ISLAM IN IRAN

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• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2021
• Case Number: F-2018-00458
• Publication Date: March 1, 1980

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Islam in Iran
A Research Paper
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March 1980
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(b)(3)
National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
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Islam in Iran (u)
A Research Paper
Research for this report was completed
on 31 August 1979.
The author of this paper is Near
East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be
addressed to the Chief of the Division on
This paper has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations, the National Intel-
ligence Officer for Near East and South Asia, and the
Office of Scientific Intelligence.
51)er
A744
March 1980
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Contents
Page
Overview
Introduction
1
Part I: The Relations Between Islam and the Monarchy in Iran 5
The Anticlerical Impulse in Iran
6
The Shiite Establishment Versus the State 7
Brief History
7
Reza Shah and the Clergy 9
Mohammad Reza and the Clergy 11
The Shah's Approach 11
The Clergy's Interests 13
The Emergence of Khomeini 14
Government Efforts To Control the Clergy 17
Part II: The Fundamentals of Shia Islam 21
Origins of the Shia 21
Shiite Theology 24
The Clergy 25
The Setting 25
An Najaf 25
Qom 26
Mashhad and Others 28
Education 30
Curriculum 34
The Role of the Mujtahed 36
Shiite Law 38
The Shariah 38
The Koran 40
The Sunna and Hadith 41
The Law in Practice 42
Administration of Justice 42
The Role of Women 46
Marriage 48
Temporary Marriage 50
Observations on the Present 51
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spoirst
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A Different Voice�Ali Shariati and His Writings 53
Shariati's Life and Death 53
Shariati's Writings 55
Opposition to Shariati 60
Forgan and Ali Shariati 62
Part III: Major Shia Leaders 65
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 65
On War 67
On Punishment 67
On Medicine 67
Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari 67
Ayatollah Abol Qassem Khoi 69
Appendixes
A. The Meaning of Moharram 71
B. The Fedayan-e-Islam 73
Glossary 77
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Seere
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Islam in Iran (u)
Overview This paper describes Shia Islam as it has developed in Iran and as it is
practiced in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's theocracy.
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The experience with a modern government based entirely on Islam is too
brief to be definitive. One year out of nearly 13 centuries of Shia
development is inconsequential in a nation that has maintained a sense of
identity for more than two and a half milleniums. In addition, Khomeini's
vision of an Islamic Republic may not outlive him. What will outlive him,
however, is the role that any Iranian politician in the foreseeable future must
give to Islam as a major determinant of social, economic, and political
actions. This paper provides some background to understanding not only
what has happened but what may happen. (b)(3)
Several conclusions emerge. Islam is not and never was�except perhaps
under Muhammad�the unitary entity of Islamic theory. This theory,
however, remains the ideal, and most Muslims will argue, against history
and evidence, that Islam remains undivided. Some even argue that divisions
� � lam were both created and exacerbated by Western machinations
(b)(3)
The monarchy and Islam were the predominant forces in Iran for 13
centuries. Iran was defined more by its national heritage of culture and
literature glorifying the monarchy�the protector of the nation against
outside enemies�than by Islam. Other nations were Muslim but only Iran
had a shah. The choice in the 16th century of Shia Islam as the national
religion was a conscious effort to separate Iran from the predominantly
Sunni Arab world. V (b)(3)
Islam and the monarchy were always uneasy allies. Each demanded total
loyalty and each was authoritarian. Through the centuries the two
maintained a rough equivalence of power. Compromises were made, and
confrontations were usually, but not always, avoided. The monarch was
always a Muslim, or if he came in as a non-Muslim Turkish or Mongol
invader, he soon embraced Islam. The society was indisputably Muslim.
Although there were frequent periods of enmity between the religious and
civil establishments, the monarchy was not perceived as threatening Islam,
nor was Shia Islam perceived as out to abolish the monarchy. Until the 20th
century the government was the protector of religion, and the clerical
establishment provided the moral guidance for society and the teachers,
lawyers, and bureaucrats that made the government function. This rough
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equivalence of power between the two institutions seems now to be being
destroyed by the impact of European- and American-inspired moderniza-
tion
The European influence became significant in Iran only in the latter part of
the 19th century. Except for relatively small Christian missionary activities,
the European influence was predominantly secular. The economic, military,
and scientific achievement of the European states had a strong impact in
Iran, as in most of the Middle East. Iranian students, diplomats, and
officials returned to Iran with European concepts, philosophies, and often
Europeans themselves to try to modernize the corrupt, unwieldy, and
inefficient oriental bureaucracy that had developed through the centuries.
