THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06188543
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2021
• Case Number: F-2018-01010

Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
ET
CIA Internal Use Only
From 080 and OPC to
the Clandestine Services
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES1
Ludwell Lee Montague
This paper. ... is designed to create a single overseas clandestine service, while at the
same time preserving the integrity of the long-range espionage and counterespionage
niission of CIA from amalgamation into those clandestine activities which are subject to
short term variations in the prosecution of the Cold War.... There is no reason why
the establishment of a single chain of command and of uniform administrative procedures
would have any effect of submerging specialized OSO or OPC missions and techniques if
intelligently applied.
� Bedell Smith, 15 July 1952
Bedell Smith's third major achievement as Director of Central Intelligence
was his organization of the Clandestine Services? The idea of integrating the
Office of Special Operations (OSO) and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)
had been advocated by Allen Dulles since 1948, but was initially opposed by
Smith. Until the adoption of NSC 10/5 (October 1951), Smith sought to make a
clear distinction between the intelligence activities of CIA, including clandestine
collection by OSO, and the covert operations of OPC. Thereafter this idea became
less important to him and the advantages of a simpler chain of command and con-
trol over all overseas operations more attractive. In the end, it was Smith who
dictated the terms of the merger, in July 1952. Only a man of his force of
character could have imposed it on OSO.
The Dulles Concept
In May 1948, Allen Dulles moved to counter a State Department proposal
by advising the NSC that clandestine intelligence collection and covert operations
should be under the control of a single director. That intervention resulted in the
establishment of OPC in CIA, though not under the clear control of the DCI.
In the division of labor within the NSC Survey Group, Allen Dulles took as
his province not only all CIA clandestine operations, for both intelligence collec-
tion and political action, but also all of CIA's overt collection activities as well.
Not surprisingly, the NSC Survey Group found that all such activities should be
brought under a single direction below the level of the DCI. Specifically, its
recommendation was that OSO, OPC, the Contact Branch of the Office of Opera-
tions (00), and perhaps also the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch (FBIB)
of 00, should be "integrated" in a new self-sufficient and semiautonomous
"Operations Division."
This is Chapter III, Volume IV, of the late Ludwell Montague's History, General Walter
Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950�February 1953. As in the case of the
preceding Chapter II, source references have been omitted here but are to be found in an appendix
to the original in the DCI Historical Series.
2 The other two were his development of a cooperative relationship with the LAC and his
0
reorganization of the DDI offices pursuant to NSC 50. In general, Smith preferred to say that he
had organized CIA (which he had found unorganized). That was substantially true.
25
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
SECRET Clandestine Services
In adopting the recommendations of NSC 50, the NSC adopted this recom-
mendation, excluding the FBIB, and directed the DCI to carry it out. Admiral
Hillenkoetter promptly submitted a plan for this purpose, but, inasmuch as it
required the amendment of NSC 10/2 in a way that would transfer the effective
control of OPC from State to the DCI, it was not adopted. (Apparently that
consequence of the Survey Group's recommendation had not been foreseen!)
Thus, when Bedell Smith became DCI in October 1950, the situation with regard
to OSO, OPC, and 00 remained exactly as it had been in January 1949, when
the NSC Survey Group submitted the recommendations of Allen Dulles to
the NSC.
Bedell Smith's Initial Concept
On 12 October 1950, General Smith told the NSC that he would promptly
comply with the direction contained in NSC 50, with one exception: he would not
merge OSO, OPC, and the Contact Branch of 00. The NSC accepted that
exception without inquiring why the DCI was opposed to the merger, or what
alternative arrangement he had in mind.
There is no record of Smith's reasons for making this exception. From his
subsequent actions, however, two considerations can be inferred: (1) he wished to
maintain a clear distinction between clandestine intelligence collection and covert
action operations by preserving an organizational distinction between OSO and
OPC, and (2) he hoped to effect the necessary coordination between them by
appointing a Deputy Director to have supervision of both. That Deputy Director
was, of course, Allen Dulles.
