigned about of mostly operational funds to infuse
internal DO infrastructure programs, which had never been
adequately resourced."
22. (S) DO/ORMS drafted a contribution for .a "DCI Issue
Paper on Budget Shortfalls" on 1 March 2000, explaining in greater
detail why the DO reprogrammed funds during FY2000. It reported
that:
Very early in FY2000, DO managers identified an extensive list of
unfunded or underfunded activities, resulting in costs in excess of
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The activities were primarily infrastructure programs,
many of them critical to the DO's operational missions. The
circumstances and decisions which led to what could be termed a
budget dilemma are complex and under considerable examination.
In part, some infrastructure programs had become underfunded
over several years as the Directorate's base funds shrank while its
operational programs were supported on a year by year basis
through Congressional and other adds to its budget. Large
infrastructure programs were established without budgeting
[operations and maintenance] funds in the future....
[DO] components who were represented most heavily on the
unfunded list. . . were protected during the realignment of funds
which focused the burden on the rest�primarily the operating (b)(1)
divisions and centers. Taxes were computed on the size of their (b)(3)
base funds . . In addition to critical funding within the [DO], the
DO's share of Agency wide cuts and corporate bills, which
rom ted further internal cuts in early FY 2000, totaled over
more recent Agency-level taxes of ove
Further DO cuts have been necessary to ay additional,
The impact on
agent operations caused by the DO's realignment of funds to cover
critical infrastructure needs and pay Agency taxes is real, though
perhaps difficult to quantify.
WHAT ARE CIA's RESPONSIBILITIES IN DEALING WITH CONGRESS?
23. (U) Statutory Requirements. The National Security Act of
1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. �413a), requires the DCI, among other
responsibilities, to:
. .. furnish the intelligence committees any information or material
cencerning intelligence activities, other than covert actions, which is
within their custody or control, and which is requested by either of the
intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized
responsibilities.
24. (U) The National Security Ad of 1947, as amended
(50 U.S.C. �413a), further requires the DCI to keep the intelligence
committees "fully and currently informed" of intelligence activities
other than covert actions that are carried out by CIA. The meaning of
(b)(1)
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the "fully and currently informed" requirement is discussed in a
15 May 1980 Senate Report, No. 96-730, that accompanied the
Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 (S. 2283). The report states the
statutory language places responsibility on the Executive Branch to
provide not only "full and complete information upon request from
the committees; it also includes an affirmative duty to keep the
committees fully and currently informed of all major policies,
directives, and intelligence activities."
25. (U) The 19 September 1980 Conference Committee Report
No. 96-1350 that reconciled and incorporated the Senate and House
versions of the oversight provisions in the Irtteffigence Authorization
Act for FY1981 lists three additional responsibilities imposed on the
DCI by the legislation. One of these is to furnish any information
requested by the committees in order to carry out their
responsibilities.
(b)(3)
26. (U/ /AIU0) CIA Regulations. Headquarters Regulation
dated 26 July 1993, states that the Director of Congressional
Affairs serves as the "focal point for Agency contact with Congress
and its individual members, committees, and staffs." Agency
Regulatio "Reporting of Intelligence Activities to Congress,"
dated 26 Mar 1996 reiterates statutory guidance and states that:
CIA will seek scrupulously to meet the obligation to keep the
Congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed
.... This obligation requires, at a minimum, that ... CIA provide
the information requested by those committees in order to conduct
their business.
Questions regarding the interpretation of these guidelines should be
referred to the Office of General Counsel, according to the regulation.
27. (U) Agency Regulationn"Response by Employees and
Former Employees to Subpoenas, Orders, and Other Demands by
Courts or Other Authorities," dated 15 May 1997, provides that no
Agency employee will respond to a request for information,
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including requests from Congressional committees, until authorized
to do so by the General Counsel. 32 C.F.R. Section 1905 provides the
same guidance, and authorizes CIA officials to delegate their
authority to subordinate officials.
(b)(3)
28. (U/ /AIU0) The CFO's authorities and responsibilities in
regard to ss are set forth in a 2 March 2000, Agency
Regulatiorentified "Office of the Chief Financial Officer
(CFO)." This regulation defined the mission of the CFO as "to
oversee all financial management and procurement activities relating
to the programs and operations of the Agency. . . ." The CFO's
functions, as identified in this regulation, include:
� Develop, coordinate, and oversee the Agency's program
planning and resource allocation processes.
� Develop and oversee execution of the Agency budget....
� Serve as the principal interface with Congress (in coordination
with Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs), Department
of Defense, Community Management Staff, and Office of
Management and Budget regarding resource matters....
[Emphasis added.]
How DID THE AGENCY PRACTICE WITH REGARD TO DISCUSSION OF
"DrrERNAL TAXES" WITH CONGRESS EVOLVE?
29. (U/ /AIU0) As established in the preceding section, CIA
has a statutory obligation to provide "full and complete information"
to Congress. It also has regulations in effect that govern which
Agency employees specifically can respond to Congressional
inquiries. These regulations state that no Agency employee will
respond to Congressional requests for information until, or unless,
authorized. On most issues, the Office of Congressional Affairs has
been delegated this authority, and in budget-related matters, the CFO
and OCA share responsibility for responding to Congressional
queries.
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30. (U/ /MOO) Written Guidance. To ensure that employees
are aware of their obligations to respond to Congressional queries
through OCA and the CFO, the Agency has issued periodic
guidance. This guidance includes a pamphlet issued by OCA on
briefing Congress; instructions to Field Stations on handling budget
questions that arise during Congressional delegation visits; an
October 1999 Employee Bulletin reminding employees to
communicate with Congress through OCA; a 22 March 2000
statement by the CFO made available to all employees reminding
them that budget realignment questions should be referred to the
CFO and OCA; and a 27 March 2000 Employee Bulletin reminding
employees to respond fully to Congressional inquiries through
established Agency guidelines for handling questions from Congress.
31. (U/ /AIUO) OCA Pamphlet on the "4Cs." Since at least
1988, OCA has issued a pamphlet entitled "Briefing Congress." In a
section entitled "Guidelines for Congressional Briefings," the
pamphlet states that "a CIA officer in contact with Congress�
whether before a committee, an individual Member, or a staff
officer�should present information that reflects the following:
candor, correctness, completeness and consistency." The pamphlet
defines "consistency" as "following established Agency guidelines
when responding to questions or requests for information, The
pamphlet also instructs employees to "concentrate on the facts, [and]
render judgments only in your specific area of expertise." Employees
are further admonished not to discuss "other programs or activities
that are not related to the issue being briefed."
32. (S) Guidance Concerning Congressional Visits. OCA
periodically issues guidance to all Agency Field Stations and Bases
concerning briefing Congressional members and their staffs during
Congressional visits to Agency field locations. A 17 June 1999 cable
3 (U/ /AIUO) As discussed in the previous section, CIA regulations require that employees refer
questions from Congress to OCA or the GO prior to responding.
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provided instructions to Field Stations on answering budget-related
questions that arise during Congressional visits. Field Stations were
told:
On budget-related topics, feel free to provide generic funding
infonnation as it pertains to your operation but do not comment or
opine on broader Directorate or Agency budget-related matters.
Please remember that Congress reviews and acts on the DCI's
budget, and [the DCI1 has directed that only Headquarters will
discuss budget specifics with members and staff, in line with their
oversight or non-oversight responsibilities. [Emphasis added.]
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
In advance of specific Congressional visits in the period from June
1999 through 29 March 2000, individual Stations were instructed by
their respective Headquarters components on many occasions to
refer to the June 1999 cable. Additionall the June 1999 instructions
were retransmitted in full to more tations throughout the
year.4
33. (U/ /AIUO) October 1999 Employee Bulletin. Agency
personnel were reminded of their obligation to communicate with
Congress only through the Office of Congressional Affairs in an
Employee Bulletin issued on 1 October 1999. The Employee Bulletin
was made available to all Agency employees on an electronic bulletin
board.
34. (U/ /AIUO) Official Minutes of "DCI (Agency) Staff
Meeting." The official minutes of the DCI weekly staff meeting are
posted on the Agency's Public Affairs electronic bulletin board and
are available for all Agency employees to read. According to
minutes of the 22 March 2000 DCI Staff meeting,
"reminded components to refer to herself and 0 A any queries from
HPSCI staff members regarding realignment of funds. HPSCI
staffers recently have directly queried some components."
4 (S) The June 1999 guidance on handling budget issues differed from the instructions issued to
Field Stations in 1997 and 1998 concerning briefing Congressional visitors. The 1997 and 1998
instruction cables did not contain any reference to budget-related topics.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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35. (U) March 2000 Employee Bulletin. On 27 March 2000, an
Employee Bulletin was issued entitled "ExDir Reminds All
Employees of Agency Policy on Dealing with Congress." (See Exhibit
A.) It instructed personnel "to respond fully�and to the best of your
knowledge�to Congressional inquiries regarding programs and
activities, including budgetary and fiscal matters." The instruction
advised employees to ensure that all dealings with Congress are
characterized by candor, completeness, correctness, and consistency.
Employees were reminded to follow established Agency guidelines
in handling questions from Congress. 5 The Employee Bulletin was
made available to all Agency employees on an electronic bulletin
board. The text also was issued as a cable to Agency Field Stations
on 29 March 2000.
36. (S) The Budget Situation Facing the Directorate of
Operations. On 6 January 2000, the Deputy Director for Operations
(DDO) sent a cable to all DO Stations and Bases entitled "The State of
the Directorate's FY 2000 Fiscal Health." This cable discussed
"unfunded" programs and the amount of internal taxes being levied
on the DO. It said:
[Thu have no doubt heard from your component management that
this is shaping up to be a tight budget year�the tightest in memory
in fact. Unfortunately, the adds to our FY 2000 budget have been
more than offset by the need to cover as the DO share
of Agency unfundeds and the need to realign over
internally to cover unfunded program needs critical to the DO
mission, such as operational training, improvements to
management and backstopping of cover, and information
technology systems supporting field and Headquarters operations.
We have also had to cover s the DO share of a
Congressional cut to independent contractors and to
cover an across the board cut to all US Government agencies
mandated by Congress. As the year progresses, additional Agency
unfundeds are likely to arise, and we will have to help cover them.
5 (U//AlUO) CIA regulations require employees to refer questions from Congress to OCA or
the CFO prior to responding.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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37. (S) In an e-mail message on 1 February 2000, a senior
officer in DO/ORMS advised Associalfe DDO for Resources, Plans
and Policy (ADDO/RPP of concern from HPSCI staff
members that funds HPSCI had earmarked for specific DO areas or
programs of special interest to the committee had been "taxed." The
officer said that the "bottom line is that the areas HPSCI thought
were going to be made healthy in FY 1999 were taxed."
(b)(3)
38. (S) A 3 February 2000 e-mail message
from
an officer
assigned to the
Office of the Comptroller tC
and the Chief of (b)(3)
(b)(3)
ORMS said that
Wanted
them to have
(b)(7)(c)
a list of significant
emaining
in fiscal
Agency unfunded
Programs
year 2000. Five
programs totalini
were
listed. The (b)(1)
"there is a good chance
all or part of these
officer said that
taxed to pay for
that the
programs."
(b)(3)
directorates will be
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
39. (S) On 15 February 2000, the Chief of Budget Operations in
� the Comptroller's Office informed each Directorate and the DCI Area
of the "next" round of taxes to be levied in fiscal year 2000
Subsequent e-mail messages within the DC)
discussed how to allocate this tax on various DO components.
nary, an OCA officer informed
and others in an e-mail message that the
"with not receiving tax data on each DO
Division. In response tated that DCI Tenet had asked her
to "put together the whole story on the DO funding issue."
said "the 'tax' issue needs to be addressed from an Agency's sic
perspective--why we have them, what we are doing about it, etc."
� 41. (S) In a 23 March 2000 memorandum to DCI Tenet, DDCI
Gordon, and ExDir Carey entitled "Critical Budget Issues," DDO
James Pavitt stated: "As you know, DO line divisions are operating
on very tight budgets this year . . The primary cause is funding
realignments at the Directorate and Agency level."
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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42. (S) Field Stations' Response During Congressional Visits.
Following Congressional visits to Agency facilities overseas, Chiefs
of Station summarize the visit in a cable to OC A with an informaii7
copy to the relevant DO area division.
the Chief of Station (COS' reported his discussion of
"funding" issues with HPSCI Chairman Porter Goss. The COS
relayed that "In reply to query from [Chairman]/HPSCI concerning
funding, COS noted that monies in FY-00 were going to be tight.
COS observed that Station's FY-00 counterterrorism [CT] budget was
pn (sic) FY-99."
43. (S) reported on
his budget-related discussions with Representative James Moran,
who is a member of the House Appropriations Committee
(HAC)/Subcommittee on National Security. He said:
In reply to Rep Moran's query concerning what he could do for the
Station, COS observed that all indicators pointed to a very tight FY-
2000 budget for the Directorate o COS noted that
Station's FY-00 budget would be of FY-99.... Rep
Moran observed that he was not aware o the budget difficulties
facing the Directorate [of Operations] and observed that he would
welcome dialogue with the DCI and/or DDO to see how he might
be of assistance in this area.
reported he spoke with Representative Peter
King at Representative Moran's request that he address the issue of
"resources" with King. The COS said:
When addressing the issue of the FY-2000 budget, COS made the
same points to Rep King as he had made to Rep Moran. Rep King
echoed Rep Moran's comments that he too was convinced that
should the Directorate [of Operations] require additional funds to
counter the threat of international terrorism, the DCI and/or DDO
should raise the issue directly with the Hill.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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At the conclusion of a visit by HAC staff members to
he COS reported his
budget-related discussions with (b)(1)
The COS reported he told the staff 1(6)65
then
members
that the Station did not
(b)(3)
have adequate resources to do its
job and Provided details about the
situation
facine the S
hon.
the COS said
as:
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
... broke
operations:
aid
it ic enino In have dire rnn glatIllPTIrOC CM Allr
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Station
in essence
of the work
will be in
over the
a retrograde movement and most
past 18 months will be negated.
if not all
45. (S)
the COS
eported
(b)(1)
he "pulled no
punches" in answering Congressman
Goss' question
(b)(3)
about the Station's blidget
situation. The COS said he an
(b)(3)
... stated our conviction that the ad hoc-like budgeting process is
unclear and inadequate and our regret that this annual ordeal now
rtlireater to impact field operations.... Specifically, COS and
old Goss that Stations are facing an
reduction for FY-2000 in discretionary [operational] and
Einapilglita ement] funds, and that had actually received a
eduction figure, which we have appealed.
46. (U/ /AIUO) Senior Officers' Views on Agency Practice
Concerning 'Waxes." ExDir Carey states that there is no policy
within the Agency regarding discussions about "internal taxes."
Carey says that, specifically, there is not a policy not to speak of taxes
with the Committees. Carey says the request was not to speak about
matters not personally known to a CIA officer or within the officer's
purview. The policy for CIA officers was, and is, to answer questions
within the officer's field of knowledge and to refer other budget-
related matters to the CFO. To avoid offices going to Congress to
(b)(1)b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
plead their own case, however, Carey says the Agency leadership
supported the position that the CFO was the one definitive source of
information to Congress on budget matters. The advice to Agency
components was if they are asked about the status of funds in their
Directorate, they should not provide an answer unless the
broad Directorate perspective, such as ADDO/RPP
alone would have in the DO.