The clerical establishment was almost universally disapproving. What had
not already been provided for by Islam could only be harmful. European
influence prospered, however, and many proponents of modernization
became strongly anticlerical. European influence did not so much create
anticlericalism as confirm it, for Iran has always produced its share of
agnostics, atheists, and religious reformers. Early in the 20th century, a
brief coalition of secular reformers and religious leaders was directed
against the Shah, who was perceived by both groups�for different
reasons� to be detrimental to the nation. The result was the 1906
constitution, a document that until recently has had the allegiance of all,
although its European-style provisions and parliamentary system were often
ignored
When Reza Shah assumed the throne in 1925, he pushed a secular program
of modernization and industrialization. In the process he confronted the
clergy�as he did most problems�head-on, stripping it of its role as teacher
and judge, and bringing it under closer government scrutiny. During Reza
Shah's reign there were flurries of antigovernment activity by the clergy, but
he suppressed them. After Reza Shah's abdication in 1941 and the
assumption of the office by Muhammad Reza, the clergy regained some of
its stature. When the Shah took over full control of the government in the
early 1960s and started his reform programs, he again was firm with the
clergy, which had expressed opposition to such things as land reform and
women's suffrage.
After 1963 when the first serious clash occurred between supporters of the
clergy and the government, there was a virtual state of war between the two.
Although the government had the power, the clergy had the support of the
masses. The incompatibility of modern influences and a traditional society,
the growing gap between the generally well-to-do westernized elite and the
bulk of the population, and an unacceptable level of corruption, enabled the
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clergy to rally a significant portion of the urban proletariat to its side. The
Shah also made political blunders. He was unwilling to permit free political
participation, and he believed�without being challenged by his advisers�
that his programs had won the allegiance of the masses. In 1976 he thought
it expedient to lessen his control somewhat, but he was unprepared for the
upsurge in opposition activity. He was never able to reestablish control. The
opposition took full advantage of this exploitable weakness. In addition, the
illness from which he had been suffering for several years and the
medication he had been taking may have prevented him from making the
kind of difficult decisions that had been his hallmark for so many years
(b)(3) '
The replacement of the monarch by the theocrat has not solved Iran's
problems nor is it likely to do so. Islam is conceived by its adherents as a total
social, political, religious, and economic system. Whatever is good, right,
and correct has or can be subsumed under Islam. All else is not only
incorrect but evil. Shia Islam has also developed the theory espoused by
Khomeini of the "just jurisprudent," the man who because of his greater
knowledge of Islam, his piety, his ability to "enjoin that which is good and
forbid that which is evil" is the only person qualified to direct the nation. (b)(3)
Also included in this concept is the role of the clergy in general in directing
the nation's affairs. The ones best qualified to do this are the mujtaheds�
more lawyers than clergymen�who are experts in Islamic law. The man
(women are excluded) who attains the rank of mujtahed has been through
many decades of intensive and detailed but limited learning. His intellectual
horizons are generally circumscribed by the traditional nature of his
material and his sources. Mujtaheds have the right to make new
interpretations of new situations by using traditional material. The Shia
authorities argue that this keeps Islam continually relevant to the modern
world. In theory it does. In practice it appears to provide only the
opportunity to assert that what is new is unacceptable. Mujtaheds permit
people to drink soft drinks because they do not contain alcohol and no
prohibition of nonalcoholic drinks is found in the Koran. A mujtahed could
not rule against the veiling of women, because this is prescribed in the Koran
and no argument of equality of treatment, suitability, or change in
circumstances can prevail against the Koran. It is explicitly described or
defined in Islamic law�the Shariah�and is inviolate. If there is no
specificity, then the mujtahed must decide what is really meant, not 17
personal reasoning but by reference to the whole body of the Shariah. (b)(3)
A substantial number of nonclerical but devout Muslims have joined in
trying to help Khomeini build his Islamic government. Most of these are
caught between two worlds. They usually have a modern education, often
received abroad, but unlike the early Western- educated class, they have not
rejected traditional Islam. They try to reconcile the two worlds, not always
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successfully. Mixed with all this are the half-assimilated ideas of imperial-
ism and colonialism they have acquired from their doctrinaire Marxist
associates.