Although it thus appears that Bedell Smith intended, from the first, to have a
Deputy particularly charged with the supervision and coordination of OSO and
OPC, he realized also, from the first, that two CIA units operating independently
in the same overseas area would require some local supervision and coordination.
For this purpose he devised a system of Senior Representatives (of the DCI)
abroad.
Smith's intention to appoint such Senior Representatives was known in
OSO as early as 12 October 1950�one week after Smith had taken office as DCI,
one month before Dulles came to Washington as a consultant, two and a half
months before Dulles took office as DDP. In short, this was Smith's idea, not
Dulles's, and it, like the appointment of a DDP, was intended to be a substitute
for the integration of OSO and OPC, not a step in that direction.3
The first Senior Representative to be appointed was
Other Senior Representatives were stationed in
Vienna, Frankfurt, Teheran, The most notable of them
Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.,
3 To quiet apprehensions in OSO that the appointment of Senior Representatives would be a
first step toward integration, the ADSO (Colonel Robert Schow) gave out assurances that General
Smith had no such intention.
4
26
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
Clandestine Services
in Frankfurt.5
(b)(1)
SECRET (b)(3)
These Senior Representatives were not in the chain of command. That still
ran from the ADSO or the ADPC to the respective station chiefs in the field. The
Senior Representatives were, essentially, local observers for the DCI, reporting
directly to him and not subject to let or hindrance by the ADSO, the ADPC, or
the DDP. They were to be kept fully informed by the field stations under their
supervision, and could intervene with advice, though not with orders. Their
leverage was that, if their advice was disregarded, they would submit their
recommendations to the DCI, who would then issue his own orders to the ADSO
or ADPC.
This was not a good system of command and control. It was, perhaps, the
best that could be contrived at the time, given a basic decision that the operations
of OSO and OPC must be kept separate and distinct.
Creeping Integration
Allen Dulles was of the same opinion still. The steps that he took, as DDP,
to coordinate the activities of OSO and OPC were plainly designed to lead
eventually to integration.
That coordination was sorely needed is evidenced by a memorandum dated
7 February 1951 from the DCI's Executive Assistant (Lyman Kirkpatrick) for
the DDP (Allen Dulles). Both OSO and OPC had made independent approaches
to the same individuals and groups with a view to recruitment. There was similar
confusing duplication in the two Offices' operational liaison with other U.S.
agencies and further duplication in such matters as
communications and procurement. OSO was concerned lest the security of its
long-term clandestine penetrations be jeopardized by OPC's widespread
contacts.6
Kirkpatrick's memorandum prompted Dulles to call a meeting on the subject
of OSO-OPC coordination. The outcome of that meeting was merely the appoint-
ment of a committee to study the subject and submit recommendations. It is
significant, however, that Kirkpatrick recorded the proceedings under the title of
"Meeting on Integration of OSO and OPC." Thus it appears that the thrust of
the discussion was toward integration, although integration was contrary to the
policy of the DCI at the time.
The committee appointed on 14 February was composed of Richard Helms
(0S0), Kilbourne Johnston (OPC), and John O'Gara (DDA). They rendered
their report a month later. In essence, it recommended that certain administrative
and support functions common to OSO and OPC be integrated, but that the
operational elements of the two Offices be kept distinctly separate.
Meanwhile, by direction of the DDP, a process had already been begun which
plainly pointed toward the eventual integration of the operating elements of the
two offices. As a first step, the ADPC, Frank Wisner, met on 3 March with the
Lt. Gen. Truscott had been a
distinguished combat commander in Sicily, Italy, and, Southern France. He completed his
military career as Fifth Army commander in Italy and Third Army commander in occupied Bavaria.
Kirkpatrick, 35 in 1951, was a highly ambitious young man. As Executive Assistant, and
later as ADSO, he was always "playing his own game"�not OSO's. His constant objective was to
outflank Frank Wisner, as ADPC and later as DDP.
