EL SALVADOR: GOVERNMENT AND INSURGENT PROSPECTS

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• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2020
• Case Number: F-2019-00695
• Publication Date: February 1, 1989

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
El Salvador: Government and
Insurgent Prospects
Special National Intelligence Estimate
This Estimate represents the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
;7.
SNIE 83.1-89
February 1989
Co� 465
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
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SNIE 83.1-89
El Salvador: Government and
Insurgent Prospects
Information available as of 3 February 1989 was used
in the preparation of this Estimate.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of .this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support,
Department of the Treasury
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
.Department of the Air Force
This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board.
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February 89
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715440 (B00203) 2-89
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Key Judgments
El Salvador faces an increasingly unsettled political environment in the
coming year�marked by a presidential election in March and changing
strategies by the guerrillas. Events could have dramatic effect over the next
12 months or so on El Salvador's political landscape and the position and
influence of the United States, which has been key to the country's political
stability during the 1980s.
The resurgent rightist Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) appears
likely (60 to 40) to capture the presidency from the incumbent Christian
Democratic Party (PDC), which has been weakened by popular disillusion-
ment with economic stagnation, corruption, incompetence, and deteriorat-
ing urban security. The Christian Democrats could still stage a comeback
by combining a more aggressive campaign with smart tactical alliances,
but the odds and momentum are against the party.
ARENA's candidate, businessman Alfredo Cristiani, is a capable moder-
ate, but party President Roberto D'Aubuisson has taken an increasingly
prominent campaign role, lending substance to suspicions that he and other
extremists will be the real power if ARENA wins.
The guerrilla-allied Democratic Convergence continues to participate in
the campaign, but apparently has been making little progress. There is a
fair chance (1 in 3) that it will pull out if it appears headed for a dismal
showing, is pressured by insurgent commanders, or if the government fails
to deal seriously with the guerrillas' latest peace proposal. If it pulls out,
the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) could make a
more concerted�and at least partially successful�effort to disrupt the
election.
The election is likely to be reasonably fraud free, and, although the turnout
will probably be lower than in 1984, it should nonetheless be sufficient to
buttress legitimacy.
The war itself is a complex arena where shifting insurgent strategies have
allowed the guerrillas to mask a weakening military capability overall with
more visible and politically successful efforts in the cities. The guerrillas
have lost 15 to 19 percent of their force over the last two years, their base
areas are less secure, and their attacks on military targets have been less
effective. To compensate, they have tripled incidents in the capital,
attacked previously unaffected areas, and assassinated and forced large
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Secr
numbers of officials to abandon their posts; they are increasingly likely to
target US nationals and facilities. The insurgents have the capability to
boost less resource-intensive terrorist activities to a higher level and are
likely to do so; they alter the psychological and political rather than the
purely military dimension of the war
External support supplies more than 70 percent of all guerrilla ammunition
needs and is critical to sustaining FMLN operations at current levels.
suggests a recent increase in external supplies,
probably through Nicaragua
Salvadoran military performance has improved markedly since 1984,
although the armed forces' efforts are still too piecemeal and not yet tied
effectively to civic action. Assuming current trends, we believe that the
government is likely to grind down the insurgency as a military force over
the next three to five years, perhaps reducing its personnel size by one-
third.
Nevertheless, the guerrillas�while unable to seize power�will still be able
to conduct a prolonged war, depending ever more heavily on terrorism,
sabotage, and small-scale attacks. The terror campaign has the potential to
destroy the always weak civil administration in large parts of the country,
while further undermining civil defense and civic action programs. The
government's inability to counter these tactics is a major weakness of its
counterinsurgency program
We believe political trends in El Salvador�the weakening center and
rightward drift of the electorate�could further polarize politics, enhance
oligarchic influence, and encourage increased insurgent support. There is a
better-than-even chance that an ARENA victory would signal some
rollback of reforms, a tougher political and military posture against the
left, and less inclination than the PDC to investigate human rights
violations�attitudes that probably would encourage vigilantism.
For their part, the guerrillas are likely to continue to pursue a more violent
and headline-grabbing military strategy to make cooperation with the
government too dangerous, convey the image that momentum favors their
side, and provoke the military into further human rights abuses. If the hard
right clearly dominates the new administration, the left would probably
pursue an even more violent strategy�more assassinations of high-level
officials and the acquisition of more advanced weapons.
In the last year, there has been some increase in armed forces' and
probably rightwing killings, pointing to the potential for escalation under
an ARENA administration. In such an atmosphere, the government could
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lose legitimacy at home and abroad, resulting in pressures for a curtailing
of US assistance and growing sympathy�and tangible assistance�for the
insurgents.
Because Salvadoran Government performance is so heavily dependent on
US aid levels, decisions in Washington will continue to be crucial for the
country. The Salvadoran economy will maintain positive growth only by
virtue of US economic assistance and emigrant remittances. A 25-percent
cut in US economic aid, for example, would translate into a GDP loss of
perhaps 3 to 5 percent. Some observers believe that a deep decline in
annual US military aid levels would push the army toward a bloody now-
or-never offensive against the insurgents or alternatively promote a highly
conservative defensive posture�either of which would have negative
consequences for the government
Regional peace initiatives are likely to present growing problems to a new
government, especially if ARENA is in power. Only a border verification
mechanism capable of interfering with Sandinista assistance to the guer-
rillas�a highly unlikely eventuality�would be perceived as beneficial.
Otherwise, regional initiatives threaten to force negotiations with the
FMLN, which the armed forces are likely to resist.
The guerrillas clearly want to shift the political battle to Washington and
reinvigorate US political opposition to continuing military and economic
support for the Salvadoran Government, and their recent peace proposals
are part of that effort. Although there are probably some linked with the
guerrilla left who wish seriously to pursue these negotiations, the insurgent
leadership intends the peace proposals principally to stave off military
pressure and it expects rejection of the proposals to legitimate intensifica-
tion of the war.
Should the insurgents offer a proposal that has genuine promise for a
political settlement, US involvement and pressures will be crucial to
overcome institutional resistance to compromise and keep the renegade
right wing from destroying the political environment. For such involvement
to be effective, however, Salvadoran authorities will have to remain
convinced�via US aid levels�that US commitment to preventing a
guerrilla takeover remains firm.
A negotiated agreement to postpone the election for six months in response
to recent guerrilla proposals would not affect our judgment of the likely
election outcome. In addition, we doubt that it would lead to a lasting
settlement because, at a minimum, hardline insurgent elements would
renew the guerrilla struggle.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
Discussion
The Economic Equation
Impact of the War
Ill
1
Future Aid Levels
The Current Political Dynamic
PDC Prospects
The Challenge From ARENA
The Left and the Election
Role of the Smaller Parties
The Military and the Election
The Balloting
2
3
4
4
6
8
8
8
The Insurgents�Shifting Political-Military Strategy
Implementing the Counteroffensive Plan
FMLN Problems
Likely Insurgent Adjustments in 1989
External Support
Government Counterinsurgency Performance
Armed Forces Performance Over the Longer Term
Impact of the Election on the War
An ARENA Victory: Two Scenarios
The Left's Postelection Strategy
External Factors
Nicaragua
The Peace Process
Implications for US Interests
9
10
10
11
12
16
20
21
22
23
24
24
24
26
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Discussion I
The halting performance of the economy and a guer-
rilla war that threatens to drag into a second decade
have escalated political tension and fed popular disen-
chantment in the runup to the March 1989 election.
At stake in the election are political, economic, and
strategic issues�potentially including the bilateral
relationship with the United States that has been key
to stability in El Salvador during the 1980s. The
country's primary political actors�the incumbent
centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the right-
ist Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), and
the guerrilla and political left�dispute even the basic
realities of the situation. Each of them seeks to
persuade not only the domestic population but also
important foreign actors to embrace its perspective
and support its solutions for the economy and the war.