Ali Shariati, who died in 1977, was one such Western-educated writer who
attempted to show how Islam, properly understood, was compatible with and
could answer all the needs of the modern world. In the process he rejected
almost everything that was typical of Shia Islam for three centuries. He has
become the guide for many who profess to follow Khomeini, but Khomeini
himself seems never to have expressed an opinion on Shariati's ideas. The
two have several things in common�an insistence on political activism, the
reconciliation of Shia and Sunni Islam, and the role of Islam as the
dominant factor in Iranian society. Shariati is cited by some as the
inspiration for the Forqan terrorist group that has been responsible for the
murders of several clergymen and one general.
Khomeini is not unopposed by other clergymen, although at this point he is
unchallenged. One school of Shia thought�Ayatollah Kazem
Shariatmadari's for one�opposes the deep involvement of the clergy in
government. Government should be left to secular authorities, although
obviously the authorities should be good Muslims, follow religious princi-
ples, and be advised by clergymen. Direct involvement risks the very
existence of Islam because acceptance of responsibility also implies the
acceptance of blame for failure and this should be avoided. Shariatmadari as
a relative moderate in church-state relations got along with the Shah's
regime while Khomeini was challenging it. Both attitudes have good
precedent in the history of Shia Islam.
Shariatmadari received government funds a few years ago�as did other
clergymen. This has damaged his reputation in the past, but seems to have
little effect now. There is no indication that he performed specific services
for the money. His moderate attitude is his own and not bought. He may
have believed that government funds were his right as one of the country's
most prominent religious leaders
Iran's first president, Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, will now have an opportunity
to implement his Islamic economics. The Revolutionary Council dominated
by the clergy will continue to set high policy under the guidance of Ayatollah
Khomeini, and a parliament sometime in the future will be faced not with
legislating but with determining what regulations are necessary to
implement God's laws. Iran now faces the challenge of turning a
modernizing secular _government into a theocratic one without losing its
unique identity.
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Islam in Iran (u)
Introduction
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The trouble with you Americans is that you are
stupid. You do not understand Shia Islam and the way
we Iranian Muslims choose our leaders. . . . The
books that are published in the West about Islam are
mostly about Sunnis and most are blasphemous.
Ayatollah Mahmud Taleoni
January 1979
This paper attempts to understand and describe Shia
Islam as it is practiced in Iran, to comment on its goals,
and to suggest ways in which Iran will be affected by
Shia efforts to achieve these goals. Most Western
studies of Islam have dealt with the Sunnis, the
predominant sect in the Muslim world; Shiism, the
official religion of Iran, is generally treated tangen-
tially if at all. Many of the more devout Muslims share
Ayatollah Taleqani's opinion that most Western stud-
ies are blasphemous and that they intend to denigrate
Islam in order to render it ineffective as a challenge to
(b)(3) the West.
The sort of questioning, searches for influences, and
analysis that Western scholars indulge in are blasphe-
mous to a devout Muslim. For him the Koran, as
revealed to Muhammad by Allah, is a faithful copy of
the ideal work which exists in heaven. It was revealed
in Arabic and, according to the most conservative view,
no translation of the Koran is possible. If it is
translated, it is not the Koran, although the translation
may help the non-Arab understand the true Koran.
Likewise, the traditions and acts of the Prophet and the
laws derived from them are hardly less authoritative.
To believe otherwise is blasphemy.
(b)(3)
The popular uprising of 1977-78 that forced the Shah
from his throne represented the temporary coalescence
of two antithetical groups�the traditional clergy and
the secular modernizers (as represented by most of the
rejuvenated National Front). Their common bond was
opposition to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. For the
religious minded he represented the destruction of
1
Figure I. Unclassified �
The late Mahmud Talegani, supporter of
Khomeini and author of a well-known
Koran commentary
Islam; for the secular modernizers he represented
dictatorship and the repression of a free and open
political system. For the latter Islam is not a primary
motivation, but Shiism is a unique symbol of Iran�
one for all Iranians to rally around even while
pursuing essentially secular goals.