27
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
SECRET Clandestine Services
new ADSO, Major General Willard Wyman,7 and they agreed upon a redefinition
of the territories to be covered by their respective area divisions, so that they
would correspond exactly to one another. The next step was to rearrange the office
space allotted to these divisions, so that the corresponding divisions would be
adjacent to each other. This required finding enough extra space to hold one
complete division "in transit" while another moved into the space the first had
vacated, and so on. It was not easily done in the cramped quarters available. By
the end of June, however, it had been accomplished. And it could be anticipated
that, when this rearrangement had been made, the next step would be the appoint-
ment of a common chief for each pair of divisions.
So it happened. On 9 June 1951 the ADSO and the ADPC agreed to combine
their small Latin American divisions into one common Western Hemisphere
Division. Its Chief, from OSO, reported to both Assistant Directors. Below him,
the OSO and OPC elements of the combined division remained distinct. This was
not yet true integration, but it was coming close.
Meanwhile, in March, Wyman proposed to Wisner that their overseas operat-
ing bases targeted against the USSR should be combined, beginning in Germany.
The DM himself approved that proposal, on 18 April.
Thus it will be seen that by the summer of 1951 Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner,
and Willard Wyman had gone a long way toward integrating OSO and OPC,
despite the fact that during the same period Bedell Smith�who still hoped to rid
himself of most of OPC's operational commitments�was constantly directing
them to keep the operations of OSO and OPC separate and distinct. Dulles,
Wisner, and Wyman complied, technically, with Smith's direction, but it is
evident that they were working toward integration as an ultimate objective, an
objective that General Smith was not yet prepared to approve.
It is also evident that General Wyman's attitude in this respect was quite
different from that of the old hands in OSO as represented by Richard Helms.
The 080 Attitude Toward Integration
OSO was derived from the clandestine services of OSS.8 By 1951 it had been
a going concern for ten years, and its old hands regarded themselves as profes-
sional clandestine operators. From their point of view, OPC was a parvenu, its
ranks composed of enthusiastic, but inexperienced, amateurs. To be sure, some
members of OPC were OSS veterans, notably Frank Wisner, the ADPC, but they
had left the service at the end of the war and so had not had the continuous
experience of the OSO professionals. Moreover, they had not shared in OSO's
struggle to survive in the postwar world, and so could not really be members
of the clan.
Another factor in OSO's antipathy toward OPC was that OPC was born rich,
while OSO remained relatively poor. That was true not only of Office budgets,
but of personal pay. Since the establishment of the OSO grade and pay structure,
there had been a general inflation in such matters. In order to recruit, OPC had
to offer higher grades than were available in OSO for similar work. Thus the
"amateurs" in OPC were, generally, better paid than the professionals in OSO.
That must have rankled.
7General Wyman relieved Colonel Schow as ADSO on 15 February 1951. Wyman had no
intelligence experience, but considerable command experience overseas. ,
8 When OSS was dismembered, 1 October 1945, these elements became the War Department's
Strategic Services Unit (SSU). OSO was derived from SSU and activated on 11 July 1946, although
organizational continuity was then technically broken.
28
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
Clandestine Services SECRET
A related factor was that OPC was expanding rapidly, while OSO remained
generally static. Consequently the prospects for promotion were better in OPC.
Another source of institutional jealousy was that OSO was committed to a
long-term and, by definition, unspectacular task, while much of OPC's work was
designed to produce an immediate or early impact, from which a sense of current
achievement could be derived.9 The urgency with which OPC undertook these
tasks made it easy for the OSO professionals to regard the OPC "amateurs" as
reckless adventurists. And, given OPC's dependence on OSO's clandestine con-
tacts, there was some substance to OSO's concern lest OPC's operations expose
OSO's assets. OSO's operations were not by nature self-revealing, but the effect
of any successful OPC operation would necessarily be noticeable, and therefore
might provoke investigation and counteraction by the enemy.
On 24 May 1951, William Jackson, the DDCI, brought the subject of in-
tegration into the open. In reporting on his survey of OPC, he recommended
"that ultimately covert intelligence and covert operations be administered
through a single command chain down to the station level." That recommenda-
tion evidently reflected OPC's then current view. It was made subject to
confirmation after Jackson had completed his survey of OSO.