Dramatically different scenarios are possible for the
country�and US interests�depending upon who tri-
umphs.
The Economic Equation
El Salvador, in coping with its myriad economic
problems, faces the irony of relative success�due, in
large part, to US aid and emigrant remittances�that
-nonetheless falls substantially short of popular aspira-
tions. In 1988, El Salvador's economy registered a
sixth consecutive year of GDP growth-1.5 percent�
despite war costs and losses of about $130 million.
Still, economic advances have not kept pace with the
rapid population growth (currently at 2.6 percent),
and per capita income has declined to 75 percent of
' This Estimate projects economic, political, and military trends in
El Salvador largely over the next year, although analysis outlines
developments in some instances that look beyond 12 months. In
addition, it places judgments within the framework of the 19 March
presidential election, assessing the implications of a win by either
the Christian Democrats or the Nationalist Republican Alliance for
the prosecution of the war and economic management, and for US
interests in the region.
1
1980 levels. Again this year, we expect real GDP
growth at the outside will not exceed 3 percent, and
will probably be lower�ruling out any improvement
in living standards. (See figures 1 and 2.)
Tight credit and foreign exchange limited investment
and production in both 1987 and 1988. The financial
constraints damping agricultural and industrial pro-
duction were compounded by disturbances in power
and water supplies, transportation shutdowns, infra-
structure damage, bad weather, bureaucratic delays
in construction contracts, and high investment risk
due to the war and elections. Last year, implementa-
tion of structural economic adjustments�including
utility rate hikes, a federal hiring freeze, and curtail-
ment of capital expenditures�mitigated a 30-percent
fall in coffee tax revenue. Nonetheless, both under-
employment and unemployment remain very high,
totaling as much as 50 percent of the work force, and
nutrient intake for most of the Donulation is below
international standards.
Even modest growth rates remain highly dependent
on revenue from external transfers. Salvadoran remit-
tances from the United States totaled $300-400 mil-
lion last year, contributing significantly to consumer
purchasing activity. Total US aid�$395 million for
FY 1989�is equivalent to about 50 percent of El Sal-
vador's budget. (See table 1.) Disbursement of
FY 1989 funding has been delayed due to program-
matic difficulties, however, and, if the holdup is
extended for several months, it could eliminate posi-
tive economic growth this year.
Impact of the War
Without significant change in the domestic situation
that would allow a reallocation of resources away
from the military and war-related destruction and at
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Figure 1
El Salvador: Selected Economic Indicators, 1982-88
Note scale change
Real GDP
Real GDP Per Capita
Percent change Index: 1980 =100
4 100
-6
1982 83 84 85 86 87 88a
'Estimated.
0
1982 83 84 85 86 87 888
Consumer Price Index
Annual percent change
Foreign and Domestic
Private Investment
Index: 1978 =100
40 100
0
ndlh
75
1982 83 84 85 86 87 88' 1982 83 84 85 86 87 88'
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the same time improve the investment climate, the
government probably will continue its high levels of
external dependency through the early 1990s. Indeed,
much of the foreign aid is consumed as an offset to
the direct and indirect economic damage done by the
war. Since 1979, total economic losses are estimated
at nearly $2 billion. We estimate that in 1989 the cost
of such repairs will be in the neighborhood of $150
million (see figure 3), owing to the insurgents' more
intensive economic targeting. In addition, the war has
prevented a needed influx of foreign investment and
led to a deterioration of industrial and agricultural
productive capacity that has serious long-term impli-
cations
Future Aid Levels
If US economic aid levels were cut significantly, this
would force the government's budget deficit higher
and compel a further restriction of credit and imports.
320465 1439
In addition, since most of the budget goes for salaries,
the administration would also be confronted with the
need to make politically unpalatable reductions in the
public-sector work force. In rough terms, if the US
economic allotment were slashed by about 25 percent
then a +2 percent growth rate would probably be
driven to a GDP loss�perhaps in the neighborhood of
3 to 5 percent�in the year following the aid cut. In
addition to attendant political and social difficulties,
there would be an immediate psychological impact.
Left, right, and center would see it as a step toward
US disengagement, and the guerrillas would redouble
their efforts to sever the remaining bonds between
Washington and San Salvador
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Figure 2
El Salvador: External Trade, 1985-88
Current million US $
Trade Balance
1,200
Imports
1,000
800
Exports
600
400
200
1985 86 87 88
Exports
0 Coffee
0 Sugar
tr Cotton
El Other
1985 1986
600 600
400
200
0
1987
0
1988
600 600
400
200
The Current Political Dynamic
The flagging economy, along with war weariness and
government corruption, has helped shift political
trends in El Salvador�a strengthening right; a weak-
ening, more fractious center; and a newly formed
proguerrilla, but legal, left. The national leadership of
the ruling PDC has been tarnished by scandal, inter-
nal divisions, and, most important, by the lack of clear
success with the insurgency or the economy. The
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rightwing ARENA party, cultivating a more moder-
ate image, is the key beneficiary of rising dissatisfac-
tion with the Christian Democrats. On the left, the
growing realization that military pressure has little
near-term chance of overturning the existing political
structure probably contributed to the decision of
guerrilla allies like Guillermo Ungo and Ruben
Zamora to return from foreign exile and reenter
Salvadoran politics. (s NF)
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Table 1
US Economic and Military Aid
to El Salvador, 1980-88
Million US $
Direct
Economic
Assistance ,
Security
Assistance
Total
1980
58.5
6.2
64.7
1981
116.3
10.5
126.8
1982
185.6
31.5
217.1
1983
261.9
81.3
343.2
1984
223.1
206.6
429.7
1985
428.8
136.3
565.1
1986
317.1
121.9
439.0
1987 b
506.5
111.6
618.1
1988
332.4
81.6
414.0
, Includes Economic Support Funds, Development Assistance,
and PL-480.
b Includes $52.9 million in earthquake assistance and $147.3
million in supplemental appropriations.
This table is Unclassified.
PDC Prospects
The divided Christian Democrats face an uphill strug-
gle, and we doubt they can finish on top in the first
round of the election unless they energize their cam-
paign and overcome the political trends evident in the
last legislative and municipal elections, where they
were convincingly beaten. (See figure 4.) Because they
occupy the political center and because the dying
President Duarte is still a charismatic figure, the
Christian Democrats could still make a comeback.
Their best chance is to deny the rightwing ARENA a
first-round majority and then attract some of the
smaller parties in a second round of balloting. With
astute alliances and an aggressive campaign, the
second round could be a dogfight too close to call.
To do so, however, the Christian Democrats will have
to demonstrate that they are more responsive to the
legislative and municipal protest votes stemming from
mismanagement and corruption charges. They will
also have to win back supporters from the majority
bloc that opinion polls now show want a new party in
government. Although we cannot fully assess the
pervasiveness of official corruption, failure to do more
over the last few years than reassign a few cabinet
ministers for alleged misdeeds has seriously damaged
the party's image and fueled the popular belief that
PDC corruption is rampant
The party also is having difficulty organizing an
effective, united campaign, and its presidential candi-
date, Chavez Mena, lacks Duarte's style, stature, and
popularity. (See inset, page 7.) Moreover, the Chris-
tian Democrats have made only feeble efforts to
refute public allegations by ARENA and others that
their campaign is being funded secretly by Washing-
ton. (s NF)
The Challenge From ARENA
ARENA is now the country's largest and best orga-
nized party, and its new, more moderate image,
embodied by candidate Alfredo Cristiani, is enhanc-
ing the party's election prospects. ARENA's founder
Roberto D'Aubuisson and others linked to past death
squad activities have allowed the moderate faction a
widened public role while still exerting significant
influence. Most party leaders, including Cristiani,
admit that the party's appeal to conservative peas-
ants-and the businessmen who are bankrolling the
campaign-would wane significantly without the
presence of the charismatic D'Aubuisson. (See inset,
page 9.)
