THE LEFTWARD TREND IN GHANA

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06169982
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• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-01291
• Publication Date: January 17, 1964

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17 January 1964
THE LEFTWARD TREND IN GHANA
Recent developments in Ghana, climaxed by the
abortive 2 January attempt on President Nkrumah's
life, are accelerating the country's long-prevail-
ing leftward trend. A referendum to be held from
24 to 31 January will formally convert Ghana into
a one-party state and will provide a constitutional
base for a.pervasive party totalitarianism consciously.
modeled on that of Communist countries. A coterie
of extremists, including doctrinaire pro-Communists
who have increasingly gained Nkrumah's ear, already
is agitating for a thorough purge of all remaining
moderate elements. At the same time, Nkrumah is
continuing to broaden his direct involvement with
the Communist world--now even publicly mouthing its
idiom--and to deflect Ghana even further from its
once exclusively Western orientation. Barring a
successful coup against his regime, it will probably
be increasingly difficult for the West to maintain
an effective presence in Ghana.
Nkrumah's Personal Dynamic
At least the pace of Ghana's
leftward movement appears directly
affected by the consuming ambi-
tion of the "Osagyefo" (victo-
rious leader)to be head man in
a politically united Africa and
a recognized world leader. In
this quest Nkrumah has encoun-
tered a long succession of un-
settling frustrations which he
believes to be the work of West-
ern "neocolonialists." Indeed,
he has increasingly come to think
that the West is so implacably
hostile to his aspirations that
it is. constantly conspiring to
bring about his physical liquida-
tion. He sees the US as the
chief villain in this fancied
conspiracy against him.
Communist countries, on the
other hand, he regards as depend-
able allies and reliable sources
of support for his grand design.
He has, moreover, been flattered
and pleased by the many atten-
tions of these countries, whose
short-term aims at least, are
well served by Nkrumah's mili-
tant nationalist line and
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increasing willingness to propa-
gate Marxist-Leninist analysis
at home and abroad.
A vain, egocentric man fired
by a Messianic drive, Nkrumah
has lung been dedicated to his
vision of African primacy. Since
he led Ghana to freedom, thereby
touching off the Black African
independence deluge, this dream
has been the key consideration
in determining virtually all his
policies and actions, internal
as well as external. In its
pursuit, he has expended signifi-
cant amounts of Ghana's finan-
cial resources and human ener-
gies.
These exertions have
created an extensive and many-
faceted operation, in some re-
spects surpassing Nasir is , for
promoting his own special brand
of militant pan-Africanism. So
far, however, they have not
brought Nkrumah visibly closer
to his goal. Indeed, his in-
cessant meddling throughout the
continent and the subversive
activities of his Bureau of Af-
rican Affairs have alienated
most established leaders and
resulted in his near isolation
from the present mainstream of
intra-African politics.
Growth of Authoritarianism
Nkrumah began to dismantle
the legal restraints on his au-
thority and to stifle the demo-
cratic practices inherited from
Britain immediately after Ghana
attained independence in March
1957.
2
He soon negated "entrenched"
constitutional clauses, strength-
ened the central government, and
destroyed the essentially tribal
power base of his principal po-
litical opponents. Under various
pressures, including the enact-
ment in 1958 of a preventive de-
tention law authorizing the
lengthy incarceration of "se-
curity risks," without trial,
the parliamentary strength of
the elements which constituted
the opposition United Party (UP)
steadily dwindled. At independ-
ence, these elements held over
30 seats; today, on the eve of
the UP's extinction as a legal
party, they retain eight.
Nkrumah also began tamper-
ing early in the game with such
British-nurtured �institutions
as the independent judiciary and
civil service. Within his own
regime, he perfected a technique
of cutting down all potential
rivals before they could hope
to challenge.him. By 1962 he
had demonstrated conclusively
that no other political figure,
not even erstwhile "comrades-
in-arms" in the drive to inde-
pendence, had a sufficiently
strong private power base to
assure a position in his own
right. Today, to a greater ex-
tent than ever, all who serve
the regime, including party stal-
warts, are clearly dependent on
the grace and favor of Kwame
Nkrumah.