Four days later, by coincidence, the Senior Representative
attended the Weekly Staff Conference and strongly urged the integration
of OSO and OPC. must have complained that the OSO and OPC personnel
were more loyal to their respective home offices than they were to him,
for Bedell Smith took the occasion to lay down the law that their primary loyalty
must be to the Agency, and consequently to the DCI's personal representative.
It appears that William Jackson never rendered a written report on his
survey of OSO, which was made during July and August.19 There is in the record,
however, a lengthy memorandum from Lyman Kirkpatrick, the new DADS0,11
to Jackson, dated 31 August 1951 and self-said to be based on Kirkpatrick's
participation in Jackson's survey of OSO. This memorandum may have been
intended to serve as a contribution to Jackson's eventual report. It was decidedly
at variance with the view that Jackson had acquired in OPC.
Kirkpatrick certainly did not contemplate an integrated chain of command
down to station level. Rather, he recommended a redefinition of functions so that
OSO would hold a monopoly of all contacts with clandestine agents and under-
ground organizations, whether for intelligence collection or for covert action
operations, and OPC would be left with only such political and psychological
activities as did not involve such contacts.12 This proposal became the key to
OSO's attitude toward integration from that time forward: that any merger of
OSO and OPC functions should occur within OSO, under OSO control.
9 It should be noticed, however, that a large part of OPC's work consisted of planning and
preparations for contingencies that might never arise.
HI Jackson ceased to be DDCI on 3 August, when he signed a personal services contract (WAE).
He returned to private business but remained active in CIA affairs as the DCI's Special Assistant
and Senior Consultant. In 1956 President Eisenhower named Jackson Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs. Jackson later retired to Arizona, where he died on 28 September 1971.
Allen Dulles succeeded Jackson as DDCI on 23 August 1951, at which time Frank Wisner
became DDP and Kilbourne Johnston ADPC.
Kirkpatrick, the DCI's first Executive Assistant, became DADSO on 1 July and ADSO on
17 December.
12 Incidentally, he recommended also that the Contact Branch, 00, of which he had once
been Chief, be transferred from 00 to OSO.
29
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
SECRET Clandestine Services
Kirkpatrick recommended also "that the staff of the DDP be held to an
absolute minimum so that the present operating offices will not be echeloned down
to a lower level, and that the operating support units being currently gathered
around DDP not become the tail wagging the operating dog, just as the CIA
administrative staff once did." Whatever the merits of that matter, this reference
to the findings of the NSC Survey Group was a plain appeal to Jackson's prejudice
against Hillenkoetter's administrative staff.
When Kirkpatrick wrote, there were three integrated special staff units
directly subordinate to the DDP: Covert Training, Communications, and Techni-
cal Services. On 25 September, Frank Wisner, the new DDP, added three
general staff units: Plans, Operations, and Administration and Logistics. Whether
or not Wisner was then aware of Kirkpatrick's out-of-channels memorandum for
Jackson, his course as DDP was diametrically opposite to Kirkpatrick's
recommendation.
Moreover, on 3 October 1951, Wisner proceeded to create a second merged
area division by combining the Middle Eastern divisions of OPC and OSO.
Again the chief of the combined division was from OSO, but this time he was given
two deputies, one from OPC and one from 0S0.13 Wisner stressed that the
constituent area branches of the two antecedent divisions and their field opera-
tions were not to be merged�for the time being.
On 24 October General Wyman, on his return from a visit to the Far East,
strongly urged upon General Smith the necessity of integrating the field opera-
tions of OSO and OPC, but his idea of how that should be done was similar to
Kirkpatrick's recommendation to Jackson in August. Wyman supplemented his
memorandum for Smith with another for Jackson which supplies the following
quotation: "I strongly believe that those functions now regarded as belonging to
OPC, but which are of a purely clandestine intelligence nature, should be con-
trolled by those individuals engaged in intelligence work." On 13 November
Allen Dulles (DDCI) reported to the Director's morning meeting that General
Wyman felt strongly "that operations should be subordinated to intelligence."
