O/NE CONSULTANTS CONFERENCE, PRINCETON, 4 - 5 DECEMBER 1958

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06186302
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: January 5, 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
$ Jetuary 1959
STAFF MEMORANDUM No. 10.59
SUBJECT: 0/NE Consultants Conference, Princeton, 4 . 5 December 1958
Participants:
Consultants
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Cyril Black
George Kennan
Klaus Knorr
William Langer
Harold Linder
Philip Mosely
Joseph Strayer
T. Cuyler Young
Agenda:
1.
2.
CIA
Allen lir. Dulles
Abbot Smith
DeForest Van Slyck
Richard Burks
James Graham
Don Harris
Willard MatthiAte
Discussion of BOUNDER.
NIE 11-4-58, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies
4MORE21.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
121 OSCLASSIFIED
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Nar REVIEW GATE;
AUTH: r7r2
(b)(3)
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--SBeltET�
NIB 11-448
1. Alter a brief discussion of the BOUNDER, the consultants
concentrated their attention on paragraph 11 of the military chapter of
NIE 11-448, which states that "Soviet military theoreticians do not
regard surprise as the decisive factor in the outcome of a major war
between great powers." The general tendency of the consultants was to
controvert this statement.
The question of surpexe attack
2. MOSELY was of the opinion that the published Soviet articles
on surprise attack were not the operationally significant literature.
Until the USSR had a significant bomber force it did not permit public
discussion of air attack. Nor will the Soviet government allow public
discussion of missiles until they have built up substantial strength in
them. KENNAN was inclined, on the other hand, to credit the available
literature as genuinely reflective of Soviet thinking, but to treat
their view of surprise attack as ideologically conditioned. The Soviets
could not admit to themselves that any weapon could destroy the "Socialist
achievement." To do so would be to deny the Marxian doctrine of the
Inevitability of Socialism.
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3. There was some criticism of the paragraphs on surprise attack,
mainly from KENNAN, on the grounds that they ignored the Wolfstetter
doctaine of the second strike. Western retaliatory capacity is by-and-
large "soft," that is, vulnerable to attack and known to the enemy. For
the next few years US second strike capability will be so low that
surprise may well have an important premium on it. As the number of
Soviet missiles increases this up disadvantage becomes overwhelming.
MOSELY suggested that since we do not know Where their missile bases
are located, we would have to direct our retaliatory force against
Soviet cities, a procedure satisfactory onilyif the war were long and
drawn-out.
4. LANGER and MOSELY thought of still another possible reason
why Soviet military writers might think that surprise attack would not
be decisive in a war between two great powers, her Soviet doctrine,
they suggested, meant only that, in the initial stages of the conflict,
the Soviets would limit their nuclear strikes to Western retaliatory
capability, in order to have something left worth conquering. The
second stage of the war, the occupation of Western territory by means
of conventional weapons, might be lengthy, but the issue would never he
in doubt.
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5. KNORR was the only consultant who showed any inclination to
accept the view that surprise might not be decisive. He averred that
studies undertaken by the Rand Corporation had shown that atomic damage
*tuld be greatly reduced by modest expenditure. The Soviet leaders
could be aware of this. MOSELY interjected that Rand studies do not
necessarily reflect Air Force thinking.
Sino -Soviet relations
6. The question was raised whether paragraphs 17 and 20 of the
chapter. of NIE 11-4-55 which dealt with intra-Bloc relations did not
Place altogether too much emphasis on the possibility of serious dif-
ferences arising between the Chinese and their Soviet ally. On this
issue the consultants divided. MOSEL; supportcd by 'STRAYER, felt
strongly that the paragraphs gave too much hope that the Chinese and the
Soviets might quarrel. KENNAN, LANGER, LINDER, and YOUNG were of the
contrary view.
7. The KENNAN Voup emphasized the primary of national interests.
They pointed to the prospect of an enormous growth in Chinese industry,
populations and power. They refused to believe that the ideological
bond with Russia obliterated the Chinese national past. Had the Chinese
really forgotten that Soviet Central Asia and the tiaritime Province*
had once been parts of the Chinese empire Differences certainly must
ow
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arise as to whether Peiping or Moscow is to serve as the center for
Asiatic Communism. In event of a break, Peiping would carry with it
all of the Asian parties except the Indian and the Japanese, and even
the Japanese party is split over which of the two capitals it should
look to for leadership. Soviet economic aid to Communist China had
apparently either ceased or been substantially reduced. In 1952 it was
clear to those in the American Embassy in Moscow that the negotiations
between Mao and Stalin were both prolonged and difficult. Transportation-
wise and quantity-wise, Chinese demands are compet:Itive with the needs
of Siberia.
