NIE 53-63: THE PROSPECTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06223593
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: July 31, 2024
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2024
• Case Number: F-2014-01314
• Publication Date: February 14, 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGERCY
11+ February
MEXORANLUM FOR: Mr. ALlan Evans, state (31111)
,Colonel K. T. Gould, USA (DIA).
�Colonel Paul E. Pigue, USA (ACS?)
-Captain G. iicodenrus USN (ONI).
'colonel A. E. Stoll, USAF (MOW 2B2),
Colonel G. R. Ronka,
Polity Staff1 NSA-
SUBIEOT: NIE 1.;HE pROSPEOTG;IN :SE1fitiltiztNAM
The attached conclusions and poet,:nortem.,-for. ai4ijeot:
estimate are forwarded for review These items viii bel
considered, with the text derted 11.,FebruarY'1963...at: a meeting,
of the UST]) representatives" zehedialed for -1000, "Wednesday,
20 February.
DIStrbibOTION B
?MCP SMITH
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
;.GROUP
Ex& u
dongradind
40o40.44,04t:
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S. -
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
14 February 1963
SUBJECT: DIE 53-63: PRCSPECTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
THE PRCOLEM
To assess the situation and prospects in South Vietnam, with
special emphasis upon the military and political factors most likely
to affect the counterinsurgency effort.'
CONCLUSIONS
A. The Communists are trying to win control of South Vietnam
by a campaign of political saveraion in which military action plays
an important part. They do not appear to be so much Interested in
seizing or holding territory as in creating a general atmosphere of
insecurity, eroding the government image, and sapping the morale of
its cadres and supporters.
Hanoi.
The campaign is largely directed from
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GROUP 1
Exclude rem automatic
downgrading
declassificati
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B. The Communist military effort involves about 20,000-24,000
full time regular military personnel and about 100,000 local aux-
iliaries. Cadres for the regular forces and most of the heavier
and more complex equipment are infiltrated from North Vietnam. For
lighter weapons, ammunition, and related equipment, they rely pri-
marily upon capture. They also rely upon indigenous sources for
food and other nonmilitary Suppd.ies. The guerrilla effort could
continue to exist without outside support, but this support has
almost certainly been essential to the higher levels of military
effort achieved in the last year or so.
C. The South Vietnamese counterguerrilla effort has been
strengthened during the past year by retraining, reevipment, and
improved tactical mobility. Nevertheless, substantial weaknesses
remain. Among these are a lack of aggressive and firm leadership
.at all levels of command, a high desertion rate, leek of trust
between peasant and so dIg.r, very inadequate intelligence, and
Communist penetration of the South Vietnamese military and civil
establishment.
D. In an effort to attack the basic political problem and to
restore a degree of confidence in tbe goverment, two comlamentary
polltico-militarypxograms, the strategic hamlet program and
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clear-and-hold operations, have been instituted and have met with
some success. However, the government appears to overestimate the
value of the former and to underestimate the importance of the
latter; hence, the two programs have not been effectively executed
in harmony with each other.
E. During the past year, US involvement has apparently enabled
the South Vietnamese regime to check Communist progress and even to
improve the situation in some areas. However, there is not at present
any adequate basis for a judgment that the tide is running either in
one direction or the other.
F. We believe the Communists still aim to win control of
South Vietnam without resorting to open invasion. We believe they
will continue to wage a war of attrition while standing ready to
exploit any opportunity which might arise. They evidently hope that
a combination of military pressure against the South Vietnamese
regime and political deterioration within it will either create
favorable circumstances for delivering a coup de grace or will lead
to a political settlement, similar to that in laose which would pro-
vide the opportunity to continue the struggle on more favorable
terms..
3
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S-E- -E-T
G. With US help, the South Vietnamese regime stands a good
chance of at least containing the Communists militarily. However,
the modus orerandi of the'Diom government, and particularly its
measures to prevent the rise of contenders for political power,
have reduced the gcmernment's effectiveness, both politically and
militarily. We believe that unless radical changes are made in
these methods of government, there is little hoe that the US in-
volvement can be substantially curtailed or that there will be a
material and lasting reduction in the Communist threat.
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-R-E-T
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