In addition to hammering the Christian Democrats on
the corruption issue, we believe a major plus for
ARENA will be its successful attack on the govern-
ment's inability to provide public security in the face
of increased leftist violence and its failure to deliver
promised development programs. In contrast to the
perceived inability of the Christian Democrats to
remedy the security situation, we judge that the
public perceives an ARENA government as more
willing to take a tougher posture toward violent
demonstrators and those suspected of terrorism and
sabotage. ARENA also has spent the last several
years organizing on the local level and using party
resources to provide a range of services to lower
income voters in the countryside
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Figure 3
Direct and Indirect Guerrilla Damage to Infrastructure, '1987 and 1988
Million US $
5� Electric power system
nWater system
n Telecommunications
1987 1988
a Includes cost of material replacement. as well as
lost prot its. wages. and productivity.
CiiTfi4niiaI
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Figure 4
PDC Versus ARENA
Performance at the Polls
Percent
100
80
60
0
ARENA
PDC
MEI Other
1984
Presidential
first round
0
1984
Presidential
second round
Legislative Seats
1985
1985
Legislative/Municipal
1988
1988
Legislative/Municipal
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The Left and the Election
The emergence of a legal leftist party, Democratic
Convergence, lends greater legitimacy to the current
political system, although its activities also assist the
insurgent cause by facilitating leftist opposition
groups and serving as a vehicle for insurgent propa-
ganda. Two of the three parties in the Democratic
Convergence coalition are allied with the insurgent
movement, and presidential candidate Ungo already
has asserted that his campaign is not a serious quest
for the office, but a vehicle for mobilizing popular
pressure for negotiations�a key insurgent objective.
Secre
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Whether the Convergence stays in the presidential
race depends upon how it�and the guerrillas�read
the campaign. Intimidation from rightwing extremists
or the prospect of being embarrassed by its own
lackluster performance at the polls could prompt a
pullout. In addition, the Convergence would likely
have to withdraw if pressured by guerrilla command-
ers. On balance, there is perhaps a 1-in-3 chance it
will pull out of the presidential race before election
day, and, to the extent that neither the Christian
Democrats nor ARENA treats recent Convergence-
backed guerrilla negotiating proposals seriously, the
odds probably rise
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The Presidential Contenders and Their Platforms
Fidel Angel CHAVEZ Mena
PDC Nominee
Former cabinet minister, party founder, and strong supporter of Duarte ...(b)(1)
considered scrupulously honest . . . retained support of most party rank am(b)(3)
file after PDC split. . . also backed by democratic labor, the church, and (b)(6)
PDC International . . .
lawyer, considered excellent negotiator . . . 49.
Key platform elements:
� No preconditioned negotiations with FM LN.
� Continuation of regional peace process.
� Agrarian reform: no further land expropriations and greater self-manage-
ment of cooperatives.
� Fiscal and trade policy: reduce deficit, crackdown on tax evasion and no
new taxes, selective import substitution and aggressive export policy.
� Supports close ties to the United States. (c NF)
Alfredo CRISTIANI Buckhard
ARENA Nominee
ARENA party President. . . known for integrity and intelligence . . . soft-
spoken demeanor and moderate tone key to revamping party's unsavory
reputation, but ability of Cristiani to operate independent
from ultraconservative faction headed by dynamic Roberto D'Aubuisson is
uncertain. . . US educated. . . 41.
Key platform elements:
� Open to negotiations with FM LN.
� Continuation of regional peace process, but make certain El Salvador is
not seen as US lackey.
� Agrarian reform: no further land expropriations, provision for private
ownership of cooperative farm plots.
� Fiscal and trade policy: reduce the deficit, simplify tax code, reduction of
nominal rates, expansion of tax base, export-led development.
� Considers US involvement in domestic policy excessive. (c NF)
(continued)
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The Presidential Contenders and Their Platforms (continued)
Guillermo Manuel UNGO Revel�
Democratic Convergence Nominee
Secretary General, National Revolutionary Movement, since 1971 and
President, Revolutionary Democratic Front, since 1980. . moderate Social
Democrat ... strong international reputation lends credibility to FMLN
program, but he has no influence over guerrilla military activities . . split
with rebel commanders over efficacy of stepped-up military activities ...
returned from exile in November and joined with Ruben Zamora's Popular
Social Christian Movement and another leftist party. . 57
Key platform elements:
� Peace process: seeks negotiated political solution to the war based on
guerrilla peace proposal, with cease-fire and agreement to deescalate war
as first steps. Meanwhile, both parties to the war are morally and legally
bound by the Geneva Accords.
� Fiscal policy: "An economic plan to help the people.-
� Sharply critical of US involvement in El Salvador.
Role of the Smaller Parties
Other than the main contenders and the leftist Demo-
cratic Convergence, only the PDC splinter group, the
Authentic Christian Movement, could play a poten-
tially significant role in the election. While a reunifi-
cation of the PDC could enhance Chavez Mena's
chances in a runoff, we believe the bitter party split
last fall will make a conciliation difficult. Neither the
Authentic Christian Movement nor the leftist Con-
vergence is likely to win more than 10 percent of the
vote, but each is vying for third place, which will
entitle the winner to a coveted seat on the powerful
Central Election Council. The remaining smaller par-
ties realize that they are not likely to attract signifi-
cant support, and most appear inclined to back the
front-runner, ARENA, in a projected second round.
The Military and the Election
We believe the armed forces will remain impartial,
despite reported attempts by some civilians to solicit
military support for their party. Only in the unlikely
S et
event of uncontrollable domestic violence by the left
or the right would the military, as a last resort, step in
to restore order. In our view, however, the military is
well aware that their involvement would discredit the
election and jeopardize prospects for international aid.
The Balloting
The election itself could be turbulent, especially if the
left pulls out and the guerrillas ratchet up their
disruptive activities which is within their capabili-
ties. Given restrictive voting regulations and some
disillusion with the national contest, the turnout may
be somewhat lower than in past years, but high
enough to buttress legitimacy. The presence of inter-
national observers will also lend credibility to the
process
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et
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Roberto D'AUBUISSON Arrieta
ARENA Honorary President for Life
Charismatic ultraconservative former army and
National Guard officer . . resigned in 1979
from active military duty under pressure . . .
. claims that US interference in 1984
election denied him presidency .. . highly criti-
cal of Duarte government . . . recently took con-
trol of ARENA presidential campaign, accord-
ing to untested source . .
received military training in the United States
and Taiwan. . . 45
More troubling and problematic will be whether the
loser accepts the results. Both the PDC and ARENA
have claimed publicly that the other is preparing to
steal the election, and, while some of the rhetoric is
only propagandizing, there are elements in the parties
willing to cry foul, no matter what the process or
outcome. Although it is not the most likely scenario, if
one of the major candidates were to denounce the
returns, the left would reap a propaganda windfall
that could contribute to wider polarization and vio-
lence.
9
The Insurgents: Shifting Political-Military Strategy
More than ever, the guerrillas' strategy is also focused
on the political and diplomatic arena. This is partly
because of necessity forced upon them by improving
Salvadoran military performance and partly because
of the realization that their own declining but still
dangerous military capabilities are better comple-
mented with a talk/fight strategy that boosts their
legitimacy. At the same time, their more sophisticated
target selection is designed not only for maximum
political and economic impact but also to exaggerate
their military prowess. Especially effective psycholog-
ically has been the boost of attacks in urban areas and
traditionally safe locales in the countryside.
