ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06164248
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2017
• Case Number: F-2017-00351
• Publication Date: January 8, 1990

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CONF 5 NTIAL
SUBJECT: Arab Perceptions of the United States
Distribution:
DI/NESA/IA,
(8 Jan 90)
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SUBJECT: Arab Perceptions of the United States
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ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
KEY JUDGMENTS
The Arab-Israeli conflict is the most important
issue shaping Arab perceptions of the United States.
The Palestinian uprising in the occupied West Bank
and Gaza Strip has raised the consciousness of
virtually all Arabs, including those for whom the
Arab-Israeli conflict is not a primary concern.
Virtually all Arabs believe the United States is
biased in favor of Israel. Many are optimistic that
the United States ultimately will use its influence
to bring Israel to the negotiating table. This
optimism is declining, however, and will continue to
deteriorate if the current US-PLO dialogue is
unproductive.
Security issues also have a significant impact
on Arab perceptions of the United States. The
smaller Arab Gulf states, which felt threatened by
the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war,
appreciated the dispatch of US naval forces to the
Persian Gulf during the war and continue to view the
United States as the ultimate guarantor of their
security. With the cease-fire, however, their
security concerns are receding, and other issues,
such as their difficulties in purchasing weapon
systems from the United States and the broader
political problem of the Arab-Israeli dispute, are
becoming more important.
In the long run, economics may be the most
important factor shaping Arab perceptions of the
United States because it is economic challenges that
most threaten the security of existing regimes.
Economic considerations are already as important as
political issues in shaping Egyptian perceptions of
the United States. Cairo counts on US economic
support, and, to the extent its needs are not met,
Washington is viewed as culpable.
Arab dissatisfaction with US policies is
compounded by the profound ambivalence that
characterizes Arab perceptions of the United States.
On the one hand, Arabs admire the United States for
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its power, technical expertise, educational
achievements, and identification with human rights.
On the other hand, the resentment they feel about
decades of Western domination is focused on the
United States as the most powerful Western state.
An Arab tendency to view the world in
conspiratorial terms nurtures a belief that
Washington can do whatever it chooses because of its
power. This can lead Arabs to blame Washington for
anything that goes wrong from rising prices to
Israeli policy in the occupied territories. These
underlying predispositions foster often volatile
reactions to specific events that seem out of
proportion to the importance of the events
themselves, and they can be tapped by those who seek
to strengthen their position by appealing to anti-US
sentiment.
Islamic fundamentalism has long-term negative
implications for Arab perceptions of the United
States. Radical Islam, the principal ideology of
protest in the Arab world, contains a strong anti-US
component. It reinforces the perception that the
West is decadent, and this perception can be
exploited by those seeking to change the existing
order.
Many of the elements that will shape Arab
perceptions of the United States in coming years
appear to work against US interests. The younger
generation in most Arab countries is more critical
of the United States than the older. Similarly, the
reservoir of good will among Arabs toward Washington
is being depleted, a process aggravated by a
perception that US power, credibility, and relevance
are declining. This perception is based on the view
that Washington is experiencing a decline in its
political, military, and economic involvement in the
Middle East. The negative implications of this
perception could be a reduced willingness on the
part of Arab leaders to cooperate with Washington.
Although the United States has little ability
to affect many of these underlying predispositions
and trends, it can affect some issues that have a
bearing on Arab perceptions of the United States.
To the extent it can move the Arab-Israeli
negotiating process forward, advance its dialogue
with the PLO, and separate itself from Israeli
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policies that particularly anger the Arabs,
Washington's image will improve. Similarly, Arab
perceptions of the United States will improve when
Washington is perceived as playing an effective
security role in an area of tension, such as in the
Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. The US image
also would improve if it could sell sophisticated
weapon systems to its Arab friends.
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CONTENTS
KEY JUDGMENTS
SCOPE NOTE
UNDERLYING PREDISPOSITIONS AND TRENDS
Ambivalence: The Historic Legacy
A People in Transition
A Conspiratorial View of the World
Islamic Fundamentalism
Generational Change
The Role of Public Opinion
THE IMPACT OF US POLICIES ON ARAB PERCEPTIONS
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
The Iran-Iraq War
US Position on Arms Sales and Weapons Proliferation.