8. MOSELY and his supporters, on the otner hand, felt that
entirely too much time was wasted on speculation r-Igarding a breach
between the Chinese and the Russians: both have too much to gain by
sticking together; the frictions which arise betweer them would develop
practical significance only if they succeeded in driving the US out
of Asia. Sinkiang is now filling up with Chinese, just as the Soviet
republics directly across the frontier are beconing Russian in
population. As for the credits extended to China, these could be
increased without public announcement. It is not certain that we have
anything to gain by the growth of a Chinese power which maybe able
one day to drag the Whole Bloc into war against us.
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Is there a harder line in Soviet foreign policy?
9. A third matter to which the consultants devoted extended
attention was the question of whether paragraph 11 of Chapter VI
described a sufficiently sharp change in Soviet foreign policy. On
this issue the consultants again divided into two groups: MOSELY,
STRAYER and BLACK thought the language of paragraph 11 was not strong
enough; LANGER and KENNAN disagreed.
LANGER thought Soviet policy over the last two years had
been cautious. The Soviets undertake to negotiate at Geneva on the
cessation of atomic testing and they probably desire a partial
agreement. They want to stay alive as much as we do. They realize
that the destruction of atomic warfare would be so immense that state
interest dictates caution. We must not believe geochlossen that the
Soviets are prepared to blow up the world.
10. KENNAN supported LANGER by asserting that Soviet policy was
not adventuristic. At the height of the Suez crisis, when they were
condmrned about events in Hungary., the Soviets did remind the British
and French that their countries were not invulnerable to missile attack.
They have also told the Danes that if missile bases were placed on
Danish soil, Denmark would find herself in the line of fire. But it
may well be that these are facts. It may be that the Soviets would be
remiss if they didn't say these things.
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SECRET
11. Whether Berlin represents a new departure in Soviet foreign
policy depends on one's estimate of Soviet motives. If Berlin is
aimed at keeping nuclear weapons out of West German hands, LANGER
suggested then Berlin is really a Soviet defensive action. We can't
stay in Berlin for all eternity. The question is what settlement
would be acceptable to us as well as to the Germans. It would be silly
to underestimate the gravity, with which the Soviet Union views West
German rearmament.
12. KENNAN, on the other hand, was inclined to feel that the
Soviet motives were internal to the Bloc. Realizing that the division
of Europe is not to be overcome by negotiation, Moscow is concentrating
on the consolidation of the Socialist canp. The great wetakness here is
the GDR. Communism cannot be a success where an alternative is
available. Thus the attack on Berlin. This need for consolidation in
eastern Europe has recently been accentuated by the miserable failure
of Communism in Western Europe. The decline of Communist party prestige
iR the welfare states of the West has encouraged revisionism in the
Satellites.
13. In answer to this line of argument, MOSELY, STRAYER, and
BLACK asserted that the Soviet purpose in Berlin was not merely to
consolidate the Bloc, but also to move forward. They want to break up
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NATO and get Garmany out of it. They ynnt to prove to the Germans
that the French and British are nct willing to take risks for Berlin.
Their leaders will use threats more freely-because this will help
break up the alliance and also bring internal disunity. It is very
difficult for the Western Allies to decide what to do and when to do
it. In six months the Russians will have convinced the West Europeans
that they don't want another air lift. They did not want negotiation
on their November note; on the contrary, they hoped for an immediate
refusal. The Soviets do not have to have a settlement in any
particular place; what they want to do is to reduce Western ability-to
resist. In short) the level of risk which the Soviet leaders believe
they can take is increasing steadily and rapidly, and paragraph 11
should say so. Moreover, the paper should have a section on the ultimate
ideological goals of the Soviets, in which these goals should be stated
in our language, together with an estimate of how far they think they
have advanced toward their fulfillment.
Comments on the next World Situation Paper
(b)(3)
14. In the final hours of the sitting the consultants were asked
to suggest the points which should be considered in the drafting of the
estimate on the world situation. This request produced a wide-ranging
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discussion which, on the whole, was colored with a deep-going pessimism
and which concentrated for the most part on the underdeveloped areas
and their prospects for modernization.
15. It was agreed that 1958 had seen some improvement. The West
had adroitly conducted successful holding operations in the Lebanon
and at Quemoy. This, in KENNANts view, had impressed Nasser. LANGER
and LINDER pointed out that Nehru had recently come to realize that
Moscow did not have the solution to the Indian problem. India must
have outside help and only the West will proffer this in sufficient
amounts.