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The seeds of conflict were thus sown between those for
whom Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, or any
Khomeini-like figure, is only a symbol representing
Iran and those for whom he is a tangible authority
representing Islam.
(b)(3)
The fundamental differences between the two emerged
as soon as the Shah left Iran. The conflict between the
government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and
the komiteh system of Ayatollah Khomeini marked
the beginning of what will be a long struggle between
ret
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Figure 2.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
Unclassified �
two opposing philosophies of government. There will be
attempts to bridge the gap between the two�some
have already been undertaken�and there will be
periods of uneasy peace. The problem will not be
solved, however, until Shia Islam makes its peace with
the modern world. (b)(3)
For the devout Shiite, this is a nonexistent problem;
Islam as he construes it has the correct answer for any
problem, in any age. It is more a matter of bringing the
modern world into agreement with Islam. The Western
mind�conditioned by a long history of skepticism, the
rejection of absolutes, and the tolerance of a wide
range of aberrant social and personal behavior�is
uneasy with a religio-legal system that seems to leave
little room for compromise or for due process in the
Western sense. But the tenets of Islam are not the work
of man but of God, and His work is not subject to
question. The uncertainties, divisiveness, agnosticism,
and self-indulgence of Western culture most evident to
the devout Shiite contrast sharply with the stability
and certainty promised by the strict application of
Koranic law.
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Islam is better understood as an all-encompassing
ideology than as a religion in the Western sense. There
is not even a suitable word in Arabic, Persian, or other
Islamic languages for "temporal" or "secular." 'This
paper refers to Islam in the all-encompassing sense as
well as the more restricted sense, for Muslims them-
selves do not make the distinction. Making contracts,
paring nails, and prayer are all religious acts.
Islam is the last revealed religion, completing and
perfecting Judaism and Christianity. One Muslim
scholar wrote that "Judaism is based on the fear of
God, Christianity on the love of Him, and Islam on the
knowledge of Him." 2
Islam is the last religion in the cycle of prophecy that
began with Adam and proceeded through Abraham
and Christ to Muhammad.
For nearly a thousand years Islam was virtually
unchallenged militarily, economically, and intellectu-
ally. The borders controlled by Islam fluctuated on the
periphery, but little that Islam won in its centuries of
expansion was lost. The last three centuries and
especially the last century and a half brought a
challenge from Europe with which traditional Islam
was unable to cope economically or militarily. The
detailed reasons for the European rise and Muslim
decline are beyond the scope of this paper, but include
the Renaissance, the Industrial Revolution, the rise of
scientific thought, the formalism and inflexibility of
Islamic thought after its great period, the lack of
innovation, and political divisiveness.'
Whatever the reasons for the disparity that arose
between Christian and Muslim civilizations, many in
the Muslim world came to see their traditional culture
as inadequate to deal with the world that Europe had
created. The success of European arms, industry and
commerce, and scientific progress were taken as
self-evident proof of this. The challenge could only be
met, many in the East argued, by adopting those
things�material and mental�that had made Europe
Seyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of Islam (New York:
Praeger 1967), P. 3. (u)
ibid, p. 34. (u)
This is oversimplified, but see Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The
Ventures of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974),
3 volumes, for masterful but in many ways idiosyncratic treatment
of these points. Other treatments are in Richard Frye (ED), Islam
and the West (S. Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1957) and Norman
Daniel, Islam and the West; The Making of an Image (Edinburgh:
The University Press, 1962). (u)
2
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,et(t
great. In doing this, Islam lost the opportunity to
develop its own path to modernization. Now, the
apparent decline of European (and American) power,
moral collapse, and economic disarray as seen from an
Islamic perspective have aroused the expectation of
some in the Muslim world that Islam can once more
assert itself. This expectation has not yet turned into a
mass movement, and most Muslim governments are
not prepared to revert to the traditional practices that
the fundamentalists would like. Spokesmen for a
rejuvenated Islam are becoming more vocal, but the
trend appears to be more toward a renewal than to a
conscious attempt to adapt Islam to a world it did not
make.
