O/NE CONSULTANTS' CONFERENCE, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY, 20-21 MARCH 1958.

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06186231
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: March 31, 1958

. r..:'
dr Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO6186231-
, ,
_
ONFIDENTIAL
411944641..
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
31 March 1958
" STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 13-58
SUBJECT: 0/NE Consultants' Conference, Princeton, New Jersey,
20-21 March 1958.
1. Participants:
Consultants
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Cyril Black
Calvin Hoover
Klaus Knorr
Col. G. A. Lincoln
Harold Linder
Philip Mosely
Joseph Strayer
T. Ouyler Young
2. Agendas
CIA Representatives
Abbot Smith
DeForest Van Slyck
Philip J. Halls
maurice williams
I. VIE 20-58s THE OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN EUROPE (Staff draft)
(20 March, morning session) '
II. Staff Memorandum 9-58: SOVIET MOTIVES IN SEEKING A SUMMIT
CONFERENCE (20 March, afternoon session and 21 March sessions)
III. Report on Trip to Soviet Union by Cyril Black (21 March session)
IV. General Discussion of Middle East Situation (20 March,
afternoon session and 21 March session)
4Mief
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 13
O DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 0
NEXT REVIEW DATE IMO
(b)(3),3)
((b)(3)
(b)(3)
TA3)
AUTH: HR 70-
---CONFIDENTIAL_2ATE:
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231
p.
aApproved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231
NIE 2048: THE OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN EUROPE
SUMMARY
There were two main trends in the discussion of the Western
European paper: (1) it was suggested that a number of issues required
fuller treatment, and (2) there was considerable support for the view
that the draft estimate was somewhat too optimistic. France and the
Algerian conflict were constantly cited as factors operating against
a sanguine view of the region. There was little belief that European
integration would go far enough even over the long term to create a
dynamic Western Europe. Instead, it was generally felt that the region
might become a large-scale Sweden,. anxious to avoid involvement in
struggles between the two world powers but possessing sufficient modern
weapons to retaliate if attacked.
- 2 -
OFEYRILFF"
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231
1.5 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231
Highlights of the Discussion (morning session, 20 March)
SMITH opened the discussion on NIE 20-58 by Wilting general
comments as to Whether the paper adequately covered what really needed
to be said about Western Europe. KNORR, ARMSTRONG, and LINDER urged
that more attention be paid to the position of France in terms of
what could be expected from that country, and what its policies
would be toward a variety, of problems ARMSTRONG referred in particular
to the need for lonediate exceptions to the impression of tranquility
given early in the paper. He felt, for instance, that internal tension
had increased in both France and the UK over a five-year period. He
further remarked that the paper's level of generalization tended to
obscure real differences between the various countries. LINDER also
thought that the paper might usefully speculate more about the UK--
especially under a Labor Party government--and about the effects on
Europe of a prolonged US recession.
STRAYER then spoke to the subject of Western Europe' s future
role in the world. Despite the favorable points which could be made,
he believed there might be an over-all decline leading to a decision
by Western Europe to cultivate its awn garden and become a "gigantic
Sweden.** He gave an affirmative answer to SMITH's query as to whether--
assuming European Integration progressed-..Western Ehrope could
- 3 -
-some�
CON
roved for Release: /07/24 C06186231
15 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231 e
withdrew from world affairs. He thought that the region might possess
considerable economic strength, but that this would not exactly equate
with political capabilities.
LINDER introduced the nuclear issue by asking about the ability
of "medium powers,' (e.g., the UK and France) to become a significant
collective world factor if armed with a nuclear capability. SMITH
thought the question involved both a capacity and a disposition to
do so. In response, LINCOLN said that within a 545 year period the
situation regarding the expense of producing massive means of des-
truction might be very different, and that the UK, France, Germany,
and perhaps Sweden might have their own missile capability. KNORR
generally agreed, but felt that the crucial point was whether those
countries would be spared the fall costs of nuclear development; if
the US helped, then at least the UK and France could develop a con-
siderable nuclear capability.
SMITH next raised the question of what kind of military posture
Western Europe would adopt under such circumstances. He thought the
consultants might agree that the Europeans probably could create at
least a deterrent capability, but he wondered if they would want to
spend the money for it. On the first count, MOSEL! seemed to express
the consensus by saying the most likely posture would be that of the
-14.
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186230
"hedgehog," maintaining just enough military strength to retaliate.
In agreeing, STRAYER thought that Western Europe wouldn't have any
use for a larger nuclear capability; that it couldn't help retain
colonial possessions or be used aggressively against the Soviet Bloc.
