PROSPECTS FOR REDUCING HEROIN SUPPLIES TO THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06164700
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• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02250
• Publication Date: September 27, 1983

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Director o
Central
Intelligence
(b)(3)
Prospects for Reducing
Heroin Supplies to the
United States
National-Intelligence Estimate
Volume II�Annexes
NIE 8-2-83
27 September 1983
Copy 387
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Warning Notice
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REL. This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to ...
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(b)(3)
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NIE 8-2-83
PROSPECTS FOR REDUCING
HEROIN SUPPLIES TO THE
UNITED STATES
VOLUME II ANNEXES
Information available as of 15 September 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Intelligence units in the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, and in the
United States Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, also participated in the
preparation of this Estimate.
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CONTENTS
SCOPE NOTE
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ANNEX B: The Mexican Case
15
Introduction
15
History of Opium Production in Mexico
15
Eradication Efforts
15
Prices, Volume, Quality in the US Market Before the Disruption
16
Trafficking Networks
16
The Disruption
17
Short-Term Impact on the US Markets
18
Price, Quantity, and Quality
18
Changes in User Community
18
Longer Term Effects
19
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SCOPE NOTE
Heroin consumption may be on the rise again in the United States af-
ter it had leveled off at about 4 tons or so a year in 1980 and 1981, with
around 500,000 addicts. In other parts of the world, consumption and
addiction have been steadily increasing. It is estimated, for example, that
in 1982 there were some 250,000 heroin addicts in Western Europe, 50,000
in Pakistan, and 25,000 in Australia, all up considerably in the last few
years. As their addict population rises, these and other countries are
wrestling with the question of how to combat the heroin problem in both
its foreign policy and domestic dimensions.
Since the problem came earlier to our country, US administrations for
over a decade have been attempting to pursue an explicit foreign policy to
cut heroin flows into the United States. In the main, that policy has focused
on reducing supplies of heroin as close to the growing source as possible,
primarily through programs to eradicate opium poppies (the raw material
from which heroin is made) but also including interdiction of supplies and
arrests of traffickers. The purpose of this two-volume study is to examine
what overall impact the US supply reduction program has had on heroin
usage in the United States, what the prospects are for reducing supplies to
the United States in the next few years, and what the implications are of
pursuing current US supply reduction policies. Volume I provides a general
overview of the problems, prospects, and implications of the US program to
reduce heroin supplies. Volume II contains supporting material in the form
of case studies of past instances of heroin supply reductions from Turkey,
Mexico, and Southeast Asia.
This study does not treat the demand side of the heroin use equation,
an aspect of any overall strategy to reduce heroin consumption that is at
least as important as cutting supplies. It also does not delve into the
financial aspects of heroin trafficking, a complex subject which will be
dealt with in future studies of narcotics-related financial flows. In addition,
the study focuses exclusively on heroin, and its conclusions do not apply
necessarily to the prospects for reducing supplies of other drugs, such as
marijuana and cocaine.
The statistics used in this paper, as with virtually all numbers in the
drug area, must of necessity be read as midpoints on estimated ranges, not
as hard figures. Nonetheless, we believe they are accurate enough to show
direction of change and magnitude, and to support the conclusions of the
study.
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ANNEX B
THE MEXICAN CASE
Introduction
History of Opium Production in Mexico
1. Mexico has supplied narcotics to the US market
since at least the last half of the 1910s. By the late
1940s, according to Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) records, Mexicans produced smoking opium,
morphine, and small amounts of brown heroin. By the
early 1960s, Mexico had also become an important
drug transit country. Cocaine from South America and
European white heroin were transported into the
United States by Mexican narcotics traffickers, who
developed sophisticated smuggling and distribution
methods for the growing US drug market. By the late
1960s, Federal narcotics enforcement agencies began
to seize increasingly larger amounts of US brown
heroin produced froth Mexican-grown opium poppies.