47. (U/ /AIUO) says the practice of the CFO's
office is that if a Congressional staff member requests information on
budget issues, it is advisable to coordinate the response with the
CFO's Office. explains that the integrity of the budget
process is important, and the Agency must have a means of ensuring
the information it is providing to the Congressional overseers is
accurate, complete, and timely. The o ve of the CFO's Office is
to provide accurate information does not believe there is
confusion over this practice; it has no c anged, and the CFO and
Comptroller have always been the focal point for budget questions
from Congress. At the same time tates her office has never
decreed that a document cannot be provided to Congress when
requested, although the CFO's office enge the budget
numbers provided by a component. says she has instructed
components to be responsive to the fl1 an as requested that any
material provided to Congress also be provided to the CFO's office
with a copy for the record.
48. (U/ /ARJO) says CIA practice is to
coordinate issues of resources with the Comptroller's Office before an
officer or operating component goes to Congress, Office of
Management and Budget, or the Community Management Staff.
explains that there is no intent to get CIA officers to change
what they intend to say. Rather, it is the role of the Comptroller,
working with or through OCA, to explain how the entire budget is
affected by specific resource decisio t these decisions in
the context of the Agency as a whole. xplains the
(b)(3)
(b)(3
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3
(b)(7 (c)
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Comptroller's Office puts reprogramming decisions in context�not
just where the money is being taken from, but where it is going and
why.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
49. (U/ /AlUO) states that since the 16 March 2000
HPSCI hearing, Agency practice on discussing internal taxes with the
HPSCI and SSCI has changed. Individual offices may address
internal tax issues or resource issues with the committees, but the
Comptroller's Office reserves the right to disagree with budget
figures presented by individual offices. while not sure,
believes this arrangement was discussed between ExDir Carey and
the then-Staff Director of the HPSCI, John Millis.
50. (U/ /AlUO) who
served in that position fron says
the guidance to Agency employees on the subject of taxes has been
not to volunteer information, but to answer any Congressional
(b)(3) questions fully and accurately, who currently serves as
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
the Devutv Director of
recalls ADDS&T Runyan relaying a story
about either DCI Tenet or ExDir� Carey pounding the table in
February 2000 saying it is very important that Agency officers
support the corporate budget.6 says these kinds of
exhortations�support the President's budget while answering all
Congressional questions completely�are made all the time.
51. (U/ /AlUO) ays that prior to
16 March 2000, there was no specific guidance on handling questions
about internal taxes. There are, however, long-standing guidelines to
notify Con en specifically appropriated funds are
reallocated, says she has never heard any guidance that the
Agency sho not talk about internal taxes. She explains there was
frustration among senior Agency management in the first several
months of 2000 that some Agency officers were making unilateral
6 (U/AIU0) In reviewing a draft of this Report, Carey asserted that he is "not prone to the
pounding of desks."
(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
approaches to Congressional staff members and "whining" about cuts
to their budgets. ays senior Agency management felt many
Agency personnelnot understand the reasons for cuts in the
budget. does not remember anyone saying "tell your folks to
stop whining," but says it is plausible.
(b)(3
(b)(7)(c)
52. (U/ /AIUO) recalls a meeting of the senior Agency
managers�either at the DCI's morning staff meeting or an Executive
Board meeting�where the frustration level of the ExDir's office was
very high following discussions by DO officers in the field with
Congressional staff members. recalls DDO Pavia felt field (b)(3)
officers should be honest in their views. recalls Pavia was (b)(7)(c)
told that despite d et cuts, there were always sufficient funds for
good operations. o advised that budget concerns should be
raised with the Executive Director and the CFO, and not directly with
Congress. Only the CFO's Office can provide the appropriate
perspective. For example, according lic
c
tsd �17 many DO officers. (b)(3)
According tcn7 many DO officers � not realize the DO was (b)(7)(c)
taxing the DO divisions in addition to the corporate taxes levied by
the Agency at large. observed that DO officers were seen to
be pursuing their own agenda given their access to Congressional
that was ultimately expressed to :Itity Directors. (b)(3)
and staff delegations in the field. aid this led to frustration
(b)(7)(c)
53. (U/ /AIUO) In regard to the specific issue of whether CIA
considers the subject of internal taxes to be out of bounds for
discussion with Congressn�explains that the Agency does not,
as a rule, share with Congress internal Agency management
deliberations. While the broader question of whether there are
internal taxes in the Agency is not out of boundsn7states that
the specifics of what is discussed when programs are being
compared for reductions would not be discussed unless there is
specific Congressional interest.
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
54. (S) DDO Pavitt recalls ;tating that any
information given to the Hill needs to go through the CFO to ensure
consistency. Pavitt says he is familiar with this comment and has
heard it in other instances. Pavia also says he has heard the
sentiment expressed about not going to the Hill with budget
spreadsheets without first coordinating with the CFO, and the
statement that internal taxes are out of bounds for discussion with
Congress. Pavitt describes this as the conventional wisdom in the
Agency�from the
Comptroller, CFO, and
ExDir. Pavia explains that
FY2000 began with
in unfundnd
programs or (b)(1)
needs. It is now down
to about
The practice was (b(3l)
not to discuss internal taxes, until
the 16 March 2000
hearing. It (b)(3)
changed after the hearing.
� 55. (U//A1U0) Pavitt says he has been at odds with senior
Agency management at what he sees as the inability of the Agency to
tell Congress what it needs from a resource perspective. Pavitt says
his advice has been to be honest on budget requests. Pavia believes
internal taxing is not an effective way to meet resource needs. Pavia
says his views are well known, and he has spoken candidly to DCI
Tenet, former Deputy DO John Gordon, Deputy DCI for Community
Management nnd ExDir Carey. Pavia believes the
Agency should be honest with its resource needs. Pavia describes
himself as outspoken on this issue.
56. (U//A1U0) Pavitt says that in February 2000, when
concern was expressed about Agency officers speaking about
internal taxes with Congress, the DS&T was not the focus of the
concern. Rather, it was the DO. Pavia says he told senior Agency
management that he would not tolerate insubordination in his
officers, but if they were asked a question by a Congressman or staff
member during a Congressional delegation visit to the field, they
would answer the question. Pavia says he received criticism
directed at his Chiefs of Stations who spoke to Congressional
delegations about resource needs. Pavitt says, however, he could not
chastise them because he insists that they do the right thing.
(b)(1)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
57. (S) ADDO/RPP xplains that the DO's budget
shortfalls had become acute. There were insufficient funds to operate
specific programs. While the "top line" of the DO budget had
increased, the DO's operational budget was declining. says
when DDO Pavitt and he discussed this situation with DCI Tenet
and others, they did not report good news says that while
Carey probably was not happy the DO had raised i
difficulties, Carey never tried to tell either Pavitt or not to
speak to Congress.
58. (U/ /AlUO) DDS&T Isham says it is not right to say CIA
regards the subject of taxes as out of bounds for discussion with
Congressional staff. Isham believes an open dialogue is needed with
Congress. Individual officers, however, do not always know the
whole story at the Directorate level.
59. (U/ /AIUO) ADDS&T Runyan recalls guidance from
on 25 February 2000 that if Agency officers are talking to
Congressional staff members, they should coordinate with the
Comptroller and the CFO. Runyan believe tatement on
25 February was probably not the first time he had heard of the need
to coordinate budget information with the Comptroller and CFO.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
60. (U/ /AIUO) DS&T Chief of Staff explains (b)(3)
there has been a traditional problem when CIA program managers (b)(7)(c)
meet with Congressional staff members. In the course of
conversation, program managers have been known to complain
about the lack of funding for their program. says the issue of (b)(3)
how to respond to Congressional questions re arding internal taxes (b)(7)(c)
had been raised at DS&T staff meetings. advised DS&T (b)(3)
offiters to answer as honestly as possible relative to their individual
program and not to speculate. stimates that 98 percent of CIA (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c
officers who brief their programs to Congress do not know how their
budget numbers were derived. Most Agency officers are not
specifically knowledgeable about internal taxes.
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WHAT GUIDANCE WAS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY ON 25 FEBRUARY 2000 CONCERNING THE DISCUSSION OF
"INTERNAL TAXES" WITH CONGRESS?
61. (U/ /AIUO) DS&T Plans Chieil
issued guidance within the DS&T in a Lotus Notes e-mail message
of 25 February 2000 to 18 recipients, including the nine office-level
plans chiefs. The Lotus Notes message, classified "Secret," was
entitled "Cuationary Note: Discussion of Internal Taxes (sic)."8
a Senior Intelligence Service (SIS)-01 officer who was
serving as the Chief, Planning and Resources Group in the Office of
the DS&T at the time.
62. (U/ /AIUO) The Lotus Note (Exhibit B) was addressed to
the planning and resource chiefs in the nine offices of the DS&T.
Included as a "blind carbon copy" recipient of the Lotus Not& was
James Runyan, a Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service
(DISES)-5 officer serving as the ADDS&T.10 An info
addressee wa art 5I5-04 officer, who w
immediate supervisor and serves as Director, Business Strategies
and Resource Center and concurrently as Chief of Staff to the
DDS&T. Seven other members of the DS&T front office were also
information addressees.
7 (U) CIA uses Lotus Notes e-mail for classified and unclassified internal communications.
8 (U/ /AlUO) Exhibit B contains the full text of this Lotus Notes e-mail message.
9 (U/ /AlUO) As a "blind carbon copy (bcc)" recipient of a Lotus Note, Runyan's name does not
appear on a copy of the Lotus Note received or printed by the sender or the other recipients.
Runyan says he received a copy of the Lotus Note, and OIG obtained confirmation that Runyan
was a "bcc" recipient.
1� (1-V /AlUO) The DISES rank is a Department of Defense level that replaced the Senior
Cryptologic Executive (SCE) level previously used by the National Security Agency (NSA) and is
equivalent to the SIS and Senior Executive Service. Runyan was detailed to the CIA from NSA in
January 1997. He was appointed to his current position on 10 January 2000.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(b)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(b)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(b)
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63. (IV/MOO) First Discussion with Runyan. nThecalls
that sometime as early as the week of 14 to 18 February 2000 Runyan
returned from the daily 8:15 a.m. DCI Staff meeting and told her that
at that meeting, it had been reported that Congressional staff
members had been hearing "complaints" from DO Field Stations
about the impact of internal taxation on operational activities?'
There was concern expressed in the DCI's morning meeting about the
ramifications of such comments. F7,says Runyan made it clear
that he had no indication it was DS&T employees in the field who
had made such comments.
64. (U/ /ARJO) According t Runyan asked her to
caution DS&T staff about the need to refrain from comm
the issue of internal taxes to Congressional staff members.
says that she did not want to telephone the nine DS&T Plans Chiefs
with this message, because she feared there would be nine different
rversin7 of what she said. So, she decided to draft a Lotus Note.
oes not recall anyone else being present when Runyan
instructed her to convey tIc__�,;:�ncern over discussions of internal
taxes to DS&T officers 1 reviewed her notebook and advised
that she has no notes of this instruction.
65. (U/ /AIUO) states that she is not certain when she
was originally instructed by Runyan to provide this guidance to the
DS&T offices. She initially believed it was during the week of
21 February 2000. Upon further reflection, best recollection is
sometime during the previous workweek. She explained that prior
to 16 March 2000 when she learned that Congressman Goss read an
Agency Lotus Note that sounded like the one she had drafted, she
did not consider the guidance in her Lotus Note to be extraordinary.
She did not take notes on what occurred leading up to the issuance of
the Lotus Note and did not pay particular attention if it was DCI
Tenet or ExDir Carey who reportedly made the statements that were
11 (U//AIU0) The DO presides at a staff meeting usually each weekday at 8:15 a.m. with the
exception of Wednesdays. There is a staff meeting for an expanded staff on Wednesdays at 10:30
a.m.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c
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relayed to her by Runyan. recognizes that there are gaps in
her recollection of the events leading up to the issuance of the Lotus
Note. She explains that Runyan's instruction was an unremarkable
event initially. The guidance she received from Runyan was similar
to what she had heard previously, and for that reason, she
uncharacteristically did not rush to send the guidance to her
subordinate Plans Officers.
66. (U//AlUO) Second Discussion with Runyan. ays
Runyan returned from the 8:15 a.m. DCI Staff meeting possibly on
Wednesday, 23 February 2000. Runyan reportedly relayed the
continued concern over discussion of internal taxes by personnel in
the field. This time, there was fist-pounding on the table during the
discussion, according tO believes she heard it was
Carey who pounded his fist. At a subsequent meeting later that day,
Runyan repeated the message and told the DS&T Office Chiefs that
the seventh floor was emphatic on this subject. Runyan told the
Board of Directors that would be sending them guidance.
67. (U/ /AIUO) According t the week of
21 February 2000 was very busy for her because it was the budget
"roll-out" week, when the Ag7itiudget was presented to
Congressional oversight staff says she drafted the
25 February 2000 Lotus Note sometime on 23 or 24 February 2000
and provided it in draft to Runyan to approve. She does not
remember if she carried the draft to Runyan or sent it electronically.I2
She says Runyan was "very, very concerned" to get the tone of the
Lotus Note ri t so that DS&T people in the field would not feel
accused. sa she did not want the tone of the message to be
accusatory. asserts that Runyan reviewed her Lotus Note draft
and had no_comments or questions nor did he make any edits to the
document believes this occurred on the day of transmission
or the prior day. Runyan probably walked into her office and told
her that it was acceptable. After the 25 February 2000 Lotus Note
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
12 (1-WAIU0) No copy of a draft version Of the message frorrn to Runyan has been found. (b)(3)
(b)(7)(c
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was sent to the DS&T office-level Chiefs of Plans, received no
comments or questions until after the 16 March 2000 HPSCI hearing.
.xplains that the Plans Chiefs are accustomed to receiving
"strict 'dance" from her because of the nature of her position.
ays the Plans Chiefs may or may not have forwarded the
message to others, but she does not know.
68. (U/ /AlUO) asserts that the statement in the Lotus
Note on taxation reflecting poorly on Agency management was not
her language. says she does not talk like this. She says she
paraphrased it from what Runyan said. says she never
thought of this point before. She says she used the expression "7th
floor" in the message, rather than anyone's name, because she did not
want the tone of the message to be accusatory. says her
concern in drafting the message was to ensure there was not an
accusatory tone. Runyan gave the oecific guidance for the message
and approved the Lotus Not I states. says she did not
immediately draft the Lotus Note when Runyan first asked her to
pass the guidance because she needed to consider the tone of the note
to ensure that it would not accuse DS&T people.