Declining US Economic Role in the Region
RESERVOIR OF GOOD WILL: INTACT OR DEPLETED'
TRENDS AND OUTLOOK
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There are numerous variations in Arab perceptions of the
United States, and this paper does not address them all. Any
attempt to describe Arab perceptions will contain a multitude
of oversimplifications. For the most part, it is the
perceptions of elites that are available to us. When
questions of broader public attitudes and proclivities are
discussed, they are viewed through the filter of US observers
who in turn are often informed by members of Arab elite
groupings.
Some countries and regions are slighted in the paper
because of varying responses from the participants. Because
of good responses to our collection requirements from US
Embassies in the smaller Arab Gulf states, for example, these
countries may be given more attention than they merit in terms
of US policy interests.
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ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
UNDERLYING PREDISPOSITIONS AND TRENDS
Ambivalence: The Historic Legacy
Arab attitudes toward the United States are characterized
by a profound ambivalence derived from a history of extensive
contact with the West. Arab feelings of superiority are born
of an ancient civilization, an indigenous religion, and the
knowledge that, centuries ago, the Arab world repulsed the
Crusader invasions and even ruled over part of what is now the
Western world. A sense of inferiority, on the other hand, has
been fed by more recent Arab domination by the West--political
domination during the colonial era and subsequent economic
domination and cultural encroachment. Though not a colonial
power in the region, the United States, as the most powerful
contemporary Western Dower, is tainted by the negative legacy
of the past.
At the same time, the United States has tremendous appeal
for many Arabs, who are attracted by US technology,
educational opportunities, political system, wealth, and
power. Many individuals are particularly attracted by the US
identification with such values as freedom, democracy, and the
rights of the individual. In addition, although it has
inherited much of the Western colonial legacy, the United
States is not viewed with the same cynicism and skepticism as
are such colonial powers as the United Kingdom, France, and
Italy. Both government and academic sources observed that the
Arabs also have an underlying affection for Americans, viewing
rtilein�a s far more open and straightforward than Europeans.
Arab ambivalence toward the United States is evident in
the coexistence and frequent expression of seemingly
contradictory attitudes--resentment and attraction,
frustration and hope. An Egyptian writer has described this
phenomenon as the Arab elite's schizophrenia toward the United
States. Resentful of their inferior political and economic
position, Arabs tend to resent those who have the upper hand.
At the same time, they have an abiding hope that the United
States ultimately will see that its interests lie with the
Arabs, will adjust its policies in their favor, and,
of its power, will be able to solve their problems.
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A People in Transition
Arabs view the outside world through the prism of their
own experience, and, in political and economic terms, they are
a people in transition. Before World War I, no Arab country
except Oman was independent, and only six were independent
before the end of World War II. The pace then accelerated,
and, by 1971, 19 Arab states had become sovereign political
entities. Most of these states are still transforming
themselves from economically backward, fragmented societies
into modern nation states. Many questions remain about how
this should be accom lished and even whether it should be
accomplished.
The uncertainty and lack of resolution inherent to
transitions have fostered the volatility that has
characterized Arab society in the past several decades,
causing reactions to specific events that often seem out of
proportion to the importance of the events themselves. Each
Arab state has had its own problems adjusting to this
transition, or modernization, but all remain vulnerable in one
way or another.
As the Arabs' perceptions of their states' political
identity and legitimacy have evolved, their attitudes toward
the outside world and particularly the United States have
fluctuated. Numerous situations and events have affected
these attitudes. In recent times, the Arab-Israeli war in
October 1973 and its aftermath have had perhaps the greatest
impact. Although the Arabs lost the war, their ability to
regain some of the territory lost in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war
convinced them that Israel was not invulnerable and that the
Arabs eventually would prevail. This new sense of confidence,
their new oil wealth, and the sense of power they derived from
the postwar oil embargo had a profound psychological impact,
restoring to them a sense of pride and enabling them to deal
with the outside world with greater dignity. To a considerable
extent, this sense of optimism has been maintained.
A Conspiratorial View of the World
Many Arabs have a conspiratorial view of life that
fosters a tendency to blame the United States, as the most
powerful Western state, for negative events and trends.
"Whereas anything that goes wrong used to be blamed on the
British secret service, now it is blamed on the CIA,"
according to a US academic expert. He cited as an example the
current Egyptian view of US complicity in the revival of
Islamic fundamentalism, reporting that anti-US Egyptians
believe the United States is using Islamic fundamentalism to
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prevent Arab progress, while pro-US Egyptians argue that
Washington is foolishly trying to exploit fundamentalism as a
weapon against the Soviet Union. A US Government official
confirmed this Egyptian orientation, stating that the United
States comes under suspicion whenever a US official meets with
a fundamentalist.