Along the way Nkrumah has
permitted no new general elec-
tion to the national legislature.
In 1960, however, he was himself
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elected to the presidency by an
overwhelming popular majority
which also endorsed a new repub-
lican constitution. This in-
strument, tailored to Nkrumah's
requirements by his pro-Commu-
nist British adviser Geoffrey
Bing, establishes the unequivo-
cal supremacy of the chief exec-
utive. After the pending ref-
erendum, it will do the same
for the Convention People's
Party (CPP), of which Nkrumah
is "Life Chairman" and general
secretary.
Nkrumah's growing authori-
tarianism and the increasingly
ruthless manner of its exercise
in recent years, notably after
the abortive attempt to assas-
sinate him in 1962, have pro-
gressively alienated important
elements of Ghanaian society.
Among these elements--the most
Western-oriented in Ghana--are
many civil servants, university
students and teachers, middle-
class businessmen, and at least
some professional army officers
and police officials. However,
they are unorganized and de-
moralized.
Even among the largely
uneducated masses, on whom
Nkrumah has based his movement
from its inception in 1949, he
has certainly lost some of his
popularity. This is attribut-
able mainly to the austerity
measures imposed since 1961 un-
der the growing financial stress
created in part by the Osagyefo's
extravagant economic and foreign
programs. These measures, which
were strengthened significantly
in the budget adopted last fall,
�
are pinching even the humblest
Ghanaians, who are more involved
in the money economy than are ,
most of their counterparts else-
where in Black Africa.
The Regime's
Leftward Evolution
Nkrumah's increasingly ex-
hibited sense of kinship with
the Communist world and his de-
cision to embrace formally its
central political feature are
products of experiences and
events dating at least from his
student days in the US and UK.
In his autobiography, published
in 1957, he openly acknowledged
being influenced during those
formative years by the writings
of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, as
well as by contacts with practic-
ing American and British Commu-
nists. He proclaimed himself
a "Christian Marxist Socialist"
--an anomaly to which he prob-
ably still subscribes. A Marx-
ist-oriented circle has existed
within the CPP from its earliest
days.
Nevertheless, the regime
actually did not begin to ac-
quire a heavy ideological cast
until around the time of Ghana's
changeover to a republic in July
1960. Nkrumah used that occa-
sion to replace some of his
older and more conservative as-
sociates with younger party men
apparently selected largely for
their enthusiasm for "socialism."
Coincidentally, the Nkrumah re-
gime began in earnest to forge
an extensive pattern of direct
relationships with Communist coun-
tries and to reinforce existing
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ties with Various international
Communist front organizations,
above all the WFTU.
At first, prominent CPP
"old guardsmen" attempted to
stem the developing leftward
tide. A year later, however,
they were purged or silenced
following a period of strikes
triggered by the imposition of
�new tax and forced-savings
schemes. After the 1962 CPP
congress, which adopted a "Work
and Happiness" program billed
as a "blueprint for socialism,"
Nkrumah's attachment to the �new
course was unmistakably clear.
This has also been reflected in
his increasing use of leftists
to manage the CPP's expanding
national apparatus.
Factors in
NkrumahhTs Frustrations
Probably no one factor has
contributed more to Nkrumah's
growing sense of frustration
than has the Congo episode,
which largely triggered and is
still fueling his deep estrange-
ment from the West. He early
became convinced that Western
financial interests -in general
and the US in particular were
responsible for the collapse
of the regime of his protege,
Patrice Lumumba, In December
1960, after the successor re-
gime expelled Nkrumah's repre-
sentative from Leopoldville and
a moderate Congolese delegation
was seated in the UN over Ghana's
protests, Ghanaian media launched
their first sustained anti-US
propaganda campaign. In a No-
vember 1963 speech before a con-
4
ference of African journalists
in Accra Nkrumah bluntly de-
picted the Congo as a land being
despoiled by "American and Bel-
gian capitalists" ruling through
"neocolonialist puppets."