The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN) guerrilla coalition has undergone major stra-
tegic shifts. (See inset, page 10.) Following its unsuc-
cessful "final offensive" early in 1981, the insurgents
attempted to match the armed forces' growth and
tactics in an attempt to defeat them in conventional
warfare. FMLN strength peaked at 9,000 to 11,000
combatants in 1984, as the guerrillas were unable to
keep pace with the government's growing superiority
in firepower, mobility, and strength. By the end of
1985, the insurgents had reorganized and shifted to a
strategy of prolonged warfare that concentrated on
attrition of the military and the economic infrastruc-
ture. During this period, insurgent strength fell to
7,000 to 8,000 combatants, and the FMLN force
structure stressed a greater reliance on smaller, more
mobile units.
In late 1986, while continuing to fight a prolonged
war, the insurgents again shifted emphasis, this time
preparing for a strategic counteroffensive. Although
this strategic counteroffensive planning contained un-
realistic elements, at its heart was a military offensive
in which local insurgents and a greatly expanded
contingent of militia forces would conduct widespread
ambush and sabotage activity to tie down government
forces. FMLN strategic and special forces would
meanwhile attack major armed forces facilities.
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Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN)
The FMLN is generally Marxist-Leninist, pro-
Cuban, and decidedly anti-US. All five guerril-
la groups comprising the FMLN trace their
origin, directly or indirectly, to the Salvadoran
Communist Party. Many in the leadership of
these groups drew their political training from
Salvadoran student politics of the early 1970s:
Marxist, violence prone, and antagonistic
toward the United States
Despite the dominance of Marxism-Leninism
within the FMLN, there are periodic differences
of opinion over strategic priorities and revolu-
tionary tactics. The People's Revolutionary
Army, for example, has long stressed the pri-
macy of military action in bringing about revo-
lution, while the Armed Forces of National
Resistance has placed more emphasis on politi-
cal organization. These differences do not, how-
ever, represent fundamental divisions regarding
the FMLN's Marxist-Leninist ideological un-
derpinnings. In this regard, the FMLN shares
many similarities with the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FS LN) in Nicaragua. Were
the FMLN to ever come to power, we believe
that�as with the FSLN�it would coalesce
around a Leninist domestic policy of one-party
control and ultimate socialization of the econo-
my and a foreign policy centered on close
relations with Cuba and hostility toward the
United States.
Implementing the Counteroffensive Plan
Tactically, FMLN operations are influenced by both
the strategic counteroffensive strategy and by govern-
ment operations and capabilities. The insurgents con-
tinue to emphasize low-risk actions to wear down both
the economy and the armed forces, and mass only for
significant operations such as attacks against garri-
sons. (See figure 5.) In 1988, the insurgents staged
12 attacks against large- and medium-size targets�
the same number as 1987. However, 1988 attacks
were less effective in terms of casualties inflicted
(b)(3) (28 percent less).
FMLN military activity did increase dramatically in
major urban centers during 1987 and 1988 with more
visible and violent actions, especially in San Salvador
where actions tripled between 1986 and 1988. (See
figure 6.) The use of vehicle-launched "rampas"�a
locally manufactured mortar-like device�has permit-
ted the FMLN to conduct headline-grabbing daylight
attacks on major government facilities without a
significant risk of insurgent assets
Local government presence is a major, continuing
target for the insurgency with attacks against town-
halls and civil defense units rising over the past two
years. Following the assassinations of nine mayors in
1988, large numbers of local officials have received
death threats and some 49 mayors have resigned in
the last year, representing 18 percent of the municipal
posts.
FMLN Problems
Despite its aggressive activity in several areas, howev-
er, the FMLN has been able only partially to mitigate
the effect of increasingly longer government incur-
sions into its base areas. (See figure 7.) Diversionary
operations and greater exfiltration of key support and
command elements out of home areas by the guerril-
las have still left them vulnerable to armed forces'
disruptions of their operational planning, logistic,
recruitment, and training activities
We assess current FMLN combatant strength to be
6,000 to 7,000 (see figure 8)�a 15- to 19-percent drop
from 1986 strength figures. Because of the counterof-
fensive philosophy, there has also been a major reor-
dering in the composition of troops, reflecting FMLN
emphasis on local forces and militia at the expense of
strategic forces. Although this reordering is a sophisti-
cated adjustment to government combat effectiveness,
the drop in overall combatant strength indicates that
the FMLN has been unsuccessful in its goal to
increase greatly the number of local and militia forces
through new recruitment
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Figure 5
El Salvador: Insurgent-Initiated Incidents by Type, 1982-88
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
0
Attacks a
Ambushes"
Harassment'
Propaganda d
Sabotage e
Other
1982 83 84 85 86 87 88
a A forceful hostile action against a stationary government
force (also called an assault).
A military action against a moving government force.
Military actions such as sniping, lobbing a small number of
shells, or similar actions that seem intended to hamper
government operations rather than to defeat them.
Dissemination of information by means such as
leaflets and briefings. Dramatic actions without verbal
content are not considered propaganda.
e The destruction of facilities that support government
military operations or the economy.
Note: Data reflect the continuing rise in
insurgent-initiated actions over the last three years.
This results from increasing emphasis on lower risk,
smaller unit actions, such as harassment, sabotage,
and propaganda; larger unit actions, such as attacks
and ambushes, have declined.
The FMLN's military emphasis on the urban theater
is designed to be complemented by an increasingly
militarized and active front group apparatus, but here
the guerrillas have made little headway. While front
group demonstrations have become more violent, they
remain small�an indication that popular support is
not expanding in the cities. More important, they
have not drawn a repressive response from govern-
ment security forces. Furthermore, in spite of continu-
ing FMLN penetration of labor unions, the FMLN is
not significantly closer to being able to call an
effective general strike
11
320458 1-89
Likely Insurgent Adjustments in 1989
We judge that the FMLN cannot launch a political-
military offensive along the lines of its proposed
strategic counteroffensive in 1989:
� Although the FMLN has developed new militia
units, these forces are concentrated in or near
FMLN base areas, do not operate independently,
and would be of only marginal value in a strategic
counteroffensive.
"gt�sr,k..,t
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Figure 6
Insurgent-Initiated Military Incidents 'in
San Salvador Area, 1984-88
0
1984 85 86 87
a Includes attacks, harassment, ambushes, agcassinations,
sabotage, and bombings.
88
320468 189
� The FMLN has not greatly increased the pace of its
purely military operations nor has it been able to
bring about a lasting strategic dispersion of govern-
ment forces.
� FMLN front groups and penetrations of the armed
forces are not able to foment a popular or military
(b)(3) insurrection.
Although the FMLN is unlikely to abandon its
strategic counteroffensive strategy largely because of
concerns about internal morale, we believe the insur-
gent leadership realizes that a near-term political-
military victory is not possible. Without abandoning
preparations for an eventual strategic counteroffen-
sive, the FMLN now apparently believes its best
opportunity is to exploit the existing domestic and
international political climate to force a decrease in
US aid to the Salvadoran Government and pressure
(b)(3) the government to negotiate
We believe FMLN political-military operations over
the next year will focus on boosting the perception of
the viability of the insurgency.-Militarily, this means
a heavy volume of high-visibility, low-risk operations.
The insurgents already are conducting coordinated
harassment sprees of up to eight actions in a single
department in a single night. Electrical sabotage also
is being conducted in concentrated spurts to enhance
impact. The insurgents are capable of combining a
harassment and sabotage spree with a significant
attack to create the impression of military initiative.
In terms of logistics and manpower, the insurgency
probably can sustain a heavy volume of low-risk
operations with only brief lulls (15 to 30 days). (See
figure 9.) We judge that these operations, in spite of
heavy publicity, will not significantly alter the present
military balance. They will, however, result in a
somewhat greater threat to US facilities and person-
nel�particularly since the FMLN is becoming in-
creasingly less hesitant to employ terrorist tactics and
to attack US targets.