During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, according to the US
Ambassador in Cairo at the time, senior Egyptian officials
firmly believed that the United States was behind the major
defeat the Arabs suffered. They argued that Israel could not
have done so well without US assistance. The Palestinian
uprising in the occupied territories is viewed similarly by
many Arabs. The United States is held responsible for Israeli
actions, and Arabs ask, "How can Washington permit beatings,
destruction of homes, and deportations?" Although these are
all Egyptian examples of the phenomenon, several academic and
US Government experts indicated that this conspiratorial
attitude is shared by much of the Arab world.
Islamic Fundamentalism
Religion is extremely important in forming underlying
Arab attitudes and assumptions with respect to the United
States. Lingering suspicions of the West and its anti-Islamic
intentions date from the Crusades and remain particularly
alive in the states of the Levant. The Iranian revolution
demonstrated that radical Islam is capable of arousing public
passions and posing a threat to established regimes, whether
through revolution, subversion and terrorism, or popular
pressure on policy issues.
Islamic fundamentalism has reemerged as an ideology of
protest in the Arab world. In searching for their identity,
many Arabs have rejected Western models and sought solutions
to problems through Islam. An indigenous belief system with
its own laws and structure for living, Islam offers a common
rhetoric and alternative approach to those unhappy with the
prevailing order and seeking a return to basic truths.
Fundamentalism is inherently hostile to outside
influences and disdains Western "corruption and decadence."
Because it reinforces underlying anti-Western and anti-US
attitudes, it can be exploited by those seeking to change the
established order. A US academic stated that, "Fundamentalism
is a threat anywhere in the region that social order is
endangered." Another argued that, although the impetus for
change in a particular state might not be religious in nature,
fundamentalists can exploit turmoil arising from economic
distress or political anger.
CDA
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Several US Government and academic experts expressed
concern about the threat posed by fundamentalism to such key
Arab states as Egypt and Jordan. The US Embassy in Cairo
emphasized that for most Egyptians religion is a way of life,
not a form of political expression. The Embassy added,
however, that the Islamic revival has adversely affected
attitudes toward the United States and the West in general.
The election to the new Jordanian parliament in November 1989
of 31 delegates emphasizing Islamic themes out of a total of
80 seats suggests that fundamentalism has considerable
resonance in Jordan.1 King Hussein has expressed optimism
about his ability to work with the new parliament, but he may
face problems advancing his reform program if the Islamic
delegates pursue a fundamentalist agenda.
The conventional wisdom holds that fundamentalism will
continue to have significant resonance in the Arab world
because it is the only viable ideology and that it will have a
negative impact on Arab perceptions of the United States. All
observers agree that a strengthening of Islamic activism, with
its inward-looking orientation, would have negative
implications for US interests.
A somewhat more sanguine view of religious activism is
taken by some US academics who argue that fundamentalism as an
active political phenomenon should not be confused with the
widespread return to religious observance in the Arab world.
According to this view, a religious emphasis does not
necessarily translate into political activity or involve
increased anti-US sentiment. In addition, these observers
maintain, there are important differences between Sunni
fundamentalism and Iran's Shia fundamentalism.2 The Iranian
revolution has lost much of its appeal to Muslims outside Iran
as a result of Iran's loss to Iraq in the war and because of
the Islamic retpublic's inability to resolve many of Iran's
problems.
Few observers believe that fundamentalism will produce
dramatic changes in the region in the foreseeable future.
Several US Government officials and academics argue that the
religious revival in the Arab world may work to US advantage.
One academic noted that fundamentalism may be less anti-
American than are pan-Arab ideologies, and another argued that
a religious predisposition may favor the United States, which
1 Twenty of these delegates are members of the Muslim
Brotherhood, and the others emphasized Islamic themes in their
campaigns.
2 Sunni fun amen alism does not exalt the Iranian model and
is not as extreme. Sunni religious practice does not allow
clerics to emerge as political leaders as in Iran.
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is viewed as Christian, over the Soviet Union, which is viewed
as atheistic.