69. (U/ /ARJO) xplains she italicized the phrase in the
Lotus Note "... that the CIA regards this subject matter as out of bounds
for discussion with staffers or our Committees" to emphasize direct
comments made in the DCI Staff meeting, according to what Runyan
told her says the succeeding line in the Lotus Note�"CIA
taxes are an internal issue, and one that often reflects (poorly) on
Agency performance in planning, managing, and executing our
programs"�also was a direct comment ItTlarIP in the Dr1 Staff
meeting, according to what Runyan tol0. states that she
was never instructed to fell DS&T employees to "close ranks," as was
reported by the employee who made the original allegation to the
OIG.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(1::)(5�)�
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
70. (U/ /AIUO) says that Runyan was just advisin
DS&T officers to be prudent in the Lotus Note's message. did
not intend to tell them to be less than forthcoming with Congress, nor
did Runyan intend this. asserts that she was simply
communicating Agency policy on this matter as conveyed by her
senior manager: questions of internal taxation were not to be
discussed with Congress.saw she never even thought of the
issue of dealing with Congress. says she was tired, and it was
late when she drafted the Lotus Note.13 She was embarrassed she
had not drafted the note before Runyan mentioned it a second time at
the DS&T Board of Directors meeting.n�Isays that although she
never considered the issue of dealing with Congress when she wrote
the 25 February Lotus Note, when she reread it on 16 March, she
could recognize how it was interpreted as an instruction to withhold
information from Congress.
71. (U/ /AIUO) Runyan says he customarily attends the
8:15 a.m. DCI Staff meetings on Thursdays and alternate Fridays in
place of Isham. By consulting his calendar, Runyan reported that
Isham attended the DCI morning meetings on 22 or 23 February, and
he attended the meetings on 24 and 25 Febniary.14 Runyan says there
was no discussion of the issue of CIA "internal taxes" at the 24 or
25 February 2000 DCI meetings. Runyan says furthermore that he
does not recall a discussion of "taxes" at any DCI meeting he has
attended.
72. (UHAIU0) Runyan reviewed his handwritten notes of the
25 Feb .15 a.m. staff meeting and says that at that
meeting aid if Agency officers are talking to
Congressiona s members, they should coordinate with the
Comptroller and the CFO. According to Runyan aid that
there were spreadsheets with budget details being shared with
13 (U/ /AIUO) The Lotus Note was transmitted on Friday, 25 February 2000 at 9:19 p.m.
14 (U/ /AIUO) According to the notes of the DC Staff meeting, Runyan attended the
Wednesday, 23 February meeting at 10:45 an., as well as the 8:15 a.m. meetings on 24 and
( 25 February.
(b)(3)
1(651(55(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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Congressional staff members. Runyan does not recall Carey making
any remarks, and he has nothing in his notes to indicate that Carey
said anything about internal taxes. According to Runyan, his notes
from the 25 February 2000 DCI Staff meeting state: "Mary:
Information to Committees/Staffers�Please coordinate with
CFO/Comptroller. Offices going down with spreadsheets. Bad
budgeting and execution is the cause."
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
73. (U/ /A.11.10) Runyan says he took notes at the DCI Staff
meeting as he saw fit, and Runyan believed wha cn17 was
asking was to coordinate with the Comptroller and 40 before going
to the Hill. l'Ilinv-2-�tates that this instruction was the basis for his
instruction t Runyan says he told to tell the office
Plans Chiefs to be sure the DS&T was not part of the problem.
74. (U/ /AIUO) Runyan does not recall hearing or being told
that Carey discussed the issue of internal taxes at the DCI morning
meetings during the week of 22 through 25 February 2000.15 Runyan
says if it was discussed, it was not important enough for him to make
a note. When Runyan was informed that the notetaker's notes
indicate that Carey spoke with the Deputy Directors about budget
cuts after the 25 February 2000 meeting, Runyan responded that he
does not recall attending a separate meeting on 25 February with the
ExDir.
75. (UHAIU0) When asked if Carey slammed his fist or used
profanity, Runyan responds that he has no recollection of Carey ever
pounding his fist. He also has no recollection of Carey displaying
anger or frustration. Runyan says he has no recollection of DCI
Tenet, Carey, or others pounding the table at a DCI morning staff
meeting in regard to this subject matter.
15 (U) Monday, 21 February 2000 was President's Day, a legal holiday.
� (b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
76. (U/ /AIUO) Runyan says when he returned from the
25 February 2000 DCI meeting, he called into his office and
indicated that there was a request to coordinate with the Comptroller
if Agency personnel were talking to Congressional staff members
about budget matters. Runyan says he toldn7he did not want
DS&T officers causing7 any problems. Runyan does not recall if
anyone besides as present at this meeting, and observes it
could have been a one-on-one meeting.
77. (U//A1U0) Runyan says he cannot explain why
Lotus Note of 25 February did not contain any reference to
statement at the 25 February DCI morning staff meeting about
coordinating with the CFO before going to the Hill. Run an does not
know why�if that
was not containe
he did not revie
t of his message t that it
tus Note of that day Runyan thinks
Lotus Note before it was issued and cannot
explain the omission. He says he sees many Lotus Notes.
78. (U/ /MVO) Runyan says that as of the guidance
from Corrado at the 8:15 a.m. staff meeting, afted the
25 February 2000 Lotus Note to the DS&T office-level Plans Officers.
There were also "carbon copy" addressees of this Lotus
Runyan says he did not intend, one way or another, for to put
his message into a Lotus Note or e it through phone calls. He
adds that he did not specify ho should promulgate the
guidance. Runyan expected tha esyage to the Plans Chiefs
of each DS&T office would be passed to the office directors. Runyan
says that as a [former] office director, he probably would have
passed the instruction "If we are headed to the Hill, let's coordinate
with the Comptroller" to his eroun chiefs. Runyan states that he did
not have the impression tha truction was aimed at
personnel in the field, and he thd not see it that way either, so the
message probably would not have been conveyed to the field.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(6)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
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79. (U/ /AIUO) Runyan avers that he rea
25 February 2000 Lotus Note, but he does not remember if he read it
prior to its issuance or afterwards. Runyan says, in any case, he read
it within 24 hours because he tries to keep current with his Lotus
Notes e-mails. Runyan say Lotus Note did not raise any
particular "flags" with him. Runyan observes that an
SIS-rank officer, and overall, he sees very few Lotus Notes from
prior to her formal dissemination.
80. (U/ /AIUO) Runyan states that he read the Lotus Note
either before or very shortly after it was sent. Asked to estimate the
likelihood that he sa Lotus Note prior to its issuance,
Runyan says he cannot make an estimation. Runyan added that if
ays she showed the Lotus Note to him before she sent it,
as a better memory than he does. Runyan does not recall
orwarding the Lotus Note to Isham prior to 16 March and does not
know if Isham saw the Lotus Note prior to 16 March 2000.16
81. (U/ /AIUO) Runyan recalls mentioning the request to
coordinate with the Comptroller at the DS&T Board of Directors
meeting the following Monday, 28 February 2000.17 According to
Runyan, he told the Board�composed of the DS&T Chiefs�
that there was "7th floor" guidance to coordinate an ould be
sending out guidance. Runyan says it was "not a big deal.'
82. (U//AIUO) Runyan says that on 16 March 2000, following
the HPSCI bu � g that Isham attended, Isham came into his
office and tol d him about the controversy that erupted at
the hearing regarding the alleged Agency guidance on internal taxes.
Runyan volunteered to Isham that "we" sent a note out and located it
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
,,,,,,(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
16 (U//AIU0) No information has been found to indicate that Isham or anyone more senior than
Runyan received the Lotus Note prior to 16 March 2000.
17 (U/ /AIUO) According to the notes taken by the 0Th officer who was representing the
Director, GIS at this meeting,. the meeting occurred on Wednesday. 1 March 2000. The only
relevant portion was attributed to DS&T Chief of Staff The notes read as follows: (b)(3)
"Be sure to coordinate requests from staff, OMB, etc (example HIPSCI (sic) briefing.)." (b)(7)(c)
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in his Lotus N box."18 This was the 25 February 2000 Lotus
Note sent by called "Cuationary Note (sic)." According to
Runyan, there was nothing remarkable about the 25 February 2000
Lotus Note that prompted hint to keep it in his Lotus Notes queue.
He only periodically clears his incoming Lotus Notes queue.
83. (URAIU0) With respect to whether the 25 February 2
Lotus Note was consistent with the guidance he provided
Runyan says that he thinks his guidance was much more general
Commenting on the 25 February 2000 Lotus Note:
� Runyan says he does not recall that the sentence that "CIA
taxes are an internal issue. .." was ever said at a DCI
morning staff meeting or any other meeting he attended. He
does not believe he said this ton7
� In regard to the statement that CIA taxes are an internal
issue that "reflects (poorly) on Agency performance in
planning, managing, and executing our programs," Runyan
says that this does not sound like a sentence he would say.
� However, Runyan adds it is hard not to philosophically
agree with the statement.
� With regard to the statement that "CIA regards this subject
as out of bounds for discussion with staffers or our
Committees." Runyan says he does not think that he
specifically said this. His guidance was more general.
84. (UHAIU0) Runyan explains the purpose of the Lotus
Note was to say that if someone was going to discuss budget issues
with Congress, they needed to be in synch with the overall Agency
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
18 (u/ /Aim tes Runyan's recollection that he volunteered that "we" sent out the (131(31
Lotus Note. Insteaintends that she volunteered this information to Isham without (b)(3)(c)
hesitation because s following Runyan's instructions when she prepared the (b)(7)(c)
guidance.
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program. He did not read the Lotus Note as suggesting that
employees withhold information or be less than candid with
Congress.
85. (U/ /AIUO) Runyan states he did not take note of the
Lotus Note "one way or another" after reading it He wanted to
ensure that DS&T personnel were not part of the Comptroller's
problem even though no one at the DCI staff meeting suggested that
the DS&T was the problem. Runyan says the Lotus Note was
probably not written in the way he would have worded it. Runyan
states he did not dictate the note to nor did he amend or
contravene it after he read it.
86. (U//A1U0) Asked whyrwould have garbled his
message in the 25 February 2000 Lotus Note, Runyan says this
question assume garbled it. Runyan says the thrust of his
message to her is in her Lotus Note. Runyan does not read the Lotus
Note as a call to "stonewall Congress.
87. (U/ /AIUO) Isham says she had an appointment outside
the building on the morning of 25 February 2000 and arrived late in
her office that day. Isham does not recall meeting with the DCI or
ExDir on 25 February in regard to any issue concerning budget cuts.
She does not recall being informed of any guidance concerning
budget matters resulting from the 8:15 a.m. DCI Staff meeting that
day.
88. (U///1U0) Isham says she first learned 4-7
25 February 2000 Lotus Note in the evening of 16 March 2000
following a hearing at the HPSCI on the CIA budget program. Isham
attended that hearing, where Goss raised the issue of Agency
guidance on discussion of taxes with Congress.
89. (UHAIU0) Upon returning from the hearing, Isham met
in Runyan's office with Runyan and others, includin who
wanted feedback from the hearing. Isham reported the "rather
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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excoriating language" used in Goss' opening comments.
observed that Goss' comments might refer to a Lotus Note she had
sent. Runyan provided Isham with a copy of the 25 February 2000
Lotus Note. Isham said it was the first time she had seen it Isham
says she and Runyan informed the DC the evening of 16 March of
this situation. Carey was not in his office, and he was informed the
next day of the DS&T Lotus Note.
90. (U//AILTO) Isham understands that Lotus Note
was written after Runyan attended an 8:15 a.m. DCI Staff meeting.
The meeting included a discussion of activities in relation to the Hill,
and the attendees were instructed to talk to their staffs about
working with the Hill, particularly in the area of not competing one
program against another program.
91. (U/ /AlUO) Isham does not know if Runyan reviewed
Lotus Note before it was issued on 25 February 2000, but she
doubts it was brought to him in advance because that is uncommon.
According to Isham, Carey was not aware that Runyan had seen the
25 February 2000 Lotus Note until she and Runyan informed him on
17 March 2000.
92. (U//AlUO) 'sham observes that the language used in the
Lotus Note does not appear to be Runyan's words, as it is not
consistent with Runyan's personality to talk like this. Isham says
there is no way that he would give direction not to cooperate with
the Hill. Isham views the language as "sharp" and notes thatn7is
a very skillful writer who may have "sharpened" what Runyan said.
93. (U//AlUO) Isham states that it is not reasonable to expect
that the Lotus Notes of a senior Agen officer are reviewed before
they are sent. Isham points out that is a senior officer. Isham
says the DS&T acknowledge otus Note immediately after
the 16 March hearing. Isham is not even stir note was the
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
((b)(3)c)
(b)(7)(c
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one that Goss referenced. Isham states tha is well aware that
she would not write the 25 February 2000 Lotus Note the same way if
she had to do it again.
94. (U/ /AIUO) the DS&T Chief of Staff and
Director of the Business Strategies and Reso er, who was
kiirect supervisor at the time, describe as a brilliant,
independent and conscientious officer who is intense about her job
and usually exhibits good judgment.
95. (U//AIU0)-7explains that he did not see
Lotus Note before she transmitted it. recalls thatn7sent the
Lotus Note in the evening, and he saw it the following work day.
explains that it was addressed to the Plans Chiefs in the DS&T
and therefore he did not read the Lotus Note closely, recalls
that he deleted it from his computer e-mail queue after he received it.
says he should have focused on it at the time he received it. He
believes the Lotus Note was not intended to be read as to appear so
harsh in tone and no one envisioned that it was going beyond the
DS&T plans staff. explains that it is not unusual forn7to
generate eight to ten Lotus Notes a day, and he does not always read
them thoroughly. He adds that he is aware that neither Isham nor
Runyan read the volume of Lotus Notes they rec
does not know if Isham originally received Lotus Note.
96. ((J//AIU0)
knowledge on the genesis of
from Runyan an that
states that he did not have firsthand
Lotus Note. He understands
believes she was following
instructions from Runyan to put out the Lotus Note to the Plans
Chiefs. does not believe that received the actual
language used in the Lotus Note from Runyan and states that he
does not know if Runyan reviewed the Lotus Note befor
transmitted it. attributes the inexact message written b
as the effort of someone who was working long hours and prepared
the Lotus Note late in the evening. If the message came from
Runyan, elieves that the words would have come out more
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(p)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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"benignly.' says that the language in the Lotus Note did not
sound like something that would have come from Runyan, and it
was not DS&T policy. does not recall if this subject was raised
at the weekly DS&T staff meetings that were held on Wednesdays.
His calendar reflected that there was a DS&T staff meeting on
Wednesday 23 February 2000 from 1:30 p.m. to 4 p.m.
97. (U/ /AIUO) say told him that Runyan
discussed the matter in a morning meeting after Runyan attended a
DCI Staff meeting. remembers a concern being discussed
about moving money to pay for infrastructure, but he cannot connect
that discussi � time period, recalls speaking with
Runyan aft Lotus Note was quoted during a hearing with
the HFSCI on 16 March 2000. says Runyan told him the DCI
Staff meeting included some discussion of concerns expressed by
Tom Newcomb, a HPSCI staff member, about "moving money."
does not recall if Runyan stated that Carey pounded on the
table when discussing the subject. n7assesses there was a "50/50
chance" that Runyan said it. However, he defers to the recollections
o and Runyan.
98. (U//A1U0) states that he read Lotus Note in
a different fashion than Congress may have interpreted it. When he
reread it after a similar message was cited by Congressman Goss, he
understood why Congress was disturbed.19 He explains that if he
read it as an outsider, he would have been left with the impression
that CIA had instructed its officers not to discuss the financial health
of their programs with Congress.
