CSHP 339 VOL I - (DRAFT PART 1) INFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY OF AGENTS IN NORTH KOREA, 1952-1953

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06145822
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2022
• Case Number: F-2018-00932
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972

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33 '7
INFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY OF AGENTS
IN NORTH KOREA, 1952-1953
AirForce./Haas/Korean War 51-53
HS [Mar 95/KCRuffner]
Doc. # IC) ; page jofjA.pp.
Aicf-t"
.11111111C
Dk9)-(A-174-2-1 1 7 7J,,
�sg-fiffer
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AirForce/Haas/Korean War 51-53
HS [Mar 95/KCRuffiler]
Doc. # 10 ; page .;..of I2.pp.
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(OW
by the US Air Force.* The had one flight,
ca4ed B-Flight, to support various intelligen9e
?yv, "7
activities in South Korea; a.s-well-as;-44y4eg4flares
and leafletsdr-op-miss4e-ns: The air support phase
appeared to be in the category of early World War II
operations. , Only one technique was apparent14
penetrat during the moon phase in
ItAm4;11' _
clear weatherdicurd4d.rop on a light pattern. Since
th-ome technique was used during every moon phase
by the Korea Mission and various other agencies in
the area, a defense of hill watchers was set up,
and numerous fires in various patterns appeared on
itile ground whenever a plane flew overhead. As a
Nesult, air^crews dropped supplies and even personnel
Without being absolutely sure that they were over the
Aght drop-zone pattern and that it was not a trap. 14/
b. Air
Operirtional air support was provided
ZAaree
..,
411W4lelatea-l-Paper410, 87, Civil Air Transport, A
illgUlqry Airline, mgml1111110 relates that
ANWOrticipated in Korean operations during the
Oltnigriod, but no indication of this was found in
Illahlean operational files.
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,n7t.
6.,---Physiefil-As.se4e-
c. Cover
With the approval of the Far East
�
Command (FEC), (050) and OPC elements were com-
bined in August 1951 into one mission under the
military cover of Joint Advisory Commission, Korea
(JACK), a component of the UN command. JACK employees
were documented as members of the US Armed Forces
or Department of Army civilians. Vehicles were given
a variety of markings in an attempt to thwart
Communist attempts t m!sinitor JACK activities.
Bases were normallyipovermd- a CCRAK, the coordination
center for all intelligence activities in Korea.
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I
e. Real Estate/.16/
At the beginning of 1952 the Agency
�ttecr acquired island bases o�-nrodest-propor-t-�ons among
arganizations. Theis-land-bases-were under the cover
ofigombined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea
(CCRAK)._:5A
�
(cases on the east coast of North Korea were on
the islands of Yang-do (EA 500150) and Yo-do (CU 820425).
Yo-do was an operations base from which one case --
officer directed special guerrilla missions, using .1
-
CIA guerrillas, ROK marines, and Army7guerrillas.
There were empimm, tents accommodating up to 0
persons. The base stockpiled arms, agent equipment,
clothing, and supplies supp1ement-IA-1V supplies
furnished by the US Navy. The Navy also furnished
water transport for Yo-do operations.
Bases off the west coast were on the islands of
Cho-do (KC 600650),
PaengnyongrAo (XC 500040),
Taechong-do (X3 500875), and Sochong-do OM 540820).
Paengnyong-do was an operations base from which..
case officers directed OPC E&E activities and
coordinated E&E activities with G-3 guerrillas.
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6 :1 eel
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Material support was furnished by gUSAK. Sochopg-do
LA,,/c4 44 7-/e/.W-rX'=>
was an advancedallall0 oper ions base-on which
approximately 4111111111111110agents were based in January
1952.
In addition to the island bases, a large base
at Tongnae, eight miles north-of Pusan, housed the
principal operations headquarters for CIA activities,
including radio facilities for agent communications.
The base was used as a storage area for vehicles and
stockpiles of agent radio equipment, food, clothing,
and other supplies. The headquarters consisted of
two Japanese-style hotel buildings.
A maritime base was activated on 16 June 1952
at Inchon (BS 920500), the primary function of which
was operational control and logistical support for
the E&E program on the west coast. A secondary function
which developed later was occasional logistical
17/
support for other projects with maritime components.
