SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM, HONOLULU - 6 MAY 1963

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06223696
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01096
• Publication Date: May 8, 1963

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8 MAY 1963
MEM *mum fr 14.mm of Central listaWoo=
Deputy Director (Plans)
.Secretary of Volume and-maceoa Vietaanti
itiftelatal 4Wgy 1963
tAIMMAIIX
The conference reviewed the �Curtest situationI Vietnam end projected
Likely Intern developments. It was noted that moo of the build-up of
American essinbmce had been completed and that a number of budgeters
point toward a turning of the thin against the VietiCeng. 'General Harkins
ex4;tregsal the belief that the military phase al the ineurpncy would have
Its back broken within asoduer year. Ambassador Netting tsarina. en
the increated xenophobia of the OVhi and its Oren to reduce the 'political
itowt of Amerlesa advisors. Howe co r e behoved that taut= Is no
major crisis at hand and these temporary problems can be solved with tact
and patience. The strategic hatolet program to pmeediag with great effective
-
wee. The $ecretary of DetitZES directed that planning be initiated ao that
Americans can be 'withdrawn from dime* fighting roles as soon as Vietnamese
can be trained, and to roaditile CNN tere4410 as soon as the insurgency declines,
in order to avoid the economic burden of large forces which would require
continuing taro scale U.L aid. North Vietnam vendors were disclutsted
and to some truest disputed between Admiral Felt and General Wheeler, but
the matter was left that the Army's plea would- be further staffed threttlit the
JCS before a decision was *ought on It and that Is the meantime CIA operations
shoulAt continuo end expand as much as pastas.
I. Getteral Harkins .preeented a &tailed run &Arm of the entensive
step* which lutd been taken by the U.S. to strengthen the Vitri and Its forces.
A review of tho indiratore such as Inside= rates, VC &factors. etc.. all
show a considerable strengthetdas of the OVN. The strategic hamlet and
provincial pacification programs are proceeding in an excelled manner,
except for sums weeknesses to IV Corps. The LeoiCatabcalla border was
viewed as a cantina* problem which would have to be met by hot', regular
and paramilitary forces. General tiarkina* conclusion was that it Is
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esseattal to keep the pressure' relax with those first indtmtless
of SUCCOBO. 11 this is dmis, he indicated that clear indiratteas of victory
would appear is about a year.
2. Ambassador lioittvg commented that In recent we there is
less of as razootrpare of trust and confidence between the OW tmd the
U.S. 146610 the situation Is by no mums critical. ft Is clear that GVN
ceeidsuce is victory has twee increased sod that it is aware of the toilette
hrossitt by Americas advisors and assismuce. It hes. hosvver. Weenie \
setnewitat restive wider the U.S. advisory efforts for the following reasons:
Vietnamese seasithe witiosalleas. long a characteristic of
the loelte-
E A resolution to be independent of whatthey envision the
uncortststtes of U.S. policy. In this regard the Mansfield report
With its invited *mentos of Americen widtdmwal from &adman
Asia caused constdemble tmpact. The U.S. position In Leos has
ids* contribumid to this belie thst U.S. *ley Iseacettele,
e. The =Wilt* impact et advisory effort at sit
levels has sharply consumed the M.