2. The major breakthrough for Mexican heroin
producers occurred in 1972-74 when Turkish heroin,
as a result of successful law enforcement action against
the French connection and Turkey's opium growing
ban, largely disappeared from the US market. Local
Mexican heroin production, generally perceived by
the US Government to that point as relatively small
and of mediocre quality, increased in both quantity
and purity. Poppy cultivation spread from the remote
mountains of Sinaloa, and intense planting was seen
from the southern portion of Sonora to the state of
Oaxaca. By 1974, Mexican heroin filled the gap left by
the reduced availability of Turkish heroin everywhere
but on the east coast of the United States. By 1975,
Mexican brown heroin was dominant even there.
3. In essence, Mexico had become almost the only
source for heroin in the United States, and addicts had
to buy it or switch to other drugs. Mexican producers
also responded to the requirements of the US market
and increased the quality of their product. Conse-
quently, hardcore addicts' preference for white heroin
began to decline as Mexican "mud" increased in
purity and quantity, and became cheaper than white
heroin. Mexican heroin
prices dropped in the early 1970s and stabilized in
1974-75 at about 39 centers per milligram, considera-
bly lower than the white heroin average price of 57
cents to 66 cents.
Eradication Efforts
4. Until the mid-1970s, the Mexican Government
did little to suppress narcotics production and traffick-
ing. Mexico was a signatory of the Hague Opium
Convention in 1911-12 and later signed an agreement
at the 1931 General Conference of the Geneva Opium
Convention to limit narcotics at their source. Mexican
Government officials, however, of ten accepted bribes
to ignore trafficking and sometimes were even more
directly involved. In June 1931, for example, the
Mexican Minister of Government resigned after being
accused of complicity in the drug trade.
5. In 1947, the Mexican Government established a
small poppy and marijuana eradication campaign
(using an aerial poppy survey conducted with the
participation of the US Federal Bureau of Narcotics
the previous year) that destroyed 200 poppyfields
covering an area of 36.5 hectares. Six years later, the
Army had assigned 12 military units to poppy and
marijuana eradication in Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and
Durango. These troops manually eradicated fields of
poppy plants which had been located by light fixed-
wing aircraft. Small Army helicopters were used be-
ginning in 1962 to locate fields and direct ground
eradication troops. Moreover, the Mexican Federal
Judicial Police (MFJP) established bases at border
crossing points and on transportation routes in Mexico
in an attempt to intercept narcotics traffickers.
6. In 1968, a pilot project was initiated to spray
poppyfields with herbicide from helicopters. The her-
bicide resulted in a quick kill, but the delivery system
carried by the helicopters was too primitive to guaran-
tee eradication, and the project was not continued
(b)(1)
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beyond the pilot stage. During this campaign, howev-
er, the Army successfully used helicopters to transport
troops to increasingly remote field locations.
7. In the late 1960s, as Mexican heroin and marijua-
na flooded US markets,
Although there was
dence of widespread heroin addiction in
Mexican officials had begun to worry about
no evi-
Mexico,
the do-
mestic abuse of marijuana. An enforcement program
which reduced marijuana availability in Mexico and
also reduced exports of heroin to the United States thus
had both domestic and international advantages.
9. Problems arising from narcotics-generated mon-
ey also may have given impetus to Mexico's anti-
narcotics campaign. The sudden influx of drug money
into rural society, according to some observers, caused
serious inflation and created a lawless subsector of
drug traffickers who began to gain considerable politi-
cal influence in the narcotics-producing and traffick-
ing regions, and who owed loyalty to narcotics organi-
zations rather than to the Mexican Government. The
increasing influence of these criminals among state
and local politicians may have contributed to the
Mexican Government's eventual decision to begin a
more effective antinarcotics program.
Prices, Volume, Quality in the US Market Before
the Disruption
10. Because of local trafficker and addict prefer-
ence for white heroin, Mexican heroin penetrated the
US market slowly, taking from 1972 to 1975 to move
from the traditional markets along the Texas-C(b)( 1)
nia/Mexico border, through the interior of the 1(b)(3)
States, and eventually to the northeast coast. Another
constraint to expanding Mexican-US heroin trade may
have been difficulties encountered by Hispanic traf-
fickers in entering non-Hispanic markets.