99. (U/ /AIUO) believes that the intended message of
1Lotus Note was not to go to Congress without alerting senior
management and to avoid hurting the Agency in exchanges with
Congress interprets the message as an instruction to not take
special pleadings or complaints to Congress; to exercise discretion in
19 (1-WAIU0) tates that he has spent 11 years of his CIA career in budget-related
positions and is familiar with working with Congress in developing the Agency's budget.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
1(651(55(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(12)(1)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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"washing private laundry;" to recognize that there is give and take
with the funds the Agency receives; and not to lie or dissemble to
Congress.
100. (U/ /AIUO) Asked about the phrase in the Lotus Note,
"we need to be sure that no DS&T folks raise the issues [of internal
taxes] directly with staffers, even if prodded at briefings or during
staff tours/visits,
guidance. He t believe
that this is wi_rot g: and unfortunate
anyone gay O that guidance, and
it was a case o eing dramatic and "embroidering with her
prose?
101. (C) served as Runyan's Executive
Assistant from February to late April 2000.20 He was present with
and Runyan on 16 March 2000 when Isham returned from the
earinrnd recounted Goss' ire over an Agency document At that
point asked if the document could have been the Lotus Note
she prepared. recalls Runyan explained to Isham that
was referring to a Lotus Note he asked her to transmit. Runyan then
went to his cmstiniter and retrieved and printed a copy of the Lotus
Note sent b on 25 February 2000. Upon examining the Lotus
Note, Isham indicated that it may be the document Goss was
referencing.
102. (C) recalls that Isham's reaction to the Lotus Note
indicated that she had not previously seen it. is certain he
did not see the Lotus Note before it was sent. He explains that he
was out of the office when it was prepared. If he had been at work, it
is likely krould have ziven the draft of the Lotus Note to him
before it went to Runyan. _______understands froin that she
showed the Lotus Note to Runyan who approved it before she sent it
out:
(b)(3)
1(651(55(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
nDi(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
20 (c) served as the Executive Assistant to former DDSILT Gary Smith from (b)(3)
approximately June 1999 until January 2000 when Smith left the Agency. (b)(7)(c)
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103. (C) recalls that during a DS&T staff meeting in
February 2000�he not remember the specific date�Runyan
told o send a Lo
tell DS&T staff employees not to
"whine about taxation." recalls Runyan saying that the
ExDir was tired of hearing about whining. If a Congressional staff
delegation spoke with Agency personnel, they were instructed to say
they were only program managers and the Congressional s
should talk with the Comptroller regarding taxation issues
office chiefs. ecalls at least two prior occasions where either
states that R ed this guidance at a general DS&T session to
Isham or Runyan told DS&T office directors that the ExDir was tired
of discussions "outside the building" regarding taxes. also
remembers Runyan telling DS&T office directors twice or Carey
"pounding on the desk" about taxes when ot
discussing internal taxes outside this building. as present
at these meetings As was customary at that time, no minutes of the
staff meetings were made.
104. (U//A1U0) Served in the DS&T from
1996 until April 2000, with his last position as Director of the
Administrative Resources Center (ARC).21 emembers a
particular occasion when Runyan spoke at the Wednesday, 1:30 p.m.
DS&T staff meeting that he attended.22 could not remember
�the exact date of it, but it was shortly after Runyan was appointed
ADDS&T.23 recalls that Isham was on leave that week24 and
Foggo thought this was the first or second occasion where Runyan
represented the Directorate in the DCI Staff meeting. recalls
that Runyan came to the meeting "atitter" as a result of what he heard
at the DCI Staff meeting. Runyan spoke about Carey's annoyance
with CIA personnel "tattling to Congress."
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
21 (U//AIU0) As Director of the ARC, vas one of the nine office directors in the DUET. (b)(3)
22 (U//AIU0) According t the most likely dates for this to have occurred were 9 or (b)(3)(c)
16 February or 1 March 2000. hvas away from Headquarters on 23 February 2000. (b)(7)(c)
23 (U//AIU0) Runyan became the ADDS&T on 10 January 2000. (b)(7)(c)
24 (U/ /AIU0) According to Isham, she was away from the office the week of 14-19 February
2000.
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105. (U/ /AKIO) says he cannot remember if Runyan's
presentation at the DS&T staff meeting was during the "open session"
or the "sensitive session" which occurs with fewer DS&T senior
representatives. emembers Runyan saying that the ExDir
was angry that there had been "whining" and "leaks" to Congress.
Agency program managers were running to Congress. Carey
wanted the components to tell their people to stay "within guidance."
That is, after the IDCI had made the decision regarding allocation of
funds and the levying of "internal taxes," Agency personnel were to
be loyal and support the decision. According to Runyan
explained that Carey stated that the taxes were necessary and it was
an executive decision in a brutal process. stated that he has
destroyed his notes of that meeting.
106. (U/ /AIUO) tates that none of what he heard
Runyan say that day was new to him. He had heard for years while
working at Headquarters that internal taxes are an internal matter
and should not be talked about with Congress. specifically
remembers Runyan saying that Carey pounded the table and Runyan
(b)(3) mimicked that motion in his staff meeting.
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
107. (U/ /AIU0) Deputy Director of
recalls attending a weekly DS&T staff meeting she believes was on
23 February 2000 chaired by Runyan. At the meeting, Runyan
relayed a story about either DCI Tenet or Carey pounding the table
saying that it is very important Agency officers support the corporate
budget. pecifically recalls Runyan pounded the table to
indicate that Carey or Tenet forcefully conveyed this message.
says that these kinds of exhortations are made all the
time�support the President's budget while answering all
Congressional questions completely. This is not a novel message,
and was not a "big deal" at the time.
� (b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c
??A03))
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108. (IV /AIUO) OIG reviewed notes taken by a
representative from the DS&T/OTS during the 23 February 2000
DS&T staff meeting. There was no reference to any discussion of the
need to support the corporate budget or anything similar to the
message in the 25 February 2000 Lotus Note.
109. (U/ /AIUO) OIG also reviewed notes taken during the
Friday, 25 February 2000 DCI 8:15 a.m. staff meeting. These notes
contained the following entries:
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
Receiving Hill questions re: budget any info given
to Hill needs to go thru CFO to be consistent (plus up, taxes) no
direct info-
Dave [Carey] Some offices going down with spreadsheets
DCI [Tenet] very angry offices had to take cuts across the board
going down to Hill complaining [Entry in the marginz].
(b)(3)
110. (U/ /AIUO) the notetaker interpreted (b)(7)(c)
her notes as follows. The term "taxes" meant cuts. as
saying that she was receiving calls from Congress on budget figures
different from the approved figures and that the source of the
inaccurate figures was Agency officers in various meetings with (b)(3)
Congress. Carey affirm statements t some (b)(7)(c)
offices were going downtown with spreadsheets ays that
DCI Tenet appeared incredulous and commente e co � not
believe�implying that after all the meetings with offices on budget
and budget cuts shared across the board�CIA officers were acting in
that manner "behind our backs" when there was an agreement on the
budget allocation figures that each component is to receive.
(b)(3) 25 (U/ /AIM) The notetake explains that if the DCI responds to something
(b)(7)(c) said by a principal at the mee iry Dim MAUD 's comment to the left margin next to the
speaker's name.
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
111. (U/ /AIUO) notes taken during the Monday,
28 February 2000 DCI 8:15 a.m. staff meeting contain the following
entries:
budget roll-out staffers (Fri) Newcomb
reangriment or ds, have to go down follow-up. May lead to
new restrictions.
Dave [Carey] talked to ODs [Deputy Directors] about it (budget
cuts) [Entry in the margin]
112. (U/ /AIUO) stateEn7was apparently
reporting the events on the preceding work day, 25 February, when
HPSCI staff member Tom Newcomb expressed concern about CIA
reprogramming funds. According t terpretation of her
notes in the margin zomment led Carey to say that he had
spoken to the Deputy Directors about budget cuts, seemingly in
reference to the comments made by the DO on 25 February 2000
(above).26
113. (U/ /AIUO) states that she has never heard any
guidance provided at the DCI Staff meetings that could be
at internal taxes should not be discussed with
ays that the guidance regarding taxes came
d it was that she t CIA employees
taking erroneous numbers to Congress. has never heard
anything to suggest that an Agency emp oyee s ould not raise the
issues with Congressional staffers "even if prodded." It was
pression that the guidance was not to avoid going to
ongress, but rather to first check with the CFO.
interpreted
Congress.r
only from
26 (U/ /A1U0) According to Carey would have had to hold this discussion with the
Deputy Directors between the conclusion of Friday's 8:15 a.m. meeting and the beginning of
Monday's meeting.
(b)(3) 27 (U/ /A1U0Os served as the Chief of the since August
(b)(7)(c) 1999, and she primary notetalcer for these meetings throughout this period.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
114. (U//AIUO) could not
locate any notes from the
e UC1 Staff meetings for the period of
22 through 28 February 2000. does not remember either DCI
Tenet or Carey expressing anger or frustration at the morning staff
meeting. She does not remember Tenet or Carey pounding on a
table. remembers Tenet urging proper coordination with
the CFO and OCA. That is, resource information given to Congress
should be vetted with the CFO's office. ecalls that some
documents went to Congress before they were reviewed for accuracy
rkrythF0 recalls Carey saying "in stronger terms" that
was being too polite when she requested the information
i ,
om component and urging that the matters should be properly
coordinated with the CFO.
� 115. (UHAILJO) Carey recalls being approached by Isham on
17 March 2000, the day after they attended the HPSCI budget
hearing. Isham informed Carey that she had identified the
memorandum referenced by Goss as being a Lotus Note emanating
from DS&T. Carey understands that upon Isham's return to the
office following the hearing, Isham described the Lotus Note to
members of her staff. Based on Isham's description,
produced the Lotus Note which had been created b Carey
requested a copy of the Lotus Note from Runyan, and Runyan
forwarded a copy electronically on 17 March.28 In forwarding the
Lotus Note to Carey, with a copy to Isham, Runyan included the
following note:
Dave, here is the note we sent out that was most likely the note
mentioned to you in your hearing yesterday. As I said, the intent
was to ensure that our folks in the DS&T were not compounding an
issue by discussing "taxes" with visitors to sites etc (sic). I had
asked that something be said to our office plans chiefs to remind
them of their responsibility. The note was sent from our S&T plans
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
28 (II/ /AlUO) OIG obtained a copy of this e-mail message in tliircip se of this investigation. It
contained the 'To" and "cc" (carbon copy) addressees, includini but did not include (b)(3)
Runyan, who received a 'bcc" (blind carbon copy). (MG has not been able to determine how the (b)(7)(c)
Mee: James L. Runyan" was removed from this e-mail message.
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chief to the office plan chiefs (sic) and was not for broad
distribution, but I have no idea if it was forwarded broadly out of
the offices. Jim.29
116. (U/ /AIUO) Carey states that Isham told him on the day
after the HPSCI hearing that Runyan told her of the Lotus Note.
Carey emphasizes that Isham did not tell him that Runyan had seen
the Lotus Note prior to the HPSCI hearing or that Runyan had
commissioned it Carey states that he did not know that Runyan had
seen the Lotus Note contemporaneous with its creation until his clic
interview on 11 July 2000.
117. (U//AlUO) Runyan states that he is not certain about
what specifically prompted him to forwarc Lotus Note to
Carey on Friday, 17 March 2000. Runyan explains that, on the
evening of 16 March, 'sham acknowledged that the DS&T was
probably the source of the message quoted by HPSCI Chairman
Porter Goss at the HPSCI hearing. Runyan explains that it "just made
sense" for him to send the Lotus Note to Carey. Based on a review of
DS&T office records, Runyan is reminded that Isham was out of the
building the morning of 17 March, and the customary 8:15 am. DCI
staff meeting was canceled that day. Runyan is further reminded by
the office records that he had a breakfast meeting in Headquarters
with four officials, including ExDir Carey, at 8:00 on 17 March. Upon
reflection and recognition of the significance of the words from his
Lotus Note to Carey, "As I said," Runyan reasoned that there may
have been a personal conversation or phone call between Carey and
him prior to Runyan's transmission of the Lotus Note to Carey.
Runyan says he may have told Carey that he would send the Lotus
Note to him.
118. (II/ /AlUO)Runyan states he is readily aware he was an
original recipient o Lotus Note. However, prior to the
involvement of the Inspector General in this matter, he had not
focused on the fact that he was a blind carbon copy (bcc) recipient of
29 (U//A1U0) The date of the Lotus Note was 17 March 2000 at 11:09 a.m.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c
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the note. Runyan says he does not know why the James L.
Runyan" line did not appear on the copy of Lotus Note that
he forwarded to Carey on 17 March 2000. Runyan says he thinks he
would recall if he removed that line before he forwardec note
to Carey. He recognizes that it would take a conscious effort to edit
out or remove that line, and Runyan says that would cause him to
remember it if he had taken such a step. Runyan explains that his
sole goal was to get the Lotus Note into Carey's hands. Runyan adds
that he had no reason to remove the line listing him as an addressee.
He does not think he needed to remove his name from the
distribution ofn7 Lotus Note. In sum, Runyan stated that "there
is zero chance" that he removed that line. Runyan is emphatic that he
did not remove the "bcc" line.
� 119. (U/ /AIUO) Runyan states that he does not know
specifically how and when Carey came to learn that Runyan had
been an original addressee of the 25 February 2000 Lotus Note of
120. (C) Upon a review of the 25 February Lotus Note, Carey
says he considered its content as "outrageous." Carey spoke with
Isham and Runyan about how it was created. According to Carey's
understanding, the note was inspired by one or more of the 8:15
morning staff meetings. It stemmed from the fad that Congressional
and staff delegations had traveled to Field Stations
Carey explains that the Stations had received
instructions to which the CFO was not privy, and Station officers
commented regarding their Station's budgets to the visiting
Congressional delegations. A "disconnect" arose, according to Carey,
from the fact that the budget data cited by the Stations was not
reflected in the figures available to the rest of Agency managers via
the CFO, and from the fact that Station personnel opined on the
causes of their financial troubles. Runyan carried the message back
to his Directorate from the staff meetings that officers should not
extrapolate on what they do not know. Only the Comptroller has
authority to speak on a broad scale.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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121. (U//AlUO) Carey explains that the discussions at the
8:15 a.m. DCI staff meetings and elsewhere focused on the need for
employees to avoid generalizations and speculation regarding taxes
or other budget matters beyond their personal knowledge.
According to Carey, questions pertaining to a Station budget, for
example, should be answered directly by the COS, but questions
asked of that same COS regarding DO or CIA budget issues should
be referred to the CFO. The issue was not how much information on
taxes should, or should not, be shared with Congress, but rather that
individual employees should not attempt to answer questions
beyond their direct knowledge.
122. (U//AlUO) Carey believes that the Lotus Note was
Mterpretation of what she heard from Isham or Runyan.
Carey says that "apparentlY embellished what
Runyan told her." Carey states that Runyan told him than7"felt
badly about what had happened." Carey was unequivocal that he
did not want any follow-up actions regarding the Lotus Note which
may appear to be retribution for creating the Lotus Note or to the
person who passed it to John Millis, the then-HPSCI Staff Director.