Detrisim these /Palms. Ambassatbr Mling *Atm* that the GV141wu
continue the present programs provided we display tact :told patiesce. The
problem Is dtiefly,at the pruvincial level where many Arnerir.en .advlsors
surround the Dorms province chief, and their own eloctiveuess frequently
dominates his dectsleas. The ertticioto is addressed at both shillala
and military advisors, bet dose Viatt apply to military advisors With military
=tut. Is the civilian sector sows elements to the Racal Affairs Division
of VS-014 believe that a men agreement to ascot an advisory rather duns
a contrellIng role is the dispensing of the .cotmterissargenty fund Waal to
MI owned) will cause the program to fail since U.S. .toilueace will be
redact& Ambassador litelting and the Embassy believe that the program
will teeth= (as it already has ha groat pert without U.S. control) subotigh
it is true that the MS. Whistles .may be titareewhat reduced, The &coat-ay
of Dame accepted the Ambanatutotott judgment and commanted that In no
=wry in the *aid do Amato= tonual the diebusement of tattigeneutt
funds. .Atntaseada .Witing commented that political Inaltuttorte us
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Idzs
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dovoloPileil to s erte etiontet eleettintais NalOnal 6,-CtanniC Comm%
Foreign investmest law, ere.) oatt that Digo Dish Mu has dearly become
a more powerful political flora in the cowry. Amboosether Minns said
be continues to press the Goverment to brim soo-Communist volition
prism= to rapid trial and incomes reparesontstine is the cabinet hy the
uneettles groups.
A briefing on seefoggreonetnic .pretee$0 ewe by Mr. Ste*.
Director of USAID, Salgto. fie moused the toodlest *orb of the Rani
�-,Antdre Divielon bt prelbecial level activities,. primarily in support of the
efts** hamlet :progrms. Mr. Urea pointed sot the critical -problems
'which will arias in the future as a result of the projected lbw billion piastre
atteetal deficit (6% ot GM, which can only podoce: inflation. On the other
heed, direct U.S. suppixtt of the -pisetare wunkt be .probibitively orporenve,
would also have AU islWalitteilary tiffeeto stoce there are not enough commodities
or prod:scam with* the country to- absorb ittio,4putatiiyut plattres� end
would he rejected by the Ui. Congress. The only solution thus would ha
to cut -boat the .arered forces In PT 1666 in order to rtnthice Owdefitch.
Another way to avoid -ottch sdef&oft would be GTh reletteXtee to atiPPeri
countotiostuleacy projects to the *wee we believe so:essary .to make the
program a success in the tociroecenorate Mid, -There was SOW! debate
between Ambassador Nutting tad Mr. *tar. Aototatit Aftlialstrator of
MD for FE, over whether an emergency hood int& be made avail** to
the .Umbeersy to Provide direct piastre support, in cane inflation threatened.
Mr. janow reiterated the obetocies to such ott operation; Axaboommitor
ttleabg pointed sat that the Wig is vending* it rote *deb Use reduced
its dollar reserve far below the level the 11.S. bad accepted as apprePrthte
in the Staley-Ono Report in mid 1961. The Secretary of rettailit requested
the Alubsseeder to advise WrOonstoge if the OVN. altotd4 he& to Pet back
Ito eouoteriztotrgetacy expenditure*.
4. With reaps= to forces, MACY presented projections which
essentially left raptor forces at the current levels for Me yeare., reduced
oomeuttat paramintary forces in PT I-966 sad eliminated traugular forces
at the end ,of the insurgency. The Secretary isketiturted that the toil force
level contemplated was tor too high for a country of 13 tuttlion to reatotain
over an extended period and erephasized the necessity to hrbajg down the
forces in order to avoid a coottating economic drain such as lE!ratit has
required of the U.S. lie Mined as a goal that the MA, 0room be reduced
from its current projected 158 mates (which MACY nays only eatisites
current eapoolitures and to which it has added a ropiest for $0 kodd minion
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tor 'Investmezt and tom improvement) to approximately SO *OW=
for PT dS en the essamptios that the itesurpney is brought under control.
The Seeretsry also empbssined throughout the notatiog the desirebility of
removing U.S. personnel from combat positions a. g., helicopter
air strike pilots, etc., mining Vietnamese to replace them sod if
uocaseary leaving the otetproont is Vietnamese hands. Ho basted that
this matter be studied for huptementatiort as sees as feasible without
hurtles the emisterinsurgesoy effort. ba elle discussion the illgthedil of
control of air attacks and sir strikes were reviewed is detail and tt was
decided that these strike* should continue with the controls 4310,4134 In
force. The Secretary insisted else that a plan be produomi to =dice
U.S. forces by IWO this coining Decorator.
