DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06158161
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01432
• Publication Date: November 7, 1986

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Directorate of
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Developments in Afghanistan
7 November 1986
1 Perspective�Soviet Union�Afghanistan: Postmortem on the Soviet Troop
Withdrawal
The recently completed withdrawal of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan was
a sham that included the insertion of two regiments and equipment that were
subsequently pulled out. The withdrawal, which did not cut Soviet combat power,
also had few of the political returns the Soviets anticipated.
5 Briefs
11 An Evaluation of the Changing Soviet Force Structure in Afghanistan
Over the past two years, the Soviets have substantially increased the mobility and
firepower of their forces in Afghanistan while adding a comparatively small
number of troops. These developments suggest that the USSR is relying heavily on
a "technological solution" to the problems of winning the war.
17 Japan Views Afghan Issue as a Minor Concern
Afghanistan has historically been a low priority in Japanese foreign policy, but its
importance as an East-West issue prompted Japan to follow the US lead and
impose sanctions against the USSR and Afghanistan in 1979. Although Japan has
since given humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees and more assistance to the
Pakistani Government, it is unlikely to take a much more active role on behalf of
the resistance.
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This document is published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor
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Developments in in Afghanistan
7 November 1986
Perspective Afghanistan: Postmortem on the Soviet Troop Withdrawal
The recently completed withdrawal of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan,
promised in a speech by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, was a sham. Two of
the "regiments" and some tanks were introduced in recent months for the sole
purpose of withdrawing them later. Soviet hopes to make a maximum positive
impression on world opinion will not be realized; initial press coverage has largely
been skeptical. . (b)(3)
Playing a Shell Game
arms and equipment to implement the sh(b)(1 )
began moving into Afghanistan on 29 July, the day after Gorbachev announc`
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the Soviets would withdraw two motorized 'rifle regiments, three air defense
regiments, and a tank regiment. By the time the Soviets were ready to begin the
withdrawal ceremonies in mid-October, they had deployed the main elements of
two new motorized rifle regiments and two tank battalions to Afghanistan to be
withdrawn. The motorized rifle regiment fakery indicates that the Soviets were
unwilling to cut the number of such units in country from 12 to 10; the tank and
air defense regiments had little military value and were expendable.
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Reading the Cards
The Soviets probably hoped that publicity surrounding the withdrawal would
convince world opinion of their desire for a negotiated settlement, but initial
evidence suggests that reporters attending the ceremonies were not impressed.
According to the US Embassy in Kabul, one Russian-speaking journalist described
ceremonies at Shindand as a badly organized spectacle. He noted that the troops
he spoke with were obviously well rehearsed, that many nervously looked to their
seniors for prompting, and that some denied any combat contact with the
insurgents. Most West European press coverage portrayed the withdrawal
ceremonies as part of a propaganda offensive with little military significance, a
view that was shared by most West European governments.
Although the withdrawal almost certainly was timed for maximum impact on the
UN General Assembly vote on Afghanistan on 5 November, we do not anticipate
much erosion in support for the Pakistani-sponsored resolution calling for the
withdrawal of foreign forces. The revelation of Soviet underhandedness in the
withdrawal is unlikely, however, to win the resistance any new supporters. Even
those countries that have accepted the legitimacy of the troop withdrawal have
largely dismissed it as an insignificant gesture. At most, the gesture may make it
more difficult in a few Third World countries to argue convincingly that the
Soviets are intransigent
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Selected Excerpts From World Press Coverage
of the Withdrawal
In France, the influential Le Monde: "The event which was noisily announced by
the official press does not seem to impress the people of Kabul. . . ."
The right-of-center Quotidien: "A withdrawal whose meaning has no relation with
the formidable propaganda operation surrounding it . . . they invited 140
correspondents in Moscow to witness the withdrawal . . . a public relations
operation. . . ."
In Belgium, the Catholic De Standaard: "The Soviet decision can best be
described as a subtraction from an unknown quantity."
In Portugal, Diario de Noticias, the leading daily, said "the withdrawal is a mere
gesture" that signifies no basic change in Moscow's policy.
In Japan, the Daily Yorniuri said "There is some doubt about the Soviet Union's
true intentions in starting its announced withdrawal of troops . . . but at any rate,
only 8,000 out of 115,000 troops are going to leave and this will not really change
the situation much."