In addition, we believe the FMLN may publicly
announce a shift from the preparatory phase to the
preliminary phase of the strategic counteroffensive.
This rhetorical leap will mean nothing in terms of
insurgent military capabilities, but may receive inter-
national attention and bolster insurgent morale
External Support
Still key to insurgent strategy and current force
structure is the continuing flow of external support.
Such support�especially ammunition�remains the
critical factor in allowing the FMLN to conduct
military operations at current levels
In 1988, 55 suspected seaborne deliveries to the
insurgency were detected, almost double the number
in past years. (See figures 10 and 11.) While we do not
know the exact composition of this traffic, the rise in
detected deliveries may indicate preparations for in-
creased military actions along with a greater need to
replace materiel losses.
12
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3*tege
Figure 7
El Salvador: Guerrilla Operating Areas
Base areas- Areas where strategic mobile forces,
local guerrilla units, major command elements, and
service and support organizations are consistently
located. In addition, these areas normally contain
a sophisticated, well-established guerrilla infrastructure.
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily authoritative.
1986
ri Base area
I-1 Disputed area
1988
1-1 Base area
Disputed area
5.0 Kilometers
5�0 Miles
Disputed areas-Areas in which the guerrillas are
contesting the military for control. Such an area may
evidence some of the characteristics of a base area
to include having command elements and local guerrilla
units based in the area, with an occasional strategic
mobile force unit being camped in it.
13
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Figure 8
El Salvador: Relative Military and Insurgent
Force Levels
Thousands
60
50
40
30
20
0
1982
84
Government: Guerrilla Force Ratios
9
6
Government
forces
Guerrilla
forces
86
88
Government
177 Guerrilla
1982 84 86 88
Salvadoran Government Military Expenditures as a
Percentage of the Central Government Budget
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
Sec
--���
320466 1-89
The insurgents have attempted to alleviate their con-
tinuing dependence on external materiel support by
locally manufacturing "popular" weapons. These
efforts have produced an impressive number of home-
made weapons that the insurgents are using with
increasing success, but the programs produce little
small-arms ammunition�the most critical insurgent
requirement.
On the basis of our knowledge of guerrilla captures of
government stocks, the insurgents' manufacturing
capabilities, ammunition expenditures, and sizes of
their arms caches, we estimate that the FMLN must
infiltrate at least 70 percent of its basic ammunition
needs�and 100 percent for such items as AK-47
rifles and RPG-2/7 rocket launchers. In addition, the
insurgents must infiltrate large numbers of fuses and
blasting caps to make homemade mines.
In 1987, the rebels captured only 82,000 rounds of
rifle ammunition from the government�compared to
the 300,000 rounds stored in a single guerrilla ware-
house. The insurgents have set up small ammunition
manufacturing facilities, but these have done little to
close the big gap between expended ammunition and
domestic sources of supply and acquisition. Last year,
army patrols uncovered more large caches of ammu-
nition than previously, also pointing toward major
external flows
Weapons of various types also continue to be infiltrat-
ed into El Salvador. While weapons infiltration is at a
lower level than in 1983 and 1984, the insurgents need
to replace older Vietnam-era M-16s, arm their new
forces, and replace weapons lost to the government.
Currently, the insurgents are losing two weapons to
the government for every one they capture. (See table
2.) Captured guerrillas also are reporting that some
units are now being equipped with AK-47 rifles vice
the M-16/AR-15. We believe that Nicaragua�often
acting in concert with Cuba�continues to be the
logical conduit for much of the insurgents' logistic
needs.
14
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Figure 9
FMLN Force Structure, Strength by Faction, and Type of Force
Special Forces
Best trained insurgent
force, serves as the pri-
mary penetration force for
significant FMLN attacks.
Strategic Forces
Serves as the major FMLN
maneuver force, primarily
assigned to a specific
zone, but can operate
throughout the country.
Local Forces
Consists mainly of guerrilla
units which operate within
specific areas conducting
both political expansion
and low-level military
operations.
Armed Militia
Low-level forces which
operate in and near their
home villages; responsible
for conducting low-level
sabotage and limited
operations with local
forces.
Force Structure -- 1984, 1986, and 1988
Percent
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1984
1986
1988
Strength by Faction and Type of Force, 1988
Number
Faction
Type of Force
Special Forces
Strategic Forces
Local Forces
Armed Militia
Total
ERP
160
900-1,000
1,240-1,390
200-250
2,500-2,800
FPL
164-218
401-504
1,096-1,304
436-537
2,097-2,563
FARN
72-95
200-220
353-400
55-60
680-775
FAL
26-30
0
384-460
Unknown
410-490
PRTC
15-20
26
239-291
45-53
325-390
Total
437-523 (7%)
1,527-1,750 (25%)
3,312-3,845 (55%)
736-900 (13%)
6,012-7,018
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)
Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)
Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL)
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC)
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
Strength by Faction, 1988
Percent
FAL 7
FARN
11
FPL
36
PRTC
5
ERP 41
15
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Figure 10
Seaborne Logistic Deliveries to
Salvadoran Insurgents, 1987-88
0
J FMAMJ J A S OND
�Like 1987, 1985 and 1986 deliveries averaged
a total of 28 per year.
The Central America Joint Intelligence Team has
developed an all-source methodology that identifies
patterns of insurgent seaborne logistic delivery
activities. Through this methodology, we are able
to monitor predelivery, delivery, and postdelivery
indicators. This methodology has been generally
accepted within the US Intelligence Community.
In addition, deliveries detected using this methodology
have been periodically confirmed through captured
insurgent documents and interrogation reports.
3204591.89
Monetary donations from Western organizations,
including some in the United States, continue to meet
a significant portion of insurgent financial needs.
the dimensions of financial aid is scat-
tered, but sufficient to underline its continued impor-
tance to the war effort.
revealed that one of the largest guerrilla
factions�but still only one of five�acquired $2.5
million in 1987.
courier admitted to carrying from $40,000 to $70,000
per month, which would equate to $480,000 to
$840,000 per year transported by a single individual
from one faction
Various ruses are used to attract and divert funds
a guerrilla-dominated labor coalition sought
in funding for a new building, and, while
organization estimated this was three
t e
organi-
times the necessary amount, other
zations serviced the request.
guerrilla-dominated human rights
COMADRES donated
to one of
Table 2
FMLN Weapons Losses
Lost to
Military a
Captured
From
Military b
Net Loss
1985
1,235
254
981
1986
719
336
383
1987
948
426
522
1988
983
409
574
a Based upon defense attache reporting.
b Based upon FMLN Radio Venceremos reporting, cross-checked
against Salvadoran military losses.
Note: This table shows that, in the last two years alone, the FMLN
has lost nearly 1,100 weapons more than it has captured from the
military. These figures do not take into account the additional
depletion of the guerrilla inventory due to normal wear and tear of
its aging stock of M-16s.
This table is S
the insurgent factions, althou h the money had origi-
nally been provided b a r anization to aid
displaced children.
Government Counterinsurgency Performance
Over the past few years, the government has imple-
mented a two-track counterinsurgency strategy to
defeat the still well-supplied and reasonably well-
funded FMLN. It is based on large-scale sustained
military operations and a nationwide civic action/civil
defense program; the military track has been much
more successful than the latter
Salvadoran military performance has improved mark-
edly since 1984, and the armed forces are now able to
conduct more frequent and effective large-scale sweep
16
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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Figure 11
Suspected Seaborne Deliveries
Guatema
Ahuachapan.
'Santa Ana
�Sonsonate
0 Logistic distribution/
transshipment point
it=37 Maritime delivery
In���=.. Supply corridor
0 30 Kilometers
I
0 .30 Miles
.Cha enan
suntepeque�
0 El.coiutepequ9
� SAN SALVADOR
Nueva
San Salvador v a � o
Zacatecoluca.