Generational Change
The issue of generational change in the Arab world must
be factored into any projection of likely trends in attitudes
toward the United States. We believe there is a generation
gap in most Arab countries and that the implications of this
gap are unfavorable for the United States. Several US
academic experts argue that the preindependence generation of
Arabs has not transmitted its social and political values to
the younger generation, which rejects Western strategies for
development and is trying to find its own--often through
Islam. This trend could become more critical as economic
conditions worsen and as the younger generation assumes
responsible positions. It is compounded by the fact that the
current bulge in the teenage population in most Arab countries
creates the specter of a larger and even more hostile
generation waiting in the wings.
The US Embassy in Amman argues that the older
generation's affinity for the United States is not shared by
younger colleagues who have had less exposure to the United
States, have witnessed the virtual collapse of the US-
Jordanian military relationship, and are more likely to be
critical. Similarly, in Tunisia, according to the US Embassy
there, the younger generation tends to be less sympathetic to
the United States than the older. The US Embassy in Riyadh
reports that the generation now in its forties represents the
high point of positive attitudes towardsthe United States and
that younger Saudis, now largely educated at home, are not
well informed about the United States and tend to be more
critical.
This negative trend is worsened by a decline in the
number of Arab students being educated in the West. For
example, only 4,000 Saudis are now enrolled in US universities
compared to 12,000 a decade ago. This declining exposure
weakens the US position because those who know the United
States best have the most positive attitudes toward it. The
US Embassy in Tunis reports, for example, that, where
Americans have personal contact with Tunisians, negative
stereotypes are replaced by friendship. Should the number of
Arabs coming to the United States remain constant or decline
further, we believe those countries that have had historically
close ties to the United States will experience an erosion in
pro-US attitudes. By the same token, we believe those states
that have had limited exposure to the United States but whose
access and knowledge are increasing (the smaller Arab Gulf
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states, for example) could experience an improvement in
perceptions of the United States.
There are observers, however, who do not believe
generational change will be harmful to the US position. The
US Embassy in Cairo reports, for example, that, although there
is a profound generation gap in Egypt, it is not manifested in
attitudes toward the United States. Several academic sources
who have taught Arab students in US universities argue that
those who have visited the United States and understand it
best tend to be most critical of it. They maintain that
students who come to the United States are often bitter and
disillusioned by the time they leave. Thus, the fact that
fewer Arabs are being educated in the United States may not
adversely affect attitudes toward it.
The Role of Public Opinion
(b)(3)
The impact of public opinion varies from country to
country. In general, the more democratic the country or the
more vulnerable its government, the more important popular
attitudes become. In Egypt public perceptions and opinions
matter a great deal, and the government is sensitive to them.
In Jordan popular attitudes also matter, though somewhat less.
King Hussein's decision to hold an election in Jordan, the
first in over 20 years, reflects his belief that public
attitudes are important enough to be given a legitimate form
of expression. In the conservative Arab Gulf states, public
opinion historically has been of secondary importance. The
Iranian revolution sensitized the leaders of all states in the
region both to the dangers of ignoring strong public attitudes
and to their ultimate dependence on public acceptance of their
rule. To the extent public attitudes are becoming more
critical of the United States and as public opinion becomes a
more important political factor, the implications are negative
for the United States. (b)(3)
THE IMPACT OF US POLICIES ON ARAB PERCEPTIONS
Many of these predispositions and trends are deeply
entrenched in the Arab psyche and in the Middle Eastern
political and economic environment. Most are highly resistant
to change, and we believe the United States can do little to
change them. Arab perceptions of the United States are also
influenced by contemporary issues that are affected by US
policy. In general, political issues tend to be of most
importance in determining Arab perceptions, but other factors
may have more resonance in some regions at certain times.
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Security concerns, for example, have carried particular weight
with the smaller Arab Gulf states because of their fear that
the Iran-Iraq war would spill over, while Egyptians tend to
focus on economic as much as on political issues.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
There is little question that US policy with respect to
the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most important issue
determining Arab perceptions of the United States. Virtually
all Arabs harbor anger toward the United States for what they
consider a bias in favor of Israel as well as for years of
what they believe to have been missed opportunities and broken
promises (of an Israeli pullback to pre-1967 borders, of
creation of a Palestinian state, of prevention of Israeli
settlements on the West Bank). They are frustrated by what
they see as US failure to perceive the obvious--that long-term
US interests lie with the Arabs. Arabs often misunderstand
and underestimate the nature and extent of the US commitment
to Israel because of their own perception that the U
States should be more supportive of Arab interests.