That generalized statement was not a precise reflection of the Wyman-
Kirkpatrick position, but shows how it was understood (and reacted to) by
Dulles, and also by Wisner and Kilbourne Johnston.
General Wyman departed on 13 December 1951, to accept a command in
Korea. Lyman Kirkpatrick succeeded him as ADSO on 17 December and Richard
Helms became DADSO.
The DC I Accepts Integration as a Goal
It appears that the turning point in Bedell Smith's attitude toward integra-
tion was the NSC's adoption of NSC 10/5, on 23 October 1951. The NSC thereby
approved the immediate expansion of OPC and the intensification of its activities.
In particular, it committed Smith to bring about an expansion and intensification
The NSC discussion of the subject showed Smith
that there was no chance that he would be able to transfer responsibility for
guerrilla operations from CIA to the JCS. He promptly withdrew NSC 10/4
from further consideration.
From that point onward, the question was not whether OSO and OPC would
be integrated, but only how that should be done.
30
ui The three men were Kermit Roosevelt,
and Miles Copeland.
2
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
Clandestine Services SECRET
On 8 January 1952 Smith signed an order prepared by Wisner directing that
the remaining area divisions of OSO and OPC be merged. The merged divisions
would be responsible directly to the DDP, as a single operating service. Thus the
chain of command would run from the DCI through the DDP to the division
chiefs, and the ADSO and ADPC would become merely staff officers to the DDP.
At the same time, Wisner mentioned the low state of morale in OSO and
OPC. Both Kirkpatrick (the ADSO) and Johnston (the ADPC) wished to see
Smith about that. Smith evaded Kirkpatrick's request to brief him on the merger,
but consented to visit OPC for morale-building purposes. There Smith confessed
to the principal officers of OPC that he "screamed like a wounded buffalo"
when disappointed but said that they must not take that too hard. He really
appreciated their operational skill and devoted service; he depended on them.
That apparently took care of the morale problem in OPC.
Meanwhile OSO was fighting a rear guard action. On 31 January Richard
Helms, then Acting ADSO, saw Frank Wisner and Gerald Miller (DADPC) and
persuaded them, he believed, to slow down the merger process. He said that he
was not opposing the merger as such, but that he was concerned regarding the
security of OSO's clandestine assets if the ADSO were to lose control of his own
operations and personnel to the chiefs of the merged divisions. In short, the ADSO
must be kept in the chain of command, at least for the time being. (b)(1)
By March 1952 it was felt in the ADPC's staff that any further progress (b)(3)
toward integration, particularly in the field, would be resisted by the ADSO and
his immediate staff, though not by the OSO personnel in the merged divisions.
Integration in Germany
The integration of OSO and OPC activities in Germany proceeded in
parallel with integration in Washington and ahead of integration elsewhere
the field (except for the very small OSO and OPC stations whicl(b)(3)
had merged in the fall of 1951). General Lucian Truscott's development of
integration in Germany made a contribution to thought on the subject in Wash-
ington, and served as a prototype for subsequent integration overseas.
General Truscott, the DCI's Senior Representative in Germany, was baffled
by a system that gave him no command authority over the OSO and OPC
stations under his supervision. That seemed to him contrary to sound military
principles. Truscott an�: the OPC qtetinn of which was Chief,
were both housed in the in Frankfurt. The OSO station, of (b)(1)
(b)(3)
which Gordon Stewart was Chief,14 was some 100 miles away at Karlsruhe.
In November 1951, when the office of the U.S. High Commissioner, Germany
(HICOG), in Frankfurt, became the American Embassy, Bonn,
and Truscott arranged to have the OSO
station move up from Karlsruhe. While they were about it, Truscott, Stewart,
and agreed to merge the two stations, with Stewart as Chief of Station (b)(1)
and as Deputy Chief. Richard Helms (DADSO) and John Bross (OPC) (b)(3)
came to Frankfurt to discuss that idea. They were favorably impressed, but
Helms concluded that Truscott should be Chief of Station with two deputies.