North
Pacific Ocean
a cente
0
Usulutrin.
San Migue
Golfo de
Fonseca
Nicaragua
Boundary represenWlon Is
not necessarily authoMat
17
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Figure 12
Salvadoran Military and Insurgent
Casualties, 1981-88
5,000
(b)(1)
(b)(3) 0 1981
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Total ESAF bCasualties
4,000
3,000
0
1981 82 83 84 85 86
ESAF
wounded
87 88
FMLN
killed in action
ESAF
killed in action
82
83
b ESAF = Salvadoran armed forces.
FMLN = Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front.
84
85
86
87
88
Note: FMLN killed in action figures rose 23.5 percent in
1988, following a three-year gradual decline. ESAF
casualty figures (combined killed and wounded) have been
rising for the last five years, and 1987 and 1988 totals
were the highest of the war. In those years, however, killed
in action were only 16 percent of total casualties,
compared to 41 percent in 1983.
operations throughout the country. Further, the mili-
tary has become somewhat more aggressive offensive-
ly, and its development and use of tactical intelligence
also has improved measurably, contributing to a
greater effectiveness in defensive operations as well.
(See figure 12.)
Government casualties are relatively high in absolute
terms, but the army will probably have little difficulty
in replacing its losses in the next year or two. The
morale of the armed forces is good and likely to
320464 1-89
remain so. Officers are generally optimistic about the
course of the war, although for most this is predicated
on continued support from the United States
We do not expect this situation to substantially
change in 1989. The military can continue to main-
tain pressure on the insurgents, to temporarily disrupt
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guerrilla base areas, to preempt insurgent prepara-
tions for major attacks, and to incrementally reduce
guerrilla strength. (See figure 8.) Its manpower and
firepower superiorities will lead to continued mea-
sured progress that is likely to reduce the military
effectiveness of the insurgency without dramatically
reducing its scope.
Military operations tend not to be guided by overarch-
ing goals, however, but to be piecemeal. A good
example are the multibattalion offensives that disrupt
guerrilla base areas but only on a temporary basis
since they do not result in a permanent expansion of
government presence and control. Uneven leader-
ship�because of an overreliance on seniority rather
than merit for military promotion�leads to inconsis-
tent application of the kind of aggressive small-unit
tactics necessary to decisively engage and defeat the
insurgents
Perhaps more important, the civic action/civil defense
program has never had strong government or military
support and continues to founder. The civic action
program targets key rural areas with projects de-
signed to extend government services and security,
but, despite its ostensible importance, military and
civilian support waned in 1988. Overall progress has
been uneven over the years because of civilian bureau-
cratic ineptitude, inadequate funding, and the failure
of a sometimes indifferent military to provide ade-
quate security
Within the past year, there has been increased rhet-
oric and emphasis on a new "hearts and minds"
strategy, but operations have had mixed and some-
what limited results. The government and military
attempted to effect a coordinated campaign in Chala-
tenango Department to displace the guerrillas both
militarily and politically; the operation has been
plagued with delays and has been short on results.
Colonel Ponce, the new Chief of Staff, also initiated a
concerted campaign in eastern El Salvador by under-
taking military/civil operations to establish a perma-
nent military presence in certain FMLN zones. (See
inset.) The campaign provoked an intensive and ongo-
ing guerrilla campaign of threats and assassinations
against civilians and elected officials, however, which
the military was unprepared for and largely unable to
counter
19
(b)(
(b)(
(b)(
The FMLN's use of terror and assassinations against
mayors and other government officials, while distaste-
ful to many Salvadorans, has underscored the govern-
ment's inability to protect those who support it. The
terror campaign has the potential to destroy the
always weak civil administration in large parts of the
country, while further undermining civil defense and
civic action programs. The government's inability to
counter these tactics is a major weakness of its
counterinsurgency program.
With military assistance declining and the Salvadoran
economy stagnating, it is doubtful the government
could expand current programs. Even when US assis-
tance was higher, civic action programs foundered
1)
3)
6)
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Is Rightwing Violence Growing? a
The human rights situation appears to have wors-
ened during the past year, although the overall
level of politically inspired murders remains far
below that of the early 1980s. While the Marxist
insurgents continue to account for the majority of
killings, we believe that rightwing extremists and
some members of the armed forces increasingly
are reacting to the government's seeming inability
to control insurgent terrorism. (See figures 13 and
14.)
None of the confirmed cases of political killings
has been attributed to the right, but extremists
probably are responsible for some of what the
characterizes as "suspicious" killings, in
which no clear motive can be established. Circum-
stances surrounding many of the crimes�torture,
assassinations by groups, and bodies being
dumped some distance from the scene of a crime�
are trademarks of death squad killings in the
Note on data: A number of organizations gather and publicize
statistical information on political killings and other human
rights abuses in El Salvador. Some of these groups employ
questionable methodologies, and others have been revealed to
be fronts for the insurgency. The data used here were obtained
n San Salvador from local press accounts
and other public sources. While the figures probably are not
precise we believe they accurately reflect trends in political
violence
because of inadequate funds. In addition, although
there are few officers who advocate death squad
methods, there is still no indication that the officer
corps is ready to investigate and punish human rights
violations by officers above the rank of lieutenant.
This tends to undermine efforts to win and retain
support in contested areas. (See inset and figures 13
and 14.)
Armed Forces Performance Over the Longer Term
The efforts to remedy deficiencies and pursue re-
forms, while not likely to have a dramatic short-term
impact, will have an important bearing on the broader
Sbr,et
early 1980s. Three new groups have recently an-
nounced their existence�the Revolutionary Anti-
Communist Extermination Action, the Central
American Anti-Communist Hand, and the Eastern
Anti-Communist Command�and are threatening
to kill leftists in retaliation for guerrilla terrorism.
Rightists no doubt have perpetrated some of the
political killings, but we have no evidence they are
acting with the explicit sanction of ARENA lead-
ers. Even party hardliners like Roberto D'Aubuis-
son probably are reluctant to risk negative politi-
cal fallout through the reckless use of illegal
violence
In contrast to regarding rightwing
killings, there has been a discernible increase in
confirmed political killings by the armed forces.
We attribute these mostly to low-ranking soldiers
and policemen, rather than to a broad, high-level
conspiracy. The officer corps generally is aware of
the political sensitivities associated with the
human rights issue and wants to avoid a cutoff of
vital US military assistance. Many officers proba-
bly do cover up such crimes to avoid damage to the
armed forces' prestige and legitimacy.
course of the war just as they have had a cumulative
effect to date. Assuming current trends, we believe
that the armed forces is likely to grind down the
insurgency militarily over the next three to five years,
perhaps reducing its personnel size by one-third. This
would sharply reduce the FMLN's capability to con-
duct medium- to large-scale attacks on strategic
targets. Nevertheless, the guerrillas will still be able
to conduct a prolonged war, depending ever more
heavily on terrorism, sabotage, and small-scale
attacks. The guerrillas, while unable to seize power,
will continue to threaten seriously the security and
stability of the country. (See figure 15.)
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Figure 13
El Salvador: Human Rights Situation
Note scale change
Confirmed Political Killings Outside of Combat
10,000
1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88a
'Through November.
Suspicious Killings�No Clearly Established Motive
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
J FMAMJ J AS ONDJ FMAMJ J A S ON
1987 1988
Most critical to any projection remains the level of
external aid to the government. The military is highly
dependent on assistance from the United States,
which provides nearly all its arms, munitions, spare
parts, maintenance, training, and medical supplies.
