ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS: PROSPECTS FOR THE UPRISING AND THE PEACE PROCESS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06124202
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00621
• Publication Date: June 1, 1989

Director of
Central
Intelligence
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Secret
Israel and the Palestinians:
Prospects for the Uprisin
and the Peace Process
National Intelligence Estimate
The National Intelligence Estimate represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
fiutd et
NIE 35-89
June 1989
Copy 336
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Warning Notice
National Security
Information
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
NOFORN (NF) Not releasable to foreign nationals
NOCONTRACT (NC) Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
PROPIN (PR)
Caution�proprietary information involved
ORCON (OC)
Dissemination and extraction of information
controlled by originator
REL...
WN
All material on this page
is Unclassified.
This information has been authorized for release to...
WNINTEL�Intelligence sources or methods involved
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Director of
Central
Intelligence
tIrtfat
NIE 35-89
Israel and the Palestinians:
Prospects for the Uprisin
and the Peace Process
Information available as of 1 June 1989 was used
in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
-Secret�
June 1989
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
(b)(3)
Figure 1
Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories
Settlement Established
� Thru August 1984
. September 1984-October 1988
by the National Unity government
O 40 Kilometers
O 40 Miles
Mediterranean
Sea
Gaza Strip
(Israeli occupied-
status to be
determined
Egypt
716596 (A00853) 6-89
,11
Lebanon
Golanr
Heights('. �� .
(Israeli
Haifa occupi d)
Lake r
Tiberias
UNDOF
Zone
1949
7 Armistice,�\....�,
Linpg �
I � .
:
1.� � . .��
t� ����:. � � � �
ttt* � � �
Tel Aviv-Yafer,
Israel
*/' 1950
/ Armistice Line
Jerusalem f
.� .
*.
/ � � �
.. �
��
� �
� �
�
�
8 Dead
"Sea
231
� Sea
. � .� )
1-
4(F'
�
967 Cease-Fire
Line
AMMAN
Israeli occupied-
status to be
determined)
West
Bank
Syria
Jordan
Uprising-Related Palestinian Deaths, December 1987-May 1989
Number of deaths
60
1
50
40
1
1
30
1
20
10
D J
1987 1988
F
M
A
M
N
D
J
1989
M
A
M
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
(b)(3)
Israel and the Palestinians:
Prospects for the Uprising
and the Peace Process
� We see no sign of a fundamental breakthrough in the peace process
in the next year. The uprising will become more vicious and
violent, unless Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza see
progress toward ending the Israeli occupation.
� Nonetheless, the recent Israeli initiative, PLO flexibility, and a
more constructive Soviet role have created some chance for incre-
mental change and opportunities for US diplomacy.
� The Shamir government is under no significant pressure from
Israelis to go beyond its recent election initiative; strong outside
pressure on Israel and the PLO probably would be needed to bring
about elections.
� PLO moderation will persist in the next year; the PLO also will
demand a role in negotiating a final settlement but might make
significant concessions on initial Israeli-Palestinian talks.
� If the peace process is not advanced, we expect more terrorism and
Arab pressure on the United States in the next two to three years.
iii -Stnmet_
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
clarrar
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
(b)(3)
Alternative Scenarios for the Near Term
A significantly higher level of violence in the occupied territories would
harm US peacemaking efforts and interests. Several scenarios, which we
believe are unlikely in the next 12 months, could raise violence to this high
level rapidly and with little warning.
� Significantly greater use of firearms by Palestinians.
� Massive Israeli repression of the uprising.
� Israeli annexation of the West Bank or Gaza strip.
� Terrorist attacks in the occupied territories and Israel that cause heavy
casualties.
� Major terrorist attacks on religious sites.
(b)(3)
iv
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
�Serret-
(b)(3)
Key Judgments
A fundamental breakthrough in the peace process is unlikely over the next
year. Continuing the current stalemate, however, will not pose immediate
or direct dangers to US interests because the Israeli election initiative, the
US-PLO dialogue, and changes in PLO policies have bought some time.
Some progress in the peace process is possible, particularly if both Israel
and the PLO receive continuing encouragement from the United States.
We believe the opportunity for progress will decline significantly within a
year.
New opportunities for incremental change and US diplomacy have ap-
peared since mid-1988:
� The Palestinians have shown they will revise long-held positions to find a
solution.
� The PLO has consolidated its control over major sectors of the Palestin-
ian movement.
� Israel's Likud bloc and Labor Party have agreed on a framework and ini-
tiative for negotiations.
� The Soviets have shown a willingness to play a constructive role.
Nonetheless, a lack of progress in the peace process over the next two to
three years will increase the threat to US interests. Escalating violence in
the West Bank and Gaza will lead to more casualties, more cross-border
attacks against Israel and Israeli reprisals, and rising international outrage.
Mounting Arab anger and frustration, in turn, will lead to more terrorism
against the United States, more pressure on Arab governments to distance
themselves from the United States, and pressure on Washington to bring
about changes in Israeli policies. Thus, even in the short term, reducing the
violence in the uprising, encouraging flexibility in Palestinian and Israeli
positions, shoring up the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and supporting Jordan
will demand attention.
Palestinians and the PLO
PLO moderation probably will continue over the next year. Arafat,
however, will need progress toward a settlement during that period to
convince Palestinians that moderation yields significant results. A lack of
results will erode his support and increase the influence of Palestinian
hardliners.
Approved for for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
-44mbetsakt
(b)(3)
Syria, Libya, Iran, and Palestinian groups opposed to Arafat will use
terrorism and assassination to try to undermine the US-PLO dialogue,
especially if the peace process advances. Hardline groups within the PLO
will continue to test�primarily by cross-border raids�Arafat's prohibi-
tion against terrorism. Disputes between Israel and the United States over
PLO involvement in such incidents will increase. Many Israelis hold Arafat
ultimately responsible for all acts of violence by Palestinians, which Israelis
lump together as terrorism.
Movement toward a settlement will depend largely on resolving the issue of
Palestinian representation in negotiations. Although leadership of the
Palestinians cannot be separated from the PLO, Israel will continue to balk
at negotiating with it. Israel, therefore, would have to overlook the PLO
connections of local representatives for talks to occur. The PLO, in turn,
would have to accept indirect representation at initial talks in exchange for
a role in negotiations on a final settlement.
