SOVIET MILITARY OPTIONS IN IRAN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06144633
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02516
• Publication Date: August 21, 1980

Director of
Central
Intelligence
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Soviet Military
Options in Iran
Special National Intelligence Estimate
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SNIE 11/34-4-80
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21 August 1980
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SNIE 11/34-4-80
SOVIET MILITARY
OPTIONS IN IRAN
Information available as of 21 August 1980 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State,
and the National Security Agency.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
THE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL FOREIG/N INTELLI-
GENCE BOARD REPRESENTING THE PARTICIPATING AGENCIES
CONCUR, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
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Ser.Let
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CONTENTS
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SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS 1
DISCUSSION 3
Status of Military Preparations
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Forces for Use Against Iran
7
Preparedness of the Forces
7
Warning Implications
9
A New Situation on Moscow's Southern Border
10
Factors That Could Precipitate Soviet Military Intervention in Iran
11
Factors Constraining a Soviet Decision To Intervene
12
Prospetts
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SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS
The USSR is taking steps to strengthen the ability of its forces to
invade Iran, should Soviet leaders so decide.
On balance, we believe the Soviets have not made a decision to
invade Iran. We believe they are likely to pursue their goals in Iran
without direct use of military force at least during the next several
months.'
Crucial in the Soviets' calculations about undertaking major military
action are their perceptions of US political will and military capabilities
in the region.
Although there is little direct intelligence on Soviet intentions, the
Soviets might intervene if they believed that:
�There was an emergent low-risk opportunity to gain the
enormous economic and geopolitical advantages that control of
Iran would bring.2
�The United States was bent on re-creating a position of strength
in Iran through military means.
Other circumstances that could trigger Soviet intervention are:
�Serious instability in Iran near the Soviet border.
' The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Service Intelligence Chiefs believe that these
judgments are overstated. There is no evidence to determine whether the Soviets have, in fact, made a
decision to invade or not to invade Iran. Moreover, the time frame "at least during the next several
months" is also beyond our evidence. To properly reflect the SNIE, they believe the judgment should be:
On balance we believe the Soviets are likely to pursue their goals in Iran without direct use of
military force at least over the next month or so. Nonetheless, the USSR is taking steps to
strengthen the ability of its forces to invade Iran and may do so particularly if the Soviets
believed Iranian developments posed a threat to their security or if the US intervened in Iran.
The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, does not believe the USSR
would see "an emergent low-risk opportunity" for a power-grab military takeover of Iran under current
circumstances. He believes that Moscow's cost benefit analysis will lead the Soviet leadership to pursue
goals with respect to Iran through other than direct military intervention, at least for the near term.
In his view the most likely motive for a Soviet intervention in Iran would be a conclusion on
Moscow's part that a Soviet intervention was needed to preempt an American move to create a position
of strength in Iran by military means.
The Soviets would, of course, find the emergence of a potentially viable leftist regime a tempting
reason for intervention, but there appears to be little chance that such a political situation will arise. A
Soviet move to occupy only the northern areas of Iran would not give Moscow control of the oil resources,
It would leave the USSR in a significantly less advantageous position to influence events in the rest of
Iran, and the Soviets would probably see such action as likely to elicit a Western counterintervention.
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�A call for assistance from a pro-Soviet faction in Iran that had
acquired national or regional power.
If the Soviets made a calculated decision to invade Iran under
conditions in which they believed they could choose the time, such an
operation probably would include 16 to 20 divisions and would be
preceded by at least one month of activity to improve the preparedness
of the forces. We would be able to see much of this activity within a
week of its beginning, and probably would interpret it as preparations
for hostilities, but determining whether the Soviets had actually decided
to attack would be more difficult.
A Soviet decision to seize northwestern Iran probably could be
implemented with three to five divisions within two weeks, If the
mobilization were limited to only those units that would take part, we
might be able to provide only a few days or at most a week of warning.