There was much less willingness to come to grips with the costs
question. MOSELY speculated as to whether the major Western European
countries might divert ground forte money to production of modern
weapons, But LINCOLN remarked that there seemed to be a Kitchener-
type war going on even now, and that all should remember there were
other military means than nuclear power. KNORR again felt that the
future position of the US was perhaps the real and undeterminable
answer to the question.
The discussion then shifted to the outlook for European integra-
tion and its effects on Western Edropels policies. HOOVER didn't
suppose that the degree of integration achieved over a 10..15 year
period would promote a quasi-nationalistic European force. He was not
unhopeful about economic unity, but thought that a similar achievement
in the military sphere was unlikely; he didn't see much possibility
of political integration in that period. MOSELY disagreed, and
supported the draft's position that the nature of modern weapons
would work for the creation of unity, HCOEVER didn't rule out such
- 5 -
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C0618620
a possibility, but also didn't see it operating in favor of a dynamic
European policy. He reinvoked the picture of a collection of Swedens.
KNORR's views were similar. He considered real military unity
very unlikely to occur within 10-15 years, and added that the military
would be the last to integrate. He thought it at least possible that
France and lest Germany might bebome really close in terms of military
collaboration, but probably wohldn't be joined by the other Europeans.
In agreement with HOOVER, KNORR believed that even a substantial
nuclear capability--fundamentally defensive in character�could not
be the basis for a dynamic European policy. However, he didn't deny
BLACK'S proposition that non-nuclear bases of power might become more
important in a stalemate, and might even give Western Europe a great-
power status.
SMITH recalled that two or three years ago the consultants seemed
to give weight to the view that the Western European countries--
sandwiched between the two great powers�might start quarreling among
themselves again, and might go their awn ways. He wondered if that
view retained validity. STRAYER didn't believe there mould be any
return to 19th century conditions, eventhough he anticipated some
stress and strain. He thought Western Europe in time might want to
avoid being an asset to either side, but he didn't foresee "positive
- 6 -
_�sEettEr�
AilimilmApproved for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231.
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231 0
neutralism" or attempts to pit one side against the other. KNORR
agreed, adding that Nasser-type regimes would be very unlike/7 in
Europe except in the event that a long and severe depression brought
rightists to power in France and elsewhere. LINCOLN felt it necessary
to get away from 19th century concepts,_ but ARMSTRONG believed they
still obtained to some extent, and thought Western Europe might be
much more chaotic than the Swedish eXample implied.
LINDER pointed to the Algerian conflict as the particularly weak
element in the European scene. He felt the draft should give more
space to the problem, especially in terms of its effects on NATO.
ARMSTRONG thought it quite possible that France might pull out of NATO
as a result of the Algerian situation. VAN SLYCK queried whether the
breakup of NATO could then be visualized. STRAYER replied that over
a period NATO might be so changed as to become meaningless.
At this juncture, BLACK offered two points for possible inclusion
in the paper: (a) he wondered whether comparisons with the US and the
USSR might show that Western Europe's economic position would be
relatively favorable, and that weaknesses would be political; and
(b) he thought the possibility of extensive European development
programs for underdeveloped countries worth exploring. ARMSTRONG then
asked whether the significance of the oil resources of the Sahara had
-7-
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231
CECRET
been taken into acCount. LINDER thought they were important not so
much in terms of money as in their value as an alternative in case
Middle East supplies were stopped. LINCOLN asked what happened to
Western Europe if the Middle Eastern oil spigot were turned off.
Both KNORR and LINDER felt that, short of 4 war situation, too much
need not be made of such an eventuality.
SMITH said he felt the conversation up to this point had expressed
tmo main themes. First, there were several issues (e.g., France,
Algeria, and certain economic considerations) that needed broader
treatment in the paper. Secondly, the present draft may be too
optimistic regarding the conduct and policy of the Western European
countries. Integration was unlikely to go far enough to support such
a position. He thought we were more likely to see developments go
along the lines envisaged in the pertinent sections of the NIE on the
world situation.
SMITH then raised the issue of a seeming conflict between the
CIA draft and the State contribution. He described what he considered
to be the gist of the State position, namely, that France and Italy
weren't doing badly and that there was little reason for concern
regarding the other Western European countries. He thought State's
favorable outlook was largely based on economic factors, which after .
-8-.
Approved for for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231 0
ODOflSIL
all could be upset by political difficulties. He believed State was
wrong in being so comfortable,_ and asked for comment on this point.