Israel
The Shamir government will continue to oppose negotiations with the PLO
and any change in the territorial status quo. It is under no pressure from Is-
raeli opinion to go beyond its initiative of May 1989. Shamir, however, is
under pressure within Likud and from the far right to make no further con-
cessions. The Palestinians do not want to appear obstructionist, but they
will continue to reject the current Israeli initiative, which they see as a ploy
to ward off pressure for concessions and to regain the diplomatic initiative
lost to Arafat last year. Discussions over election details will require
considerable outside encouragement to bridge differences between Israelis
and Palestinians.
The governing coalition in Israel is not likely to address Palestinian
concerns over the next year. It will wait for non-PLO interlocutors to
emerge�Jordanians and West Bank representatives�who are prepared to
negotiate on Israel's terms. Meanwhile, the coalition will continue to push
its election initiative and put the blame for a lack of progress on the PLO.
The Soviet Union and Syria
Moscow is expanding its relations beyond its traditional Arab allies to gain
an active role in the peace process. To achieve equal status with the United
States, the Soviets will show even greater flexibility on the details of the
peace process and will continue to try to moderate Syrian and PLO
positions.
'Secret� vi
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Srnrint
(b)(3)
The Soviet ability to force Syria into an agreement is highly questionable.
Syrian President Assad demands the return of the Golan Heights and a
comprehensive settlement of all Arab-Israeli issues. He will play the
"spoiler" if his demands are not met.
The Uprising
The uprising will become more vicious and violent unless Palestinians on
the West Bank and Gaza see tangible progress toward ending the
occupation. In the next year, harsh Israeli measures to suppress the
violence will not solve the problems facing the Israeli Government that
stem from the uprising. Vigilantism by Israeli settlers and settler clashes
with Israeli security forces and Palestinians will continue to spoil the
atmosphere for conciliation.
Israel will retain its substantial strategic superiority over the Palestinians.
This will ensure that the material costs of the uprising will continue to be
heavier for Palestinians than for Israelis.
PLO leaders abroad and local leaders in the West Bank and Gaza will con-
tinue to cooperate in support of the uprising. No alternative Palestinian
leadership is likely to emerge from the occupied territories over the next
year to negotiate with Israel. The self-confidence of the uprising's leaders
will increase but not enough to cause local Palestinians to move forward on
their own. Israeli arrests and deportations of prominent Palestinians will
diminish Palestinian willingness to engage the Israelis in a dialogue.
(b)(3)
VII
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
""Seefet_
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
-Seeret�
(b)(3)
Contents
Page
Key Judgments
Ill
Discussion
Trends in Israeli Politics
1
1
The Uprising
The Israeli Government
Shamir's Strategy
The International Conference
1
2
3
3
The Israeli Initiative
Palestinian Reaction
Israeli and Palestinian Conditions
The Possibility of Movement?
The Crackdown on the Uprising
Palestinian Perspectives on Key Issues
PLO�West Bank Relations
The US-PLO Dialogue and Future Concessions
Policy Changes and Steps Toward Moderation
PLO Positions
Violence and Terrorism
Israeli Reaction
Next Steps
The Soviet Union and the Peace Process
International Peace Conferences
Israel
3
4
4
5
5
5
6
8
8
9
9
10
10
10
10
11
Palestinians 11
Moscow's Strategy Toward the United States
Implications for the United States
The Pressure of Events
The Changing Situation
Opportunities and Threats for the United States
Annex: Principal Arab Actors
11
11
11
12
12
15
ix SUCTet�
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
"Serefat_
(b)(3)
Discussionl
Trends in Israeli Politics
Israel is struggling through a period of uncertainty
that has eroded the confidence of many Israelis in
their leaders and further divided Israel over the terms
on which it should make peace with the Palestinians.
Neither side is likely to make proposals the other will
accept. The Israeli Government probably will resist
changing its offer of limited autonomy and carefully
controlled local elections. A major departure from the
Israeli initiative�for example, incorporating as a
final objective a land-for-peace formula�would de-
stabilize the Israeli Government coalition. The Pales-
tinian leadership will continue to reject the current
Israeli offer as a device to avoid negotiations with the
PLO and will put forward its own proposals.
The Uprising
After 18 months of upheaval, the uprising shows no
signs of abating, even as its character has changed
from widespread demonstrations to more isolated, but
frequent, instances of violence by Palestinian activists.
Although Israel has s suffered a drop in economic
growth from 5.2 percent in 1987 to 1 percent in 1988,
its economic situation is not severe enough either to
force a change in Israeli tactics to deal with the
uprising or to depart from its diplomatic and political
strategy. The level of violence in the uprising appears
to be escalating, as internecine Palestinian killings,
Jewish settler vigilantism, and other acts of bloodshed
become more frequent. These actions threaten to
poison the atmosphere for conciliatory measures.
Despite some popular ambivalence toward the govern-
ment's handling of the violence suggest
that a broad majority of the Israeli electorate backs
' This Estimate examines political trends in Israel, the Palestinian
movement, and the uprising (intifadah) primarily over the next
year. It focuses on the context in which US policy toward the Arab-
Israeli conflict will be formulated and the challenges the Bush
administration will face. It is intended to give policymakers analysis
and judgments on Israeli policies and the likely roles and attitudes
of principal Arab actors and the Soviet Union.
1
Israel Versus the Palestinians:
The Unequal Struggle
The balance of power between Israel and the
Palestinians is profoundly unequal and is a basic
reason no settlement is likely in the next year.
This imbalance, in our view, illustrates why Israel
is yet to feel compelled to make major new
concessions to the Palestinians even though the
PLO has substantially altered its political
program.
The differences in power form the framework for
the current struggle. The Palestinians have resort-
ed to a popular uprising to try to redress the
balance by appealing to international and internal
Israeli pressures:
� Israel's armed forces are the strongest in the
Middle East. It has deployed at most only
10,000 soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza at
any one time to control the uprising. In contrast,
the PLO has only a few thousand irregulars in
southern Lebanon and some hundreds more
elsewhere in the Arab world. No Arab state has
even threatened to go to war to support the
uprising.
� Israel's economy, measured in GDP, is 24 times
larger than that of the West Bank and Gaza.
Moreover, Israel received $3 billion in US mili-
tary and economic aid last year. On the other
hand, all the Arab states together promised the
PLO $350 million, but only Saudi Arabia deliv-
ered its full share (about $85 million).
� The cost of the uprising in human lives has been
similarly unbalanced: over 500 Palestinians
compared with two dozen Israelis killed since
the start of the uprising in December 1987.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(D)(i)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Figure 2. Palestinian demon-
strators
the government's handling of the uprising. The impact
of the uprising is not seen by the Israelis as severe
enough to persuade the government or public to
accept a territorial solution
The continued defiance of young Palestinians, even
after hundreds of casualties, initially surprised the
Israelis. The impact of the uprising in Israel has been
reflected in many ways:
� Feelings of insecurity have been heightened, even
though Israel's military supremacy remains
unchallenged.