If the Soviets perceived a situation threatening their security
interests�such as an intervention in Iran by US forces�they probably
could hastily assemble a force of some 10 to 12 ill-prepared divisions
and launch an attack directed at seizing major objectives in Iran,
including some on the Persian Gulf littoral, within about two weeks of a
decision to do so. We probably could provide at least a week, and
perhaps 10 days, of warning of such an attack.
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DISCUSSION (b)(1)
Status of Military Preparations
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,
In the first four months of 1980,
there were activities in the Soviet forces opposite
northwestern Iran that suggested that the Soviets were
paying more attention to the posture and readiness of
those forces.
2. On the basis of activities in the past month, it is
evident that the Soviets are indeed developing plans
for military contingencies in Iran.
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Figure 2
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Forces for Use Against Iran
14. The evidence indicates that the Soviet planning
for military operations in Iran includes the 12 ground
divisions (including one airborne) of the Transcaucasus
Military District, at least three of the four divisions in
Turkestan, and at least part of the 40th Army in
Afghanistan. Altogether the forces from the Turkestan
and Transcaucasus Military Districts and in Afghani-
stan would total some 16 to 20 divisions.
15. The six divisions in the North Caucasus Military
District also probably would be mobilized in any
preparation for an invasion of Iran. In selecting other
reinforcements for an invasion of Iran the Soviets
would be constrained by the need to maintain large
forces opposite NATO and China.
16. The tactical air forces in the Transcaucasus and
Turkestan Military Districts have some 450 combat
aircraft, including 285 in the Transcaucasus and 165 in
Turkestan Military Districts. The Turkestan tactical
air forces are presently supporting Soviet operations in
Afghanistan. About 75 Soviet fighters, most of them
from Turkestan, are based in Afghanistan. There are
also some 100 combat aircraft assigned to two training
regiments in the Transcaucasus that could be used for
operations in Iran.
In addition to the
tactical air forces opposite Iran, the Soviets also have
some 300 air defense interceptors in the Transcaucasus
and Turkestan.
17. Combat helicopters would provide support for
Soviet forces moving into Iran. The Soviets have some
175 helicopters in the Transcaucasus Military District,
which could be augmented by helicopters from other
military districts. There are 180 combat helicopters
inside Afghanistan and another 40 in Turkestan.
18. Since the beginning of 1980, the Soviet Indian
Ocean Squadron has averaged 30 to 32 units�four to
six attack/cruise missile submarines, eight surface
combatants, two amphibious ships, one minewarfare
ship, and 15 auxiliaries. In support of Soviet operations
in Iran, these forces could be used to deter and counter
Western naval operations in the region. Without sub-
stantial augmentation from either the Pacific or Black
Sea Fleets, naval forces currently in the Indian Ocean
have only a limited amphibious assault capability.
Preparedness of the Forces
19.
the overall prepared-
ness of the units comprising the forces has undergone
relatively modest upgrading. Although small changes
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To
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Soviet Ground Force Divisions Opposite Iran
Tank
Motorized Rifle
Airborne
Total
I II
III
I
II
III
(All Cat. I)
Forces Immediately Adjacent to Iran
Transcaucasus MD 0
0
0
0
4
7
1
12
Turkestan MD 0
0
0
2
1
1
0
4
40th Army, Afghanistan 0
0
0
3
0
0
2
5
Potential Reinforcements
North Caucasus MD 0
0
1
0
0
5
0
6
Kiev MD 0
1
5
0
0
4
0
10
Central Asian MD 0
1
0
0
2
4
0
7
Odessa MD 0
0
0
0
0
. 7
1
8
Moscow MD 0
1
1
0
1
3
1
7
� ..11
Ural MD 0
0
1
0
0
2
0
3
Volga 0
0
0
0
0
3
0
3
Category descriptions:
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I - 75-100% manning; ready to move at M+1.
II - 50-75% manning; ready to move at M +1-2.
III - 10-40% manning; ready to move at M +3.
would be difficult to detect except over long periods of
time, most of the divisions in the Transcaucasus
Military District appear to remain at low
levels.
manning
20. Some new ground forces equipment has been
delivered to Soviet units in the Transcaucasus Military
District, but other than communications equipment
the deliveries have been consistent with the generally
low priority at which new equipment has been intro-
duced into the forces of this district. In general, the
equipment of the ground forces in the Transcaucasus
Military District lags behind that found in most other
ground forces units in border regions but recently has
been upgraded and is better than that found in most
interior military districts.