The conservative Sankei Shimbun said "The Soviet Union should show a more
visible withdrawal figure as it is pulling out only 8,000 of its 115,000 troops
estimated to be in Afghanistan. . the Soviets should announce a complete
withdrawal timetable."
In China, Renmin Ribao said ". . . the number of regiments scheduled to be
withdrawn amount to only a small part. In addition, the Soviet Union has not yet
published the troop withdrawal schedule and has not stopped Soviet military
operations in Afghanistan. For this reason, people cannot understand whether this
is the beginning of a general withdrawal. . . or a tactical step for the purpose of
gaining a favorable position in the US-Soviet talks."
In Yugoslavia, domestic radio commentators said "It is obvious that the military
situation and the relation of forces in Afghanistan have not changed considerably
. . . Anyway, even if one discounts�but one does not have to do so�the number
of soldiers who will be withdrawn, . . . there is also the composition of those
forces. One of the six regiments is a tank regiment, two are mechanized and three
are antiaircraft. Not only do the mujahidin not have tanks or planes, they do not
have a large quantity of heavy arms. This is why mujahidin members seem not to
much believe in a real withdrawal. . ."
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The Key Players Add Up the Points
The Chinese were quick to judge the withdrawal pledge as largely a rhetorical
gesture. Although Soviet leader Gorbachev clearly hoped that the pledged partial
withdrawal of forces would help to remove one of the three main obstacles that
Beijing says stand in the way of normalized Soviet-Chinese relations, he almost
certainly has not succeeded. From China's perspective, Soviet policy on
Afghanistan is unchanged.
Pakistan probably was initially cautiously hopeful that the withdrawal indicated a
desire on Moscow's part to be more flexible in the UN-sponsored negotiations in
Geneva. President Zia in early October commented publicly that he saw the move
as "encouraging," but that he did not endorse a withdrawal in installments. He
insisted that, if the situation had stabilized enough to allow a partial withdrawal,
all Soviet forces should go.
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Zia, who subsequently told the press that the Soviets had introduced 15,000 troops
into Afghanistan this year, is unlikely to feel any pressure to respond to the
withdrawal with a "reciprocal gesture," as the Soviets insist. Although the
Pakistani President may be unwilling to -Criticize Moscow publicly over its
duplicity, the Soviet ruse may have an impact on Pakistan's negotiating position at
Geneva. The Pakistanis are likelY to be more suspicious of Soviet pledges, possibly
more insistent on strong monitoring provisions, and probably even less willing than
in the past to consider any Soviet offer to withdraw all its forces over an extended
period. Pakistan will continue bilateral discussions with Moscow, however.
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At the same time, Moscow's attempts to convince the world that it wants a
negotiated withdrawal in Afghanistan risks creating fears among Kabul's ruling
elite that the Soviets are beginning to abandon them. We believe that the ruling
party, seriously divided since the Soviets installed Najibullah as party chief, would
suffer increased strains if party members were to believe that a genuine Soviet
disengagement had begun,'
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It was embarrassing for (b)(3)
Moscow, moreover, when Babrak was publicly mobbed by well-wishers at
withdrawal cermonies in Kabul. This show of support followed his conspicuous
absence from pullout ceremonies a few days earlier in Shindand and rumors of his
arrest. (b)(3)
Looking at the Scorecard
The withdrawal almost certainly has failed to win over world opinion and impress
China and Pakistan with what was meant to appear as a "good faith" gesture of
the Soviets' willingness to solve the Afghan problem. But the negative results of
the venture�primarily the charges of Soviet duplicity�were also manageable.
Even the reaction of the US Government to the deception apparently was
considered by Moscow as likely to be within acceptable bounds.
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Afghanistan
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Briefs
Covering Withdrawing Soviet Forces
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Despite several weeks of combat activity on the periphery of Kabul, the Soviets
and the Afghan regime have been unable to stop insurgent rocket attacks against
the city. In mid-September, the US Embassy reported that the insurgents had hit
Kabul Airport with several rockets. The explosion of a car bomb outside the Soviet
Embassy, where a Soviet delegation headed by the Deputy Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers was visiting in late September, underscored the unsettled
security conditions in the city.