This negative opinion of the United States is shared by
both US allies and adversaries. Officials in the US Embassy
in Jordan report, for example, that even those Jordanians who
admire the United States criticize its policies with respect
to the conflict. The US Embassy in Cairo reports that
Egyptians resent that, no matter what assistance Cairo
receives from the United States, Israel is given "more and
better." Palestinians believe the United States is, at best,
indifferent to their aspirations, while Syrians are fiercely
critical oftheJJited States for its "one-sided" support of
Israel.
The outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in the occupied
territories in December 1987 reinforced popular Arab support
for the Palestinian cause and intensified anger toward Israel.
It also strengthened the Arab perception that the United
States is biased in favor of Israel because the "powerful"
United States does nothing to stop Israel's repression of
Palestinians in the occupied territories and obstructs UN
resolutions condemning Israel's actions. Such sentiments are
sustained daily by television and press commentary
highlighting Israeli actions a ainst Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.
Most of the Arab world has been affected by the
Palestinian uprising. The US Embassy in Tunis reports that it
has raised the consciousness of virtually all Tunisians, who
are convinced that Israel can pursue its repressive policies
only because it has US support. Even the Gulf Arabs, who
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consider the Arab-Israeli conflict a secondary issue, have
been deeply affected. Reporting from the United Arab
Emirates, for example, indicates that the uprising has
"embittered attitudes toward the United States without
exception."
The US decision to open a dialogue with the PLO was
received favorably by most Arabs (except those who oppose a
negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict or fear their
own exclusion from a settlement--radical Palestinians, Syria,
Libya). The US Embassy in Cairo reports that the Egyptians
believe they were instrumental in the PLO's adoption of a more
moderate line, which made possible the US-PLO dialogue.
Egyptians expect the United States to press Israel to make
concessions. The dialogue has raised expectations throughout
the Arab world, even among those who are skeptical of its
prospects. Its collapse or stagnation almost certainly would
produce increased anger and disillusionment.
The Iran-Iraq War
Embassy reporting strongly suggests that security issues
are of most importance in shaping the perceptions of the
United States held by the small, conservative Arab Gulf
states. The Iranian revolution of 1979 and the subsequent
Iran-Iraq war created anxiety in these vulnerable states.
Both US Government officials and academic observers agree that
the US naval presence in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq
war was appreciated by Gulf Arabs as was the US agreement to
escort Kuwaiti shipping in the Gulf. The United States also
has been credited with helping to bring about the Iran-Iraq
cease-fire. Embassy reporting maintains that many Gulf Arabs
continue to view the United States as the ultimate guarantor
of their security. With the end of the Iran-Iraq war,
security concerns are receding--although the Arab Gulf states
continue to be concerned that the US Navy may leave the region
before there is real stability in the Gulf.
Probably the strongest favorable impact of US policy in
the Gulf during the war was in Kuwait, the most threatened of
the smaller Arab Gulf states. According to the US Embassy in
Kuwait, that state's views of the United States have become
more positive as a result of US policies. US policy also
helped to mitigate a growing Arab view of the United States as
ineffective and unreliable and to restore confidence in the
willingness and capability of the Uni to use force
to defend its interests--and theirs.
The US Embassy in Baghdad reports that Iraq's perceptions
of the United States improved as a result of US support for an
arms embargo against Iran, the US naval escort of Gulf
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shipping, and US political support for Iraq's efforts to end
the war through UN action. In the aftermath of the war,
however, Iraq has reverted to a more critical attitude toward
Washington. The Embassy indicates the Iraqi belief that both
the United States and the Soviet Union seek improved relations
with Iran. Iraqi suspicions of the United States were
reinforced by the aborted US-Iranian arms deal of 1986.
According to US officials and academic observers, the Iraqis
retain their suspicion that the United States is unfriendly
and has interventionist intentions whether in support of the
Iraqi Kurds, Iran, or Israel.
The gains made by the United States as a result of its
policy during the war were tangible as well as perceptual.
Embassy reporting indicates that several states in the region
became more willing to allow the United States access to their
military facilities and have continued to cooperate even
though the war is over. The willingness of Kuwait and Bahraip
to cooperate militarily with the United States during the war
meant that Oman was no longer the only member of the Gulf
Cooperation Council to do so. Since the cease-fire, Oman has
resumed joint military exercises with the United States, and
the US Embassy in Manama reports that Bahrain's leaders favor
a permanent US naval presence in the Persian Gulf.