US military aid has been declining since 1984�in
part due to a leveling off in the growth of the armed
forces. The military was able to cope with a sizable
reduction in FY 1988 by utilizing unspent funds from
the previous year. The present level of aid is sufficient
to meet day-to-day operational needs, but further
reductions would threaten to cut into combat capabili-
ties and to provoke morale problems. Some observers
believe that a deep decline in annual assistance would
push the military toward a bloody "now or never"
offensive against the insurgents and their sympathiz-
ers or a highly conservative defensive posture. Either
would have clearly negative consequences for human
rights and the prospects of democratic government.
21
320461 1439
Impact of the Election on the War
Regardless of which party wins the presidential elec-
tion, the general prosecution of the war will remain
the province of the armed forces, which tolerates little
interference from civilians. A new Christian Demo-
crat government would be especially unlikely to devi-
ate from the way the war has been conducted. While
many individual�and perhaps even the majority of�
officers and soldiers are pro-ARENA, we do not
believe the military would surrender very much of its
authority or sublimate its institutional interests even
to archconservative politicians. The armed forces will
also continue to have a de facto veto over concessions
the guerrillas may demand in any future negotiations
regardless of the government in power. In a more
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Figure 14
El Salvador: Confirmed Political Killings
Outside of Combat, 1987-88
By Guerrillas
By Armed Forces
By Right
By Unknown
assailants
1987
Total: 226
Does not include
36 civilian deaths
from guerrilla landmines
or 54 civilians killed in
combat by both sides.
1988 (January-Nosember)
Total: 162
Does not include
43 civilian deaths
from guerrilla landmines
or 42 civilians killed in
combat by both sides.
320462 1 89
general sense, however, the weakening of the political
center threatens to interrupt the momentum of social
and economic reforms, which could further polarize
Salvadoran society, enhance oligarchic interests, and
simultaneously encourage increased support for the
(b)(3) insurgents.
An ARENA Victory: Two Scenarios
We believe that an ARENA victory could have an
indirect-- but profound impact on the course of the
war. The prospect of a government firmly in the hands
of the right signals a tougher stand, politically and
militarily, against the left. An ARENA government
would be less inclined than a PDC administration to
investigate political crimes by the right and to punish
offenders a process complicated in any event by
El Salvador's corrupt and inefficient judicial system.
It is also likely that the ascendancy of ARENA would
be perceived by some extremists as giving tacit en-
couragement to anti-left vigilantism. Failure by the
next government to demonstrate a commitment to
democratic values and human rights could result in
the loss of vital US assistance and undermine the
government's popular legitimacy. An ARENA
government dominated by extremists like Roberto
D'Aubuisson or Sigifredo Ochoa might, in the name
of nationalism, move to curtail or minimize US
influence. It also could seek quick, dramatic gain
against the insurgency by resurrecting death squads,
prompting international condemnation of the govern-
ment, and generating sympathy�possibly even tangi-
ble support�for the guerrillas.
Alternatively, an ARENA administration either dom-
inated by moderates, or in which the hardliners curb
their behavior, probably would not try to alter the
current approach to the war. Such a government,
recognizing the importance of continued US assis-
tance, would attempt to maintain reasonably good
relations with Washington. Should US economic and
military aid levels remain relatively constant and the
new government do nothing to jeopardize its own
political standing, we would expect a further weaken-
ing of the insurgency, albeit at the current measured
pace. ARENA, which already has contacts with rebel
leaders, may continue talks in the hope of building
domestic support, improving its own international
image, and maintaining US funding levels
At a minimum, however, we would expect an
ARENA administration, whether moderate or ex-
tremist, to reestablish legislation which lapsed in
early 1987�limiting civil liberties for suspected guer-
rillas. Such a move would facilitate operations by the
military and police but also would provide ammuni-
tion for human rights critics. Any ARENA govern-
ment is also likely to crack down on guerrilla front
groups and pursue an aggressive legislative agenda. It
probably would not move wholesale to undo all of
Duarte's social and economic reforms, but the party's
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Figure 15
El Salvador: Key Indicators
0 Low
9 Moderate � High � Increasing
� Decreasing
Strength of the Government
Strength of the Salvadoran Insurgency
1984
1988
1984
1988
Political
Political
Foreign assistance
�
�
Foreign assistance
90
Foreign recognition/state of relations
9
9 A
Popular support/cooperation
9
0
Government internal unity
�
9
Insurgent cohesion and unity
9
Legal/illegal immigration
9
�
Political strategy
�
� A
Local government control/presence
9 �
Psychological operations
9
9 �
Civic action/psychological operations
9
International image
90
Popular support/legitimacy
9
�
Military
Economic performance
0
0
Military initiative
9
9.
Military
Combat proficiency
9
Strategy and tactics
09
Weapons/logistics
9
Military aggressiveness
0
9
Troop discipline/morale
9
9
Civil-military relations
09
Recruitment/numbers
�
Q
Military presence in rural areas
0
9 A
Geographic scope of operations
9
9 A
Urban control
99
Secure areas
9
9.
Availability of weapons/logistics
�
�
Urban effectiveness
09
Troop morale
�
Use of intelligence
0
9
Respect for human rights
0
9A
strong ties to conservative businessmen and landown-
ers will incline it to shift the country's economic
program to loosen state control of marketing and
probably to roll back at least some of the agrarian
(b)(3) reform
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The future role and agenda of ARENA hardliners,
most notably D'Aubuisson, remain the critical vari-
ables in how far and fast ARENA would try to move.
D'Aubuisson is politically savvy, and the moderate
tone of the ARENA campaign reflects his apprecia-
tion for the practical need to distance the party from
its extremist reputation. He probably understands the
value of continued US assistance but is rash, and
harbors deep resentment against the United States
that could overwhelm other interests.
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The Left's Postelection Strategy
We believe the insurgents and their allies will persist
in their efforts to delink the United States from the
Salvadoran Government, regardless of which party
wins the presidency. An ARENA administration
would sharpen the existing polarization in Salvadoran
politics and enhance the effectiveness of insurgent
propaganda. Nonetheless, we believe the insurgents
will pursue essentially the same postelection guide-
lines against an ARENA or a PDC government,
albeit with some differences in degree and emphasis.
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Resources have been a primary determinant of
leftists' tactics and so limit their options. We expect
they will attempt to intensify their urban campaign of
sabotage, terrorism, strikes, and demonstrations in the
capital and other cities. Militarily, the guerrillas will
opt for additional high-visibility, low-risk attacks on
military targets, similar to those carried out in the
capital in late 1988 and early 1989
An ARENA administration, however, might also
prompt the guerrillas to heighten a dirty war with
efforts to assassinate high-level targets. The guerrillas
would reason that the real and imagined reputations
of ARENA party chiefs provide both better justifica-
tion and offer greater likelihood of sparking the
hardline response they have unsuccessfully sought
during the Christian Democrats' tenure. In addition,
the guerrillas and their Cuban and Nicaraguan bene-
factors might come to believe that increased or more
sophisticated arms were a more justified gamble in
such an environment where international scrutiny
would be directed more toward the government than
the guerrillas
External Factors
Nicaragua. Under most likely scenarios for Central
America, the Sandinistas will be able to devote
increased attention to their goal of promoting revolu-
tion in the region:
� In the event of a regional political settlement, the
Sandinistas would continue to support the FMLN
with logistics and materiel, even if they were bound
by the settlement to cease such support.
� Absent a settlement, a winding down of the Nicara-
guan Resistance effort would have limited, but
positive, effect for El Salvador's insurgents, princi-
pally through freeing up some Nicaraguan military
supplies for ultimate provision to the FMLN. Some
Resistance weapons might also find their way to the
(b)(3) FMLN
Managua�in conjunction with Havana�would,
however, carefully assess increased support of the
FMLN, balancing its impact in El Salvador with
likely US and other international reaction. (See inset.)