The impact on Nkrumah of
his failure in the Congo has
been all the greater because of
a conviction he apparently de-
veloped on the eve of that coun-
try's independence in June 1960
that the Lumumba regime was pre-
pared to support his project
for African unity. Moreover,
this frustration came at a time
when he was already having large
doubts that Ghana's "union" with
Guinea, proclaimed with much
fanfare in 1958, would ever be-
come viable. Also by 1960,
Nkrumah was feeling himself un-
der greater time pressure, mainly
because of the emergence of his
giant neighbor, Nigeria, as a
rival for African leadership.
At home Nkrumah's pre- I,
disposition toward radical solu-
tions and preference for leftist
advisers were sharpened first
by the strikes of 1961, and then
by his first narrow escape from
assassination--at Kulungugu in
August 1962�and the ensuing po-
litical bombings in Accra. The
latter series of events, par-
ticularly, had traumatic effects
on him. He hardly ventured from
his heavily fortified Flagstaff
House residence for months. Con-
cluding quickly that, somehow,
the West must have been behind .
the plot, his antagonism toward
the West deepened into pathologi-
cal suspicions and fears which
almost certainly have been
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GHI11111
AFRICA
UPPER VOLTA
GULF OF GUINEA
intensified by the 2 January in-
cident.
In late 1962 these came
through clearly in a massive
new surge of anti-Western at-
tacks in the leftist-managed
party press, continuing almost
without letup until well into
1963. All major Western govern-
ments were in turn accused of
complicity in the Kulungugu af-
fair, but the main brunt of the
sustained campaign was directed
against the US and various of
its agencies. For a time last
January, Nkrumah demanded the
removal of two US Embassy of-
ficers who he had apparently
been persuaded to believe were
subversive agents in league with
his domestic enemies.
Nkrumah's Ideological Institute
Much of the regime's ac-
quired ideological underpinning,
called "Nkrumaism" and designed
above all to glorify the Osagyefo,
has been developed locally at
a special training school opened
near Accra in 1961. Now of-
ficially styled the "Kwame Nkrumah
Ideological Institute," its mis-
sion is to indoctrinate selected
officials of the CPP and the
party's "integral wings"--the
mass movements for labor, youth,
farmers, and other groups. It
also caters to a limited number
of Nkrumah-oriented "freedom
fighters" from other African
countries.
The director is a veteran
Ghanaian pro-Communist, Kodwo
Addison, and currently three
of seven "resident" faculty mem-
bers are nationals of Eastern
European Communist countries.
A fourth is believed to be a
Communist of American origin.
The institute can handle about
100 students at a time and is
being expanded.
Much of the curriculum is
based solidly on orthodox Com-
munist ideology. The syllabus
on political science, for ex-
ample, incorporates verbatim
large segments of Fundamentals
of Marxism-Leninism, the basic
ideological text published by
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the Soviet Communist Party in
1959. Nevertheless, the over-
all thrust of the program, which
Addison said in 1962 would in-
clude training in guerrilla war-
fare, remains adulation of
Nkrumah and support for his
practical regional objectives.
One Ghanaian staffer recently
characterized Nkrumaism in a
lecture as the variant of Marx-
ism-Leninism adapted to Africa
�
and thus the regional counter-
part to Maoism and Titoism.
Wore Communist Ideology
Although Nkrumah remains
even today essentially a prag-
matist interested in specific
political goals, he has for.
some time now made it evident
that, in principle at least,.
he regards "scientific social-
ism" as the only bona fide basis
of socialist faith. Beginning
about last spring, he has per-
mitted the doctrinaire pro-Com-
munists in his regime to propa-
gate Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy
openly and with increasing in-
tensity.