HOOVER, KNORR, LINDER, and STRAxER generally agreed with SMITH's posi-
tion. KNORR emphasized that the recent high rates of ecanamic growth
for the most part have constituted postwar recovery. He thought it
possible that a period of stagnation might set in. HOOVER felt there
was a time-lag in State's position; a year ago he would have agreed
as to the further impact of the good economic situation. There would
still be considerable support for State's views were it not for the
complex balance of payments problem. STRAYER observed that even the
CIA draft promised a higher degree of economic and political stability
than he believed would be true of the area as a whole.
On the other hand, MOSELY noted that 'Western Europe thus far had
been less affected by the US recession than anticipated. LINDER
remarked that many European countries would not suffer anywhere near
as much as the US during a world depression, since they were so much
closer to the subsistence level. MOSELY added that the last sentence
of paragraph 30 in the draft was too abbreviated to illustrate the
full impact of a favorable contingency.
SMITH then closed the discussion with a summary Which pointed out
such uncertainties as the French political situation, the NATO outlook,
- 9 -
--fEGREL__
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231
0 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231 0
�8E9REP-
the future of European integration, and the continuing US recession.
He thought they added up to a rather dubious outlook for Western
Europe. By not describing the UK, France, and West Germany in detail,
the draft perhaps had not sufficiently illustrated the region's weak-
ness. However, he had the impression that the paper could be adjusted
to reflect less optimism without any necessity for drastic reorganiza-
tion.
- 10 -
Approved for for Release: 2018/07/24 C06186231
bApproved for Release: 2018/07/24 C0618626
II. SOVIET MOTIVES IN SEEKING A SUMMIT CONFERENCE
(Afternoon Session, 20 March)
Summary: Discussion of the paper on Soviet motives occupied most
of the afternoon session of 20 March. There was general agreement
with the conclusions of the paper, which was discussed primarily in
terms of various Soviet proposals for disengagement in Central Europe.
It was agreed that the USSR had found talks of peace and East-West
negotiations an effective political formula for weakening NATO.
Highlights of the Discussion
SMITH opened the discussion by asking what benefits the Soviet
leaders hoped to gain from proposals for disengagement in Central
Europe? He suggested that they might be very much afraid of an uprising
in the Satellites and hence anxious to cut down the military power of
the West. Yet could they seriously consider a real disengagement when
the presence of their troops in Eastern Europe appeared to be imperative
for their continued control of the region?
LINDER suggested thAt the Soviet leaders are serious about a
reduction of forces in Europe. They are not such gmblers as to make
proposals of this nature if they didn't mean them. Their proposals,
however, are purposely vague in order to leave plenty of room for maneuver.
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231
�Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C0618624
There was general agreement that the USSR could hold Eastern Europe
with a considerable reduction of forces.
MOSELY believed the Soviet leaders had probably decided that a
reduction of their forces was desirable and that they should attempt
to gain the maximum advantage from it. He did not believe it was
really a question of complete withdrawal for them. However, since
the US has made it clear that it couldn't consider a complete with-
drawal of its forces from Europe, the Soviets have been able to assume
a more extreme position. If their proposals are accepted, then they
could negotinte for something less.
STRAYER thought that any agreements between the US and USSR
would tend to reenforce the status quo in Eastern Europe and to dis-
courage uprisings. LINDER replied that the US presence in Central
Europe had already been discounted as a result of our inaction during
the Hungarian uprising. LINCOLN disagreed. In his view the presence
of US troops in West Germany was still an important factor in Eastern
Europe.
LINCOLN went on to point out that almost any agreement on dis-
engagement would be to our disadvantage since it would tend to give
the USSR greater freedom of action. In several years they might even
- 12 m
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231
�Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C0618620
consider that by timing a change-over to a hard line with economic
troubles in the West, they would stand a chance of completely dis-
rupting the present Western European structure. MOSELY thought it
unlikely that they would switch to a hard line until they had achieved
an operational ICBM.
KNORR expressed the conviction that the Soviets nre very much
concerned about the dangers of war breaking out by misadventure.
The Soviets may feel that we are less predictable than we believe
ourselves to be. LINCOLN agreed and pointed out the great appeal in
Western Europe to measures which appeared to reduce the chances of
war by an inadvertent chain of circumstances.
In this regard SMITH mentioned the emphasis placed by both Russian
and Chinese Communist leaders an the importance of 10 to 15 years of
peace. If this could be assured, they appeared to believe that the
Communist system would triumph on a world-wide scale. A Summit meeting
would serve this objective by reducing the dangers of war.