(b)(1)
east coast traffickers' heroin supPlie:(b)(3)
low in 1975. In order to buy Mexican heroin, these
predominantly Italian or black drug traffickers had to
make contacts in the local Latin community. The
establishment of a heroin source outside usual ethnic
acquaintances was difficult and dangerous, and it was
handled with caution. Some of the delay in Mexican
heroin market penetration may have been caused by
the time and care expended establishing these
contacts.
11. In the absence of significant competition, how-
ever, Mexican heroin gradually took ovei the US
market. By 1973, more than half the heroin in the
United States was Mexican. By 1975,
(b)(1)
that as much as 85 percent of the heroin consun(b)(3)
the United States that year was produced from opium
grown in Mexico. The -Golden Triangle- of Southeast
Asia supplied about 15 percent of the US heroin
market. Very little, if any, heroin from Southwest Asia
entered the US market at that time. (See figure B-1.)
Mexican Heroin Production in
Pure Metric Tons, 1969-75
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
0.19
0.16
0.17
2.46
3.74
5.42
6.5
Trafficking Networks
12. Most narcotics trafficking from Mexico into the
United States has been conducted by small organiza-
tions and individual entrepreneurs. (b)(1)]
in 1976 there were som(b)(3)
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Figure B-1
Mexican Heroin Production in Pure
Metric Tons, 1969-75
1969
Unclassified
70
71
72
73
74
75
300832 (A03383) 10_83
over 100 small heroin trafficking organizations (com-
posed of perhaps 1,000 individuals), responsible for
smuggling about one-fourth of the Mexican heroin that
entered the United States. Associates, couriers, and
smugglers subordinate to these organizations, but oper-
ating independently, were probably responsible for
another fourth. Another 1,000 "free lancers" and a
few (perhaps as many as five) large organizations
accounted for the other half of the Mexican heroin
brought into the United States in the mid-1970s.
the large Mexican trafficking
organizations probably smuggle less than 20 percent of
Mexico's yearly heroin production. They also deal in
cocaine and marijuana, however, so that their com-
bined illicit drug business is probably larger than any
of the independent dealers who may traffick in larger
quantities of heroin. In addition, their control over all
aspects of heroin production and marketing�from the
poppy farms in Mexico to retail street sales in the
United States�allows them to operate efficiently,
producing high profits margins on relatively low vol-
umes of drugs.
13. Trafficking groups in Mexico have been largely
familial in structure. Some poppy-cultivation areas,
such as those north of Durango city, were controlled
by large families that intermarried and stayed in the
area to become a controlling clan
(b)(1)
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14. Smaller trafficking groups, working mostly out
of the city of Culiacan, were more numerous but less
organized. They bought opium from middlemen, who
had procured it from farmers, and contracted with
independent chemists to convert the opium to heroin.
These small groups arranged delivery to wholesalers
and smugglers on the Mexican side of the border, who
would in turn sell to US smugglers, usually in the
Tijuana or San Luis areas.
The Disruption
15. By the early 1970s, heroin production in Mexico
was increasing by about 50 percent a year. By 1975,
frIexican heroin produc-(b)( 1 )
tion had reached 6.5 metric tons and the purity of thE(b)(3)
average street-level dose of Mexican heroin in the
United States had increased to an almost lethal level.
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Short-Term Impact on the US Markets
Price, Quantity, and Quality
20. The poppy eradication campaign was a clear
success in the first few years. Opium production
decreased 85 percent from 1975 to 1979
the US street purity of Mexican heroin fell
from a high of 6.1 percent in 1976 to well below 4
percent by 1979. At one point, the purity of Mexican
heroin dropped so low in some cities that addicts
switched to synthetic drugs.
21. Although the eradication campaign acc((b)( 1 )
for almost a 40-percent decrease in heroin prod(b-).(3..)
for the first year of operation, prices remained stable
at first. Nationwide quarterly averages ranged be-
tween $0.31 and $0.49 per pure milligram of heroin.
The distance between farmgate and user market may
account for this price lag, since
(b)(1)
takes about three to four months for opium t(b)(3)
converted into heroin and shipped to US user markets.