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The US Embassy claims that Soviet and Afghan regime forces employed
"scorched earth" tactics during these operations in order to destroy civilian as well
as insurgent targets in the Shomali Hain and Paghman. Termed by US Embassy
sources as "one of the most brutal campaigns" in the Kabul area, the operations
included what local residents consider to be the deliberate destruction of crops and
livestock, a primary reason for the Soviets'
the Afghan regime's inability to stop guerrilla activity directed against Kabul f( b)( 1)
Paghman is the strength of resistance support among civilians there. (I)()(3)
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According to the US Embassy, Soviet and Afghan regime units from the city of
- Qandahar launched an operation in mid-September in the Darya-ye Arghandab
(Arghandab River) and Bazar-e Panjval regions southwest of the city, probably in,
an effort to curb resistance infiltration. (b)(1)
a combat operation was under way north of Qandahar. Afghan (b)(3)
forces reinforced one fire-support base, added a second, and established a small
security post. This activity occurred not far from where insurgent activity has kept
a portion of Highway 1 closed since 1985. The Soviets and the Afghan regime
have created a more easily defended detour, over 20 kilometers long, that skirts the
closed road. (b)(3)
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Afghan Regime Plans Population Relocation
The Kabul regime announced in early September that it plans to relocate 30,000
Afghan families�some 300,000 people�from Konarha, Laghman, and Paktia
Provinces in eastern Afghanistan to less populated Nimruz, Helmand, and Farah
Provinces in western Afghanistan. The resettlement scheme, which is to take place
over a 10-year period, supposedly would be voluntary. Afghan resistance leaders
told US officials in Islamabad that the regime was offering tribal groups between
4,000 and 6,000 afghanis (about US $40 at market rates) to participate in the
program but that resistance commanders were countering these measures
effectively. Afghan Agriculture Minister Lakanwal also claimed that the United
Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is participating in the
relocation program.
We believe that the regime regards the plan as a means to deny the resistance its
civilian support base by depopulating the eastern border provinces. Although a
forcible program would be difficult to implement because of popular resistance
and weak regime control in the countryside, the regiine has not hesitated to use
coercion to undercut civilian support for the insurgents. Citing involvement by the
FAO�which the UN agency denies�is another means by which the regime is
trying to show its legitimacy in international circles. This fall, the Kabul media
have been particularly aggressive in invoking the names of various international
organizations to buttress bogus regime claims of humanitarian accomplishments.
Regime Making Strides With International Agencies?
Several international humanitarian agencies appear to be considering more
extensive working arrangements with the Afghan regime. Separate delegations of
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the League of Red
Cross visited Afghanistan in early September to discuss the establishment of
health care programs there, according to the US Embassy in Kabul. The Swedish
Red Cross is thinking of participating in a children's vaccination program in
Afghanistan conducted under Kabul regime auspices. UNICEF also claims it will
conduct a vaccination program with both the regime's and the insurgents'
assistance, but US officials in Islamabad say no arrangements to include the
resistance have yet been made. The US Embassy in Bonn reported in early
October that the International Assistance Mission�which oversees several
medical programs in Kabul�may expand its activities outside the Afghan capital.
. These international humanitarian organizations probably believe they cannot
continue denying aid to the Afghan population on the grounds that such assistance
would strengthen the regime's claims to legitimacy. The expansion of these
programs outside Kabul could increase pressure on other organizations�especially
UN agencies, which have cited security reasons for limiting their programs to
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Kabul�to follow suit. Kabul would almost certainly point to such health programs
to give credibility to its claims that it is making great strides in improving the
health and welfare of the population.
Resistance Successes With Surface-to-Air Missiles
The increasing effectiveness of the insurgents in using surface-to-air missiles has
-forced changes in Afghan and Soviet air tactics'
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Soviet and Afghan navigators and
air traffic controllers are attempting to reroute military aircraft to avoid areas of
heavy insurgent antiaircraft fire.
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The Soviets will probably employ standard countermeasures to keep losses down,
including modifying flight profiles, using at least four aircraft per attack mission,
and making more use of onboard systems such as infrared jammers and chaff.
They are also likely to step up efforts to intimidate Pakistan by increasing
sabotage and subversion in border areas as well as shallow cross-border airstrikes.
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the insurgents' increased success with tf(b)(1)
missiles has lowered morale among-Afghan fighter pilots. More pilots are ask(b)(3)
for transfers to transport units or ground assignments and complaining that the
Afghan military is not doing enough to counter the threat.
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An Evaluation of the Changing
Soviet Force Structure
in Afghanistan
In seeking a solution to the military stalemate in
Afghanistan, the Soviets have tried different tactical
approaches, looking for the least costly and most
effective combination of manpower and weaponry to
achieve their objectives. Since the fall of 1984
upgrades of major ground force weapons and the
deployment of helicopters have substantially
increased both the firepower and mobility of Soviet
forces. At the same time, Soviet troop strength in
Afghanistan has risen only gradually.
