CSHP 339 VOL III - (DRAFT) INFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY OF AGENTS IN NORTH KOREA, 1952-1953

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06145820
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-00580
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972

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AVAILABLE
INFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY OF AGENTS
IN NORTH KOREA, 19*2-1953
Fere,/
INIM
01,9"-Gt1i4-2-1 17 73,
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B. AIA:93/
In 1953 it was estimated that during the war
period approximately.. CIA agents were ailaropped
into North Korea. The records were incomplete,
;
_
especially in the case of project 41111111111241d
ti
it was estimated that the total number dropped for
OM. ranged from to ap agents.
The whole aim of the air activity in Korea
seemed to be quantity, not quality. Tons and tons
of rice and other commodities, as well as thousands
of personnel, were dropped into North Korea dtiripg..
the war period from 25 June 1950 to 27 July 1953.
The USAF crews of B-Flight were able to receive
credit for two missions and actually penetrate the
bomb line only once. For example, if they dropped
above a certain area or flew over five hours, the crew
was credited with two missions. It was not unusual
for B-Flight crews to rotate every three or four
months. Even though there were occasional skilled
crews, it was readily apparent that they would be
,N
lost within a few months by rotation. New/crews
arrive/ unskilled; completed their 75 missions, and
*returned to the US about the time they were acquiring
skill.
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Airiorce/Haas/Korean War 51-53
HS [Mar 95/KCRuffner]
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From mission reports it was apparent that
B-Flight was never taught the finer techniques of
clandestine air support. Various passes were made
over drop zones. Accuracy of alltitudes, speeds, and
dropping was not the practice in B-Flight. The normal
practice seemed to be to get in and get out regardless
of the quality of service rendered.
Training of reception committees was never
extensive or adequate. The Korea Mission Air Opera-
tions personnel did not conduct the training in most
cases. With the poor air support supplied by
B-Flight, it would have perhaps been impractical to
spend a great amount of time on training agents'
reception committeesq when the air crews did not
observe the rules of clandestine air operations.
Another disadvantage to the air support was the fact
that various missions were combined, the Agency's
being only one of several drops to be made during one
flight. This was especially poor during personnel
dropsy as it compromised the security of the agent.
Complete control'of air support is absolutely
necessary for any Agency air support operations.
Without complete control specialized training was
useless when the air crews could not be trained in
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the finer techniques of clandestine air support.
Technique could mean the difference between success
and failure of the missioTgeven though the air crew
returned to home base. By using several of the basic
techniques of air support, and using available elec-
tronics and visible or infra-red equipment, it was
felt that a maximum of three aircraft and crews
completely controlled by the Agency could have pro-
vided much superior support than was provided by
B-Flight.
It was realized from past history of the Agency
that it was probably not possible for the Korea Mission
to establish a headquarters and immediately set up
its own air support and operate. B-Flight might
have been a second choice and was able to render some
air support even though the quality might not have
been of the highest degree. B-Flight ran other
missions, such as flare and leaflet drops, which
were entirely different from clandestine air support
missions. It was hard to teach two entirely different
methods to one pilot. It was recommended that in any
future operations of that type CIA make every effort
to give the mission the proper tools to work with,
one of which is absolute control over air support.
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c. mARtrilms.
Before late 19521 the Korea Mission had no
branch or section within its organizational structure
charged with the responsibility of obtaining reports
on maritime infiltrations and exfiltrations, and
leission case officers were not required to prepare
regularly until the fall of 1952. Reports on
maritime operations were therefore incomplete and
fragmentary, and the differentipassion case officers
often overlooked maritime techniques altogether.
An estimate of the number of maritime operations
was made only from December 1952.
From December 1952 through June 19536? there
were an estimated infiltrations and dip exfil-
trations, with a total of ANDagents, averaging.
per month, or Per year. At that ratel,probably
dillagents would have been processed during 1953.
For those resu1tsc9the Korea Mission depended upon
approximately almothertbhips and al small craft.
Because operations were limited to the dark-of-the-
moon phase, a mother6bhip could handle one to three,
but normally not more than two, operations.
� _
It had been estimated that an_APD (or similar
.4`..,ft ...4�-�
type naval craft) could had run at least 41111 opera-
tions in one night and space the launching and recovery
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SE
points at 15-mile intervals. On the basis ofillms
nights for execution of each operation, one APD
could have made about 1. operations per moon phase,
or 4.1111.1of that actually achieved by the Korea
Mission with approximately., vessels.
If the Agency had had at the beginning of the
war IIMMIwooden-hulled, full-diesel, radar-equipped,
b
American-manned PC's4) capable of 15 to 20 knots9 and
the resources to keep the fleet �in operational con-
dition eight or nine months of each year, it might
have been possible to infiltrate illiagents withal"
maritime operations per month and to exfiltrate agents
when necessary. On that basis it might have been
possible to infiltrate about...agents during the
period of hostilities and exfiltrate as many as
necessary. However, the Agency did not have the ships
or personnel to.maintain that average.
The Korean seamen employed by the Korea Mission
had little or no technical maritime or naval train-
ing, and the )fission did not have properly equipped
American personnel to remedy the situation. Conse-
quently, operations were marked by a strong lack of
precision that was at all times dangerous and
intolerable. The extraordinary tidal conditions on
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Korea's west coast and the severe weather which
produced heavy fogs and high winds were factors that
hampered maritime efforts throughout the war period.
Sea launchings and recoveries were further limited
to the dark-of-the-moon periods.
In November 1952, when the number of vessels
operated by the Korea Mission increased to al from
411111in late 1951, the Maritime Operations Section
(MOR) was created. For a time MOS exercised opera-
tional control over 41111vessels, and the rest of the
fleet remained under the respective case officers,
a policy apparently dictated by the need for coMpart-
mentation of operations. Therefore, very little
maritime centralization resulted, and at the same
time there was little centralization of maritime
administrative affairs. As a result, confusion and
misunderstanding arose concerning the functions and
responsibilities of the MOS. Maritime experience
revealed that in Korea Mission thinking operations
predominated consistently to the exclusion of support.
Mission vessels never had a restricted berthing area
in either Inchon or Pusan which inevitably led to
the loss of security and efficiency. On the east
coast no provision was made to ship supplies from
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the rear echelon to staging areas which resulted in
dependence upon FEC/L1:"s or upon Korea Mission
operational craft to perform that function. Costly
air cargo appeared to be preferred by Headquarters
as a means of support. On the west coast case
officers were forced to spend four-fifths of their
time on supply.and repair problems because of the
lack of a support section to handle the logistics of
island bases and the projects in those areas. These
conditions were the results of extreme comimrtmentation
and project self-sufficiency which ,fission case officers
found, without exceptions)a bitter experience.
,7
The experience in Korea --.13or the fol-
lowing lessonsfjearnedWA
1. The need for a simple maritime technical
training program to produce reasonably efficient
\I skippers and seamen.
2. The need for centralizing maritime admin-
.1:1;a6frir-12
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istrative activities through the use of port coordi-
nators who have been delegated substantial in-port
authority and through a/KaritimeAdministrative
rection at Headquarters.
3. The need for assigning to a single support
authority the necessary number of vessels to coordinate
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and centralize maritime supply runs.
Although the maritime problems in Korea had
been recognized for an extended period, the solutions
had been rejected by higher authority because of
security, compartmentation, and lack of qualified
personnel. Some case officers also rejected assistance
because they did not want to lose a part of their '
empire or be subjected to more control through a
centralized system.
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