123. AlUO) Carey believes the addressees to the Lotus
Note wer ubordinate Plans Officers in the DS&T divisions.
He did not ask who was the highest level official who received the
Lotus Note. Carey says he did not know prior to OTC's interview
with him that Runyan was on distribution of the Lotus Note.w
124. (U/ /AlUO) After reviewing the notes of the 8:15 a.m.
DCI Staff meetings for 25 and 28 February 2000, including the entry
'Dave [Carey] - some offices going down wispreadsheets," Carey
recalls the issue at the 25 February meeting to be related more to CIA
officers talking with staff delegations in the field than going up to
3� (U/ /AIU0) As reported previously, the distribution line "bee: James L Runyan" did not
appear on the 25 February 2000 Lotus Note that Runyan forwarded to Carey. The interview with
Carey was conducted on 11 July 2000.
(b)(3)
0A7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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Capitol Hill. With respect to the marginal note in the handwritten
minutes "DCI very angry offices had to take cuts across the board
going down to Hill complaining," Carey responds that the notation
that DCI Tenet was very angry is misleading. Carey observes that
the DCI "being exerdsed is normal operating procedure."
125. (U/ /AlUO) Carey explains that he had not remembered
the issue in the context described in the notes of the meeting. He
says that there had been a number of conversations since February
with SSCI and the HPSCI regarding DO Stations talking about the
reduction of operations funds. Carey explains that there was a
"disconnect" because the budgetary figures in the hands of Congress
did not correlate with the information maintained at Headquarters.
To avoid offices going to Congress to plead their own case, the
Agency leadership supported the position that the CFO was the one
definitive source of information on budget matters.
126. (UHAIU0) Carey reviewed the notes from the
28 February 2000 DCI morning staff meeting which contained the
marginal note, "Dave talked to DDs [Deputy Directors] about it
[budget cuts]." Carey believes that he met with Deputy Directors on
25 February 2000, probably after the 8:15 a.m. staff meeting and prior
to the budget roll-out briefings that began mid-morning. His
calendar for that date does not reflect any scheduled meeting with
the Deputy Directors. Carey does not remember what guidance he
provided to the Deputy Directors at this meeting nor who
represented the DS&T during the meetinot
31 (1J/ /A1U0) According to the notes of the 8:15 a.m. meeting which apparently immediately
preceded this meeting, the 1DS&T was represented by Runyan. Runyan recalls he attended the
8:15 a.m. meeting.
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DID THE 25 FEBRUARY 2000 GUIDANCE CONFLICT WITH CIA's
OBLIGATIONS AND POLICY IN DEALING WITH CONGRESS?
127. (U//A1U0) Senior Agency officers agree that Agency
practice at the time the 25 February Lotus Note was issued called for
individual officers to coordinate or to refer Congressional questions
concerning budget matters, induding internal taxes, to the CFO or
Comptroller before responding. As discussed,32 they explain the
intent of this policy was to provide accurate information to Congress
and to explain resource decisions in the context of the Agency as a
whole. These officers state that this practice was not meant to
withhold information from Congress, but rather it limited who was
permitted to answer a Congressional query. According to Executive
Director Carey, in the DO, only the ADDO/RPP had a sufficiently
broad perspective to answer tax and resource questions. This
practice did not mean that a Congressional query would go
unanswered. As explained by one senior officer, it is a prerogative of
the Executive Branch to make such designations.33
128. (U/ /AIUO) ExDir Carey says the statements in the
25 February Lotus Note that CIA taxes are an internal issue and the
subject of taxes is out of bounds for discussion with Congressional
staff are absolutely not accurate. Carey says he has never heard nor
provided any guidance to this effect. Carey describes as "nonsense"
the statement in the note that taxes often reflect poorly on Agency
performance in planning, managing, and executing programs. Carey
32 (U) See the section entitled "Senior Officers' Views on Agency Practice Concerning 'Taxes,'"
paragraphs 46-60.
33 (I.WAIU0) By statute, CIA is required to provide "full and complete information" to
Congress." Agency regulations further provide that no Agency employee will respond to a
request for information, including requests from Congressional committees, until authorized to
do so by the General Counsel. 32 C.F.R. Section 1905 provides the same guidance, and authorizes
CIA officials to delegate their authority to subordinate officials. The assignment of the CFO as the
"principal interface" with Congress on budget matters appears to be such a delegation. This
subject is discussed in greater detail in the section of this Report entitled 'What are CIA's
responsibilities in dealing with Congress?: paragraphs 23-28.
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
further states that he has neither heard nor provided guidance that
CIA personnel should not discuss the issue of taxes with
Congressional staff members even if prodded.
129. (U//AIU0) DDS&T Isham says it is not correct to say
that CIA regards the subject of internal taxes as out of bounds for
discussion with Congressional staff. Isham says taxes are not an
internal matter and an open dialogue is needed with Congress.
Individual officers, however, do not always know the whole story at
the Directorate level. Isham further disagrees with the statement that
internal taxes often reflect poorly on Agency performance in
planning, managing, and executing programs. Finally, 'sham says
the statement that Agency personnel should not discuss taxes with
staff members, even if prodded, is absolutely untrue.
130. (U/ /AIU0) 1escribes 5 February
2000 Lotus Note as a poor choice of words. ays the subject
of taxes is not out of bounds for discussion wi ongress.
explains, however, that the Agency has a responsibility to assure the
integrity and accuracy of the information that is passed to Congress.
Regarding the Lotus Note's statement that CIA taxes are an internal
issue notes the DCI has the authority to reprogram funds
within guidelines, and reprogramming notifications are done within
the required thresholds. ays that, nonetheless, whenever
questioned about a reprogramming by Congress, the Agency
provides the information.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
131. (U/ /AIUO) Regarding the point in the 25 February Lotus
Note that internal taxes often reflect poorly on A
enc erformance
(b)(3)
in planning, managing, and executing programs
sa s this is
(b)(7)(c)
poorly written but reflects the state of the Agency.
xplains
that if a program has been proposed without funds
for operations
("3)
and maintenance, it is an example of poor planning. Concerning the (b)(7)(c)
point in the Lotus Note that corporate taxes erode program dollars
and top line gains and Agency perso
ould not raise the issue
(b)(3)
with Congress "even if prodded,'
ys she does not believe
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
wha eant not to talk to Con ss. However, is not sure
specifically meant. Homments that while the
Lotus Note reflected poor terminology, overall its content was
acceptable guidance except for the statements about taxes being "out
of bounds" for discussions and the instruction not to discuss taxes
"even if prodded." According t the Agency has never had
a policy of not talking to Congress. Rather, the policy is that there
should be coordin�OonmAith the Comptroller or CFO first on
resources matters. opined that the impact of the language in
the Lotus Note is still a factor in CIA's relationship with Congress.
She expects CIA to be under a spotlight for a year or so to come until
CIA can regain the confidence of the oversight committees.
132. (U/ /AIUO) says she regards the
statement ill Lotus Note that CIA taxes often reflect poorly on
Agency performance in planning, managing, and execution
programs as a true statement since the Agency has done a poor lob in
"dosing bills." also says the second paragraph of
25 February Lotus Note generally is an accurate reflection of the
views of the CFO's office (This paragraph, as shown in Exhibit B,
says the Agency does not consider internal taxes a matter to which
the Agency would wish to draw Congressional attention and says
the subject is out of bounds for discussion with the oversight
committees or staff members.) 77states that 25 February
Lotus Note was not "unusual," but the language was inappropriate.
says the question of whether there are internal taxes is not a
subject that is out of bounds for discussion with Congress. However,
internal management discussions about taxes generally are
considered out of bounds for discussion with Congress. Once
decisions about taxes are made, however, the information is shared
with Congress, as appropriate and consistent with reprogramming
guidelines.
133. (II/ /AIU0 says the 25 February
2000 Lotus Note is understandable to him, but he wishes the author,
had said it differently. According t the
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(b)(3(b)(3)
(b)(7(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
phrase "out of bounds for discussion" could have been better
explained as being more appropriate for the Comptroller's Office or
senior resource managers to discuss. Individual officers or program
managers do not know the context regarding taxes and are not the
=rsons to answer such questions, according to
does not read the Lotus Note as an instruction to
"stonewall" Congress.
134.(U/!AIUO)
describe 25 February 2000 Lotus Note as "unfo
phrased" and open to being read in different ways. As
says she was not aware of similar time guidance being
issued during her tenure as Says it is not
true that CIA taxes are an internal issue, and she describes as "very
unfortunate" the statement that internal taxes are out of bounds for
discussion with Congress. In regard to taxes reflecting poorly on
Agency performance, ays that the level and timing of
Agency operating adjustments reflect poorly on IA's ability to
properly budget for activities. However, tates that all
government agencies function under operating year adjustments
because a budget formulation made 18 months earlier cannot
accurately predict all spending requirements:
135. (U/ /AIUO) ADDO for Resources, Plans and Policy
says that at no time was he ever tol wer a question
asked by Congress. However, sa tus Note was
not far off the mark. statement that taxes are an internal
Agency matter, and the Hill should not be involved, was part of the
attitude of the Agency. believes, however, that_______
instruction not to discuss taxes "even if prodded" was a poor choice
of words.
136. U/ /AIU0) supervisor says the
guidance ir otus Note not to discuss the issue of internal
taxes directly with Congressional staff members "even if prodded" is
wrong and unfortunate guidance. Regarding the statement that CIA
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(13)(41-.\(3)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3)3)
(b)(3)(c)
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regards internal taxes as "out of bounds" for discussion with the
oversight committees or staff, says he believes this means there
should not be any special pleadings to Congress by Agency
personnel. says he interpreted the instruction as meaning that
an Agency officer should talk only about his or her program, and not
the programs of others.
Dm SUPERVISORS RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBLE
MISINTERPREATION OF THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN THE 25 FEBRUARY
2000 LOTUS NOTES E-MAIL AND TAKE ANY ACTION TO CORRECT IT?
137. (U/ /AIU0) Iirst and second line
supervisors were recipients of her 25 February 2000 Lotus Note to the
DS&T office Chiefs of Plans?' states that because the Lotus
Note was address Plans Chiefs in the DS&T, he did not read
it closely. He read Lotus Note in a different fashion than
Congress may have interpreted it. He states that when he reread it
after the 16 March 2000 HPSCI hearing, he understood why Congress
was disturbed. explains that if he read it as an outsider, he
would have been left with the impression that CIA had instructed its
officers not to discuss the financial health of their programs with
Congress.
138. (UHAIU0 tates that his decision to not disavow
or specifically correc Lotus Note was based on his
assumption that it had stayed within the narrow confines of its
written distribution, what he considered a small and knowledgeable
audience who would put it in context. He explains that he did not
specifically rescind the note because he did not view it as formal
policy. Moreover, he did not wish to appear to undemtin
publicly, especially because of his view that no malice or malfeasance
was intended or recommended. Additionally, the recipients of the
note also heard subsequent guidance from more senior officers.
r�contends that although he did not subsequently issue a written
M (U/ /AIUO) As stated earlie
an SIS-04 officer, and Runyan is a DISES-05 officer.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
1(651(55(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
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correction t
specific note, he did point out to DS&T Plans (b)(3)
Officers, the
(b)(7)(c)
and Resource Staff, and to the DS&T Board of
Planning
Directors at various times and in various forums
to avoid
uncoordinated special pleadings with Congress.
rt
tructed (b)(3)
these officers to never sacrifice honesty or candor
(b)(7)(c)
interface
in their
with Congress.
139. (UHAIU0) Runyan states that he read the Lotus Note
within 24 hours of its issuance and it did not raise any
particular
"flags" with him.
Nevertheless,
according to Runyan, the
guidance
that he passed �to:
was more
general
than the text of the Lotus (b)(3)
Note, and he cannot
explain
whynote
did
not contain the (b)7)(c)
guidance he reported to her.
(b)(7)(c)
� 140. (U/ /A1110) Asked if he had any concern that he was the
highest level Agency officer to see the Lotus Note and had a chance
to correct it, but did not, Runyan says if he had thought it would be a
problem, he would have done something. However, he read the
Lotus Note differently, and not as an instruction to stonewall or be
less than complete. Runyan says that on a "cold reading," the Lotus
Note could be read as intending to give direction to withhold �
information from Congress.
141. (U/ /A1U0 Asked if Runyan had a responsibility to
correct the record if ote were inaccurate, Isham responded
than�drafted many Lotus Notes e-mail messages. Isham
observes that she does not know how many e-mail messages a busy
executive can correct.
142. (U/ /A1U0)When Carey was asked if he would have
expected Runyan o o correct the record when they initially
saw that the Lotus Note contained erroneous guidance, Carey
responded "absolutely." Carey adds that he left it to the discretion of
Isham and Runyan to take any corrective action they felt necessary
with the few addressees of the Lotus Note.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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WHAT DID THE CIA EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR SAY TO CONGRESS ON 16 AND
23 MARCH 2000 ABOUT AGENCY POLICY ON DISCUSSIONS OF INTERNAL
TAXES WITH CONGRESS?
143. (UHAII.J0) The HPSCI Hearing. During the 16 March
2000 budget hearing on CIA's FY2001 Program, the following
relevant exchange occurred among Chairman Goss, Congresswoman
Heather Wilson, and ExDir Carey.35 It is the only instance during the
transcript when Carey testified regarding the content of the Lotus
Note:
The Chairman: Ms. Wilson
Mrs. Wilson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wasn't here to hear your
opening statement, but I have just read it, and [would like to know
what your reply is specifically. I assume this is a memo that has
been quoted from. Have you heard of that? Have any of you
heard of or seen that?
Mr. Carey: I have not. I don't know what memo the Chairman is
quoting. It is not any that I have written or am familiar with.
Mrs. Wilson: Anybody here in this room know anything about
taxing?
Mr. Carey: No. I thought you were referring to the memo that
said -
The Chairman: The specific quotes.
Mr. Carey: There were specific quotes that had to do with not
sharing information. With regard to taxing, let me explain, what I
said in my opening statement is we are trying to invest for the
future, that is the nature of the Strategic Direction program, as well
as continue current operations. We try to do both with equal
energy and commitment. That requires a constant series of
35 (S) or reviewed the transcript of the 16 March 2000 hearing and confirmed that portions of
25 February 2000 Lotus Note were quoted by Chairman Goss. (b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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reassessments and reestablishing priorities. That gives rise to so-
called unfundeds, not a very helpful term. But inasmuch as those �
Mrs. Wilson: My time is limited, as you know, and I would like to
get a direct answer to this question.
Mr. Carey: I am trying.
Mrs. Wilson: I don't think it is out of line to ask. "The CIA regards
this subject matter as out of bounds for discussion with our
committees." Also, CIA taxes are an internal issue and one that
often reflects poorly on Agency performance in planning and
executing our programs. Is that news to everyone in this room?
Mr. Carey. Yes.
Mrs. Wilson: Ms. Dempsey?
Ms. Dempsey: Yes. I was not aware of that quote before I walked
in and heard the Chairman say it.
The Chairman: Will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. Wilson: Yes, sir.
The Chairman: Just let me ask then, is that the policy?
Mr. Carey: No.
�The Chairman: Good. I yield back.
