RECENT COMMUNIST USES OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY SUMMARY

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06172343
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 7, 1968

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02: C
CENTRAL INTBLLICT-I,NCE AGENCY la,
Directorate of Intelligenceugumay
7 Narch 1968
Mandatory Review
Case # NIJ 14-(A
Document # a-
INT'OLLICENCE MZMORANDUM
Recent_Communiet_Uses of_Cambodian Territory
pummary.
The Communists continue to use Cambodian terri-
tory for tactical sanctuary, for'base areas, for the
infiltration of personnel, and as a source of rice,
medicines, and sundry supplies. Communist base areas
on the eastern border of Cambodia have continued to
expand as the tempo of the war in South Vietnam has
increased. We do not believe, however, that the
step-up in military activity since the Tet offensive
has taxed the 'capability of the established supply
route from North Vietnam via Laos and the trail
aystem along the Cambodian border.
There is a growing body of circumstantial
evidence, however, that the Communists may have
stepped up the acquisition of supplies through
southern Cambodia. The appearance of new weaponry
in the IV Corps area, along with the heavy expendi-
ture of ammunition in the III and IV Corps areas,
point to an increasing likelihood that Cambodia may
be used to at least augment the military equipment
which in reaching this area over more oltabliehed
routes from North Vietnam via Laos and the trail
into out Vietnam.
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e 7:
Introduction
a a
The Vietnamese Communiata continue to use
Cambodian territory for tactical sanctuary, for base
areas, for infiltration of pernonnel, and aa a
source of supply. With the step-up in Communint
military activity since the Tot offensive, eauecially
the increase in enemy ammunition expenditures, there
has been increasing concern that Cambodia is playing
a more direct role as a logistic base for the Co-
units. There There have been reports of Chinsaa ships
unloading arms at Sihanoukville for the Vietnameso
Communiats, of large convoys of trucks transiting
the Cambodian border with arms and ammunition, and
of enemy tanks in action in ?ay ninh Province close
to the Cambodian border. This memorandum reviews
current knowledge of (1) VC/VA access to Cambodia
from southern Laos, (2) developments along Cambodia's
eastern frontier, and (3) the possibilities of sea-
borne deliveries of arms to VC/VA forces via
Cambodia.
Recent Trends
The level of vC/i1VA ammunition expenditures in
aouth Vietnam has grown appreciably since the Tet
offealive. However, the largest increaae has occurred
in areas that are independent of lonistic support
from Cambodia. Soecifically, the artillery, rocket,
and mortar ammunition firings In the I Corps areas and
the DMZ by VC/IVA forces have shown the largest in-
creases. These are the same areas whore the heaviest
Communist expenditure- were made in 1967. aunitions
for Communist forces in these areas were supplied
from Worth Vietnam by shiooent through Lam and acroaa
the DMZ.
Communist mortar and rocket fire have also been
ateeped up in the III and /V Cr po areas. we do not
believe that their recent ammunition exnenditures have
been aufficient to deplete stockpiles or place an imooa-
aible burden on the Communiat logistical ystem,
although individual Communist combat units may have
experienced temporary shortages of ammunition from
time to time. aumerous Pi's have reported that large
quantitina of arms and ammunition were obtained
from steckrilas already within south Vietnam, however.
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ft
It is clear that prior to the Tet offensive, the
Communiats had completed a large logistic build-up.
This build-up enabled them to equip recruits and
guerrillas with new weapons and adequate supplies
of armunition. Given the substantial unutilized
capacity of land routes from North Vietnam through
Laos, we do not believe that the Communist offensive
in South Vietnam -was of such a nagnitude as to have
required the.establishment of a new logistic pipe-
line dependent on Chinese material imported through
Cambodian ports. It is possible that the build-up
in the III and IV Corps areas was augmented by an
input of materiel moved via Cambodia, although we
have no hard evidence that this was the case.
A number of low-lovel reports of the deploymeat
of VC/NVA armored vehicles into eastern Cambodia
and adjoining areas of South Vietnam have not been
substantiated. Although the North Vietnamese could
move armor over Laotian roads to the tri-border area,
its deployment. further south would be hampered by .
the lack of secure roads, long dintancos, and main-
tenance problems.
Since the armored vehicles that were employed
against a US force in ray Ninh Vrovince late in
February 1960 have not been identified, it ia partic-
ularly difficult to judge how they arrived there.
It is poasible that the tank a wore rehabilitated
US vehicles that had been lost in earlier operations.
The repair of a few US vehicles could have been
carried out by cannibalizing a number of tanks, even
perhaps by a unit of the Cambodian army without the
knowledge of the central government. The Cambodian
army inventory includes 12 US 1-24 tanks, 60 US
armored cars, and 46 GS halftracks. the Cambodians
alao have 17 French 7Mx-13 tanks, 6 Soviet DTR-40
armored personnel carriera, and 4 Soviet tracked
prime movers, but there is no evidence that they
have turned over any of their armored vehicles to
the VC/VA forces.
The northern Access to Cambodia from Laos
We do not believe that the Communists are freely
using Cambodia's internal road and waterway nets for
the shipment of arms and ammunition from Laos.
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Coeprehensive aerial reconnaissance of the northern
border area reveals no connecting road from Laotian
eouto 110 (see the map) to the Cambodian road system,
ther than the abandoned segment of Cambodian Route
9
V. Since early 1966, sihanouk has allowed this
s mant to deteriorate to prevent its use by the
Ccniunits. The photographic evidence is buttressed
by ground observer reports, that indicate an average
dare, traffic flow along Route 110 of no more than
tw vehicle per day. Although there is a subetan-
tial volume of small watercraft on the Se Kong -
Tonle Kong waterway, ground observers report that
cargo is being moved almost exclusively upstream,
from Cambodia into Laos. These shipments consist
principally of rice, other foodstuffs, and gasoline
destined for We forces in southern Laos and adjoin-
ing areas of South Vietnam. Low-level sources
recently have reported small shipments of arms moving
upstream, but these could have been destined for a
small Cambodian outpost known to be on the border.