Weighing the Alternatives
Although the Soviets may have considered sharply
increasing the size of their combat contingent in
Afghanistan, they probably concluded that they could
not do so easily. They would have to draw down forces
currently deployed in Eastern Europe, in interior
military districts, or in the Soviet Far East. The
present logistic infrastructure in Afghanistan would
also have to be substantially expanded to support a
major influx of forces. In addition, there would be
considerable political repercussions abroad�and
perhaps at home�associated with a massive
reinforcement.
A "technological solution" clearly has had more
� appeal to Soviet military leaders in recent years. They
probably believed that advanced weaponry would
constrain casualties relative to the level of combat. In
addition, advocates of this approach probably argued
that an emphasis on advanced armaments would
allow the Soviets to increase firepower dramatically
with only a marginal increase in manpower. Further,
the military would have a unique opportunity to test
new weapons in combat.
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Firepower and Mobility
The Soviets' emphasis on better weaponry in the past
two years is well illustrated by a comparison of trends
in the weapons effectiveness value and increases in the
number of troops in Afghanistan.' From 1980 to 1984
'Weapons effectiveness values are mathematical characterizations
of the effectiveness of ground force and helicopter weapons systems.
troop strength and armaments increased at about the
same rate. But in 1985 troop totals increased by 5
percent while the weapons effectiveness value grew by
11 r�ercent.
Firepower and mobility have been strongly
emphasized in the changes in the weaponry of Soviet
forces in Afghanistan since 1984:
� BMP-2 armored infantry combat vehicles and BTR-
70 and BTR-80 armored _personnel carriers have
replaced BMP- 1 s, BTR-60s, and BMD airborne'
amphibious combat vehicles. The 30-mm gun on the
BMP-2 has been far more effective in Afghanistan
than has the 73-mm cannon on the BMP-1 and
BMD-1, while the upgraded suspension system of
the newer BTRs allows greater mobility than older
BTR-60s have.
� Vasilek 82-mm automatic mortars (some mounted
on an MT-LB amphibious armored tractor), M1975
240-mm self-propelled mortars, 2S1 122-mm and
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2S3 152-mm self-propelled howitzers, and 2S5 152-
mm self-propelled guns have replaced older towed
artillery and mortars. The newer models have
improved capabilities for delivering high volumes of
direct and indirect fire and for maneuvering in
rugged terrain.
Some of the armaments also feature better protection.
Most Soviet tanks and some BMP armored
infantry combat vehicles in Afghanistan now have
this extra protection. The modification�armor plate
on the glacis and skirts over and under the track or
wheel shelves�is intended to detonate shaped charges
of insurgent antitank weapons before contact is made
with the main body of the vehicle. On turrets, several
large plates cover a 90 degree sector on both sides of
the gun.
Augmented Rear Service and Support
The added mechanization and fire support of Soviet
forces in Afghanistan have necessitated a
corresponding increase in the rear services and
support structure. To handle the greater logistic
demand, the Soviets have augmented the materiel
support brigade of the 40th Army with assets
normally associated with a front-level command.
Trends in Weapon Effectiveness
Values (WEV)
WEV
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5,200
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Prospects
Despite the Soviets' failure to make significant
advances in the counterinsurgency over the past two
years with the influx of more up-to-date weapons and
incremental changes in forces structure, Moscow
probably will continue with this approach. Soviet
military leaders probably are encouraged by the
limited successes with smaller, more mobile units and
massive firepower in attacks on insurgent forces.
Resistance forces have had to shift more of their
supply activity to nighttime and to dispatch smaller
supply caravans over varied infiltration routes. Even
so, they have lost more supply trains to Soviet
interdiction. The Soviets' emphasis on firepower and
mobility has also caused resistance forces to place
more emphasis on cover and concealment techniques
and to keep their own units as small and as mobile as
possible.
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Japan Views Afghan Issue as a
Minor Concern
Afghanistan has historically been a low priority in
Japanese foreign policy, but its salience as an East-
West issue prompted Tokyo to follow the US lead and
impose sanctions against the Soviet Union and the
Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan in 1979.
Japan has since given modest amounts of
humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees and more
generous assistance to neighboring Pakistan, where it
has become Islamabad's second-largest aid donor.