21. The tactical air forces in the Transcaucasus and
Turkestan Military Districts, unlike the ground forces,
have been and continue to be equipped about on a par
with those in any of the other military districts. I
22. There have been a few indications of increased
preparedness of rear services and logistics support
forces in the Transcaucasus Military District. (b)(1)
9
Warning Implications
23. The Soviets could mobilize ground force divi:
sions of the kind located opposite Iran, complete with
authorized wartime levels of manpower and equip;
ment, in about three days. (b)(1)
They would have low combat effec-
tiveness, however, especially in the case of a large-
scale invasion of Iran�where the distances and terrain
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difficulties are substantial, and organized 3 resistance
would be virtually assured.
24. These considerations lead us to estimate that if
the Soviets make a calculated decision to invade Iran
under conditions in which they believe they can afford
to choose the time, such an operation is likely to be
preceded by at least one and probably several months
of activity to improve the preparedness of their forces.
We would be able to see much of this activity within a
week of its beginning and probably would interpret it
as preparation for hostilities, but determining whether
the Soviets had actually decided to attack would be
more difficult.
25. The Soviets could launch a more limited attack
to seize northwestern Iran with a force of about three
to five divisions. This force probably could be readied
within two weeks. If the mobilization were limited to
only those units that would take part in the attack, we
might be able to provide a few days or at most a week
of warning.
26. If the Soviets perceived a situation threatening
their security interests�such as an intervention in Iran
by US forces�they probably would forego most of the
longer term force improvements discussed above and
Mount an invasion as quickly as possible. We judge
that the Soviets could hastily assemble an invasion
force of some 10 to 12 ill-prepared divisions and
launch an attack directed at seizing major objectives in
Iran, including some on the Persian Gulf littoral,
within about two weeks of a decision to do so. We
iSrobably could provide at least a week and perhaps 10
days of warning of such an attack.
A New. Situation on Moscow's Southern Border
� � � �
27. Although the Soviets' recent military activities
opposite Iran probably do not reflect a decision to
launch a large-scale intervention in the immediate
future, they do show that Moscow is enhancing its
ability to conduct substantial military operations
against Iran on relatively short notice. At a minimum,
they indicate heightened Soviet interest in containing
Or reversing potentially adverse trends.
28. The Soviets and their Czarist predecessors have
long viewed Iran as a lucrative potential addition to
3'The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Service
Intelligence Chiefs do not believe that Iranian forces are capable
,of opposing the Soviets with "organized"' resistance. However,
Iranian forces could put up "some" resistance.
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their sphere of influence, and the currently critical
global importance of the Persian Gulf and its oil
undoubtedly has made it seem an even more tempting
target. Control of Iran would bring the USSR major�
even decisive�gains. It would shift the power rela-
tionships in the Persian Gulf and hence the world a
considerable way in Moscow's favor. Control of even
part of the region's oil would give Moscow new
leverage on Western Europe and Japan, and a success-
ful invasion of Iran would enhance Moscow's ability to
intimidate other vulnerable countries in the Third
World. Even if the Kremlin does not now think
Iranian oil critical to its own economic well being, it
would help ensure that Eastern Europe remained
dependent on Soviet-controlled oil, alleviate economic
problems in the Bloc, and give Moscow new sources of
hard currency earnings. Moscow thus welcomed the
overthrow of the Shah as a decisive setback for the
United States and as another indication of waning US
influence in the entire Persian Gulf. It created the
possibility of a pro-Soviet Iranian regime, if not one
entirely dependent on Soviet support.
29. In order to capitalize on this situation, Moscow
has sought to cultivate the Khomeini regime and pose
as its protector. But the Iranian Revolution has not
evolved as the Soviets might have liked. Iranian-Soviet
relations have deteriorated recently and are now at
their lowest point since the Iranian Revolution. Not
only has the opportunity for the pro-Soviet elements in
Iran that Moscow may have anticipated failed to
materialize, but militantly anti-Communist clerics
have become increasingly powerful and have shown
signs of successfully institutionalizing their power.