3. The problem of relations between the GVN mid the U.S. press
were reviewed. This continuing problem will be worked on- in the field
and in Washiegtes, primarily by tritoil to aiito thtt U.S. Prom bettsr
OCC044 to the news stories is the *tea.
6. In a restricted session opentioes I A** Vietnam were
discattsed. This baps with a briefing by. CRWPAC officer 40 OMAN
33062 for the overt ersploymest_of U.S. tones against Wrdi Vietnam.
In this plan an ortessive target review has been conducted *ad plats have
been worked out by PACPLT, PAW sad 'MAC. During this &sonatas
reform= was mak to a list of about six targets that the Secntakry of
bad appeready relayed to the President. These hail been pot tow
getter by JCS and were primarily concerned with air strikes for possible
applicationis C4124007154 with the recent dtfiladties in Lass.
7, The CPAC officer then gave 4 briefing on the Dopartment of
Army study of possible operations in North Vietnam, inspired by
General Wheeler's report. The CINCIIAG officer potato:4 eta that the
operational concept required coven tether than even operations. CINCPAC
=sweats were than the *wantons were opproshretely the name t we
being conducted by clA. if* ids* pointed out that the plea
the zee of combat air and that ositfi miser targets were esateinpiated,
so that there was some question whether the plan wield ofrotItivolY *tor
the DAV. In stuontory he urged that CIA he given a chalice to apply its
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Flail Old its now assets Wu limiting dm U $. military itt the covert
bissinees General 'Wheeler took 014;04146nt tte, this presentation of the
Oepartment of Amy study. He samtanted that It was necessary to We
the *true& offitesive *pima Hs Chi fidthit rather than remain on the
defensive. He stated he bed talked to btc.ltfoCone and Coven= Harriman
and both agreed with the objective and with the e1xabU1r t erembiing
the problem to determine the feasibility of * .pregmn. In this exwelnatioa
he stated it had been determined that an overt program 'would est be teaslititi.
s CIA resoucea
reduced their potaiitial. He thee believed it essentlect _tary
operations wider the guise_ asThtuatiorec detijoted_set to Istrite
but ter pitte_ejk_rettenre_gpo�iiiplen costeropiated that CM
upend Its '3 wallstetal operations" but that MACVaged ouzIzo
ASSISS In this cove ii_o_w_vithe asme way it verrently
OVN assets word Ta Soo* Vietnam/ ifs alto commented that a joist
Lbacetveutloi3al 'Shuteye Ins ora weuld be it l'ittahlished to 409:1410110
mU1*ar and CIA-eperatiose. lie stood that the mow was wordy $ study
and preaennthen to the *acid Grow end freshisat .11,:tentedy naturally
depended spat CINC/Atra comae:Hs and viftwitft Mallessesitur Nadu
betioved he 40111d get 'President Dlenice two� val. The -Secretary commented
that 010 Jel but tot yet accepted the study and that it &mold be staffed
thrtatei JCS ter father review and consideration. .A4mbra1 Veit thee en*
pressed his disagreement wIth General Vimeler'a position nod again
emphasized that taA has the capability. that ,MACit Shesid not be engaged
In *overt operations to North Vietnam and that CIA should be allowed le
testiest In its present activity.
a. Mr. Richardson then oresseted areview et the Selman Stetiera
ProStaal.
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would be further considered le liNstiltienton end ileat we would keen him
advistd ef any needs. Comet:
ft to believed that we de 3oot need say further Department etDefense
assistance thala thin presentiy scheduled end that the /belts ea ear capabilities
In 1963 ere prittierily Vietnamese rather dust Annerieee. mega WM
be reviewed, however* sad a seemerandure prep wed stustesriodes the
situation for the Dirmer pesethly to use in cAotects with the Seerassy of
Defense
ee DDel
Distribution:
Original and 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
2 - DDP
� 1 - ADDP
1 - CFE
1 -
1 FE/VNC
/84 4. Co2by
E.
chief, pia. FAist Dtvlstcn
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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