(b)(3)
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Islam in in Iran (u)
Part I: The Relations Between
Islam and the Monarchy in Iran
The revolution in Iran is the most conspicuous example
of an "Islamic resurgence." It is too early to know if
recent developments mark a genuine long-term return
to Islam or are merely a temporary setback in the
general trend toward complete secularization. There
seems little doubt, however, that religious consider-
ations will play more of a role in government actions
and policies in the foreseeable future than they have
(b)(3) for the last half century
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The religion of Islam and the institution of the Persian
monarchy have been the two predominant forces in
Iran for 13 centuries. The former established its
position around the year 641, when Arab Muslim
armies defeated the last of the Sassanian shahs and
Islam replaced Zoroastrianism as the dominant reli-
gion in Iran. The latter dates from the 6th century B.C.
when the first of the Persian shahs appeared in history.
The two have sometimes worked closely together, but
at other times�especially in the last two centuries�
have been at swords' points. Until recently, neither has
been able to completely suppress the other. The
importance of both institutions was recognized by the
1906 Constitution, which attempted with indifferent
success to spell out roles not only for the monarchy and
religion but also for a new institution�a parliamen-
tary government independent of both. The subordina-
tion of the government to the monarchy for most of the
last 73 years indicates how shallow the roots of
parliamentary government have been. The idea of
parliamentary government continues to be strong,
however, among important segments of the educated
population. But the idea continues to draw its inspira-
tion from Western models and is essentially secular.
The religious institution can be no more comfortable
with an independent parliamentary government than it
has been with the monarchy.
Today's opportunistic alliance between the secular
nationalists and the clergy parallels the alliance of
1906. Both then and today the coalition was directed
5
against the monarchy rather than for any commonly
shared set of beliefs.' The antagonism between Islam
and the monarchy arises as much from their
similarities as their differences. Shia Islam demands
total allegiance as does the monarchy and both are
autocratic. Religious leaders have differed over the
proper relation between church and state. In its most
extreme form, Shiism challenges any form of secular
government and insists that the clergy is the only
legitimate arbiter of politics and society as well as
reli ion. This is the dominant school of thought today.
(b)(3)
Monarchy and Islam over the centuries have main-
tained an equilibrium and together have formed the
base on which Iran has rested. Each in its own way was
an expression of Iranian identity which served even in
times of great turmoil and disruption as joint symbols
of Iran�as something unique that distinguished Iran
from its neighbors as well as its conquerors. Most of
Iran's conquerors acquired legitimacy by becoming
both Muslim and monarchs in the Iranian tradition.
(b)(3)
The rough equivalence of the power position of the two
institutions may now be disappearing, although it may
be years before this becomes clear. If this is the case,
Iran's future�perhaps its very existence as a unitary
state�will be questioned. This traditional relationship
is upset by the influence of modernization, that
aggregation of technologies, organizations, modes of
thought�including ideologies�and education that
originated in Europe and the United States and that
has challenged traditional ways worldwide
(b)(3)
Modernization in the early part of this century was the
goal of many intellectuals who used it as a weapon
against the reactionary Qajar monarchy. The Pahlavi
' A discussion of the chances for a parliamentary government to
emerge as a powerful, independent institution drawing its inspiration
from Iranian experience and history is beyond the scope of this
paper. Tentatively, I would suggest this will not happen within the
next generation, although there may be short periods when
parliamentary government predominates by default. (u)
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Dynasty embraced modernization as its major goal but
failed to permit the sort of political participation that
would have provided a broad popular base for its
programs. This political failure threw into opposition
many intellectuals whose essential goals were the same
as the Pahlavis, but who could not accept the monarch
as the leader of this endeavor. But the secular-minded
modernizers are as uneasy with clerical domination as
-vith that of the Shah.
(b)(3)
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The Anticlerical Impulse in Iran
Some modernizers have almost uncritically accepted
Westernization; some have been strong critics of the
West. In both cases anticlericalism has often been
present. Many intellectuals of the past have considered
Islam to be a barrier to the sort of changes that Iran
needed to make if it intended to become a modern
state. Others have considered the clerical establish-
ment itself to be the major culprit in keeping Iran
backward.