� Israelis and Palestinians confront each other direct-
ly without a Jordanian buffer; each side assumes the
worst about the other's intentions.
� The range of issues under debate in Israel has
broadened. The far right of the political spectrum
talks about "transfer" (expulsion) of the Palestinians
and annexation of the West Bank. At the other end
of the spectrum, Israelis talk of negotiations with
the PLO.
-Secret
� Although the vast majority of Israelis do not believe
the PLO has accepted Israel's right to exist or
renounced terrorism, a narrow majority seems to
favor talking to the PLO if it fulfilled these condi-
tions. A substantial minority may be prepared ulti-
mately to trade territory for peace. At the same
time, however, a majority also supports stern mea-
sures against the uprising
The Israeli Government
The national unity coalition is facing major internal
disagreements over whether Israel should trade land
for peace and a negotiated settlement with Palestin-
ians. These differences, however, probably will be
insufficient to bring down the government over the
next year.
Neither the Labor alignment nor the Likud bloc will
have the option of breaking up the coalition and
forming a new government with the religious and
satellite parties. The coalition agreement provides for
holding new elections if the government collapses. The
government's longevity, therefore, will hinge on
2
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
"Secret
Figure 3. This cartoon from the Arab press
comments on the latest PLO moves. "He's threat-
ening me," complains Prime Minister Yitzhak
Shamir to a skeptical world, as an Arab offers an
olive branch of peace. (Published in the East
Jerusalem daily, An-Nahar.)
whether Likud or Labor thinks it should go to new
elections. This factor will be a stabilizing element as
long as Israel remains closely divided between Labor
and Likud over key issues, as appears likely for at
least a year
Shamir's Strategy
Prime Minister Shamir is confident that his govern-
ment can take measures sufficient to suppress the
uprising and implement the government's initiative.
The initiative, in his view, helps defuse tensions with
the United States, and it appeals to the substantial
number of Israelis who are prepared to make conces-
sions if the Palestinians are prepared to forsake
violence. Shamir calculates that most Israelis regard
the status quo, however unpleasant, as better than the
alternative of giving up parts of the West Bank, which
he categorically opposes.
Nevertheless, Shamir is not immune to pressures for
change. Some of Likud's ambitious, younger leaders,
for example, realize that Israel will need to produce
suggestions of its own for the peace process that
eventually will have to go beyond the plan for elec-
tions the cabinet adopted in May. Shamir's continu-
ing concern about relations with the United States
and the views of the Israeli military leadership also
are pushing him to soften his position.
3
The International Conference
Although he continues to oppose direct negotiations
with the PLO, Shamir is willing to talk directly with
non-PLO Palestinians and Jordanians under super-
power auspices if the Soviet Union restores relations
with Israel. The conference thus would become an
umbrella for negotiations on limited autonomy. This
contrasts with the Arab view that the conference
should lead to a comprehensive peace and include the
possibility of a Palestinian state
The Israeli Initiative
The US decision in mid-December to open a dialogue
with the PLO upset most Israeli politicians and led to
the formulation of a four-point diplomatic initiative
which the Cabinet and the Knesset approved. The
most important part of the intiative is a two-stage
proposal:
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
1. "Free and democratic elections" among the Pales-
tinians in the West Bank and Gaza. These elections
will produce "interlocutors" for negotiations with (b)(3)
Israel on an interim period of limited self-government.
This interim period of no more than three years will
be a test of cooperation and coexistence between
Israelis and Palestinians.
2. Negotiations on the final settlement, in which
Israel will be prepared to discuss any option
presented.'
This cautious plan helps the Israelis:
� Counter international pressure on Israel and the
widespread impression that the PLO�but not
Israel�is ready to talk.
� Focus international attention on an Israeli initiative
that emphasizes an interim solution instead of a
comprehensive plan that would involve withdrawing
from occupied territory.
The other three points of the initiative are: reinforcing the Camp
David accords, solving the refugee problem through multinational
gotiations on peace with regional Arab countries.
-Seeret-
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
� Put the onus on the PLO and its followers in the
West Bank and Gaza. If they reject Israel's propos-
al, they are seen as obstructionist. If they accept
elections, they risk the formation of an alternate
leadership to the PLO
Palestinian Reaction
The PLO views Shamir's plan for elections and
limited autonomy as a pretext for continuing the
occupation, an attempt to dictate to the Palestinians
who should represent them in negotiations, a ploy to
create an Israeli-sanctioned non-PLO leadership, and
a substitute for a Palestinian state rather than a step
toward it. Nonetheless, the concept of elections was
included in the November 1988 resolution of the
Palestinian National Council and subseauently in the
PLO election proposal of May 1989
The cautious reaction of various Palestinians�
particularly those in the occupied territories�to the
Israeli initiative reflects, in part, the interest of many
West Bankers and Gazans in breaking the political
impasse and demonstrating that the uprising has
produced concrete movement toward eroding the Is-
raeli occupation. Moreover, Palestinians worry that, if
they appear intransigent by rejecting the idea of
elections, the United States might conclude that the
Palestinians had lost an opportunity for progress and
thus reduce US involvement in the peace process.
Some Palestinians also apparently want to trap Sha-
mir in his own plan. If the complex modalities sur-
rounding elections can be resolved and if elections can
then be held, these Palestinians calculate that Israel's
leaders will be forced to deal with the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people or face in-
creasing criticism and greater pressure for an interna-
tional conference
Israeli and Palestinian Conditions
Both sides have taken hardline positions with respect
to elections. These positions essentially are opening
moves in advance of the tough negotiations that lie
ahead:
� The Uprising and Israeli Withdrawal. Although not
spelled out in the initiative, Shamir said in March
that ending the uprising was a precondition for
holding elections. The coalition is undecided on this
issue. The Palestinians, however, will not trade a
scaling back of the uprising for a simple promise of
elections, especially because Israel is barring in
advance the idea of a Palestinian state. Moreover,
the Palestinians demand the withdrawal of Israeli (b)(3)
forces from at least some parts of the West Bank
and Gaza before the balloting. They argue that
elections under Israeli rule by definition would not
be free and democratic. Shamir has reiterated that
Israeli forces will not withdraw, even from major
population centers, before elections.