Speaking mainly through
The Spark, a weekly newspaper
ZiFculated around Africa by the
Bureau of African Affairs, these.
elements have challenged the
concept of "African Socialism"
as distinguished from Marxism-
Leninism and have insisted that
the class struggle as defined in
Marxist dogma is applicable to �
Africa--a position denied in the
past by Nkrumah and other Afro-
Marxists. The general effect
of their effort has been to
nudge Nkrumaism ever closer to
6
the common bedrock of faith
shared throughout the Communist
world.
By November Nkrumah himself
began speaking in ever more ex-
tremist terms. The US Embassy
characterized his speech to the
journalists as perhaps his most
extreme anticapitalist and rev-
olutionary performance. It in-
cluded his first known specific
use of such phrases as "class
interests" and "class politics."
He gave ample evidence that, in
common with other spokesmen for
what he obviously regards as the
international "socialist" fra-
ternity, he views the US as the
citadel of reactionary opposi-
tion to progressive forces every-
where. Subsequently, he has in-
creasingly tended to mouth the
Communist-derived jargon appear-
ing continually in The Spark.
Public criticism of-CUmiallagf
countries, which as recently as
last spring was still occasion-
ally tolerated in the controlled
press, now is apparently for-
bidden, even under provocative
circumstances such as those sur-
rounding the student demonstra-
tions in Moscow. last December.
Nkrumah deplores the quar-
rel between the USSR and Commu-
nist China and has gratuitously
attempted to present himself as
a mediator. In general he has
avoided taking sides, although
an authoritative editorial occa-
sioned by Chou En-lai's visit to
Accra this week seems to reflect
views nearer to the Soviet than
to the Chinese position. There
was a conscious attempt, however,
to minimize, as mere matters of
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"approach," ideological differ-
ences with the visitors.
Recent Leftward Stimuli
Immediately behind Nkrumah's
latest slide to the left lie
fresh defeats and vexations
beginning at the African "summit"
conference in Addis Ababa last
May. Not only did he fail there
to sell his highly touted proj-
ect for early "continental
union" to his fellow African
leaders, but Ghana ended up be-
ing excluded from the important
new African Liberation Committee.
Last fall new Nkrumah
initiatives to obtain a major
voice in the UN military opera-
tion in the Congo and to pro-
mote an all-African "defense
command" also failed. Frenetic
efforts to play a prominent
role in mediating the Algerian-
Moroccan border dispute also
proved futile. Again, Nkrumah
has mostly blamed the West
and particularly the US, for
these setbacks.
Meanwhile despite his
earlier acquisition of almost
$200 million worth of credits
from Communist countries and
US loan commitments of $147
million for Ghana's priority
Volta hydroelectric-aluminum
project, economic troubles
are also crowding in on the
Oasgyefo. Depressed prices for
cocoa--Ghana's chief export--
over several years, combined
with heavy development expendi-
tures and extravagances, have
shrunk foreign exchange reserves
dramatically. From over $500
million at independence they had
dwindled to approximately $140
million by last November. In
addition, there have been suc-
cessive large budget deficits,
that for 1963 alone amounting
to about $120 million.
The financial crisis
promises to intensify in the
years immediately ahead when
the government will be required
to honor a sharply rising
schedule of payment obligations.
Moreover, the ambitious new
Seven-Year Development Plan,
to be inaugurated soon, seems
doomed from the outset, inas-
much as the foreign private
capital upon which its success
essentially depends will almost
certainly not be attracted to
Ghana under present circumstances.
In the past, Nkrumah has made
periodic attempts to build con-
fidence among potential in-
vestors, but these are vitiated
by the anticapitalist climate ,
he is personally encouraging.
Nkrumah's exasperation over
these economic problems was
aggravated last fall by an out-
burst of sharp criticism of
regime policies in Parliament.
Several CPP members were promi-
nent among these attackers--
a most uncommon phenomenon.