Managua would probably regard moderate increases
in the supply of equipment currently in the FMLN
inventory as a relatively safe risk, although this would
probably not have a decisive impact on the fighting.
The Sandinistas probably would avoid dramatic mea-
sures�such as the introduction of new and more
sophisticated weapons�that it believed could trigger
a reestablishment of US lethal aid to the Resistance.
But if the Resistance were completely neutralized�or
if the Sandinistas did not regard US military action as
a credible possibility�Nicaragua would be positioned
to expand the scope of its assistance. The FMLN
would become a substantially more dangerous adver-
sary were this assistance to include SA-7 surface-to-
air missiles and crew-served weapons such as heavy
mortars. The effect would not simply be the military
impact but the psychological one. The Salvadoran
military, like their counterparts in Nicaragua, would,
after initial losses, adjust to the provision of SA-7s to
guerrilla forces. The momentum, confidence, and
morale of government forces could be substantially
eroded, however, especially if such escalation went
unanswered by Washington
The Peace Process. Prospective regional peace agree-
ments are a double-edged sword for the Salvadoran
Government that on balance are likely to present
growing political and public relations problems rather
than practical solutions. This is likely to be especially
true if an ARENA government is in power. In almost
all cases, the guerrilla left is the most obvious benefi-
ciary.
The only regional peace initiative the government
would welcome is a border verification mechanism
capable of interfering with Sandinista logistic assis-
tance to the FMLN�a highly unlikely outcome given
demonstrated problems in terms of practical imple-
mentation and lack of political will. Otherwise, the
Esquipulas II peace process and related regional
initiatives threaten to force the government into nego-
tiations with the FMLN, which the armed forces are
likely to resist strongly, adding to civil-military prob-
lems. Indeed, if the Sandinistas and the Resistance
resume talks under the Sapoa Agreement or a new
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Cuban, Soviet, and Sandinista Perspectives
on the Insurgency
Cuba and Nicaragua have long been the principal
supporters of the Salvadoran insurgency. Mana-
gua, probably reflecting Havana's guidance, open-
ly promotes a political settlement in El Salvador
while continuing to surreptitiously provide the
guerrillas with military aid. Nicaragua's role con-
sists primarily of providing transportation, ware-
housing, and coordination for deliveries of supplies
from Cuba, including arms and ammunition sup-
port. It also encompasses training, safehaven, safe
transit, and secure communications facilities to
support the insurgent military network. We have
no convincing evidence that the Soviets are provid-
ing direct military assistance to the Salvadoran
guerrillas. However, Moscow does give financial
assistance and military training to the Communist
Party of El Salvador, which is included in the
FMLN.
We believe Cuba and Nicaragua over the short
term will try to keep both the political and mili-
tary options open. Havana's interest in the politi-
cal track could begin to wane in the months ahead,
however, and military pressure could be stepped
up if the political environment changes�for exam-
ple, if the Central American Peace Plan disinte-
grates or if a radical rightist government is elected.
Similarly, if the insurgency began to pose a
framework, international pressure for El Salvador to
pursue a parallel process could enhance the FMLN's
bargaining position.
The recent FMLN negotiating proposal suggests the
possibility that the guerrillas are under pressure to
consider more seriously a political settlement. The
proposal�presented to the government by the
church�involves postponement of the election, re-
spect for its outcome and elected officials, and drops
longstanding demands for power sharing and restruc-
turing of the armed forces. (See inset, page 26.) It is
25
credible threat of a military overthrow, we believe
Havana and Managua would throw their weight
behind the attempt.
Havana also provides military training, arms, and
logistic support to the FMLN, in addition to more
visible medical and propaganda aid. Fidel Castro,
who helped the disparate factions that comprise
the FMLN to unite in 1980, also reportedly contin-
ues to mediate disputes within the group and to
offer tactical advice
For their part, the Soviets see political action as
the most promising means for the left to increase
influence and to avoid being held responsible for
any escalation in the fighting. While TASS cover-
age of insurgent activity is favorable, Moscow is
critical of the guerrillas for being inflexible and
thinks them naive for believing they can defeat the
government militarily. the Soviets
turned down an FMLN request for
that
the Soviets have expressed interest in the prospects
of the Democratic Convergence and have invited
to Moscow. By
trying to build relationships with such leaders, the
Soviets hope over the longer term to broaden their
influence in San Salvador.
intended at least as much for international as for
domestic impact. Although there are probably some
linked to the guerrilla left who wish seriously to
pursue these negotiations, reporting indicates the in-
surgent leadership views the peace proposal principal-
ly as designed to stave off military pressure, and it
expects rejection of the proposal to legitimate intensi-
fication of the war
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If the Sandinistas are successful in redefining the
Esquipulas democratization provisions using human
rights criteria, Nicaragua and the FMLN will point
increasingly to alleged government abuses or the
inability to control death squad activity. This poses a
potentially acute public relations problem, especially
for an ARENA administration. Government refusal
or inability to rein in human rights abuses or negoti-
ate with the FMLN could have repercussions in the
US Congress, possibly threatening bipartisan support
for continuing US aid
Implications for US Interests
In the most likely scenario�a protracted war of
attrition�the key political battle will shift to the
United States. The FMLN will endeavor to reinvigo-
rate US political opposition to continuing military and
economic support. The FMLN's January 1989 peace
plan is clearly part of this strategy�a seemingly
forthcoming offer that meets many of the govern-
ment's oft-repeated demands, the rejection of which
will make the government appear rigid and duplic-
itous.
For the Salvadoran Government, the task will be
essentially defensive. While carefully monitoring US
Congressional opinion, it will attempt to refute allega-
tions by the guerrillas and their sympathizers of
human rights abuses and corruption, remain open to
the concept of a regional peace accord and dissenting
strains of opinion, and ensure that the election is fair,
and unmarked by significant fraud.
If the government loses the public relations war with
the FMLN, it may well find itself facing reduced
levels of economic and military aid or conditionality
on continuing aid that it will find burdensome or even
intolerable. US leverage in supporting the survival of
El Salvador's democratic institutions and improve-
ment in the human rights arena derives from continu-
ing high levels of US economic and military aid. In
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particular, the armed forces' commitment to democ-
racy and acceptable practices in the field continues to
hinge on their dependence on US support
Given the strong antigringo streak in D'Aubuisson
and his cohorts, if ARENA were in control of the
government, a substantial reduction of US aid could
spark a brutal military effort to wipe out the guer-
rillas and their supporters, along with reciprocal
FMLN atrocities. The quick result might be a tempo-
rary but pyrrhic gain, which would be eliminated as
new insurgent recruits and higher levels of external
aid would gradually turn the war back to 1983-84
(b)(3) levels
(b)(3)
Should the FMLN offer a proposal that has genuine
promise for a political settlement, US involvement
and pressures will almost certainly be crucial in
overcoming institutional resistance to compromise and
keeping the renegade right wing from destroying the
political environment. For such involvement to be
effective, however, Salvadoran civil and military
authorities will have to remain convinced that US
commitment to preventing a guerrilla takeover
remains firm.
Other scenarios could include:
� A negotiated agreement to postpone the election in
response to recent guerrilla proposals. This would
not affect our judgment of the likely election out-
come. In addition, we doubt that it would lead to a
27
lasting settlement because, at a minimum, hardline
elements in the FMLN would renew the guerrilla
struggle.
� The splintering of the FMLN, with some factions
pursuing interests through the system and others
fighting on.
� A degenerative weakening of the system caused by
increased political polarization and intraparty fac-
tionalism combined with more rapid economic de-
cline, enabling the FMLN to exploit the ensuing
political chaos.
In the last case, uncertainty about the reliability of
US economic and military support would be a key
factor contributing to government paralysis and a
deteriorating military situation, possibly facilitating a
Sandinista-style revolution led by the FMLN
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