� Land for Peace and a Palestinian State. Although
there is a broad Israeli consensus for no return to
the pre-1967 borders, Shamir has often stressed that
Israel will not withdraw from any of the West Bank
and Gaza, "which we believe belong to us." The (b)(3)
Palestinians do not expect Israel to accept the idea
of Palestinian statehood immediately, but they insist
that this idea not be precluded at the start of
negotiations.
� Guarantees and Assurances. The Palestinian side
will want US assurances of a specific timetable for
prompt movement from agreement on interim ar-
rangements to final-status negotiations. The Israelis
worry that US involvement ultimately will lead to
pressure to accommodate Palestinian demands.
� The Role of East Jerusalem Arabs. This issue is
fundamental and critical for both Israelis and Pales-
tinians. The coalition is split: Shamir has said that
he opposes participation in elections by East Jerusa-
lem's 140,000 Palestinians, but Labor favors their
participation. The Palestinians insist on
participating.
(b)(3)
� Other Modalities. Difficult issues will include voter
eligibility, monitoring of elections, what offices can-
didates will run for, the role of those elected in
negotiating an interim arrangement with Israel, and
the link between interim arrangements and the
final-status negotiations. Likud and some Labor
ministers oppose international supervision of the
voting but not observation by foreign journalists,
4
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
eCI 0
politicians, or diplomats. Shamir and other govern-
ment officials have expressed a willingness to work
with the United States on "finalizing the details and
creating the conditions which can turn the initiative
into reality." He also seems to have ruled out as
candidates "overt" PLO members but not PLO
sympathizers
Shamir has expressed the hope of holding elections by
the end of 1989. We believe that this timetable is
optimistic. Its success would require considerable
softening of the government's positions on major
election issues. The PLO leadership, in turn, would
have to accept the concept that elections will validate
the role of Palestinians from the occupied territories,
and not those from the diaspora, in negotiations with
Israel on interim arrangements
The Possibility of Movement?
Despite the practical obstacles to implementing Israeli
proposals, the positions of neither side seem frozen:
� Israelis feel obliged to push ahead with the election
plan to recapture the diplomatic initiative, drive a
wedge between local Palestinians and the PLO, and
avoid alienating the United States. They are con-
vinced of the need for an alternative to the PLO's
insistence on an international conference leading to
an independent Palestinian state.
� The cautious reaction to elections by some Palestin-
ians�despite the rejection of Shamir's plan�re-
flects a longing by some for tangible results from
the uprising and a "breakthrough" with the United
States and Israel.
For the first time in over 40 years of conflict,
Palestinians and Israelis are debating within their
own communities over the same issues: elections and
interim arrangements. Although neither side can be
sure how its positions will evolve, these controversial
issues will be the major fors of attention over the
next yearl
The Crackdown on the Uprising
Shamir promises firm measures to demonstrate to the
Palestinians that violence is not a substitute for
negotiations. Likud hopes that Israel's superior power
5
Figure 4. West Bank confrontation
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
will wear down the uprising over time and gradually
reduce the pressure on Israel to make concessions. (b)(3)
The government's methods will include greater use of
economic pressure, selective deportations, arrests and
detentions, and continued demolition of houses. Al-
though some government officials assert publicly that
Israel's vigorous tactics are already wearing down the
uprising, most believe they are in a long war of
attrition whose cost can be borne indefinitely (b)(3)
Vigilantism by Israeli settlers is increasing. A minor-
ity has organized its own militias. Settlers have
become more frightened and less conciliatory because
of the growing perception that the Israel Defense
Forces are not committed to ensuring settler security.
Clashes between settlers and Israeli soldiers, settlers
and Palestinians, and settler provocations also are
likely to increase. Moreover, ideologically nationalis-
tic settlers will step up their activities if progress is
made toward a settlement.
Palestinian Perspectives on Key Issues
(b)(3)3)
Palestinians believe the uprising has forced Israel, the
Arab governments, and the United States to confront
the Palestinian national movement for the first time.
West Bank and Gaza residents believe it has trans- (b)(3)
formed the Palestinians into the agents of their own
destiny. Palestinians demand that the uprising lead to
tangible results that will end the Israeli occupation
-fiesmet_
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Figure 5
Israeli Settler Population
Total Estimated Israeli Settler Population
Thousands
200
150
100
50
0 Labor Likud National
pre-1977 1977-84 Unity
1984-85
Government in power
Jewish Population
Thousands
125
75
25
1982
East
Jerusalem
West Bank
� Golan Heights
I Gaza Strip
84 86 88
Since 1982, Israel has established 56 new settlements in
the West Bank, 3 in the Golan Heights, 5 in the Gaza
Strip, and 2 in East Jerusalem. Settler population has in-
creased by 89,000, half in the West Bank, for an estimated
total of 187,000 in all the occupied territories.
and eventually establish a Palestinian state. This
demand produces both anxiety that the uprising may
fail to achieve its objectives and determination not to
lose opportunities for progress. Although economic
hardships have increased, these problems are unlikely
to cause a reduction of the disorders or make West
Bank and Gaza Palestinians more likely to accept the
Israeli initiative for local elections
The uprising and the changing international environ-
ment have heightened PLO confidence in its ability to
negotiate with Israel and to achieve a Palestinian
322358 6-89 (b)(3)
state. Growing Soviet activism in the region and
improving US-Soviet relations also have encouraged
the PLO. Most Palestinians have replaced the PLO's
old idea of a secular, democratic state of Palestine
(incorporating Israel and the occupied territories) with
the concept of a two-state solution
(b)(3)
PLO�West Bank Relations (b)(3)
The symbiotic relationship between the PLO and the
Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories will
continue. The PLO realizes that the uprising has
6
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
'Secret�
Figure 6
Significant Acts of Settler Violence During the Palestinian
Uprising in the West Bank, December 1987-April 1989
Number of incidents
25
20
15
10
D J
1987 1988
J J ASO N
D J F
1989
M A
Physical
attacks,
shootings
Demonstrations,
stonings
Vandalism,
arson
shifted attention and power in the Palestinian move-
ment from the more prominent diaspora personal-
ities�the "outsiders"�to underground, new lead-
ers�the "insiders"�in the West Bank and Gaza.