144. (U) The Executive Director's Congressional Letters of
23 March 2000. ExDir Carey sent letters to Representatives Goss,
Julian Dixon, Nancy Pelosi, Norman Sisisky, Sandford Bishop, and
Heather Wilson responding to issues and questions raised at the
16 March 2000 hearing on the CIA's FY2001 Program. Carey also
sent a letter to then-SSCI Staff Director Nicholas Rostow. The seven
letters differed in their specific content because each addressed
incividual issues raised by the member during the 16 March hearing.
However, all the letters addressed the subject of the Lotus Note and
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Agency policy in speaking with Congress. A summary of the
statements Carey made to the HPSCI members concerning this
subject is detailed in the box "Excerpts of Executive Director Carey's
Letters to HPSCI Members and SSCI Staff."
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Excerpts of Executive Director Carey's Letters to
HPSCI Members and SSCI Staff
On 23 March 2000, Carey sent letters to six HPSCI Members and
then-SSCI Staff Director Rostow addressing the 25 February 2000
Lotus Note and Agency policy on candor with Congress. Excerpts of
this correspondence follow:
(U) To Chairman Goss: I assure you that I take with the utmost seriousness
your opening remarks at the hearing concerning the perceived lack of candor
and forthrightness of CIA officers in working with the Committee Members and
Staff. Although I was not aware of the internal CIA note referenced in your
opening remarks, I have subsequently obtained a copy and have been able to
review it. Let me say emphatically that the note does not accurately articulate
our policy on dealing with Congress. Quite the opposite; taken literally it is in
contradiction to our policy. Clearly, however, that policy is not as well
understood within the Agency as it should be. I will take immediate action to
redress that situation by publicizing both here and in the field the need for
candor, completeness, correctness, and consistency to characterize all our
dealings with Congress. [Emphasis added.]36
(U) To Ranking Member Dixon: Finally, I want to let you know that I
personally take with the utmost seriousness the Chairman's opening remarks
concerning the perceived lack of candor and forthrightness of CIA officers in
working with Committee Members and Staff. It is our policy to ensure that we
provide the information, visibility, and access necessary to accomplish your
oversight responsibilities. Clearly from the Chairman's remarks this policy is not
as well understood within the Agency as it needs to be. I will take steps
inunediately to communicate to all CIA employees that candor, completeness,
correctness, and consistency must characterize all our dealings with Congress.
(U) To Representatives Bishop, Pelosi, Sisislcy, and Wilson: Finally, I want to
let you know that I personally take with the utmost seriousness the Chairman's
opening remarks concerning the perceived lack of candor and forthrightness of
CIA officers in working with Committee Members and Staff. Clearly, however,
36 (U) Goss and Dixon received copies of the letters sent to the other four members.
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that policy is not as well understood within the Agency as it should be. I will
take immediate action to redress that situation by publicizing both here and in
the field the need for candor, completeness, correctness, and consistency to
characterize all our dealings with Congress. To that end, it is own policy that
all requests for budget-related information be coordinated through our Chief
Financial Officer, who is best positioned to ensure that all budget-related
information is accurate and reflects our broad corporate priorities. [Emphasis
added.]
(U) To then-SSG Staff Director Rostow: Mr. Goss made reference to an
internal CIA note indicating that certain budgetary information relating to
internal CIA "taxes" should not be shared by individual Agency employees
with the Committees. Neither I nor any member of my senior management
team was aware of this note prior to the hearing. Subsequent to the hearing, I
was able to obtain the email the Chairman quoted (attached). I emphatically
underscore that the note does not accurately articulate our policy on dealing
with Congress. Clearly, however, our policy is not as well understood as it
should be. I will take immediate action to ensure that all CIA employees, both�
here and in the field, understand that candor, completeness, correctness, and
consistency must characterize all our dealings with Congress.38 [Emphasis
added.]
145. (U/ /AIU0) Isham says she offered to see Goss in regard
Lotus Note, and she volunteered to write a letter to clarify
the Agency's policies.39 Carey responded that he had decided to
send a "global" response to the Hill following the 16 March hearing.
Isham offered to provide text, but in the end, she did not provide
anything.
146. (U/ /AIUO) Isham recalls either seeing the letter to
Rostow or seeing a package of letters from Carey to the Hill
following the 16 March 2000 hearing that would have included the
37 (U) The letters to Representatives Bishop and Wilson from Carey use the word "my" policy
instead of "our" policy.
38 (U) The Minority Staff Director at the SSCI, Al Cumming was listed as a carbon copy
recipient of the letter to Rostow.
39 (U/ /AIUO) Isham served as Director of Congressional Affairs from 1994 to 1996.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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Rostow letter. The text of the letter to Rostow (see Exhibit C) looked
familiar to her. Isham does not recall if she saw the letters in advance
of sending them, but certainly saw them afterwards.
147. (U/ /AIU0) Runyan believes the first time he saw the
23 March 2000 letter from Carey to Rostow was when OIG
investigators showed it to him during his 10 May 2000 interview.
Runyan says if Isham were present in the office, the letter would
have been routed to her. Runyan does not recall if he saw it in March
2000.
148. (C' who was Runyan's Executive
Assistant at the time, recalls the packet of letters coming to him in the
review process. During his review
1\, T�ecognized that the
letter to Rostow borLotus ote as an attachment.
explains that it disturbed him that CIA was needlessly providing a
copy of the ote to Con ess as a "smoking gun." He
approached about it. dicated that he had seen some of
the letters in an earlier dr ormat, but had not known that a copy of
Lotus Note was bemg sent in a letter to Congress.
senior, Runyan.
time However, base on Runyan's response to him, it was very
evident that Runyan had seen the packet and knew precisely the
issue vas raising�otherwise Runyan would have told him
so.
149. (C) On the following day says he approached
Runyan about the letter to Rostow with the Lotus Note and
questioned why Lotus Note was being attached and sent to
Rostowl recalls an did not offer much of a
response to his question. had the impression that Runyan
was signaling that it was none of usiness. recalls
Runyan's response was something e we're looking at this" or
"we're dealing with this.', sensed that he may have
overstepped his d did not pursue the issue further with his
dds that the packet was not at hand at the
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)(c)
(6)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(7)(c)
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Rostow durin the internal
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states that he had seen Carey's letter to
He understood that Carey
response letters to the members of the
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
coordination.
task *th preparing
HPSCI. He explains that
the draft letter he saw was a "generic copy
for negative coordination." That is, when he reviewed it he would
only respond to the drafter if there was a disagreement with the text.
Tiht7i
of the draft letter he reviewed did not include a copy of
otus Note, although it was probably in the packet he
(b)(3)
received.
He learned later that
a copy of the Lotus
Note
was sent
(b)(7)(c)
with Rostow's
letter. F�[provided
a copy of
I.otus Note to
(b)(3))
the day after the HPSCI
hearing.
(b)(7)(c))
151. (U/ /AIUO) a program analyst in the Office
of the Comptroller, was tasked to prepare testimony for Carey before
the HPSCI which was held on 16 March 2000. During the hearing,
there were questions or comments that the HPSCI members posed
about various aspects of the Agency's budget and operations that
were not fully addressed due to time const r 1 other
limitations. Within two days of the hearing earned that ti
Carey had decided to respond to select questions or comments made
by the members. The plan was to prepare letters in response to the
questions or comments made by the specific HPSCI member at the
hearing. Included in the letter to the HPSCI member would be
comments regarding the inaccuracy of the guidance quoted in the
Lotus Note..
(b)(3) 152. (U//AIU0) According to the notes taken by two
(b)(7)(c) CIA officers during the hearing were reviewed to identify the
appropriate questions and comments from HPSCI members for
response. Carey played the principal role in selecting which
members and which questions to address. Next, the questions or
comments were referred out to the respective Directorate referents
for the appropriate response in the same manner used for questions
for the record. When the responses were received from the
(b)(3) Directorates then fashioned the first draft of letters to the
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
members identified by Carey to receive responses t draft
underwent the normal review process in the Office o e
Comptroller and the CFO's office before going to Carey for signature.
153. (U//AlUO) In order to respond to the comments and
questions regarding candor with Congressn�lconducted an
online search for Agency materials available that addressed Agency
policy on dealing with Congress. He reviewed copies of "What's
News at CIA," worldwide Stations and Bases cables, Agency Notices
and obtained a brochure from OCA.
154. (U//A1U0) In reviewing the letter signed by Carey to
Chairman Goss dated 23 March 2000,n�bbays he initiated the first
draft of this letter. He says the language in paragraph two of the
letter must have been added during the review process. Specifically,
he had no role in the drafting of the portion of the paragraph that
contains the sentence, "Although I was not aware of the internal CIA
note referenced in your opening remarks, I have subsequently
obtained a copy and have been able to review it."
155. (U/ /AIU0) With respect to the letter to Ranking Member
Julian Dixon explains that each letter was customized to
nthe specific concerns cited by a member during the hearing.
bserves that the language alluding to the Lotus Note was
different between the Goss and Dixon letters and adds that he does
not know how the customization process occurred regarding the
Lotus Note issue. He believes the language in the letters to the non-
leadership members of the HPSCI was more standardized, but
cautioned not to suspect any "evil intent" if there was a difference.
nexplains it was easy to understand how some language may
have changed during the staffing process in the rush to get the letters
sent to the HPSCI addressees.
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
156. (U/ /AIUO) as asked about the particular
language appearing in a portion of the letter from Carey to
Representative Heather Wilson of the HPSCI. That language was:
To that end, it is my policy that all requests for budget-related
information be coordinated through our Chief Financial Officer,
(b)(3) who is best positioned to ensure that all budget-related information
(b)(7)(c) is accurate and reflects our broad corporate priorities.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
responds that this is the accurate policy of C
accurate before and after the 16 March 2000 hearing. xplains
that the intent of the policy is to defer questions on taxes to the CFO,
explaining that those CIA employees outside of the CFO's office do
not have the complete picture.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
157. (U/ /AIU0) reviewed a copy of the 23 March letter
from Carey to Rostow, and states that despite the fact that his name
appears on the originating office line of the filathis letter as
the author, he had never seen it previously.0 says he is (b)(3)
unfamiliar with Rostow's name and position e I, and he is (b)(7)(c)
certain that Rostow was not on the original list of those who were
going to receive letters from the ExDi_r. He is confident that it would
only have been assigned if Carey added it to the list of letters to go to
the Intelligence Committees. assumes the Rostow letter was
drafted by someone in the CFO front office who drew the
information from the source material contained in the other draft
memorandan7had assembled and then cut and pasted material
from the other letters, including the originating office line.
158. (U/ /AIUO) states that he does not know of any
discussion regarding the prudence of providing a copy of the
25 February Lotus Note to Dixon or any other member of the HPSCI.
40 (U/ /AIUO) The originating office line on the file copy appears "DCl/CFO
(20Mar00)."
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He assumes the reason that it was not sent as an attachment to the
letter to Goss was the recognition that he already had a copy of it that
he cited during the hearing.
159. (UHAIU0) Carey explains that on the day after the
hearing, he received a telephone call from Al Cumming of the SSCI
staff whom Carey said he has known for a long time.41 Cumming
asked Carey about the Lotus Note issue from the HPSCI hearing, and
it appeared evident to Carey that John Millis had briefed the staffs of
SSCI and probably the HAC about the matter. Carey says he called
Rostow to inform him of the matter and the circumstances
surrounding the Lotus Note. Carey found Rostow to be somewhat
familiar with the controversy. Rostow claimed that he had not seen
the Lotus Note and requested that Carey forward a statement about
the issue and include a copy of the Lotus Note. Carey then drafted
the letter to Rostow himself and included a copy of the Lotus Note as
requested. Carey obtained a copy of the Lotus Note forwarded to
him by Runyan.42
WAS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S 23 MARCH 2000 LEITER TO THE SSCI
STAFF DIRECTOR ACCURATE?
160. (U/ /AIU0) As discussed in the introduction of this
report, this investigation arose from an allegation brought to the
Inspector General that ExDir Carey provided false and misleading
information in his 23 March 2000 letter to Rostow. There is no
indication that the source of this allegation had access to the six
41 OE /AIU0) SSG staff member Al Cumming appears on the Rostow letter as a recipient of a
copy of the letter.
42
in flipfrill � fields. "Memorandum For" [nine Plans Officers in the 1:644:TI; "From
oi/ /AIU0) The copy of the Lotus Note that accompanied the Rostow letter con
(b)(3)
and seven other DS&T (b)(3)(c)
and "Office" [ODDST]. The lines for "cc"
officers]; and "bcc" [James L Runyan] were also absent. (b)(7)(C)
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letters to HPSCI members. The specific information the source
alleged to be inaccurate concerned the statements in the letter to
Rostow that
Mr. Goss made reference to an internal CIA note indicating that
certain budgetary information relating to internal CIA "taxes"
should not be shared by individual Agency employees with the
Committees. Neither I nor any member of my senior management
team was aware of this note (the 25 February Lotus Notel prior to
the hearing. . .
I emphatically underscore that the note does not accurately
articulate our policy on dealing with Congress.43
(b)(3)
161. (U/ /MOO) Defining "the Senior Management Team."
There is no formal body in CIA known as the DCI's or the Ex
"senior management team." According to Agency Regulation
the CIA Executive Board consists of the DCI and the DDCI (both ex
officio), the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive Director, and
the Deputy Directors for Administration, Intelligence, Operati
and Science and Technology.44 According to Agency Notice
the DCI personally selects the Executive Director, Deputy Executive
Director, the Deputy Directors, the Associate Deputy Directors, and a
limited number of other very senior positions.
162. (U/ /MOO) Views on the Accuracy of the 23 March 2000
Letter. ExDir Carey affirms that the information contained in the
23 March 2000 letter to Rostow was accurate at the time he drafted it
as well as currently. Carey says that when he composed the letter to
Rostow and used the term "my senior management team," he was
thinking in terms of the staff that accompanied him to the 16 March
43 (D) Carey made essentially the same statement in his letter to HPSCI Chairman Goss, saying
''Let me say emphatically that the note does not accurately articulate our policy on dealing with
Congress."
44 (IMAIU0) The Executive Board acts as an advisory body to the DCI, the DDCI and the
ExDir. The Board advises these officials on decisions affecting the Agency's mission and
functions and its relationship with the Intelligence Community, the Executive Branch and the
Congress.
(b)(3)
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HPSCI hearing. Carey believes that it is plain from the context of his
letter to Rostow, but much of the misunderstanding could have been
avoided if he had added the words "then present" or "present at the
Hearing" for clarification. That group consisted of Isham, Deputy
Director for Administration Richard Calder, DDO Pavitt, and then-
Deputy Director for Intelligence John McLaughlin. Carey says that
as a result of their responses at the hearing and a subsequent
discussion on the ride back to Headquarters that day, it was clear to
Carey that no one who accompanied him to the hearing knew about
the Lotus Note prior to the hearing.