About the same time, some of
Nkrumah's own ministers, along .
with other high government offi-
cials,were reported making
similarly caustic remarks in
private about current policies.
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.Economic Relations With
- Communist Countries
To a considerable extent
Nkrumah is pinning his hopes
for economic salvation on ex-
panded relations, especially
in the trade field, with Com-
munist countries. Imports
from this source are a major
means of conserving hard-cur-
rency reserves. As a result,
Ghana's trade with the Commu-
nist world, which in 1957 ac-
counted for only about 3 per-
cent of its total foreign
trade-value, has in recent
years risen steadily to a. new
high in 1963 of approximately
11 percent.
. In the process, the Com-
munist countries as a group
for the first time last year
purchased more of Ghana's
cocoa than did the US, still
the largest single buyer. A
further expansion of this trade
will probably occur this year,
especially as the Communists
are showing some disposition
to revise their payments agree-
ments in Ghana's favor.
At the same time, the way
is now opening for more rapid
implementation of the extensive
credits advanced by the Commu-
nist countries in 1960 and 1961.
Again, the latter have recently
gone to considerable lengths
to accommodate Ghanaian com-
plaints. By 1962 these had �
8
reached the point where Nkrumah
has ordered an official review.
Criticisms are voiced less
openly since Moscow agreed last
'March to help Ghana with the
local costs connected with.
Soviet projects. Ghana has
obtained credits from two West,-
ern sources to defray local. �
costs of certain other Communist
projects.
Warning Signs
At least by November it
was becoming evident, even
apart from Nkrumahls fire-
breathing Speech to the jour-
nalists, that a new move to
the left was underway in Ghana.
Legislation to strengthen fur-
ther the preventive detention -
act and to unify and place under
the direct control of the Pres-
ident the various services con-
cerned with political-security
and intelligence was.suddenly
pushed through the National
Assembly.
More significantly, Nkrumah
began openly tO employ his ex-
tremist advisers--previously
confined mainly to managing the.
information media, the Bureau
of African Affairs, and national
party machinery--to,help-estab7-
lish policy lines in such. areas
as labor 'and education. Nkrumah
installed one of them, the fa-
natical pro-Communist editor of
The Spark, Kofi Batsa, as sec-
retary general of the now Ghana-
dominated Pan-African Union of
Journalists.
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SELECTED AGREEMENTS IN FORCE BETWEEN GHANA AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNIST
COUNTRY
DATE
EXTENDED
AMOUNT Of
CREDIT
SELECTED PROJECTS
STATUS OF
PROJECT
Number of
Eamomic
Technicians
Communist
Country has
in Ghana '
(end of 1963),
Number of
Ghanaian
Academic
Students in
Communist
Country
(mid 1963)
USSR
August 1960
$40,000,000
Geological Survey
- in progress
222
520
November 1961
$42,000,000
Hydroelectric power plant, But
- under survey
Four State Farms
- in progress
Agricultural technicians' school
- unknown
Development of fishing industry
- in progress
Gold refinery
- in progress
Prefabricated panel factory
- under const.
Textile mill
- unknown
August 1960-
$13,400,000
Purchase of IL-18 aircraft
- completed
March 1961
L_
BULGARIA
Originally extended
October 1961;
revised March 1963
$ 5,600,000
Complete plants
Education of Ghanaian
specialists in Bulgaria
1
30
L
CZECHO-
May 1961
$14,000,000
Sugar mill
- unknown
22 75
SLOVAKIA
October 1961
510,500,000
Tire factory
- survey completed
Shoe factories
- under constr.
Leather tannery
- equipment sent
Hydroelectric studies
- in progress
Aluminum cutlery factory
- unknown
EAST
May 1961 $ 1,600,000
Equipment for printing plant
- in progress
5
GERMANY
JL.
Oil mills
-
- largely comp.
HUNGARY
April 1961
S 4,600,000
-
Pharmaceutical factory
- under coast.