US Position on Arms Sales and Weapons Proliferation
Virtually all of the observers that we interviewed agree
that the US unwillingness or inability to sell sophisticated
weapon systems to its moderate Arab friends is having a
significant negative impact on Arab perceptions of Washington.
The US Embassy in Amman reports that the Jordanians are
irritated by the US refusal to sell them sophisticated weapon
systems and that their pride has been bruised to the point
that King Hussein has announced that Jordan will no longer
seek US arms. The US Embassy in Riyadh reports that the
Saudis are irritated, frustrated, and hurt by the fact that
their need for weapons is questioned in US Congressional
debates. Saudi officials argue that they have not taken part
in any aggressive military action since the early 1930s and
that they have a legitimate need for defensive weapons in an
area as unstable as the Persian Gulf. The Saudi response to
US policy has been to begin diversification of arms sources.
Riyadh's most dramatic purchase to date has been the Chinese
CSS-2 intermediate-range missile system.
In the smaller Arab Gulf states, the US position with
respect to arms sales is becoming more important as security
concerns recede. According to US Embassies in these states,
the political elite considers the long process involved in
purchasing weapons from the United States humiliating and
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strongly believes that arms purchases by moderate Arab states
are legitimate to defend against an aggressive Israel that the
United States refuses to control. Their response has been to
begin purchasing weapons from the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe.
Most Arabs see US policy with respect to proliferation in
the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and consider the
policy hypocritical and directed only against Arabs. Even the
Egyptians, who share the US antipathy for Qadhafi, are angry
that Washington is more worried about chemical weapons in the
hands of Libya and other Arab states than about nuclear and
chemical weapons in Israeli hands. Many Arabs wonder why
Washington has not insisted that Israel sign the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and there is a growing Arab belief that
chemical weapons may be the only Arab deterrent to Israel's
nuclear threat.
This negative view of US policy undermines Washington's
efforts to gain cooperation to control proliferation. Many
Arabs are reluctant to support US efforts to isolate Libya on
the chemical warfare issue because ' view that US
policy is being applied unfairly.
Declining US Economic Role in Region
The relative US economic role in the Middle East is
declining, although the United States continues to give
extensive economic and military assistance to Israel and
Egypt, remains a major supplier of goods to Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, and offers attractive investment opportunities for the
Arabs. Its relative role is declining because Western Europe
and Japan are competing more effectively for Arab markets. We
do not believe this decline has had a major impact on Arab
perceptions, but Arab awareness of the trend is growing.
Continuing decline could have significant long-term
implications for Arab attitudes toward the United States.
The US Embassy in Bahrain reports that the decreasing US
economic role is affecting Bahraini attitudes toward the
United States. Whereas the United States was once seen as an
overwhelming economic and commercial power, according to the
Embassy, it is now "just another player" competing with Japan
and the European Community for business and contracts--and not
doing so successfully. US businesses are seen as less
sensitive than their competitors to local market conditions,
less willing to compete for contracts, and less interested in
proving themselves throuah smal contracts to gain strategic
advantage later on.
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Those countries that depend on US aid or are seeking such
aid are affected by the US economic position, particularly its
willingness and ability to sustain or increase aid levels.
This is particularly the case with Egypt. The US connection,
originally sought by President Sadat to alleviate some of
Egypt's economic problems as well as to extricate Cairo from
the costs of the Arab-Israeli conflict, has led many Egyptians
to believe that their country "bought and paid for" US aid at
Camp David and that it has a right to it. Cairo counts on
Washington for economic support, and, if Egyptians believe
their needs are not being met, they are ready to blame the
Egyptian Government--and ultimately the United States.
The fact that Egypt remains poor despite US help feeds
the traditional Egyptian conspiratorial view of the world.
Many Egyptians believe that US aid is poorly designed and, at
worst, purposefully ill designed. A US academic who recently
returned from Egypt said Egyptians believe that "if America
wanted Egyptian prosperity, it would design it." A former US
Ambassador to Egypt said that Washington unintentionally
bolsters this perception because much of its economic aid is
invested in projects that are not visible at lower levels and
because considerable aid is funnelled off by the wealthy.