Nevertheless, both insiders and outsiders have their
own legitimacy: the insiders through their role in the
uprising and the outsiders through their recognition
among Palestinians as authentic representatives. The
insiders, who�along with PLO proxies�make up the
"Unified National Leadership of the Uprising," are
autonomous but are prepared to let the PLO handle
the diplomatic arena, where the Israelis keep the
insiders from operating
Insiders will not blindly take orders from the PLO,
but they will listen to it. Although insider leaders have
given a mandate to the PLO, the insiders can exercise
restrictive and "corrective" influence. Discussions be-
tween the groups, therefore, will remain a two-way
street. PLO leaders, for their part, are confident that
7
9�'89 (b)(3)
the insiders will remain loyal to the PLO, but they are
listening closely to insider demands. Contacts between
the two groups will be carefully maintained (b)(3)
Israeli pressure and PLO intimidation will prevent a
dominant indigenous leadership, capable of carrying
out a sophisticated political program, from emerging
in the occupied territories over the next year. The
uprising, however, has produced a leadership capable
of organizing strikes and demonstrations. These new
leaders tend to be young and well educated. They do
not look to outsiders�including the PLO�for inspi-
ration
(IP)))
Insiders and outsiders agree that a political settlement
has to be reached, that concessions will have to be
made, and that direct negotiations with the Israeli
Government will be required. Both believe that interim
Approved for for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Figure 7
Palestinians Killed as Suspected Collaborators,
December 1987-May 1989
Number of deaths
15
10
5
0
0
El
7
0
0
0
0
ri
0
D
J
F
M
A
MJ
J A S 0 ND J F M AM
1987 1988
1989
arrangements are acceptable only if they are part of a
plan to reach a comprehensive solution. Both Palestin-
ian camps also agree that the sorts of interim mea-
sures the Israelis are talking about are an unaccept-
able Israeli ploy to ward off the pressure generated by
the uprising.
The US-PLO Dialogue and Future Concessions
Doubt is likely to increase among Palestinian leaders
over the utility of the dialogue with the United States.
Such doubts, however, probably will not become
critical this year. PLO leaders are jubilant over the
US decision to open a dialogue. Despite their com-
plaints, they are pleased that the dialogue has gone
beyond focusing on terrorism, and they hope that the
United States will exert pressure on Israel. The extent
of further PLO concessions will depend on favorable
US or Israeli reactions to the PLO's actions to date
and on Arafat's ability to dominate his rejectionist
opponents. We believe he probably will continue to
dominate PLO decisionmaking
Policy Changes and Steps Toward Moderation
The challenge Arafat faces in coming months will be
to strengthen those moderate Palestinian elements
that accept coexistence with Israel. The PLO will also
need to improve its diplomatic and public relations
322360 6_80)(3)
skills to maintain the movement toward moderation so
that the PLO can ultimately become a participant in
negotiations. Such negotiations will not occur during
the coming year, but we expect the PLO to hold to its
moderate course
PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat is in a strong position.
His priorities are to keep the Palestinian movement
relatively unified and to remain its leader. He is a
pragmatist and proven survivor who has reacted to the
uprising by lining up with the more pragmatic Pales-
tinians living under Israeli occupation and not with
the hardline ideologues in the diaspora
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
By directly addressing an American audience through
its actions in recent months, the PLO hopes that it has
prepared the way for an active US role in the
settlement process. This orientation reflects the PLO's
hope that the United States will try to change Israel's
position or, by virtue of its dialogue with the PLO,
that it will help to break open the political debate in (b)(3)
Israel on dealing with the Palestinians (b)(3)
The dialogue with the United States helps Arafat and
is a key element in his efforts to gain international
8
Approved for Release 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
�43-eefet
Figure 8. "242�Count 'em.'
recognition. He uses it to consolidate his dominant
position in the PLO and to cope with PLO hardliners,
especially fundamentalists. The fundamentalists will
become a serious problem if local leaders of the
uprising and the PLO fail to make progress toward a
settlement. The dialogue also has encouraged Pales-
tinians to think that talks with Israelis and the United
States on transnational arrangements and election
modalities are likely within the next several months.
PLO Positions
Decisions of the Palestine National Council late last
year and subsequent PLO statements and interviews
give insights into the PLO's posture in coming months
on key issues in the peace process:
� The PLO is aware that the peace process will
require time and confidence-building measures.
Therefore, it will consider arrangements for autono-
my during a transitional period, but only if they are
closely linked to a comprehensive settlement that, at
a minimum, will not preclude a Palestinian state.
The PLO is prepared to exhibit flexibility on proce-
dures and modalities if it is represented at the
negotiating table. To obtain that representation,
Arafat, for example, probably would be prepared to
revise the Palestinian National Covenant considera-
bly beyond his recent characterization in Paris of its
reference to the single, democratic, secular state of
Palestine as having "lapsed."
� PLO leaders believe that an international confer-
ence eventually will be necessary to forge a coalition
in its favor that is strong enough to compensate for
9
its lack of leverage on Israel. The conference will
require careful preparation. It could be merely a
ratifying mechanism for agreements reached in
other forums.
� The PLO is eager for direct talks with Israeli
officials, but it realizes that Israel will need time to
accustom itself to talking with the PLO.
� Because the uprising provides the PLO's only lever-
age on Israel, the PLO will make no commitment to
stop it before negotiations begin. We believe that
the PLO could not halt the uprising altogether. The
PLO, however, could increase or decrease the scale
of the disorders, depending on how well preliminary
negotiations were going.
(b)(3)
� The PLO will reject Israeli proposals for non-PLO
negotiators. Its delegation, however, would include
representatives from the occupied territories. (b)(3)
Violence and Terrorism
Actions by Syria and Palestinian splinter groups in
particular, and by Libya and Iran to a lesser degree,
will play a central role in the future of the US-PLO
dialogue. All have a major interest in the collapse of (b)(3)
the dialogue and will try to undermine it, especially if
they see movement toward a solution that ignores
their interests. Many extremist non-PLO Palestinian
organizations�Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary
Council, Abu Musa's Fatah Uprising faction, and
Ahmad Jabril's Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine�General Council (PFLP-GC)�will try to
stage terrorist actions both outside and inside Israel
and the occupied territories. The effect of these
incidents on the dialogue will depend on Arafat's
willingness to condemn them. Nevertheless, a success-
ful terrorist strike against an Israeli target would
generate strong reaction against the PLO regardless
of which groups were involved. (b)(3)
Hardliners within the PLO�especially the PFLP and
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP)�will continue to test the limits of Arafat's
prohibitions on terrorism. Their actions will include
continued infiltration of guerrillas into Israel from
southern Lebanon, which has become a focal point for
Shia fundamentalism and radical Palestinian activity
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
-Sercret--
continued violence against Israeli soldiers and civilians
in the occupied territories as evidence that the PLO has
not abandoned terrorism. (b)(3)
\\ `�
_\\
\s\
�.\\\
tgR�4
Figure 9. Israeli view
directed against the Israelis and their Lebanese allies.