9
October 1961
$ 7,000,000
Light bulb factory
- under coast.
Hydroelectric survey
- in progress
POLAND
April 1961
$12,600,000
Sugar refinery
- under survey
_
54
December 1961
$14,000,000 t
Hand tool factory
- under survey
Farm implement factory
- under survey
Cement plant
- under survey
Furniture factory
- under survey
E.
Iron ore mining plant
- under survey
RUMANIA
September 1961
Fs 8,400,000
Refrigerators, installation &equip
- unknown
5
Chemical plants
- unknown
Knitwear factory
- unknown
Distillery
- unknown
-Geological exploration for oil
- in progress
COMMUNIST
August 1961
$19,600,000
Cotton processing plants
- surveyed
CHINA
,
Pencil factory
Earthenware factory
- prelim. survey .1
- unknown
1
Rice cultivation
- unknown
Irrigation project
- unknown
GRAND TOTAL 5193,300,000 312 6.55
I
DATE OF
BASIC
TRADE
AGREEMENT
4 November 1961
r 5 October 1961
16 October 1961
L _ _ J
19 October 1961
23 October 1961
26 October 1961
. 30 September 1961
18 August 1961
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Parallel signs of new
involvement with the USSR in
critical areas also began to
appear. Soviet security agents
were again reported serving as
advisers at Flagstaff House as
they had for several months
after the Kulungugu incident.
Ghana's intelligence chiefs said
that they had recently been
forced to send trainees to Mos-
cow. Overshadowing these develop-
ments, however, were indications
that major new military arrange-
ments between Ghana and the So-
viet Union were in the works.
In late October a Soviet
delegation reportedly composed
of high-ranking military officers
paid a brief, surreptitious visit
to Accra. Shortly thereafter
British officials began making
guarded references to an exten-
sive new Soviet military aid of-
fer which they believed had been
accepted by Accra. Under the
program Moscow was said to have
agreed to provide Ghana with a
sizable quantity of arms and
heavy equipment and to train
some 400 Ghanaian servicemen in
the USSR.
Intermittent military dis-
cussions had been held between
the two countries since late
1960, when Moscow first offered
broad assistance in this field.
The only tangible results up
to this time, however, have been
two small arms shipments to
Ghana and a 1961 program for
training Ghanaian cadets in the
USSR which had to be curtailed
because Nkrumah was unable to
furnish sufficiently qualified
candidates. Ghana's British-
oriented professional military
10
leaders are generally opposed
to the acceptance of Communist
military aid.
Nkrumah may be bent on
creating, with Soviet help, a
new military unit separate from
other components of the Ghanaian
Army. He probably considers the
existing units of his armed
forces politically unreliable
because they have been trained
by Britain and Canada. He may
also calculate that a larger
military establishment will boost
his sagging prestige in Africa
and give him greater leverage
with embattled nationalists in
the southern part of the conti-
nent.
The Referendum
Notwithstanding the trend
clearly under way, there was no
evidence that Nkrumah was plan-
ning the early formal conver-
sion of Ghana into a one-party
state until early December, when
three of his former associates
who had been detained for alleged
complicity in the Kulungugu in-
cident were acquitted on treason
charges. Nkrumah was unable to
produce any solid evidence against
them, but the verdict apparently
took the Osagyefo by surprise,
judging from the violence of his
reaction.
Publicly he took the posi-
tion that his quarrel was not
with the decision but with Chief
Justice Korsah's failure to
notify him of its nature before
it was announced. This, he
charged, made it impossible for
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authorities to safeguard public
order. In short order, Korsah
was demoted and retired, and
the CPP central committee, the
cabinet, and the National As-
sembly were summoned into spe-
cial sessions. On 23 December
Parliament enacted legislation
enabling the President to void
any decisions of the special
court--a step he immediately
took with respect to the 9 De-
cember verdict. The three sus-
pects are being kept in prison
under the preventive detention
law.