The influence of anticlericalism should not be underes-
timated. Most members of the intelligentsia in the past
have shared it. A century ago, well before the
Constitutional Revolution of 1906, Iran's first pri-
vately owned newspaper wrote in its first and last
issue:
Some so-called progressive mullas want a constitutional
regime that is in accordance with the shari'ah. . . . They
must realize that there is much of great importance in
today's society that is unmentioned in the Koran. . . .
What solutions do the mullas have for these problems? Do
they wish to proceed according to fiqh? or do they propose
to consult some mujtahed in Najaf? . . . If all the
mujtaheds were to put their heads together, their
combined intelligence would be inadequate to cope with
these matters. Therefore we must respectfully approach
the house of the `unclean and heathen' farangi and
implore them to save us from our ignorance and
misery. . . . Mullahs and zealots will persecute us and call
us irreligious, but the truth is that true Islam is not
(b)(3) opposed to civilization.
Government and religious pressure forced it to close. The episode is
described in Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran (Stanford,
1961), p. 22f. (u)
The anticlericalism of an influential group of young
writers and poets popular among the middle classes in
the first decades of the 20th century provided support
for Reza Shah's secularizing reforms in the 1920s and
1930s.6 Reza's Minister of Court Teymurtash talking
to the American Minister expressed his opposition to
Christian missions in Iran and commented that Iran
was trying to get rid of religion in its own schools:
He asked how we would like it if they bundled up a crowd
of moth-eaten mullas and sent them to America to open
schools?
This anticlericalism remained a constant theme
through the years. In 1922 the newspaper Rastakhiz
warned that:
The corruption existing in Iran is entirely the fault of the
clergy. In dealing with them absolute and final steps must
be taken.
A few years later, on the eve of Reza Shah's assuming
the throne, Rastakhiz addressed an editorial to him:
The root of our evil is not insecurity, it is the class of the
clergy. If this root is not attacked soon, all the gains of the
army and the army itself will vanish. The best method of
eradicating the clergy is to take away their means of
livelihood. The waqf lands should be taken away and sold
to poor peasants.
Two decades later Ahmad Kasravi became something
of a cult figure with the publication of his book The
Creed. In it he criticized Reza Shah's reforms as being
an indiscriminate adoption of Western materialism,
but he was also critical of traditional Islam and
particularly the Shia clergy. Kasravi was assassinated
in 1945 by a member of the Fedayan-e-Islam (the
Some of these opposed Reza Shah. His decision to accept the throne
(after the clergy came out in opposition to a republic) and his
increasing authoritarianism lost him the support of some
intellectuals. (u)
'Letter, Herrick B. Young to A. C. Boyce, 19 August 1932, from
Presbyterian Mission files, quoted in W. Copeland, "American
Influence on the Development of Higher Education in Iran," Ph.D.
dissertation, U. of Pennsylvania, 1973, p. 61. (u)
6
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Devotees of Islam), an event that was greeted with joy
in clerical circles in Qom.'
More recently Jalal Al-i-Ahmad, whose 1962 pam-
phlet Gharbzadegi (Western Mania) is a strong attack
on the evils of Westernization, is also contemptuous of
the clergy.' Even Ali Shariati, whose writings have
become the bible for many of the religiously inclined
intelligentsia, is strongly anticlerical, blaming the
priests for corrupting the true faith.
The anticlericalism of the Pahlavis thus was not
peculiar to them as individuals, but represented a
well-established attitude that was shared by a signifi-
cant number of the educated over the last 100 years.
For the clergy, anticlericalism is irreligion, and while
clerical wrath has been directed at the Pahlavis
specifically, it has also attacked a school of thought
that has been influential in the past and is likely to be
so again. Fundamentalist Shiite insistence that nothing
be published contrary to Islam suggests that some of
the best known of Iran's modern writers will be
banned, a censorship that may be more extensive than
that under the Shah.'