At least for the near term, Arafat probably will be
able to prevent PLO groups from launching attacks
outside Israel and the occupied territories
Continued violence will be accompanied by disputes
between the United States and Israel over the defini-
tion of terrorism and whether PLO elements played a
role in a particular incident. For many Israelis, Arafat
is ultimately responsible for all acts of violence by
Palestinians, which the Israelis lump together as
terrorism. For the United States, however, the identi-
ty of the perpetrators will often be difficult to deter-
mine and responsibility hard to pin down.
Radical Palestinians will seek to assassinate PLO
moderates as "traitors." We also do not rule out the
possibility of additional Israeli assassination opera-
tions. Arafat thus is a real target of assassins, and the
risk to him has increased considerably. His death
would cause a power struggle in the PLO, but it would
not reduce pressure from Palestinians to pursue a
moderate course. The decisions to change PLO policy
made late last year were not Arafat's alone. Thus his
closest associates in Fatah and at the top of the PLO
hierarchy could be expected to maintain Dresent
policies, at least for the next year.
Israeli Reaction
Israeli officials have strongly attacked the PLO's
actions since mid-November as an effort to legitimize
terrorism and an exercise in disinformation designed
to appeal to the United States. Israelis will continue to
reject the PLO as a interlocutor even as its rhetoric
changes. Moreover, some Israeli leaders will point to
-43e.Fet�
Underlying this view is the Israeli fear that the PLO's
ongoing "peace offensive" will lead to the integration
of the PLO into the negotiating process. The Israelis
see the PLO's dialogue with the United States as the
first step in a process that will lead most Western
countries to upgrade relations with the PLO and to
exert heavy pressure on Israel to negotiate with the
PLO
(b)(3)
Next Steps
International organizations will remain an important (b)(3)
arena for a PLO campaign in coming months. This
campaign will keep PLO-related issues at the forefront
of deliberations in international organizations, in gen-
eral, and the United Nations in particular. The PLO
will try to obtain financial aid and other tokens of (b)(3)
recognition if it fails to win membership for the state of
"Palestine" in specialized UN agencies (b)(3)
The Soviet Union and the Peace Process
Moscow's efforts to expand relations with Israel and
key Arab states are intended to secure equal status for
the USSR with the United States in the peace process.
The Soviets also aim to stop successful US or Israeli (b)(3)
bilateral negotiations with Palestinians or Arab states.
The Soviets will work diligently over the next year to
demonstrate to the Bush administration that Soviet ar-
ticipation in Arab-Israeli negotiations is necessar (b)(3)
International Peace Conferences
To ensure Soviet involvement, Moscow focuses on
convening an international conference to settle the
Arab-Israeli dispute. The Soviets are blurring their
previous insistence that the conference must have full
decisionmaking authority by suggesting that it merely
provide the "proper environment" for negotiations.
The Soviets still oppose a conference designed solely (b)(3)
to bless US-brokered bilateral deals between Arabs
and Israelis. Moscow will continue to show flexibility
on the details of a conference to ensure its inclusion in
the process. Moscow also is likely to accept a super-
power conference cosponsored by the United States
10
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
"aerefet--___
and the USSR with any combination of Arab repre-
sentatives and Israel. To demonstrate Moscow's
importance to the process, the Soviets
will work to modify baseline
Syrian and PLO demands. Soviet ability to deliver
Syria, however, is highly questionable. Damascus is
not responsive to Soviet nressiire when major Syrian
interests are at stak
Israel
Moscow's moves toward reestablishment of relations
with Israel are designed to correct the admitted
mistake of severing official ties in 1967, which left the
USSR unable to deal with one of the key players in
the peace process. For the near term, Moscow will be
satisfied with its present level of contacts with Israel.
The exchanges of consular delegations, cultural and
economic visits, and tourism allow the Soviets to
claim that they have normal contacts with Israel. The
lack of movement toward a peace conference, coupled
with Israel's apparent willingness to maintain these
low-level contacts, has taken the pressure off Moscow
to reestablish relations immediately. The Soviets,
however, will encourage East European states to
reestablish relations with Israel. If the Soviets believe
the peace process is moving forward without them�
an unlikely event this year�they will find a way to
finesse their preconditions and resume relations to
underscore their relevance to the process.
Palestinians
Just as Moscow is pressing leaders of Arab states to
adopt a unified position, it seeks to achieve Palestinian
unity. The Soviets exerted pressue on the PLO for
moderation and concessions last year and will contin-
ue to support Arafat's moderate course. Arafat, for
his part, is reassured by renewed Soviet support for
his leadership and by Soviet pressure on hardline
Palestinian elements to support his policies
Moscow's Strategy Toward the United States
The Soviets remain concerned that the United States
is not convinced of the need for Soviet participation in
the peace process. Therefore, they will press the
United States harder to set forth its own comparable
basis for further dialogue with Moscow and to indi-
cate how Moscow will be included and how Washing-
ton intends to deal with the Shamir government on
11
key issues. In return for having influenced the PLO's
evolution toward moderation and because of their
strong ties to many Arab states, Moscow will continue
to argue that it is an indispensable player in the peace
process.' (b)(3)
Implications for the United States
The pace of activity surrounding the Arab-Israeli
conflict has accelerated since the US decision in
December 1988 to open a dialogue with the PLO. In
anticipation of renewed US involvement, Arab and
Israeli leaders�over the next year�will continue to
struggle to control the terms of reference for the peace
process, gain the diplomatic initiative, and dominate
the public relations battle. They will want to shape the
Bush administration's approach to the Middle East.
The Pressure of Events
The Arab-Israeli conflict affects so many US interests
that it will tend to force itself on the US agenda.
Nurturing US-Israeli relations, warming the "cold"
peace between Israel and Egypt, and shoring up
Jordan, for example, will ensure a continuing focus of
attention on Arab-Israeli issues:
� Dealing with developments in the Middle East�the
uprising, changes in Israeli and Palestinian policies
and terrorism, for example�is likely to require
preparation either for sustained engagement, if that
is deemed appropriate, or for effective crisis
management.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
� Friendly Arab leaders will continue to appeal for
US involvement. They view the Arab-Israeli conflict
as the principal threat to regional stability. They
worry, however, that the United States will be too (b)(3)
preoccupied with other issues and too tied to Israel
to commit itself to the difficult process of making
peace.