US average heroin prices began to rise in the last
quarter of 1976 and took a dramatic upswing in the
first quarter of 1977 as the effects of reduced opium
supplies began to be felt.
22. The 1977 eradication campaign reduced opium
supplies an additional 25 percent, and US heroin
prices continued to increase. By the first quarter of
1978, a milligram of Mexican heroin on the average
cost over a dollar nationwide�although it had cost
more than a dollar on the east coast since the last
quarter of 1976.
Changes in User Community
23. The drop in availability of Mexican heroin from
1976 to 1979 affected the US heroin user community.
First time users and the amount used by younger
people probably decreased, and many addicts entered
drug treatment programs. In particular, Hispanics
entering drug treatment programs rose from 14 per-
cent of all entrants in 1975 to almost 20 percent in
1980.
24. The decline in the availability of heroin in this
period also affected the overall pattern of drug usage.
There was a shift to heroin substitutes, including such
synthetic narcotics as Dilaudid, oxycodone, and pen-
tazocine. Multiple drug usage also increased as heroin
addicts learned to take heroin in combination with
other substances (such as cocaine or marijuana) or to
combine synthetic narcotics with other drugs. One
popular combination, for example, is known on the
street's as "T's and Blues." Talwin, the "T" poi(b)( 1 )
the combination, is the brand name for pentaz((b)(3)
potent analgesic and a Schedule IV controlled sub-
stance. The "Blues" portion of this drug combination,
pyribenzamine, is a noncontrolled antihistamine. The
most common method of abuse was to dissolve a tablet
(b)(1)
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of Talwin and a tablet of pyribenzamine together and
inject the solution. The effect was described by addicts
as similar to an injection of heroin. Addicts came to
like "T's and Blues" since the products were pharma-
ceutically pure, consistent in potency, and readily
available. In addition "T's and Blues" were abundant
and cheap (compared with heroin), and traffickers
could anticipate lighter sentences if caught, since
Talwin is only a Schedule IV substance.
25. This changed pattern of drug usage is reflected
in DAWN statistics on drug-related deaths from 1975
through 1978. During that period deaths from heroin
fell steadily from 1,789 to 501, while deaths from
-other narcotics, various depressants, amphetamines
and other stimulants, cocaine, and cannabis rose al-
most every year.
Longer Term Effects
26. By 1979, Mexican opium and heroin producers
and traffickers had lost their dominant position in the
US heroin market, but the decline in Mexican opium
production stopped. This happened because, among
other reasons, Mexican opium poppy farmers learned
how to counter the effects of the eradication program.
Their response to the aerial eradication campaign was
to reduce the size of their poppyfields and locate them
only in the most remote mountainous areas to avoid
detection. Prior to the 1976 eradication campaign,
poppyfields aver-
aged 3,600 square meters in size. By 1980,
:he average field covered only 400
square meters. Poppy farmers also widely dispersed
their fields into rough terrain, and planted them only
in narrow ravines and shadowed areas adjacent to
cliffs and steep hills.'
27. Mexican poppy farmers also developed a tech-
nique to counter the effects of the herbicide used in
the spray campaign. Esteron-47, known generically as
2-4D, is a hormone that accelerates the' poppy plant's
growth until the plant's environment can no longer
supply adequate nutriment and moisture. Poppies
sprayed with this herbicide generally die in three days.
some farm-
ers discovered they could still harvest the poppies
successfully if they washed them down or scored them
'As a bonus for the farmers,
poppies grown in shade produced opium gum wit er morphine
content than those grown in direct light.
h high
h
soon after the spray helicopters had departed. Report-
edly, the residual herbicide left on the poppies stimu-
lated growth and made the plant pump harder after
scoring, which may have increased opium yield.
28. Efforts such as these probably contributed to
lowering the eradication campaign's effectiveness, but
potentially the most severe problem for the campaign
has been spray delivery timing. Poppy plants do not
mature at the same time; indeed, poppy capsules on
the same plant may be in three different stages of
development. As a consequence, it is extremely diffi-
cult to spray poppies at exactly the right time, when
the majority of the poppies are fully mature but not
yet harvested. This may account for the fact that of
the many fields in recent years,
most had some opium extracted before spraying
occurred.