Further and more drastic
measures were foreshadowed by
a loud new press campaign in
which the leftists portrayed
the acquittal as fresh evidence
of the "conspiracy" against
Ghana and demanded strong new
action to safeguard "the people's
revolution." The main focus
was on the need to replace
"treacherous" judges with ones
"honestly devoted to the cause
of socialism." However, a build-
up began for a purge of all
"counterrevolutionary" and "op-
portunist" elements in the gov-
ernment and CPP, with specific
references to parliament and
the civil, foreign, and security
services as well as to the judi-
ciary.
In this atmosphere, Nkrumah
announced on 31 December the
forthcoming referendum on two
proposed constitutional amend-
ments. These will render the
judiciary completely subservient
to the President and enshrine
the CPP as Ghana's "only na-
tional party." The latter ,
proposition also officially
defines the CPP as "the van-
guard of the people" and the
"leading core of all organiza-
tions"--phrases employed in the
Soviet constitution in regard
to the Communist Party. Stimu-
lated still further by the new
attempt on Nkrumah's life on
2 January, the regime's propa-
ganda mill is calling for a
"100-percent" affirmative vote.
Present 'Status
Right now Nkrumah appears
a badly frightened man whose
behavior in the immediate future
is likely to be even more er-
ratic and unpredictable than
usual; it may even be affected
by superstitious considerations.
His initial reaction to the lat-
est attempt to kill him has been
to start an extensive internal
shakeup which so far has mainly
affected the police but may soon
extend to top-level regime per-
sonalities.
Last week he purged virtu-
ally the entire.top command of
the British-trained police after
his captured assailant report-
edly implicated the deputy com-
missioner. The police have also
been disarmed and their ar-
mories placed under army con�
trol. For the moment, a
staunchly Western-oriented offi-
cial hag been installed as act-
ing police commissioner.
11
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The US Embassy believes
that these precipitate actions
have for the moment placed the
regime in greater jeopardy from
a coup than it has ever been
before, but that Nkrumah can
probably ride out the critical
period. While moderate ele-
ments in the government have
been badly shaken by recent
events, the army support essen-
tial for any successful move
against Nkrumah does not seem
to be in sight.
Outlook
Assuming Nkrumah stays in
power, further fundamental
changes in the political system
along the lines advocated by
the pro-Communists can probably
be anticipated. Once the CPP's
legal monopoly over politics
is established, he probably will
proceed to make political loyalty
the prerequisite for employment
in the security services, the
civil service, the education
system, and other professional
areas. For some time, however,
the CPP will continue to lack
sufficient machinery and effi-
ciency to enforce its "leading
core" role everywhere.
Within the regime, the
field-now seems to be wide open
for the extremists,whose influ-
ence over Nkrumah is likely to
continue to increase as long as
they do not overplay their hand.
The result appears certain to
be a further progressive Commu-
nist penetration of Ghanaian
political life through such
12
vehicles as the Ideological
Institute and perhaps.eventuall,
the.entire educational system'.
Nevertheless, Nkrumah at -this'
point probably retains suffi--
tient perspective to be wary.
of any attempt on the part of
his pro-Communist associates to
create an independent power
base. Similarly, he seems in
no immediate danger of losing
his essential freedom of action
'16 Moscow or Peiping, although
his ties with the 'Communist
world will undoubtedly grow.
He seems particularly receptive
to increased Communist collabora-
tion in his African ventures.
For the West, prospects
in Ghana are thus dismal at
present. New diatribes against
the US and other Western govern-
ments, including accusations of
direct complicity in the latest
assassination attempt, may be
launched soon. If a new anti-
Western vendetta does develop,
it may this time involve some
reduction of the Western pres-
ence. The US Peace Corps could
be an early victim of any such
move. In any event,it will prob-
ably be increasingly difficult
for private foreign interests,
especially those involved in com-
mercial activities, to function
profitably, and Nkrumah may in
time even proceed against estab-
lished Western-owned enter-
viprises.
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