30. Along with their disappointment with develop-
ments in Iran, the Soviets almost certainly have been
concerned about recent signs that the United States is
prepared to play a more direct and active military role
in the Persian Gulf area now that Washington can no
longer rely on Iranian forces. The Soviets undoubtedly
view the military measures that the United States has
taken and is planning as inimical to their interests and
aimed at depriving them of legitimate opportunities to
influence regional developments. Moscow recognizes
that US capabilities in the region are limited, but it
may believe that they are adequate for an intervention
on behalf of internal Iranian opponents of the Kho-
meini regime, and it fears that they could grow.
31. In short, the Soviets see two adverse trends at
work in Iran: their relations with Iran are deteriorating
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and US military capabilities in the area are improving.
Their concerns over these developments are likely to
continue, and the situation is volatile; there are a
number of contingencies that could intensify their
anxieties and conceivably could precipitate a decision
to intervene militarily.
Factors That Could Precipitate Soviet Military
Intervention in Iran
32. The Soviets would be willing to intervene
militarily in Iran if Moscow's leaders came to believe
that they could do so with relative impunity. That is, if
some combination of circumstances had brought them
to the view that:
� The Iranians would not be able or willing to offer
much military resistance.
� Soviet strength in the area had become sufficient
to gain a quick military decision before effective
US or other military counteraction could be
brought to bear.
� US resolve was insufficient to produce a serious
risk of US-Soviet military confrontation.*
33. Alternatively, Moscow could decide to intervene
militarily in Iran if Soviet leaders believed that the
United States was preparing to send military forces
there. The scope and nature of Soviet reaction would
depend very much on what Moscow thought US
motives were. If the Soviets concluded that a small,
quick US military move was designed strictly to obtain
release of the American hostages, they probably would
not intervene. If, however, the Soviets concluded that
4 The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State, does not believe the USSR would see an emergent
low-risk opportunity for a power-grab military takeover of Iran
under current circutnstances. He believes that Moscow's cost
benefit analysis will lead the Soviet leadership to pursue goals with
respect to Iran through other than direct military intervention, at
least for the near term.
In his view the most likely motive for a Soviet intervention in
Iran would be a conclusion on Moscow's part that a Soviet
Intervention was needed to preempt an American move to create a
position of strength in Iran by military means.
The Soviets would, of course, find the emergence of a poten-
tially viable leftist regime a tempting reason for intervention, but
there appears to be little chance that such a political situation will
arise. A Soviet move to occupy only the northern areas of Iran
would not give Moscow control of the oil resources, it would leave
the USSR in a significantly less advantageous position to influence
events in the rest of Iran, and the Soviets would probably see such
action as likely to elicit a Western counterintervention.
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the United States intended to use force to create a
pro-US regime in Tehran or take control of the.
oilfields, they might invade and occupy all or part of
Iran to preempt the US move.
34. The Soviets could be tempted to intervene if the
pro-Soviet Iranian left had seized power but needed
Soviet military assistance to hold it. In the event a
pro-Moscow government called for Soviet support, it
would legitimize Soviet involvement. This would re-
quire a� real growth in leftist pOwer, however, before,
such a situation developed on its own.
35. Another precipitant of Soviet intervention could
be the fragmentation of Iran into a number of regional
and ethnically based entities. The Soviets might in fact
be tempted to promote such a breakdown of order in
the northwestern provinces to provide justification for
intervening. Soviet efforts in 1921 and 1946 to estab-
lish a Soviet-oriented entity in Azerbaijan demonstrate
that Moscow has long had an interest in expanding its
control into northern Iran. The Soviets would have
even more incentive to act if they feared that anti-
Soviet, pro-Western governments could emerge in the
provinces bordering the USSR. In a situation in which
the authority of the Iranian central government had
broken down and local authorities were taking control,
the Soviets no doubt would provide substantial assist-
ance to leftist elements making a bid for power, in
areas such as Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, and Kordestan.,
They, would hope that leftists could get enough control
for enough time to legitimize a public bid for Soviet
military help. Even without such a bid, however, they
probably would move into the northern provinces if
the only alternative seemed to be governments that
were actively hostile to the USSR.