Three safehouses were set up for use by American case
officers and Korean principal agents,in�cannect-kon
with developing and exploiting Korean and Chinese
smuggling contacts.
There was a major OPC guerrilla training base
on the island of Yopg-do near Pusan. The base was on
C -3.
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a 20-acre site which contained approximately., tents
accommodating about ...1M trainees. It was a
major outfitting base, with stockpiles of arms,
explosives, trucks, jeeps, clothing, agent equipment,
food, and other supplies.
A major base headquarters wax in Pusan, staffed
with 11110PC personnel, supported all operations under
Project ...gm am) safehouses were also in Pusan.
An area on the outskirts of Pusan was reserved for
radio operator training0
There was also a guerrilla training base at
�Kyongju ON 200650) and another one at Kadok-do
(DP 830750).
A military-type warehouse was maintained at K-9
Airfield in Pusan for the storage of all airrop
supplies. The Agency kept two aircraft at K-9, a
Cessna on contract from Civil'.Air Transport and a
C-45 on loan from the USAF.
In early 1952 a new training camp was being set
up at Pohang for the training of Chondokyon personnel.
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f. Logistical Support
Materiel support was furnished by
EUSAK through the use of support letters in the name
of Department of Army Liaison Detachment (DALD) or
Far East Air Force/Technical Analysis Group
(FEAF/TAG), which were &tamer cover elements for
OSO and OPC activities in Korea. These letters,
known as Jesus Christ letters because of the reaction
they provoked, were issued by FEC under authority
given in a letter from Department of the Army to-c4---
-/V
DCI, dated 18 January 1951,,I."Logistics Assistance
to the Central Intelligence Agency." Requisitions
using those letters or other ones subsequently
issued to JACK by FEC were honored by Army supply
depots.
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II. INP/LTRATIONbXFILTRATION. OD RESUPPLY ACTIVITIES / r'S2.
PER402471952
A. Foreword
Preparations for spring operations in 1952
continued. At geadquarters,ANorth Asia Command (NAC)
and at�CIA/Korea (JACK), there was an awareness of /
the major problems affecting agent infiltration
�
operations as practiced in 1950-1951:---The-problems
were-known-to_be:
1. The unrealistic goal of armed harassment
.of the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces
through the infiltration and resupply/agents from
" South Korea.
' 2. The low level of agent material pre-
viously recruited and on hand for 1952 spring
� infiltrations.
3. The basically guerrilla/paramilitary
1
training concepts under which the agent mate-rlaq-
had been trained.
4.. The fading motivation of the agent..)-
-mate.E4A-1,on hand (Fl, PM, and E&E-oriented) because
of a growing indication that the war was ending in
a stalemate and that support for North Korean oper-
ations might soon disappear.
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,S.ReftEr.
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B. 1952 Operational Background
art:Am-
During theuperioq;Admiral *. H.
McCollum
acting
to-set--up--naval----suppta-t---for-esA, t rave-led�to- Korea
and _other -F-a-r --Eas t- stat-iens--with s Assistant
Deputy for Policy Coordination (ADPC), 11111111111111111110-
dammommw and the Oa:Assistant Deputy for
Special Operations (kDSO)
� - e", /Jt /-' eirf � , . , v.:Pt .47.
In a report dated 15 March 19524? the ADPC pointed � &. .�i
.outo;,smcule nthAr tiltnisa/that the Eighth Army felt
their shortage of tactical intelligence was the
fault of CIA and that the Commanding General of the
Fifth Air Force felt that. Army and G-2 dominance of
CCRAK'was detrimental to CIA's intelligence support
to the.E&E effort of the US Air Force. .A lack of\
the kind of intelligence on which OPC operations
.v`
,Ar
could logically be predicated was a heavy contri- 9
buting factor to the false starts and misfires.
Throughout the entire Far' East area there appeared
to be a general lack of appreciation of how to get
things done covertly. Further, paramilitary opera-
tions throughout the Far East were largely abortive:/
The ADPC report stated that a wide discrepancy
existed between the relatively optimistic reports
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�sc-eftET
7.1
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(2)
11.11111.111111111.111111111.11111111111111111111.11111111.111
52
g-eilrEf
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