A large portion of Egyptian and Jordanian debts is owed
the United States. Thus, when either country is having
serious trouble paying its debt, frustration and blame are
directed at Washington. Academic sources and former US
Government officials commented that in many Arab countries,
even when an economic problem is domestic (an increase �in
bread prices, for example), the United States is often blamed
for not alleviating the situation.
The US Embassy in Amman reports that the decline in US
aid to Jordan is having a debilitating effect on US-Jordanian
relations. According to the US Embassy in Khartoum, the
prospect of less US aid has made the Sudanese less open to US
advice, although the Embassy adds that this has not changed
basic attitudes toward the United States. The subsidiary
political affect, however, is that Sudan has more incentive to
seek assistance from Libya and less incentive to push economic
reform.
RESERVOIR OF GOOD WILL: INTACT OR DEPLETED?
Opinion among those interviewed for this paper was
divided on the question of the current status of Arab
attitudes toward Washington. Most US academic observers and
US Government analysts believe that Washington's reservoir of
16
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good will is being depleted. Several attributed this to a
growing Arab perception that the United States is in decline.
Widespread press reports of drug use, rampant crime,
homelessness, and general economic malaise in the United
States are undermining the Arab view of the United States as a
power to be feared and respected.
US credibility and relevance also are being questioned.
A former US Ambassador argued that "we have led people down
the garden path over and over again" and lost credibility in
the process. The US Embassy in Amman reports that the United
States is suffering from a decline in relevance. The fact
that US military and economic assistance to Jordan is
decreasing makes the United States less central to Jordan's
interests--and, therefore, reduces its influence.
US setbacks in Lebanon in recent years--the bombings of
the US Embassy and Marine Barracks in 1983, the withdrawal of
US forces in 1984, the taking of US hostages, and the abortive
US effort to mediate a solution to the Lebanese election
crisis in 1988--contributed to a decline in US prestige.
Several former US officials argued that being seen as
incompetent and undependable is worse than being viewed as
biased or corrupt because it undermines US credibility and
makes the Arabs less willing to cooperate with the United
States. They stated that US setbacks in Lebanon reinforced a
general Arab perception that the United States does not have a
"good strategic sense" and that Americans are "naive
amateurs."
The combination of declining relevance, respect, and
credibility may affect the US ability to advance its interests
in the Middle East. According to a former US Government
official who was involved in the negotiations leading to the
opening of the US-PLO dialogue in late 1988, for example, the
US lack of credibility complicated efforts to move the process
forward. At one point, he reported, PLO leader Arafat sought
Egyptian and Saudi advice before proceeding and was warned by
both that Washington could not be trusted to follow through
with assurances it had given.
Current US Government officials tend to be more
optimistic about Arab attitudes toward the United States.
They believe the United States has a large reservoir of good
will. They argue that, although the Arabs may be angry and
frustrated with US policies, they respect US values and
appreciate their need to work with Washington. Supporting
this argument is reporting, from the US Embassy in Damascus to
the effect that, despite years of anti-US propaganda, most
Syrians have a positive view of the United States, seeing it
as an economic, technical,: and even political model. The
embassy believes this attitude will continue. The US Embassy
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in Cairo also believes that favorable attitudes toward
Washington will be maintained.
Some officials argued that continued appreciation of the
United States is based on the Arab perception that the United
States is strong and has leverage with Israel. As one
official stated, "We have survived 40 years of frustration,
broken promises, betrayal, and one-sided US policy--but the
Arabs still look to us for help." Another cited the ability
of the United States to bounce back from perceived setbacks,
arguing that "each new administration gets another chance."
(b)(3)
TRENDS AND OUTLOOK
We believe many of the underlying elements that determine
Arab perceptions of the United States will not change in the
foreseeable future. These include the development and
strength of Islamic fundamentalism, the nature and ultimate
impact of the generation gap, and the ability of the moderate
Arab states to deal effectively with their economic problems.
Washington will have little ability to affect these
predispositions and trends. (b)(3)
There are, however, important issues that the United
States will be able to affect, if only marginally. These
issues will have a significant impact on Arab perceptions of
the United States and on the resulting US ability to further
its regional interests over the long term. (b)(3)
The Arab-Israeli conflict will continue to be the most
important single issue affecting Arab perceptions of the
United States. If the stalemate on this issue continues, the
implications for the United States over the long term almost
certainly will be negative, particularly if Washington
continues to be seen as Israel's patron. If Israel is seen as
the obstacle to progress, the United States will almost
certainly suffer a continuing and debilitating decline in its
prestige, credibility, and influence. If the Arabs are the
cause of stagnation, however, their attitude toward Washington
will not be as strong or as negative.