36. Although the Soviets would be deeply disturbed
by what looked like movement by any Iranian central
government toward resumption of close relations with
the United States, Moscow is unlikely to see direct
Soviet military intervention as an effective counter. If
a legitimate government were moving gradually in
such a direction, the Soviets would be more likely to
try to halt the trend by a combination of economic
inducements and covert subversion than to use mili-
tary threats or actions, which would be likely to speed
an improvement of Iranian-US relations and even
result in an Iranian plea for US protection. The
Soviets, however, would be more likely to intervene to
preempt or overturn a pro-Western coup, particularly
if they thought it had active US backing.
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Factors Constraining a Soviet Decision To
Intervene
37. The most important constraint on Soviet inter-
vention in Iran is the possibility of direct and poten-
tially escalating military confrontation with the United
States, The continuing Soviet preoccupation with US
military intentions and actions in the region argues
that Moscow has not discounted the US factor, and
both public and private Soviet statements indicate that
Moscow clearly recognizes the significance Washing-
ton would attach to a Soviet military move in Iran.
Brezhnev himself has publicly acknowledged the im-
portance to the West of continued access to Persian
Gulf oil, and has said
that Moscow recognizes that both the United States
and the USSR have vital interests in Iran. Neverthe-
less, in view of the limited US forces in the region and
of our uncertainty about Soviet evaluations of US
resolve to confront the USSR, we cannot completely
rule out the possibility, that Moscow believes it has the
military capability to deter or overpower a local US
military response and to intimidate Washington from
undertaking a broader military response.
'38: Even if Moscow discounted the likelihood of
effective American military resistance to a Soviet
invasion of Iran, it would be mindful of the danger
that a new demongtration of Soviet aggressiveness
could lead to vastly increased US defense spending,
accelerated US-Chinese military cooperation, and a
reinvigoration of the NATO alliance. Moscow un-
doubtedly recognizes that the West Europeans would
gee a Soviet move into Iran as far more detrimental to
their interests than was the invasion of Afghanistan.
Moreover, Moscow could anticipate similar adverse
reactions from a number of Iran's Middle East neigh-
bors, who, though tempted to accommodate to the
Soviet force majeur, might begin to cooperate with the
West in a serious long-term effort to contain the
further spread of Soviet influence and power.
39. A further constraint on Soviet aggression would
be the major efforts needed to seize and control Iran.
The Soviets probably recognize that they have much
less support in Iran than they thought they had in
Afghanistan at the time of their intervention. Moscow
must take account of the xenophobic nationalism and
religious fervor the revolution has aroused in Iran,
even if it is also aware of a concomitant decline in
Iranian military and administrative effectiveness.
Prospects'
40. We believe Moscow's calculations of risk and
gain will most likely lead the Soviets to pursue their
goals in Iran without direct use of military force, at
least over the next few months.5 Moscow is likely to
continue to follow a less risky course in its quest for
"secure borders," regional hegemony, and global influ-
ence. It does not follow, however, that Soviet-Iranian
relations will remain militarily quiescent. At a mini-
mum we expect the Soviets to continue preparing for
military contingencies and to create and take advan-
tage of any opportunities that present themselves.
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Service
Intelligence Chiefs believe that these judgments are overstated.
There is no evidence to determine whether the Soviets have, in
fact, made a decision to invade or not to invade Iran. Moreover,
the time frame "at least over the next few months" is also beyond
our evidence. To properly reflect the SNIE, they believe the
judgment should be:
On balance we believe the Soviets are likely to pursue their
goals in Iran without direct use of military force at least over
the next month or so. Nonetheless, the USSR is taking steps
to strengthen the ability of its forces to invade Iran and may
� do so particularly if the Soviets believed Iranian develop-
ments paied a threat to their security or if the US intervened
in Iran.
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