Truscott needed no better cue than that. He assumed command of the
merged German Station, with Stewart as his deputy, and proceeded to organize
it on military lines, with a clear distinction between staff and line functions. The (b)(3)
(b)(3)
14Stewart, twice Chief of the German Station, became Director of Personnel (1957-60), a
member of the Board of National Estimates (1966-68), and Inspector General (March 1968 until
his retirement).
31
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
� Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
SECRET Clandestine Services
OSO and OPC station staffs became two staff sections in his headquarters.15 The
line units were the operating bases in the field.
On 3 March 1952 General Truscott arrived in Washington with Tom
Polgar to brief the DCI on his plan for the integration of the German Station.
General Smith was highly pleased. At his request, Polgar went aside and dia-
grammed a plan for the integration of OSO and OPC derived from Truscott's
plan for the integration of the German Station. Polgar's diagram was, in essence,
the plan that Smith adopted on 15 July.
The immediate effect of Truscott's presentation on Smith is indicated by a
conversation that Smith had with Kirkpatrick and Johnston about ten days
later. They were discussing certain operational failures in the Far East. Smith
attributed those failures to the attempt to run operations in the field from desks
in Washington. What CIA needed; Smith declared, was area commanders with
their command posts in the field and only backstop desks in Washington.
On 25 June 1952 the DDP, without consulting the ADSO or the ADPC,
sanctioned Truscott's organization of the German Station by approving his
proposed table of organization. Wisner was pleased to note that Truscott's plan
was already working well in practice. He emphasized that Truscott had already
proved that there was no substance to the OSO contention that, in an integrated
situation, OPC "dynamism" would overwhelm the intelligence function.
Integration Accomplished
On 17 April 1952 Wisner, Johnston, and Kirkpatrick met at Johnston's
home in Fairfax. Wisner and Johnston understood that Kirkpatrick then agreed
to proceed toward the more complete integration of OSO and OPC, and in
particular to clarify the command position of the DDP and the staff positions of
the ADSO and the ADPC. The next morning Wisner reported this happy devel-
opment at the Director's morning meeting. Smith then remarked that it was not
necessary to go too far toward integration, that the merger was really a matter
of coordination.
The substance of this so-called "Fairfax Agreement" was already clearly
implicit in General Smith's order of 8 January. Thus the agreement, if there was
one, was nothing more than an agreement to proceed further toward the imple-
mentation of that order. Two weeks later, however, Kirkpatrick submitted a
plan for "integration" that was radically at variance with Smith's order, as well
as with the supposed "Fairfax Agreement," but entirely consistent with Kirk-
patrick's recommendations to Jackson in August 1951 and with the principle
advocated by Helms in March 1951 and January 1952. The essence of it was
that the ADSO would retain command of OSO.
Kirkpatrick proposed that OPC should be divided into two offices, Psycho-
logical Warfare and Para-military Activities. Those two offices and OSO "should
retain their integrity as offices with separate, independent staffs and with full
command control under DDP of their personnel, budget and missions." There
should, however, be a strong Vice DDP to give operational and management
direction to them and to control compartmentalization between them."
Kirkpatrick's proposal of 2 May 1952 was the last stand of OSO against
integration.
15 A third staff section was an intelligence research unit that Truscott had inherited from HICOG.
16Kirkpatrick would have been the logical candidate for appointment as Vice DDP. It is not
clear what there would have been left for the DDP to do.
32
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
� Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
Clandestine Services SECRET
Kilbourne Johnston, the ADPC, forwarded Kirkpatrick's proposal to Frank
Wisner, the DDP, with a furious, but cogent, memorandum of dissent. It is not
apparent what Wisner did then, but it is evident that Kirkpatrick's paper did
reach Bedell Smith in one way or another. Smith rejected Kirkpatrick's concep-
tion of a trifurcated command structure, but he adapted some of Kirkpatrick's
ideas to his own conception of a single chain of command down to the chiefs of
merged overseas stations.