BLACK agreed that Soviet leaders do believe that time is on their
side. Self-confidence in many segments of Soviet society is a very
powerful force today. At the snme time, BLACK believed that stress
on a summit meeting is directed at weakening NATO as a major objective
13
Approved for for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231
�Approved for Release 2018/07/24 C0618624
of Soviet Soviet foreign policy. Anything they are able to achieve on the
reduction of forces in Central Europe weakens NATO and Western refusal
to undertake such negotiations also weakens it.-
LINDER said that if the Russians really believed they needed 10
years of peace, they ought to be willing to pay for it to make
concessions to the West to assure peace. STRAYER, however, replied
that they had hit on a very good political device. By talking peace
and pressing for a summit meeting, they do weaken NATO.
Even if they
don't achieve a single agreement with the West, they gain from such
propaganda.
HOOVER pointed out that the Soviets in stressing 10 to 15 years
of peace really meant a situation in which they would gain full freedom
of action throughout the world and we would never be in position to
resist.
III. REPORT OF TRIP TO OBSERVE SOVIET ELECTIONS
(31 March)
Summary: BLACK briefed the group on his recent trip to the USSR to
observe the recent Soviet elections. The major topics included
Soviet election procedures, the role of the Supreme Soviet in the
-
EGRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231
("Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C0618620
--SteRiff-
formulation of legislation, the effects of economic reorganization
on political stability, and the general position of the Communist
Pnrty. In concluding his report BLACK recommended th t future work
on the USSR place priority emphasis on foreign policy problems. He
did not think there was much point in spending time on questions relating
to an internal collapse of the USSR.
Highlights of the Discussion
SMITH agreed that the USSR should be regarded as a going concern
and a traditional great power. However, he wondered if a disruptive
struggle for power within the USSR might not develop in the future.
BLACK believed that individual greed or aMbition would be resolved
throwh a strengthened party organization. He found every indication
thnt the party had increased its strength and that the ruling oligarchy
would pull together in the face of danF7er.
HOOVER believed th-t personal power struggles would remain
inherent to the Soviet system. BLACK agreed but said the real
question is whether the weakening resulting from any future struggle
would be such as to seriously affect the foreign position of the USSR?
In BLACK's opinion, this appears to be unlikely.
-15-
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231
0Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C0618620
INT. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (Afternoon 20 March and
21 March session)
Summary:
The Middle East Was discussed for a brief period during the after-
noon session of 20 March and during part of the session on 21 March.
YOUNG and LINCOLN had recently returned from trips to the area and
reported they were distressed and disturbed by what they had seen and
hoard. Both said the current of events was running against the West
and that present Western policy in the area was inadequate to check
this trend. The consultants were equally gloomy in their appraisal
of prospects for traditional Western interests and governments friendly
to the West in the area and could see no prospect for an Arab-Israeli
settlement.
Highlights of the Discussion
The discussion of the Middle East situation was begun with reports
an recent trips to the area by LINCOLN and YOUNG. LINCOLN said his
trip had been a very brief one, but that he hnd returned convinced that
events were running ap7ainst the US and that US policy was too heavily
influenced by militPry thinking. Libya and Saudi Arabia were cited as
- 16
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231
0Approved for Release 2018/07/24 C0618620
examples of the precarious nature of the US position in the area. The
situation in Libya is currently quiet but could turn against the US
overnight. LINCOLN quoted Ambassador Tappin as saying the US has no
foreign policy but only a military policy in Libya. LINCOLN cited
two US violations of Saudi Arabian rights of sovereignty in relation
to use of the Dhahran air base as examples of the disregard for the
sensitivity of foreign powers sometimes exhibited by US representatives
in the area.
YOUNG echoed LINCOLN's pessimism over the course of developments
in the Middle East. He likened most of the area to a schizophrenic
mental patient both in that individuals were divided within themselves
over East-West orientation, and in that the people were separated from
their governments. Egypt, he said, was the only country in which the
government came close to representing the will of the people. Con-
tinuing his mental health analogy, YOUNG said there were two possible
trdatments of the patient: shock, or very quiet and gentle handling.
He believed that opportunities and the time for effective shock treatment
were passed and that a quiet approach would be the most successful
today. YOUNG said his best contacts in the area were in Iran and that
there the situ&tion was particularly disturbing. The regime is autocratic
and represses all opposition without supplyin- a compensatory feeling
- 17
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231
�Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C0618620
3EORET
of accmplishment. As yet there is no organized opposition but
dissatisfaction is rising rapidly. Furthermore, the expectations of
the people are beyond the capabilities of the country and few have a
real conception of the problems involved in developing the country
and providing for the sharply increasing population.