' Soviet policy toward the region will be examined in more detail in
the forthcoming Estimate NIE 11/30-89, Soviet Policy Toward the
Middle East. (s NF)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
� Both Palestinians and Israelis look to the United
States. For the Arabs, only the United States can
pressure Israel to reach an agreement. For the
Israelis, the United States is both Israel's shield
against such pressure and the potential source of it.
� The Soviets will continue to press for a dialogue
with the United States in coming months on surer-
power cooperation in reaching a settlement
The Changing Situation
Dramatic changes in the political environment sur-
rounding the peace process have occurred over the
past 18 months
The Uprising. The Palestinian uprising in the West
Bank and Gaza shows no signs of ending. It is
sustainable at present levels by the Palestinians and
tolerable to the Israelis. Nonetheless, it is forcing both
sides to reassess how they deal with each othe
Jordan's Disengagement. King Husayn has made
clear, as recently as his visit to the United States in
April 1989, that Jordan will not play a central role in
the peace process at this time. The King has given a
qualified endorsement of the idea of elections in the
West Bank and Gaza, but only in the context of a
process leading to negotiations on the final status of
the occupied territorie
Palestinian Movement Toward Moderation. Despite
differences in emphasis between the inhabitants of the
West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian diaspora,
the leadership of the Palestinian movement has
reached a consensus in favor of recognition of Israel,
acceptance of UN Resolution 242, and renunciation
of terrorism. It wants direct negotiations with the
Israeli Government and is prepared to accept interim
steps, including autonomy, as long as they are tightly
linked to reaching a final settlement. Moderate Pales-
tinians, however, worry that the mood among activists
in the occupied territories will turn more violent if the
PLO's efforts toward accommodating Israel and the
United States produce movement toward a com-
prehensive settlement
Shifting Israeli Views. The uprising has intensified
the political debate in Israel over territorial compro-
mise, dealing with the Palestinians, and coping with
the violence in the occupied territories. The US
dialogue with the PLO has increased pressure on the
Israeli Government to counter the perception that the
PLO�but not Israel�is ready to talk
(b)(3)
Opportunities and Threats for the United States (b)(3)
Although progress is not ensured, developments in the
last year have created new opportunities in the peace
process:
� Instead of waiting for others (Arab countries, the (b)(3
United States, the USSR) to solve Palestinian prob-
lems, the Palestinians themselves have taken the
intiative and have shown that they will revise long-
held positions to find a solution.
� For the first time in 10 years, Israel's Likud bloc (b)(3
and Labor Party have agreed�reluctantly�on a
framework for peace negotiations.
� The PLO has consolidated its control over major
sectors of the Palestinian movement, both inside and
outside the occupied territories.
� The Soviets have shown a willingness to play a more
constructive role
We believe the opportunities will not remain beyond
one year. Divisions within the Palestinian movement
and the Israeli Government are likely to deepen,
leading to an inability on both sides to make further
concessions and possibly a retraction of current offers
if there is no progress. Such a deterioration of the
situation is likely without significant outside involve-
ment to encourage compromise by Israelis and Pales-
tinians
At the same time, traditional US concerns in the
Middle East seem less acute this year:
� The cease-fire last summer has reduced the risk that
the Iran-Iraq conflict will spill over to other states.
12
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 006124202
teL
� Unlike the period 1973-79, US policy in the Middle
East will not be conducted, for at least the next
year, under the threat of oil shortages and dramati-
cally higher prices.
� Islamic fundamentalism has not swept through the
Middle East.
� "Cold war" tensions are at a low ebb
The Near Term. In our judgment, US interests will
not be directly or immediately threatened if there is
no progress in the peace process over the next year:
� No peace process has been under way for 10 years.
The absence of negotiations for another year will
not increase the chance of war.
� The United States and its allies will not face a
cutoff of oil if nothing happens in the peace process.
� The United States will not face a major terrorist
threat because of the absence of negotiations. Ter-
rorist actions, however, are likely to increase as a
way for hardliners to sabotage developments that
look promising.
US interests would be threatened in the near term in
several unlikely scenarios: for example, significantly
greater use of firearms by Palestinians, massive Israeli
military repression of the uprising, annexation of the
West Bank and Gaza, or major terrorist attacks on holy
religious sites. In such circumstances, we would expect
Arab governments to pressure the United
13
States to restrain Israel�in some cases by threaten-
ing to act against US interests elswhere. Jordan�
where Palestinians are the majority�would become
especially vulnerable. A strong Palestinian reaction
there would seriously threaten King Husayn. We
would also anticipate a substantial increase in inter-
national terrorism directed against US citizens and
property
The Longer Term. We believe that a lack of move-
ment in the peace process over the next two to three
years will lead to more violence in the occupied
territories, increased terrorism, and greater pressure
from Arab states on the United States. Some activi-
ties that would lead to this include:
� A decision by the Israeli Government to use much
greater force to try to quell the uprising.
� A judgment by Palestinians and other Arabs that
the uprising and the PLO's moderate course are not
leading to an acceptable solution. This failure will
breed popular resentment and frustration and
strengthen hardliners within the Palesinian move-
ment and Islamic fundamentalists. As a result,
violence in the occupied territories and terrorism
against Israel and the United States would increase.
-secze&
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 006124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 006124202
.Seerer
Annex
Principal Arab Actors
Syria.
President Assad insists on Israeli withdrawal from the
Golan Heights and intimate Syrian involvement in the
settlement process. He follows a two-track policy: (1)
demand for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied
territories and the establishment of a Palestinian
state; 2 establishment of "strategic parity" vis-a-vis
Israel
Palestinians. The vast majority of Syria's 320,000
Palestinians reject Assad's claim to speak for them
and regard the PLO as their rightful representative.
This has no effect on Assad's policy toward the peace
process. The bitter personal antipathy between Assad
and Arafat that has persisted for six years will
continue
The "Spoiler" Role. Through terrorism and assassi-
nation, manipulation of various Palestinian factions,
and perhaps military moves Assad will cause major
problems if his interests are ignored and if Arafat
seems to be moving toward a separate deal with
Israel. Therefore, excluding Damascus from delibera-
tions that have a direct impact on Syrian interests will
be risky.