16. This mild optimism Was offset by-ARMSTRONG's prediction that
a new Middle Eastern crisis was on the way. This time over the question
of the Arab refugees. One-third of the total population of the Fertile
Crescent, and two-thirds of the population of Jordan, are Palestinian
refugees. Present dispositions for caring for these regugees come to
an end in 1960 and so far we have developed no policy for dealing with
this situation. We have so tied ourselves to the Israelis that we are
politically-helpless. Our one prospect is to persuade the Israelis
to make substantial concessions. YOUNG agreed.
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17. With regard to the outlook for the underdeveloped countries
in general, KNORR raised the possibility that the rash of military
dictatorships which had recently appeared is a sign of improvement. The
new military rulers are relatively incorrupt and open to Westernization.
They represent the emergence of a new middle class, which would be
more resistant to Soviet penetration, and in fact the only feasible
alternative to a Communist elite. The present Egyptian government is
the best in modern times. BLACK was inclined to agree, while LANGER
brought up the example of Ataturk and suggested that the new dictator�
ships might take his regime as a model.
18. LINDER, YOUNG, ARMSTRONG, and MOSELY were, however, not so
sure. They saw no reason to assume that military-elites were incorrupt�
ible or especially competent. Popular expectations in these countries
are high, and if there is no immediate improvement in the local situation,
the Communists will make a comeback. If the West does not intervene
with massive assistance, the dictatorships will endure only briefly. Of
themselves, they do not solve the real problem in these countries,
which is the scarcity of trained manpower and skilled management. The
Ataturk example is a pocr one; Russia is the traditional enemy of the
Turks, and the military doee not have in other backward countries the
prestige it carries in Turkey.
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19. LINDER and MOSELY went on to point out that the economic
position of the underdeveloped areas has deteriorated in the last year.
The prices of the basic commodities which are the prinad.pal exports of
these areas have stabilized themselves at a pretty low level, but one
which may be normal, after the artificilasituation created by the
Korean war. The political consequences of this decline in prices --
increased friction with the Western purchasers, greater instability of
local governments -- will not be long in appearing. The underdeveloped
countries have for years put pressure on the United States to enter
into commodity agreements. Washington has always regarded such agree.
ments as iniquitous (in these cases in which we are the purchasers)
but as Chinese Communist trade cuts in more and more US policy may show
greater flexibility.
20. In addition to the problem of commodity prices is the dilemma
created by population growth, which tends to cancel out gains made in
other fields. KENNAN assumed that there was no real chance of
fulfilling the aspirations of underdeveloped areas. Foreign aid is
simply a game we have to play in competition with the Russians, but we
have no reason to hope that it will be successful.
21. LANGER asked whether the process of industrialization, which
had already gone so far in the ussa, would not inevitably generate in
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the East the same pressures that had developed in and had liberalized
the West? How long can the new social forces be kept in check? Junker
Germany had had a strong Social Democratic movement and even the Soviets
have some kind of representative system, phony perhaps, but necessary
nevertheless. Ergo: representative democracy enjoys a certain natural
advantage.
22. KENNAN thought there had, in fact, been changes in Soviet
dynamics. Youth, once enthusiastic, is today inclined to be cynical
and disillusioned. The sons of the most influential people are the
rebels. "Is a society staple in which the second generation of its
most influential elements is the least reliable?"
23. The opposing view was presented by MOSELY. Communist ideology
is a hard shell within which great power nationalism bubbles. Psychic
rewards are still important; the system channels and controls the
expression of popular aspirations. The lack of ideological interest
characteristic of some youth may make it easier to recruit and utilize
types who are interested primarily in power and are prepared to work
within the system without worrying about it.
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rternlar"
(b)(3)
24. There was a final round of discussion on the subject of
nuclear plenty. It was agreed that the Europeans seemed indifferent
to the establishment of missile bases on their continent. The public
is simply incapable of grasping the significance of the new weapons.
To quote KENNANt "The general reaction to the advance in nuclear
weapons is one of apathy and fatalism."
The consultants were also in agreement that the existence of
nuclear weapons had not much effect on government policy. If there
were no nuclear weapons to pay for, Europe would now be maintaining
large standing armies. The desire of small countries to possess
these weapons is based partly on prestige, partly on disbelief that
the United States will stand by them in time of need, and partly on
failure to grasp the implications of the "second strike." If the
Soviets are unwilling to talk about "third parties," it is because
they are, much to their own embarrassment, not in a position to
commit the Chinese.
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