29. Prices for Mexican heroin in the United States
changed more slowly than did quantity and purity as a
result of the eradication program. Mexican poppy
farmers planted fewer hectares and produced less
opium in 1979 than in the prior decade, but their
profit probably changed little up to that point since
their product did not have much competition on US
streets and heroin prices were at a high.
30. This high market price and the growing short-
age of heroin attracted other potential suppliers. Paki-
stan, Afghanistan, and Iran increased their opium
production from 1,000 to 1,200 metric tons in 1978 to
possibly as high as 1,600 metric tons in 1979. Much of
this opium was used or stockpiled in Southwest Asia
and the Middle East, but the remainder was converted
into heroin which was sent to Europe and the United
States. By the end of 1979, Southwest Asian heroin
began to arrive in large quantities in the northeast
United States, where the drop in Mexican heroin
availability had been most drastic.
(b)(3)1(1)
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Figure B-2
Poppy Cultivation Areas
1,tan Ysid
Tijuana
Sa
IS
Sonora
--; Chihuah a
Culiaa
North Pacific Ocean
Unclassified
700186 10-83
United States
'4\-\
Las I
sllarreras
curango
Si lo Duro:Igor:.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
4
Sai
uis
"/"..
a s
ME IC11
uerrero
Poppy cultivation
Estado (state)
boundary
0 . 300
Kilometers
Gulf of Mexico
(Ver ruz
1V-�
Oaxaca e
Chiapas
Be
Se
Guatemala
Honduras
El
Salvador
33. The average price per pure milligram rensaicieu
N R Record
low during the first three months of 1980 and heroin
deaths continued to be high, but by the second quarter
of 1980 east coast traffickers began to realize that
Southwest Asian heroin was purer than the Mexican
heroin they had been receiving. The average east coast
price almost doubled during the second 1980 quarter,
and traffickers cut the street purity down to a "safe"
injectable level, causing New York City heroin deaths
to drop 87 percent.
� 34. In 1979, Mexico's share of the US market had
dropped to 30 percent. In order to compensate for this
reduction, traffickers encouraged farmers to increase
production. In 1980 and 1981 Mexican opium produc-
tion increased to about 15 metric tons. However, the
Mexican heroin market share returned only to about
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40 percent in 1981 due to the rapid increase of better
quality Southwest Asian heroin.
35. The increase in Mexican heroin production
caused some Mexicans to begin a reevaluation of the
eradication program. The Mexican National Coordina-
tor for the eradication campaign stated in the Mexican
press in May 1982 that if the intensity of the eradica-
tion program were to decrease, drug production would
resume. A few days later, an editorial appeared in the
Mexican press noting that the desire to cultivate the
poppy, despite its illegality, was caused by the lack of
an alternative licit crop. Since poppy cultivation is not
native to Mexico�the poppy was introduced and
cultivated in the 1800s by Chinese railworkers�the
editorial called for a training program to substitute
legal income-producing crops. During the past several
years, this concept has been proposed repeatedly, but
the Mexican Government has not found an alternate
crop which would grow in rugged terrain and realize
the high profits of poppy cultivation. Despite calls for
a more comprehensive program to discourage opium
production, the Mexican antinarcotics program has
changed little since 1975, even though opium produc-
tion has not decreased in the last four years after the
sharp drop realized between 1976 and 1979 (b)(1)
1%1exico opium pi(b)(3)
duction has held steady at about 16 to 18 tons in 1981
and 1982. Preliminary CIA forecasts for 1983 indicates
opium production will again be in that range.
(b)(3)
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DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. This copy is for the
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know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials
within their respective departments:
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b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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f. Director of Intelligence, for Headquarters, Marine Corps
g. Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, for the Department of Energy
h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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j. Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, for the Department of the
Treasury
k. The Deputy Director for Intelligence for any other Department or Agency
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a
period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed
or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding
agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C06164700
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C06164700
--Seeret_
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