SMITH commented that from an intelligence point of view there
are only limited problems in knowing what is going on in the Middle
East. He added that in his opinion not enough thought had been devoted
-to defining what was an acceptable and supportable Western position
in the area. SMITH noted that access to area oil is thought to be
essential tc Western economic survival and asked the consultants for
their views on the future of oil in the Middle East. STRAYER believed
the present basis of Western control of nre, oil would certainly be
destroyed if Nasser gnined hegemony over the area. VANSUCK added
that the special British position in the Persian Gulf area also would
be destroyed. LINDER pointed out that the West was the only possible
customer for the oil and that if the political judgement could be made
that Nasser would not come under Soviet control it was safe to assume
the West would retain access to the oil. He cited the Suez Canal
as an example of Nasser continuing the deal withthe West on reasonable
terms. SMITH and STRAYER pointed out that reasonableness was not always
- 18 -
Approved for for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C0618624
o

3ECRET
a controlling motive, citing the Mossadeq affair as an example. KNORR
said the real danger was that a near monopoly of Middle East oil would
allow Nasser to use control of its supply for political purposes.
LINDER commented that the West is moving rapidly towards a wider degree
of independence from Middle East oil and that the danger of political
control would decrease with time.
SMITH said that there was some concern over the possibility that
Nasser might back a Government for Palestine, which would seek admission
to the UAR. BALLA noted that the plan was very indefinite and that
some reports indicated the government would be only for the Gaza strip
and some that it would include the Nest Bank of the Jordan River.
HOOVER wondered how much difference such a Proclamation would make.
Control of the West Bank would still depend upon subverting the Arab
Legion cr assassinating Hussein. VAN SLYCK and SMITH remarked that
the worry was that such a proclamation would ignite a Palestinian Arabs
uprising. LINDER felt that Israel would fight if Nasser tried to get
control of the West Bank. HOOVER agreed. SMITH said that this was
probably the real restraining influence.
SMITH noted that an estimate is currently being drafted on Israel
and asked the consultants for their views on the future of the state.
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231
oApproved for Release: 2018/07/24 C0618620
�
ARMSTRONG noted that Ben Gurion had said there were still 600.000 Jews
in the USSR. LINDER said this was a real threat to Israel and that
the Soviets could out remendous strains on the state by releasing these
Jews over a short nPriod of time. Furthermore, there remains a very
large resermAr of Jews in Morocco And if the ben on emigration is
lifted these may go to Israel in larce numbers. SMITH noted that some
columnists feel the Soviets will push the Arabs into a "second round".
MOSEIY remarked that the Russians already had established their willingness
to fight for the Arabs and therefore need no further war threats for
this purpose. LINDER commented that there was no evidence of increased
Soviet pressure on Israel. In fact, the Russians had repatriated Polish
Jews only on the understanding that they would not be allowed to emigrate
to Israel. None of the consultants saw any hopeful signs of an approach
to an Arab-Israeli settlement. YOUNG commented that Western-oriented
Arabs were becoming increasingly frustrated because not even a start
was being made on the problems of a peace settlement, especially the
refugee problem. ARMSTRONG said that the Arab Federation might prove
a means of resettling some refugees in Iraq without a formal settlement.
LINDER commented thnt most observers felt the Arab governments deliberately
were avoidinf any approaches to a refugee settlement outside of a formal
peace treaty. The refugees were one of their primary bargaining points,
he added.
- 20
-CONFIDENTIAL-
430;i1WP
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231
oApproved for Release: 2018/07/24 C0618624
CONFIDENTIAL
At the close of the discussion on the Middle East BLACK said he
thought the estimates of prospects for the area were perhaps too
optimistic. Public opinion, he felt, was very deeply concerned with
living standards and the leaders would of necessity make demands upon
the West which the West was unwillinr to meet. They then would turn
increasingly to the Soviets for aid and as long as the Soviets were
willing to continue to extend aid their strength in the area would
continue to expand. SMITH agreed that the outlook for the Middle East
was very gloomy, especially if thought of in terms of the Western
position in the area as it existed as recently as ten years ago. He
repeated his thought that it was of primary importance that the Western
powers clearly define their minimum tolerable position in the area.
^41115,1B116
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 006186231