Nonetheless, Tokyo's interest in the Afghan issue
stems principally from its desire to stay in step with
Washington, and we do not expect Tokyo to break
stride on the Afghan issue.
Sanctions Against the Soviets
Tokyo quickly supported US initiatives following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In addition to
calling for a withdrawal of Soviet forces and Afghan
self-determination, Tokyo imposed its own sanctions.
The Japanese took a number of steps, including:
� Postponing bilateral cultural and political
exchanges.
� Supporting strengthened COCOM restrictions
against high-technology exports to the Soviet Union.
� Supending Japanese Export-Import Bank credits for
forestry development, pulp manufacture, and harbor
expansion joint ventures in the Soviet Union worth a
total of $1.2 billion.
� Boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow.
� Downgrading diplomatic relations with the Soviet-
backed government in Kabul and suspending aid to
Afghanistan.
These actions were a result of a policy debate on
sanctions, reflecting Tokyo's efforts to balance
support for Western initiatives with economic
interests in the Soviet Union.' According to interviews
' In comparison with Japan's large economic stake in the Soviet
Union, Japan's economic interest in Afghanistan is insignificant.
Although Japan is one of Kabul's leading Western trading
partners�accounting for almost 15 percent of Afghanistan's
imports�bilateral trade accounts for a miniscule percent of
Japanese trade.
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with Japanese officials, a majority of then Prime
Minister Ohira's close advisers, as well as senior
Foreign Ministry officials, argued that Japan should
align itself closely with US policy. They said this was
especially critical to mend strains in the US-Japan
relationship created by Tokyo's slow imposition of
sanctions against Iran during the US-hostage crisis.
But Japanese business interests, particularly powerful
trading companies and their allies in the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, countered that
Japan's considerable economic equities in the Soviet
Union,should not be jeopardized. Their argument
carried considerable weight during the energy
shortage then occurring. Prospects of lucrative export
contracts and fishing rights in Soviet waters also
bolstered their more cautious view. As a result, Tokyo
ensured that its long-standing ventures in coal,
petroleum, and natural gas in the Soviet Union�
worth some $5 billion�went unaffected by the
sanctions action.
Contribution to Western Interests
TokVo's subsequent involvement with the Afghan
issue has largely been through support for Pakistan.
Japanese officials have described their aid to
Islamabad as a tool to promote stability in the area,
which is strategically important to Japan because of
its proximity to oil supply routes. To this end, during
both Pakistani President Zia's trip to Tokyo in 1983
and Prime Minister Nakasone's trip to Pakistan in
1984, Nakasone reaffirmed Japan's commitment to
Pakistan's economic development. Japan has boosted
its aid considerably. since 1980, becoming Pakistan's
second-largest bilateral aid donor, with a $266 million
commitment in 1985. Tokyo also has consistently
supported Pakistan's UN resolutions on Afghanistan.
It has not offered, however, to mediate, as it has in
Cambodia and the Iran-Iraq war, where Japanese
interests are more directly affected.
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Japanese government support for the Afghan
resistance has been limited to humanitarian aid,
channeled primarily through the United Nations and
other international organizations. Japan donated
approximately $17 million to Afghan refugee relief
programs in Pakistan in 1985 and $400,000 for
refugees in Iran�far less than the Europeans and
also much less than the amount Japan has funneled to
Thailand for Cambodian refugees.
More of the Same?
Japanese officials are seeking to arrange a visit to
Tokyo by General Secretary Gorbachev, perhaps
early in 1987, but the Afghan issue is unlikely to
figure prominently on the agenda. Tokyo never
believed that Moscow's announced withdrawal of six
regiments from Afghanistan represented a major
policy shift. Even evidence of Soviet duplicity in the
partial withdrawal is unlikely to spark greater
engagement in Afghanistan by the Japanese
We believe Tokyo will continue supporting the US
position and maintain its moderate humanitarian aid
effort for the insurgents. But we do not expect the
Japanese to provide direct financial support or a
public forum for the resistance./
In our view, the only area in which Tokyo might
become more active is in an international effort to
achieve a political solution to the Afghan problem.
The Japanese recently have shown heightened interest
in the United Nations as a forum for their views on
global issues. Japanese envoys in September 1986
called for greater funding and participation of non:
military personnel in UN peacekeeping operations. If
such a UN role becomes possible in Afghanistan�
although it is unlikely in the near term�Tokyo may
be inclined to contribute
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