The eastern Border of Cambodia
Vietnameee Communist forces are continuing to
develop infiltration routes and bases along Cambodia's
eastern border. Although the base in the tri-border
region of Cambodia was established several years aeo,
it has been further developed in recant months.
Tribal groups have been forced out of this area, a
road has been extended through the extreme salient
into South Vietnam, and new facilities for storage,
training, shelter, and defense have been built. A
well-developed trail system is used to TOVO pen and
supplies southward from the tri-border base into the
Sc Son and Chu Fong base areas.
Food, medicines, and other supplies of Caebodian
origin reach these bases via secondary roads and
traila (west-east) from Route 19, and by water via
the Tonle San. Continuing improvements being made
by Cambodian civil and military authorities on the
roads between Virachei and the South Vietnamese
border to facilitate the delivery of supplies to
state plantations and Cambodian nilitary outposts
will also facilitate deliveries to the Vietnamese
base areas.
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A
Further south, Cambodia's roads in the border
regions of Mondolkiri, 'aratie, ftempong Chem, and
Svay Rieng Provinces are used to transport Cambodian
supplies to VC/VA military units. Determination
of the volume of these shipments is complicated by
the location of Cambodian military camps and civil-
ian population in these areas. This inability to
distinguish Communist traffic from all other traffic
is particularly difficult on the heavily traveled
Route 7 in the Snoul area. Nearly all trucks moving
from Phnom Penh and the south regions to the four
northeastern provinces must travel On Route 7 through
Snoul. It is in this area that most of the traffic
said to be bound for the VCCIVA forces la reportedly
scan.
We continue to believe that most of the VC-
destined supplies moved over Cambodian roads con-
eist of rice, other focidstuffs, and such support
naterials as batteries and medicines. The volume
of Cambodian shipments to VC/HVA forces via the
eastern border may be on the order of 35 short tons
a day, and both civilian and military trucks are
used to transport them.
There are recurrent reports of arms transfers,
however, and it is probable that some Cambodian
military commanders supplement their incomes through
illegal sales of Cambodian equipment, much of which
is similar to that used by VC/VA forces, to the
Vietnamese Communiate. In the absence of central
government approval, however, equipment accountabil-
ity controls would probably limit the volume of such
sales.
there
has been a systematic and posaibly sustained move-
ment of military supplies from Cambodia. The
quantities involved are not yet known, and it in not
clear whether these supplies came from Camnodian
stocks or were brought in clandestinely. We have �
no evidence to confirm the reports of large convoys
of trucke moving military supplies to vC/NVA forces
along the border of South Vietnam. Often such
reports contain contradictions, or do not agree
with other known information on the road system or
traffic movements.
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3 3(h)(2)
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Seaborne Deliveries
Seaborne deliveries of military cargo to Cam-
bodia are infrequent. The last identified major
delivery of military cargo was a 450-ton consign-
ment, believed to consist mainly of small arms and
ammunition, on a Communist Chinese ship in March
1967. There are indications that some military
equipment may also have been included among unidenti-
fied cargoes delivered by two Communist Chinese
ships in August 1967 and January 1968. The
appearance of 120-mm and 140-mm rockets it the III
and IV Corps areas has led to the suspicion that
sea infiltration is actually an important source.
The nature and volume of known Cambodian arms
purchases and deliveries appear to have been consist-
ent with. Cambodian requirements. Since 1963. Com-
munist countries -- principally Communist China and
the Soviet Union -- have provided armaments valued
at nearly $15 million. These included 14 MIG-176s,
30,000 small arms, 800 mortars, as well as vehicles
anti-aircraft guns, artillery, and light aircraft.
South Vietnamese controls on shipping transiting
the Mekong to Phnom Penh maks it unlikely that
significant amounts of arms or ammunition are being
smuggled to the Communists via that route. These
controls include cargo inspections. and the surveil-
lance of ships in transit. Communist-flag ahips,
shim) chartered to Communist countries, and shiements
from Communist countries are prohibited.
arms
deliveries to Sihanoukv e are a on a rectly from
shipboard to Cambodian military bases or units.
without government collusion, any continuing effort
to =toggle arms through Cambodian ports to communist
forces probably would be detected.
It is conceivable that Sihanouk has permitted
the shipment of small quantities of some types of
military supplies to VC/HVA forces via Cambodian
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3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
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military channels. Sihanouk may have concluded
that small, easily disguised shipments would entail
little risk and would servo as insurance ia any
future confrontation with the Communists. The same
motive may have prompted his public approval of
normal trade relations with the Communists.
On the other hand, Sihanouk has been persistent
in striving to maintain his country's neutrality and
has loudly professed his opposition to any foreign
encroachment upon Cambodian territory. He has also
made a sharp distinction between military and non-
military aid to the Viet Cong, arguing that the
former would not be consistent with Cambodia's
position as a neutral. /t seems more likely that
if the Communists are moving military hardware into
Cambodia via the sea they would do so in much the
same way they rodintribute supplies along the coast
of South Vietnam. We believe that it would be
relatively easy for the Communists to make clandes-
tine deliveries by small craft over the beach along
the virtually unpatrolled Cambodian coast for subse-
quent overland movement into South Vietnam. We
have no reliable reports, however, that this has
been occurring.
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3.5(c)
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Major Vietnamese Communist Infiltration Routes and Base Areas Along the Cambodian Border
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