163. (U/ /AIUO) Carey explains that he considers the
Associate Deputy Directors, and specifically Runyan, as part of his
senior management team. Carey states there is no consistent
definition of the term. He adds that some have interpreted it to
include the so-called "Gang of 120" which includes 120 senior Agency
officers, including office directors. Carey says that he did not know
until interviewed by OIG that Runyan was on distribution of the
25 February Lotus Note.
164. (U//AIU0) DDS&T Isham says there is nothing
inaccurate in the statements in Carey's letter to Rostow that the
25 February 2000 Lotus Notes e-mail does not accurately articulate
CIA policy on dealing with Congress. Isham also does not believe
Carey was inaccurate in his statement that neither he nor his "senior
management team" were aware of the e-mail prior to the 16 March
hearing. Isham says Carey is referring to "full" Deputy Directors in
the context of the letter and the hearing. Isham adds that there is not
a consistent definition of the senior management team. In all cases, it
includes the four Deputy Directors, but it can also refer to senior staff
and even to office-level personnel.
165. (U/ /AIUO) ADDS&T Runyan does not recall if he saw
Carey's 23 March 2000 letter to Rostow in March 2000. Runyan
believes the first time he saw the letter was when OIG investigators
showed it to him in May 2000. Runyan believes Carey's statement in
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showed it to him in May 2000. Runyan believes Carey's statement in
the letter to Rostow is accurate that the 25 February Lotus Notes
e-mail does not accurately articulate CIA policy. Runyan says
Lotus Note was not intended to tell employees to
be less than candid with Congress. Carey's letter wanted to be clear
that Agency oli was to be candid. According to Runyan, the
purpose of ote was to say that if someone were going to the
Hill to make sure the person was in synch with the overall Agency
program. Runyan did not read the Lotus Note as suggesting to
withhold information. Runyan considers himself part of the senior
management staff of the Agency, and he "takes it for granted" that
Carey would also consider him part of the senior management
team.45 All Associate Deputy Directors are part of the senior
management team, states Runyan. Runyan explains that if Isham is
unavailable, he is expected to attend meetings and her other duties in
her place.
166. (U/ /AIU0) 4id not see the 23 Mardi
2000 letter to Rostow with her Lotus Note attached during the
internal Agency coordination process. n�tearried of the existence
of the letter on 30 March 2000, and the following day, she says she
went to her supervisor land told him she believed there
were two false statements in Carey's letter. These were the
statements that no member of the senior management team was
aware of the e-mail prior to the 16 March HPSCI hearing, and Carey's
statement that the Lotus Note did not represent Agency policy.
7�kays she to141 that Runyan was aware of the 25 February
Lotus Note and had approved its release. According to
said Runyan is not part of the senior management team.
167. (U/ /A1U0E7 says she also tolc on 31 March
that she believed Carey's statement in the Rostow letter concerning
there being no Agency policy not to share internal tax information
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
45 (U/ /AIUO) As discussed earlier in this Reporl included Runyan as a "blind carbon (b)(3)
copy" recipient of her 25 February e-mail message, and Runyan states he read the Lotus Note (b)(7)(c)
within 24 hours of its date.
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with the Intelligence Committees was untrue.
says it was not
(b)(3)
written policy, but it was verbal policy that had
in effect
(b)(7)(c)
been
throughout her tenure as the DS&T Plans Officer
states the
(b)(3)
guidance not to share internal tax information
with the Hill was
(b)(7)(c)
virtually the
same
guidance as
was rovided
in the previous year in
the DS&T.
says she told
the
statement in the 25 February
(b)(3)
Lotus Note,
"CIA
taxes are an
internal issue
and one that often
(b)(7)(c)
reflects (poorly) on Agency performance in planning, managing, and
executing our programs," was a statement
that Runyan had
told her,
and he attributed it to Carey. According t
said that he
(b)(3)
had heard Carey say similar things on several
occasions.
(b)(7)(c)
168. (U/ /AIU0) DS&T Chief of Staff
-7
who coordinated
(b)(3)
on the letter to Rostow during internal Agency
review,
says he
(b)(7)(c)
strongly agrees with the statement in Carey's letter to Rostow that the
25 February 2000 Lotus Note "does
not accurately
articulate
[CIA]
policy on dealing with Congress."
want to speculate on the accuracy
however,
says
in the
he does not
letter that
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
of the statement
"Neither I nor any member of my senior
management
team was
aware of this note prior to the hearing."
says he does not know
(b)(3)
if Carey included the Associate
Deputy
Directors
in the definition of
(b)(7)(c)
his senior management team.
states that he has heard Carey
(b)(3)
use the tent to mean the DCI,
DDCI,
CFO and Chief Information
(b)(7)(c)
Officer.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
169. (LWATUO)
Carey's letter to Rostow arose after a conversation between SSCI staff
member Al Cumming and Carey. Carey wanted to take appropriate
steps to set the record straight after the 16 March hearing that
Lotus Note did not accurately reflect Agency policy.
believes the statements in Carey's letter about the Lotus Note not
accurately articulating Agency policy is correct. 4so says
Carey's statement that neither he nor his s ement team
were aware of the note is accurate, althou onsiders the
Associate Deputy Directors to be part of the senior management
team.
xplains that the genesis of
(")(3) (b)(3)fh)(7)(c
(b)(7)(c)" "
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3)
(b)(3) 170. (U/ /AIUO) believes Care s (b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c) statements in the letter to Rostow appear accurate con�in2Jhafact
that the Lotus Note does not articulate Agency policy.
interprets the term "senior management team" as referring to the
Executive Board, which includes the Deputy Directors. (b)(3)
would also include the Associate Deputy Directors as part of the (b)(7)(c)
senior management team since they regularly fill in for the Deputy
Directors at the Executive Board.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
171. (U/ /AIUO) says that
although she knows of nothing m wnting that defines the senior
management team, the Associate Deputy Directors are absolutely
part of the senior management team. They are the alter egos of the
Deputy Directors. They attend Executive Board meetings with or
without the Deputy Director and can sign for the Deputy Director.
WHAT HAS BEEN THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE LOTUS NOTES E-MAIL WITHLV
THE DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY?
172. (S) Even after the 16 March HPSCI hearing brought the
issue of Agency policy on discussion of internal taxes to the fore,
Agency instructions continued to tell officers not to respond directly
to Congressional inquiries. This is reflected in the following Lotus
Notes e-mail exchange d On 20 March 2000,
DS&T Plans Chie old several DS&T officers who were about
to brief Congress: "If asked about taxes, you should be honest in
noting that there have been execution year adjustments within your
programs."
173. (S) An e-mail the next day fromn7however, entitled
"Answering the Tax Question," informed DS&T Office Chiefs that:
The Comptroller has weighed in with guidance to 0Th [the Office
of Technical Services] and FBIS [Foreign Broadcast Information
Service] (and the Agency writ large) on how to answer
Congressional questions about funds redirected to cover internal
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c
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taxes.... If [Congress asks], none of us are to respond but to say
that the Comptroller will provide this information for OIS in the
context of the whole DS&T. [Emphasis added.]
upervisor, DS&T Chief of Staff was an
information recipient of this e-mail message.
174. (S) On 22 March 2000 reiterated the previous day's
guidance to DDS&T Isham and ADDS&T Runyan. In an e-mail
message wrote that the policy was not to discuss specific
rdollarrounts if offices are asked by Congress about internal taxes.
aid:
Joanne and Jim,
I wanted to ensure you knew the guidance we have received from
the Comptroller related to the ()TS and FBIS briefings this week on
the Hill, and any other briefings that ensue during this session ....
(b)(3) First wants no specific discussion
(b)(7)(c) of dollars if the offices are asked about internal taxes. He asks
that we say that we are working with the Comptroller to provide
that information for the entire DS&T, as part of an Agency-wide
request for such information. This is a significant point, because
OTS has beat pretty concerned about how to answer the tax
question, because they (and I) suspect it will come up. [Emphasis
added.]
175. (UHAIU0) Treatment of According to the
employee who brought the allegation of misleading Congress to the ICand requested confidentiality, as of late April 2000, was
suffering from recriminations and had been isolated and ostracized
by DS&T senior management. He cited that, in her position
needs access to information, which she was no longer getting. She
goes home in tears and is suffering psychologically. The employee
believes thainThs being made the scapegoat, and that Carey has
tried to suggest she is a well-meaning, but rogue, employee who did
not accurately reflect Carey's policy in her Lotus Note.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c
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176. (C) who served as Runyan's Executive
Assistant until late April 2000, does not believe that Runyan's role in
the generation of the Lotus Note has eroded his relationship with
Isham. assesses that, at the time, the revelation that the
DS&T had sent out this Lotus Note appeared to be a big issue within
the Agency say was greatly affected by the issue.
177. (U//A1U0)nstates that has not suffered
retribution for the issuance of the Lotus Note. According ton7
bffered to resign after the incident and has been consoled by
Isham, Runyan and himself. He added that, ai supervisor,
he retained confidence in her.
178. (IWAIU0) Isham states that she does not know ifn7
was counseled. Isham does not know what was told to write
in the Lotus Note, and she does not think a person in a position like
should be removed from his or her job for this action.
179. (U//A1U0) Carey states that on 16 March 2000 during a
break in the hearing, he met with then-HPSCI Staff Director John
Millis and staff member Tom Newcomb at Millis' request. Carey also
said that he had an interest in seeing the Lotus Note to fully
understand its content and thus reach some judgment as to how the
misinterpretations that led to the note occurred. According to Carey,
Millis told him that he wanted to 'bury the hatchet" and move
forward. Millis cautioned Carey that he did not want any retribution
directed to the author of the Lotus Note. Carey responded that no
retribution was intended.
180. (U/ /AIU0i-7 recalls that after Runyan provided her
Lotus Note to Isham following the 16 March HPSCI budget hearing,
both Isham and Runyan tol not to worry. Both told her they
understood the context in which the note and Runyan
reminded her that he had approved i ays they told her that
the message Goss rferred to in the hearing did not appear to be
Lotus Note then learned that Isham went to Carey
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3),)
1 (b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
that evening with a copy of her Lotus Note. In the subsequent days,
earned that a copy of the Lotus Note had been given to
1anc11 says she thought she was going to be fired. She
next learned that a copy of her Lotus Note had been provided as an
ratac,1-7
ent in a letter from Carey to Rostow. After a discussion with
t 31 March 2000 concluded that there was a lack of
support and candor from her management, and1�Thays she told
she believed she could no longer be effective in her position.
say told he thought her concern was unnecessary,
and Runyan told her that day that she o reason to fear
repercussions from the matter. While does not claim to have
suffered retribution for the Lotus Note, she told OIG investigators
that the fad of the investigation has caused her to fear the potential
for retribution.
181. (U/ /AlUO) contends that she did not tell
after the incident that she was willing to resign. Rather she told
that she would be willing to step down as Chief of the Planning
and Resource Group if DS&T management lacked confidence in her.
She adds that she has never been "consoled" by Isham on this matter.
states that the only conversation that Isham had with her on
this entire matter occurred on the evening of 16 March 2000 when
Isham told "no one can be sure it is your note." Additionally,
tates that Run told her that she had no reason to fear
repercussions becaus d been "following his [Runyan's]
instructions."
182. (U/ /AlUO) When interviewed on 30 May 2000
states that she sensed that her relationship with her management
chain had eroded. She felt had not been supportive and had
distanced himself from her position. says she recognizes that
she is in conflict with Runyan's recollections regarding the origin of
the Lotus Note. She further cites, for example, that she originally
received three calls a week from Isham who would be checking in
with her when outside of Headquarters. There has been only one
such call in the intervening months since 16 March, and her contact
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
16:13/(i(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)(b)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
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with Isham has been greatly reduced. dds that in late April
or early May 2000, after a computer system upgrade, there was a
change in the abffity of herself and other select DS&T staff members
to be able to view the electronic calendartsl of Isham and Runyan. saysthat when she questioned about the change to this
long-standing procedure, which assisted her in her carrying out her
job duties, she was informed that Isham maintained quasi-personal
information shared outside of the DS&T. states that she does
appointments on the calendar. Reportedly, did not want this
not know if this change was related to her involvement with the
Lotus Note, but it left the impression that Isham no longer trusted
her.
183. (URAIU0) When reinterviewed on 30 August 2000,
Runyan states that as far as he is concernedJ tatus or position
has not changed since 16 March 2000. Runyan says she is the DS&T
Plans Chief and has a job to do. Runyan still has meetings with her,
and he expects her to continue to do her job. Runyan is
second-line supervisor. Runyan says is a full participant and
has respect. Runyan says there has been no direction to:Irthib
tasks or responsibilities away froM Runyan says has
actively sought other employment within the Agency. Runyan
cannot say this_search is a function of the events surrounding the
Lotus Note. is looking for a career change and more
responsibility. She has accepted a new appointment
184. (UHAIU0) Isham describes performance in the
DS&T as terrific and says she would love to have her return to the
DS&T. Isham says she believes withdrew after the 16 March
2000 hearing and felt uncomfortable around Runyan and her.
Consequently, she and Runyan had to work around this, and they
worked more throu 'sham says she tried to help find
other jobs in the DS&T because she was an excellent employee.
'sham hope return to the Directorate, and she would like
to work wi again.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
cb)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(1?)Vicc)
(b)(7)(c
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185. (U//A1U0) On 5 September 2000FM)egan a
rotational assignment with the Directorate of Administration,
Information Services Infrastructure, had served in the DS&T
front office since November 1998. As of 27 September 2000
has not received a Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) for her past
assignment. According t the last PAR she received was in
1998.
186. (U/ /AIUO) says that, in September 2000, she was
told by a colleague of an instance when Isham reportedly expressed
to her successor as MU' Plans Chief Isham's lack of confidence in
In this instanan7 says the colleague advised her that the
new DS&T Plans Chief said that Isham wanted someone in the
position whom she could trust.
187. (U/ /AIUO) In another instance, Says a different
colleague told her that nThuccessor said Isham had cut off
access to Isham's daily calendar because she could not trust
states that she called her former supervisor
n7 on 4 October 2000 to surface these reports that she had
received. According tc said both he and Isham were
aware that on at least one occasion that successor had
publicly commented on Isham's alleged lack of trust ii
Furtherj ko14 that at Isham's request :ounseled the
successor on this matter. expresses concern over receiving this
second-hand information, sourced to an individual who cannot
speak with first-hand knowledge of her performance.
188. (U/ /AIUO)n7asserts that Isham never directly
offered her a position. All offers to "direct" her into assignments
came froi4 supervisor explains that it is
important to recognize that Isham offered her two directed
assignments in the DS&T of less responsibility than the job the held
as the Directorate's Chief of Planning and Resources Group. These
positions were to perform at the office level the same function
held at the directorate level. Further, whennrejected these
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
((b)(3)c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)(c)
1130(c)
(b)(3)(c)
(D))(7))(c)
(luD)()(c)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
�(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
((b)(3)c)
(b)(7)(c
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offers, 'sham
exchange
her tha
lc� itrougl to consider an industrial
serts that no fewer than three DS&T officers told
d approached them about taking her position before
accepted a new position. adds that she specifically
chose to take an assignment outside of the DS&T in a field that was
completely new to her rather than accept a directed assignment of
this nature.