Assad provides a home to two hardline components of
the PLO�the PFLP and the DFLP�and to more
radical rejectionists (the PFLP-GC and Abu Musa,
for example) who share Syria's opposition to negotia-
tions with Israel. In coming months the radicals are
likely to stage terrorist actions to stop the US-PLO
dialogue, undermine or assassinate Arafat and block
further evolution toward moderation
The Soviet Union. The Soviets supply Syria with
high-technology weaponry to maintain Moscow's
most important access to the Middle East. Neverthe-
less, the Soviets are unhappy with Syria's poor perfor-
mance in repaying its huge debt, its efforts to domi-
nate the Palestinian movement, and its
confrontational approach to Arab-Israeli issues. The
Syrians are displeased by Moscow's refusal to support
"strategic parity," support of PLO moderation and
moves to improve relations with Israel.
15
The United States. Opportunities for moderating Syr-
ian actions are likely to arise only in those areas
where Syrian and US objectives coincide: resolution
of territorial claims between Israel and its neighbors
and stabilization in Lebanon, where Assad's policy is
financially and politically burdensome
Egypt
Egypt as a Bridge. President Mubarak calculates that
Egypt is well positioned to serve as a diplomatic
bridge between Israel and the Arab world and will
continue to counsel the PLO toward moderation and
to encourage a PLO-Jordanian rapprochement. He is
counting on movement in the peace process to help
shore up support for his government at home and
abroad as he tackles difficult domestic challenges.
The United States. Mubarak is convinced that the
immediate and continuing engagement of the United
States is essential to make progress toward peace.
Therefore, he will continue to try to persuade the
Bush administration that only the United States can
offer hope for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, as
he did during his Washington visit in April 1989.
Equally important for Egypt, movement toward a
settlement under US aegis will vindicate Egypt's
treaty with Israel and its Cairo's relationship with the
United States
Mubarak 's Opponents. Israeli efforts to suppress the
uprising and the absence of an ongoing peace process
have the potential to strengthen Mubarak's oppo-
nents. A deteriorating situation would offer them a
major point of attack on a regime overburdened by
economic problems. But his diplomatic efforts on
behalf of the PLO have helped to neutralize much of
the internal opposition to date. The Egyptian opposi-
tion will continue to seize on Israeli actions against
the uprising to try to force Mubarak to cool the
relationship with Israel
Sectea_
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 006124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Mubarak, however, realizes that correct relations
with Israel are essential to preserving access to US aid
and resolving bilateral issues with Israel. At the same
time, he wants to keep Egypt's ties to the United
States, Israel, and the Arab world in balance and to
avoid another period of estrangement from his Arab
brethrer
Jordan
King Husayn's decision in July 1988 to pull back from
West Bank affairs reflected a need to shore up his
East Bank base, concern that the uprising might
spread to Jordan, an effort to combat the argument
that Jordan should be the Palestine state, and ack-
nowledgement of his loss of influence in the West
Bank. The King's posture is clear:
� Measured by the steps he has taken in recent
months, the King means business. He knows that he
cannot dominate the Palestinian issue and that he
retains neither admiration nor support in the West
Bank and Gaza.
� Dispite his difficulties with Arafat, the King also
recognizes the PLO as the legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people and has promised to work
closely with it. Although Jordan has not ruled out a
joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to an interna-
tional conference or eventual confederation of a
Palestinian state with Jordan, Amman is much less
enthusiastic about either than in the past.
� Riots in Jordan in April 1989 have further discour-
aged the King from an active policy and focused his
attention on domestic economic and political needs.
Iraq
Baghdad's primary focus over the next year will not
be the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead, its preoccupation
with Iran will continue as it tries to force Tehran into
an "acceptable" peace treaty and attempts to counter
Iranian moves elsewhere.
Iraq will revert to the active role on the Arab stage
that it played before its invasion of Iran in 1980. In
particular, it will look for ways�short of hostilities�
to take revenge on Syria for its wartime support of
Iran.
Supplying arms to anti-Syrian factions in Lebanon�
possibly including FROG rockets to the Christians�
is a preview of what can be expected as Iraq tries to
thwart Syrian and Iranian objectives there. It will also
continue to use terrorism and support for Syrian
opposition groups as part of its campaign to oust
President Hafiz al-Assad. It may try to undercut
Syrian influence with economically hard-pressed Jor-
dan by offering Amman modest military and financial
aid
Iraq will be interested in joining forces with Egypt,
Jordan, and the PLO to isolate Damascus further,
"strengthen" the Arab front against Israel, and exert
influence on the PLO. Baghdad, however, will support
a settlement of the Palestinian issue that meets the
requirements of mainstream Palestinian groups
16
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
34 35
Israel
International boundary
District (megoz) boundary
* National capital
9 District (megoz) center
Railroad
Divided highway
Other road
0 40 Kilometers
I I I,
The 1950 Israeli proclamation
that Jerusalem be the national
capital is not recognized by the
United States Government.
32 . _
31
�1-
Bi'r Hasanah, 6
Nakhl
Boundary rapras�ntation is,
not nen aaaaa authordattvin
40 Miles
Mediterranean Sea
GAZA STRIP
Osreoli occupied-
status td be determin
Khan Ye
Al 'A 'sh
rs.
Ashqelon
Ga
Bit Lahlger�-���,
*.`�-� Abe
`-,s'Ujaylah
-`-�(
..Ek\
Ousayno,�",
'Akko
Hai
Nub,
Tyre
_ollarjyya
- '
NORTHERN
Tiberias
, � LakeirAsti ��!' !Nazareth
;
;
Hader
Netanya�
CEN
Herzliyya
TEL AVIV
Tel Aviv-Yafo
..Bat Yam
411111
Ashdod
OV Oin141 -..,..14."........
ERUSA,LE'Sirenl:
! ! , ethle
Oiryai
Gat
�
-Est-
(Is, i 6cc
us to deter
abu
'1950
Armistice.
Line `
Hebro
,' 1949 Armistice -
Beersheba�
S 0 UT 1:3
Al Kuetilla
EG E
MOB
Bron
`/.
RN
mo'irr/'
Zefa'
Zin
b?),
i'yen 38
Li. pi Zone
na Outeyrirah
OLAN
IGHT�
risme?, 'I&
occupiedi r
0,64.
',bid
- - -33
Suwaydi'
a
Ai--
Magog
Jarash,�
(Al Karak \
:�Ac$ fi J 0
4re
Ma'in
lys:an aqb
Yotvet
flat
Gulf
of
Agclo:
AI Agabah
An Zaria"-
Al Oapanah
Al
Mudawwarah �
36
Bova
sh Shiny
DAN
, AI Jafr
32-
SAUDI
ARABIA
Base 801245 (A00853) 12-88 (b)(3)
17
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Sec! vt
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202
Approved for Release: 2019/12/11 C06124202