We believe that a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict
that is acceptable to the moderate Arab world, no matter what
the auspices, would have a favorable impact on Arab
perceptions of the United States. Although it would not
remove all sources of strain and irritation, it would
eliminate a chronic source of tension and alleviate the stigma
of "unfair" US support for Israel.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Any steps taken by the United States to advance its
dialogue with the PLO, to put distance between itself and
Israel and particularly Israel's alleged human rights abuses,
and to move the negotiating process forward will enhance the
US image with the Arabs. Those US policies that appear to
support Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, such as
vetoes of UN resolutions condemning Israeli policy, will
further erode perceptions of Washington as a credible
intermediary.
We expect that the continuing US inability to sell
sophisticated weapon systems to the moderate Arab states will
lead them to further diversify their sources of military
equipment. In time, we believe this diversification will
reduce the US military advisory presence, reinforce
Washington's declining economic role in the region, and
diminish Washington's ability to influence regional policy.
We believe the United States will continue to play an
important role in the economic and commercial life of the
region, but that US exports of all sorts will face
increasingly effective competition from the European Community
and Japan and that this too will lead to a gradual decline in
US relevance and influence.
Over the long term, economic considerations will have
increasing importance in forming Arab perceptions of the
United States. It is economic challenges that most threaten
the security of existing regimes (particularly those that are
friendly to the United States) and that will ultimately
determine the success or failure of radical, and inherently
anti-US, forces in the region.
If the economic deterioration of moderate Arab states
coincides with the continuing decline in the US economic role
in the region, Arab attitudes toward Washington will become
increasingly negative. Few observers are optimistic about the
economic prospects for the poorer Arab states. Although
Egypt's economic problems are so profound that its dependence
on the United States appears inescapable, the United States
will face a major challenge if its funding levels are reduced.
The impact on the US image and relationship with Egypt is
potentially destructive and could produce a violent backlash.
If assistance to Israel were not reduced proportionately or if
the Egyptians believed they were bein unished unfairly, the
impact would be even more severe.
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(b)(3)
TAL
8 January 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Richard N. Haass
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director
for Near East and South Asian Affairs
National Security Council
SUBJECT: Arab Perceptions of the United States
1. You may be interested in this paper addressing Arab perceptions
of the United States.
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
2. The paper deals with underlying Arab attitudes and
predispositions as well as with current issues and US policies that affect
Arab views of Washington. The paper discusses the role of political,
security and economic factors in forming Arab attitudes toward the United
States as well as the impact on those attitudes of Islamic fundamentalism,
generational change, and the rofound ambivalence that characterizes the
Arab view of the West.
3. The author of this paper is
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
l
B. E. Layton
Director
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
Central Intelligence Agency
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
CO DENTIAL
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SUBJECT: Arab Perceptions of the United States
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(b)(3)
CO TIAL
Pohe ciac.)bol 4,1 Ict-P-1
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Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
8 January 1990
NOTE FOR: D/CPAS
SUBJECT: Arab Perceptions of the
United States
You may be interested in this
paper addressing Arab perceptions
of the United States.
Attachment
B. E. Layton
(b)(1
(b)(3
(b)(3)
Pal)d A/4tfir V5LTIU Riac.)6101 ci,1 17114
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n'ag 1129:0 illron v3,,;sop mp'?rtn
3 14. 6) I
Office of. Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
- Directorate of Intelligende
8 January 1990
NOTE FOR: DDI
SUBJECT: Arab Perceptions of the
United States
FYI, no action reauired.
Here
is your copy of
(b)(3)
paper on Arab perceptions.
A copy
(b)(6)
has gone to the DDCI.
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
Attachment
B. E. Layton
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coq TIAL
j\ct
3 -11."..0" j..r1J 0.35:"--1. J L..' I I 1) la
n�om billl 113,w1 n'ttn np'7nDm
� ..).3 1-"4" .4-1�="1-; 6i la
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
8 January 1990
NOTE FOR: DDCI
SUBJECT: Arab Perceptions of the
United States
FYI, no action required. You
may be interested in this paper
addressing Arab perceptions of the
United States.
Attachment
B. E. Layton
CON TIAL
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