CONCLUSIONS
189. (U//A1U0) The 25 February 2000 DS&T Lotus Note was
intended as informal guidance to a limited number of DS&T
employees and not as a statement of Agency policy. Its author was
attempting to convey what she believed to be the wishes of her
superior, but the wording was not carefully considered and was
inartfully drawn. The statements that "the CIA regards this subject
matter [internal taxes] as out of bounds" for discussion with
Congress, "even if prodded," could be read to mean that Agency
employees should not be candid with Congress, which was not and
is not Agency policy. Agency policy at the time was that employees
coordinate with the CFO before responding to Congressional
questions about budget-related matters, including "taxes," but this
policy was not enunciated in the Lotus Note at issue.
190. (U/ /AIU0) The guidance was sufficiently open to
misinterpretation to expect DS&T management to have recognized
the need to issue a correction or clarification. Yet, two senior officers
in the DS&T who received the note�ADDS&T James Runyan and
Chief of Staff kailed to do so. They explained that they
did not interpret the note as suggesting that Agency employees be
less That candid with Congress. Runyan said it raised no particular
"flags" with him, and deleted it from his e-mail queue after
reading it without taking further action.
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c1
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191. (U/ /AIUO) It is impossible to determine if the text of the
Lotus Note accurately reflects Runvare&instructions to the author of
the Lotus Note asserts that Runyan gave her
the specific guidance contained in the 25 February Lotus Note.
who did not take notes of her meetings with Runyan, says she
coordinated the note in draft with Runyan in advance of its issuance
because Runyan was concerned about getting "the tone right."
Runyan does not recall reviewing a draft, but say4 memory is
better than his. Executive Director Carey states that he does not
remember what he told Runyan and the Deputy Directors on
niary 2000 that may have given rise to Runyan's instruction to
d Runyan does not recall the meeting with Carey. We have
found no other information to clarify this issue.
� 192. (U/ /AIUO) Regardless of whether he saw a draft of the
Lotus Note before it was sent, Runyan read (otus Note
shortly after it was seerititis own admission, it did not contain the
had
guidance he d giv i.e., that responses to Congressional
inquiries concerning internal taxes had to be coordinated with the
CFO. Moreover, the guidance it did contain was open to
misinterpretation, i.e., as an instruction to withhold information from
the Congress. Runyan, therefore, bears some responsibility for
failing to recognize the potential problem and taking appropriate
steps to correct or prevent any misunderstanding.
193. (U/ /AlUO) read Lotus Note shortly
after it was sent. While he noted that dissemination of the Lotus
Note was limited to DS&T addressees, it nonetheless addressed a
sensitive issue, i.e., what DS&T employees could say in response to
� Congressional inquiries regarding "internal taxes."
supervisor and a senior officer in the DS&T with 11 years experience
in dealing with such issues also bears some responsibility for
failing to recognize the potential problem and taking appropriate
steps to correct or prevent any misunderstanding.
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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c
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194. (U/ /AIUO) The actions o ould be considered
with several mitigating factors in mind, guidance was not a
statement of inolicy , but rather issued as informal guidance to
subordinates. ays Runyan gave her the specific guidance
contained in the Lotus Note, and reviewed it prior to issuance. In
sending the Lotus Noten7believed the was only carrying out the
directions of her supervisor and did not intend it to mean that
subordinates should be less than forthcoming with Congress.
Nonetheles as a senior officer also bears a measure of
responsibility for drafting and passing on guidance that could
reasonably be interpreted as an instruction to withhold information
from Congress.
195. (U/ /AIUO) Senior Agency managers, who sought to
manage the flow of information to Congress on budget reallocation,
bear some responsibility for the circumstances which resulted in the
issuance of the 25 February 2000 Lotus Note. While these officials
were understandably concerned that the Congress receive an
accurate and complete explanation of the "taxation" issue, their
emphasis was solely upon ensuring that all communications with
Congress on this subject were channeled through the CFO. Had they
also emphasized that this guidance was not meant to change the
responsibilities of employees to provide candid and complete
responses to requests from Congress, the environment which led to
the creation of the 25 February 2000 Lotus Note might have been
different.
196. AlUO) Extant Agency policies (e.g.,
fall short of providing employees with dear
guidance on how to respond to Congressional inquires which may be
posed to them in formal settings (e.g., hearings and briefings) or in
informal settings (e.g., visits by Congressional delegations in the
field). In fact, a conscientious Agency employee with access to all
published policy statements could reasonably conclude that he or she
is not permitted to respond to any Congressional inquiry without
prior approval from the Office of General Counsel or OCA.
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197. (U/ /AIUO) Agency employees are instructed in a
brochure issued by OCA to be "candid, complete, correct and
consistent" in their dealings with Congress. But even this guidance,
which is not available in any Agency database and strictly speaking
not a statement of policy, is ambiguous. The OCA brochure states
that in order to meet their obligation of "consistency," employees
must follow "established Agency guidelines when responding to
questions or requests for information." Agency regulations, in turn,
require employees to refer questions from Congress to OCA or, in the
case of resource matters, to the CFO. Thus, a conscientious Agency
employee, with access to the OCA brochure, could conclude that he
or she would have to obtain permission from OCA or the CFO before
responding to any Congressional inquiry for budgetary information.
Even the Executive Director's 27 March 2000 instruction, which was
distributed as an Employee Bulletin, did not establish new policy, but
rather restated existing policy.
198. (U/ /AIUO) Carey accurately stated at the 16 March 2000
HPSCI hearing that he had not seen the Lotus Note prior to the
hearing. The statement in Carey's letter to then-SSG Staff Director
Rostow that no member of his senior management team was aware
of the Lotus Note prior to the 16 March 2000 hearing proved to be
inaccurate, although this was apparently not known to Carey at the
time he signed the letter. In fact, ADDS&T Runyan read the 25
February Lotus Note shortly after it was issued. Although DDS&T
Isham recalls having told Carey, the day after the 16 March hearing,
that Runyan had seen the Lotus Note, Carey says he did not learn of
this until several months later when he was interviewed as part of
this investigation. Carey's version is bolstered by the fact that the
copy of the Lotus Note that was forwarded to him on 17 March by
Runyan did not show Runyan as a recipient of the original note.
199. (U/ /AIUO) Carey testified at the 16 March HPSCI
hearing that the DS&T's Lotus Note did not represent CIA policy on
dealing with Congress. In his 23 March letter to then-SSCI Staff
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Director Rostow, Carey reiterated his testimony to the HPSCI,
writing "I emphatically underscore that the note does not accurately
articulate our policy on dealing with Congress." Insofar as the note
suggested that the subject of taxation was "out of bounds for
discussion" with the oversight committees or that DS&T employees
should refuse to answer questions from committee staff "even if
prodded," the note did not, in fact, accurately articulate Agency
policy on dealing with Congress. Earlier in his letter, however, Carey
refers to the Lotus Note in question as "indicating that certain
budgetary information relating to internal CIA 'taxes' should not be
shared by individual Agency employees." When this description of
the note is juxtaposed with the statement made later in the letter that
the note "does not accurately articulate our policy on dealing with
Congress," it conveys the impression that it was not the Agency's
policy that information relating to internal CIA taxes should not be
shared by individual Agency employees. In fact, it had been the
Agency's practice, if not its policy, that individual Agency employees
should not attempt to share information with the Congress on
internal CIA taxes, but rather to refer such inquiries to the CFO or
those with broad Directorate knowledge who were better positioned
to answer them. Thus, the 23 March letter could be read as
conveying an incorrect impression of the Agency's policy. The
investigation developed no evidence to suggest a deliberate attempt
to mislead Congress, however, and several days after the letter was
sent, Carey issued new guidance instructing all employees to
respond fully to Congressional inquiries, including budgetary and
fiscal matters, following established Agency guidelines.
200. (U/ /ARJO) The disclosure of the 25 F 2000 Lotus
Note to the HPSCI created a difficult situation for in the DS&T.
She felt that her superiors were placing responsibility for the episode
excl-usively on her shoulders and did not support her specific
explanation of the genesis of the Lotus Note. This led
believe that she was being marginalized in her position. While OIG
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was made aware of difficulties that ensued, we do not condude that
there was a deliberate effort on the part of DS&T senior managers to
take retribution against her for her issuance of the Lotus Note.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
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CONCUR:
L. Britt Snider
Inspector General
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UNCLASSIFIED
EXDIR
EB No. 0001-00
27 March 2000
EXDIR REMINDS ALL EMPLOYEES OF AGENCY POLICY
ON DEAUNG WITH CONGRESS
This time of year traditionally is marked by a busy agenda
of Congressional meetings and hearings. Therefore, this is a
good opportunity to remind all employees of the Agency's
longstanding policy on dealing with Congress.
Earlier this month, as I presented the Agency's FY 2001
Program to the Congressional Oversight Committees, it became
clear to me that our policy is not as well understood as it needs
to be. During one of my briefings, the Chairman indicated that
he perceived a lack of candor and forthrightness by Agency
officers in responding to requests for information from his
Committee. I take the Chairman's comments with the utmost
seriousness because a strong partnership between CIA and its
oversight committees is critical to the success of US
intelligence.
The purpose of this notice is to make clear to all employees
my expectations on this fundamental issue. I expect all
employees to respond fully--and to the best of your knowledge--to
Congressional inquiries regarding programs, and activities,
including budgetary and fiscal matters. In that regard, all of
us--both in Washington and the field--must ensure that all of our
dealings with Congress are characterized by the so-called "Four
C's":
'Candor: Ensuring that the information you provide is, to
the best of your knowledge, true and accurate.
*Completeness: Responding to questions in a full and
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forthright manner.
�Correctness: Correcting as soon as possible any incorrect
information that you may have provided.
0Consistency: Following established Agency
guidelines--available from the Office of Congressional
Affairs--when responding to questions or requests for
information.
I am committed to providing the oversight and appropriations
Committees with the information, visibility, and access necessary
to effectively carry out their roles. I need your help in
fulfilling that commitment so that we can maintain and build upon
the trust that exists between the Agency and the Congress.
UNCLASSIFIED
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(b)(3)
25 February 2000
FROM:
OFFICE:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
ChiefS.
I need to make you aware of an issue, and enlist your help.
ODDST
Cuationtuy Note: Discuselon.of Interval Taxes
The 7th floor has recently become aware that some CIA officers/program managers are talking to PIM
staffers about the Impact of CIA taxes on the health of their programs. No sped& directorates or
programs were identified, but I want to remind you (and ask you to remind your managers, both hem and
th the field), that the CM regards this subject matter as out of bounds for dIscusskit with staffers or our
Committees. CIA taxes are an Internal Issue, and one that often reflects (poorly) on Agency performance
in planning, managing, and executing our programs. The Agency does not consider this a matter where
we would wish to draw Congressional attention.
I know, just as you know, that corporate taxation erodes program dollars and topline gains...the Hill knows
it too (Tom Newcomb raised such Issues at today's budget rollout with the authorizers), but we need to be
sure that no DS&T folks rain the Issues directly with staffers, even if prodded at briefings or during staff
tours/visits.
Thanks for ensuring your folks get this wore know these messages are not easy to receive...or to pass
along.
(b) 3)
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Sent on 25 February 2000 at 09:19:03 PM
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":23,Merch 2000
. _
Mr. Nickolas Rostow . �
Staff Director:.
Senate Select committee on Intelligence
Washington, DC 20510 ..:
- : �
aritr. RostoW,
�' (11) _As� a,fellow-uptOYout telephone.conversatiOrlynn
Monday 20�,Merch,am Writingtn.ptavide.yoU, further details
-regarding.anisSue raised by the Chairman of the House �
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence during his-
opening remarks �At the F? .2001 Central.IntelliginceAgency
.program hearing:. Mt..:� Goss's remarki indicated that he
perceived a lack of candor and forthrightness_byagency
officers in responding to -requests for inforMationfrom his
Committee. want to assurt.you, as.I did Mr. Goss, that I
take. his comments. with the utmost seriousness: '.The �
partnership between the Agency and its oVersight, committees
is critical to the success of US intelligence. It is
incumbent.on.us to provide the Committees with the.
information, visibility, and access necessaty:th.carry.out
effective 'oversight.
_
(U) Mr; Goss made reference to an internal CIA note
_indicating that certain budgetary information relating to
-internal CZAiataxes':shOUld:not be shared bkinftividual:
Agency employees wi)..S.the�Committees� �Neither I nor any
member Of mySenior.management team:waslaware of this noce-
PtiOrLto:the hearing Subsequent to the hearing. I..wad able
to 'obtain the email the Chairman quoted (attiChea.H.1
emphaticalIiI:Underscote that the note:dept-nOtjaCcuritely
articulate our policy on.dealinuwith,CongreasiH..
1U).: Clea.riy loWever, Our policy ii not.asWell'
.understood as it Should be. I, will take:immediate-action:to,
ensure that all CIA employees, both; here:and-in the field,
Understankthatvtandori coipleteneigi.COireCtness, and-
_Consistency Exist Characterize all, our dealings with
.-Congress:' If at any time you feel that-the,CIAis'not.being
, , _
� y -
Unclassified when Separated
from Attachment
(b
)(3)
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UNCLASSIFIMD
Mr, Nickolas Rostow
responsive to the Committee please alert me. It is my
sincere desire to maintain and build upon the trust that
exists between the Agency and the Congress.
Sincerely,
(b)(6)
--David W. Carey\
Executive Directory
Attachment
As Stated
CC: Mr. Al Cumming
2
UNCLASSIFIED
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�
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SECRET
FROM:
. � .
� SUBJECT: Cuaricrary Nora: Discussion or: Internal Taxes
REFERENCE:
Chiefs,
I need to make you zwa.-e :dr: Issue. and en fist your help:
The 7th &cr.'s= .racsazy tat:care awn that some CIA officers/program managers are taikng to Hill
� gimlets sow the impeor.ot C:.4 axes on :he health a/ their programs. No specific dretc. rates or.
� pragrams were Identified. out i want to remind you (and ask you ro remind your managers, both here arc
in the field), that the CIA regards this subfet mane, as out of bounds for discussion with staffers or our
� Committees. pi; taxes are ar internal issue, end one that often ;diets 'Cpccriy) on Agent/ perfonr.ancs
in planning, 177an41ng, and exec:lung Cur pi:grams, The Agency does not =sider this a meter where
we would wish to draw Congressional attention.
I know, just as you know, that =morzre tendon erodes program dollars and tcpline gains... the Hill knows
it too (Tom Newcomb raisec such ISSUES at today's budget rollout with the authorizers), but we and to i..e
sure tr.at no 0.54T folks raise :he issues oirecoy with staffers, even if prodded at briefings or during sraif
toUrsNisits.
Thanks for ensuring year folk, per this ;MOW these messages are nor easy tc receive... or to pass
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UNCLASSIFIED
Mr. Nickolas Rostow
SUBJECT: (U) Courtesy Letter to.SSCI Regarding the
16 March Budget Bearing withEPSCI
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - Mt. Al Cumming,
- DCI
1 DDCI
1 -.DDCl/CM
� 1 - EXDIR Chrono-
1 - DDA.
1 - tea
1 - DDO
1 - DDS&T
1 - D/OCA
(b)(3) I - RMO/CMS
(10)(7)(ca 1 - DAC
1 - Comptroller
1 - CFO Chrono
1 - CFO ISC
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DCl/CF0t
(CFO 00-1088)
SSCI
(20Mar00)
3
UNCLASSIFIED
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