The next development was a meeting in late May arranged by Wisner and
attended by Smith, Wisner, Johnston, and Helms (as Acting ADSO in Kirk-
patrick's absence). The result of that meeting was that Helms prepared at Smith's
direction a draft dated 4 June 1952 and entitled "A Proposed Organization of the
CIA Clandestine Services." The military analogies contained in that paper
strongly suggest that its organizational conception had been dictated by Bedell
Smith himself. Certainly that conception differed radically from Helms's previous
ideas on the subject, while conforming to the concept of Smith's order of 8
January. One may infer that Helms perceived that the time for argument was
over and that he loyally wrote as Smith directed. One may infer also that he was
made the drafter in order to silence OSO opposition. Nevertheless, it is notable
that much of the language of Smith's final version, dated 15 July, was taken ver-
batim from Helms's 4 June draft. Thus, ironically, it was Richard Helms who
drafted the final order for the integration of OSO and OPC.
Bedell Smith, however, personally prepared his own text for that final order.
On 30 June 1952 he desired to have Wisner, Kirkpatrick, Johnston, Hedden
(the Inspector General), and White (the Assistant DDA) review a revised draft
of his own paper entitled "CIA Clandestine Services�Description of Proposed
Organization" and suggest any final changes that they might wish to make in it.
The next day Gerald Miller, the Acting ADPC, advised Wisner that he should
accept Smith's draft "with enthusiasm" and press to have it issued as a directiveP
In early July Bedell Smith personally cleared his draft with David Bruce,
the Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, the Secretary of Defense, and
Sidney Souers, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.
The final version of Smith's paper was issued as a directive on 15 July 1952,
under the title "Organization of CIA Clandestine Services." Its stated purpose
was to create a single overseas clandestine service while at the same time protect-
ing the long-term espionage mission of CIA from becoming lost in multifarious
opportunistic and urgent covert operations. (See text at the head of this chapter.)
Smith reaffirmed his decision of 8 January to establish a single chain of
command from himself as DCI through the DDP and the chiefs of the merged
� area divisions to the chiefs of merged stations overseas. To this end, the DDP
would assume the residual command functions of the ADSO and the ADPC.
The DDP would be assisted by a Chief of Operations who would serve as
both his deputy and his chief of staff. This position may have been suggested by
Kirkpatrick's proposed "Vice DDP," but it reflected also Smith's military
experience. Kirkpatrick was appointed to the office, but was unable to serve
because of his severe illness (polio), which began on 20 July. Richard Helms
substituted for Kirkpatrick as Acting Chief of Operations until he was appointed
to that position in his own right, on 26 February 1953.
"Given the textual correspondence between Helms's 4 June draft an Smith's 15 July text,
it is virtually certain that Smith's 30 June text was derived from Helms's draft and substantially
identical with the 15 July version.
33
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543
SECRET Clandestine Services
The Chief of Operations, as chief of staff, would supervise five staff units:
Foreign Intelligence, Political and Psychological Warfare, Paramilitary Opera-
tions, Technical Support, and Administration. Foreign Intelligence was the former
staff of the ADSO. Its function was to exercise staff supervision of the espionage
and counterespionage operations of the merged divisions and stations. Its
designated chief had been Richard Helms, the former DA DSO. Similarly, Political
and Psychological Warfare and Paramilitary Operations represented the division
of OPC recommended by Kirkpatrick, but here they appeared as staff units
rather than as line offices. Gerald Miller, the former DADPC, was made Chief
of the Political and Psychological Warfare Staff."
The DCI's Senior Representatives abroad were assigned command authority
over all CIA activities in their respective areas of responsibility.
General Smith emphasized that in this structure there were only two echelons
of command authority: the DCI in Washington and the Senior Representatives
abroad. The DDP and his division chiefs had only delegated authority, as the
executive agents of the DC1.
This order went into effect on 1 August 1952. OSO and OPC then ceased to
exist. In their stead there was a single organization with a plural name, The
Clandestine Services.
18Ki1bourne Johnston, the ADPC, had resigned. Miller served as Chief, PP Staff, for only one
month and was then made Senior Representative
34
Approved for Release: 2021/05/18 C06188543