'"On the day that the news of the death of Ahmad Kasravi at the
hands of. .. the Fedayan of Islam reached Qom, I went to the home
of Ayatollah Khonsari, who was slightly ill . . . to give him the good
news.... I said Kasravi had received his just punishment for his
lying pretensions and his presumption with regard to the holy tenets
of religion and the customs of Islam.... Khonsari said 'Thank God,'
the color lit up his face, and he continued to say that this was very
good news, that his health had been restored, and that he was no
longer sick...." (Ayatollah Mohammad Razi, Asar al'Hujjah ya
Tarkih va Daireh al-Mdarif-e Howzeh-ye-Elmiyyah-ye Qom (The
Signs of the Twelfth Imam, or the History and Encyclopedia of the
Qom Circle of Learning) (Qom, 1953-54). (u)
9 "Gharbzadegi" is difficult to translate. It has been rendered as
"Weststruckness," which is close to its literal meaning, as well as
"Westernization," which is, however, too neutral to convey
Al-i-Ahmad's meaning. Al-i-Ahmad, whose father was a mullah and
a Sufi guide, was a schoolteacher before turning to full-time writing.
He was a member of the Tudeh Party for several years. (u)
'� A ban on anti-Islamic publications was written into the 1906
constitution, but like other articles that gave a special role to Islam,
this one was also ignored. (u)
7
The Shiite Establishment Versus the State
Brief History
Space does not allow a full examination of how the
clergy has developed its role in the last two centuries.'
Much of the substance of today's controversies has
been fought out before and may be fought out again in
the future. The contest between the Shah and
Khomeini was only the apex of a conflict that has
waxed and waned for 200 years.
(b)(3)
The clergy began to assume its present status when
Twelver Shiism became the state religion in the early
16th century.' A basic tenet was carried over from an
earlier period, however, that any temporal government
is illegitimate until the last imam " returns to rule the
world. This concept was blurred by the claim of the
shahs of the time�the Safavids to be descendants of
the imams. By the same reasoning the ulema (the
clergy collectively) lacked temporal authority, but
during this period something like an official clergy
developed and attained a de facto authority. The clergy
provided a point of reference and leadership for the
Shia community, a link between the community and
the imams. The fall of the Safavids and the rise of the
Qajar dynasty in the 18th century was the occasion for
a break between church and state." The Qajars
claimed much the same royal power as the Safavids
but without the semilegitimacy provided by the claim
to be descended from the imams. At the same time,
Shia legal theory had developed the concept of a
distinct role for the clergy in directing and even ruling
the community. There was, thus, a fundamental
conflict. The clergy, as representative of the imams
could not recognize a temporal authority that claimed
a superior position on earth. The monarch, for his part,
" This has been examined in detail by Hamid Algar, Religion and
State in Iran, 1785-1906 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1969). This book is required reading for anyone
who wants to understand the roots of Khomeini's movement. (u)
'2The Shias believe that the successors to Muhammad follow the line
of his son-in-law, Ali. There were 12 of these, hence the name
"Twelver," in Arabic Ithna Ashari. (u)
'' See p. 22 ff. (u)
"Seven Qajar Shahs ruled Iran between 1779 and 1924 when Reza
Shah Pahlavi took over. The Qajars were an important Turkish tribe
that had played a role in Iranian history for many centuries. (u)
�eir
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could not accept the position required of any believer
that he follow the decisions and rulings of a mujtahed,
for this would have made the monarchy and the
government simply an executive arm of the clergy. The
idea of dominance by the clergy is still held by the
(b)(3) Khomeini school of thought.
In practice, the Qajars acted like all Persian monarchs,
tyrannically, tempered only by personal characteristics
or good advisers. The clergy as a whole refused
association with the state, although there were excep-
tions. Cooperation meant forfeiture of allegiance to the
faith and loss of following among the population. If the
clergy regarded government officials with abhorrence,
the sentiment was often reciprocated, for many among
the educated�and therefore probably connected with
the government�looked with disdain on the clergy as
(b)(3) being obscurantist and retrogressive
(b)(3)
The clergy and the masses were thrown into close
association through their faith and their mutual
distrust of government. Although it possessed little
direct power, the clergy became the natural leader of
the masses and came to be regarded as their protector
against government tyranny.
The Constitutional Revolution in the early 20th
century is a key episode in recent Iranian history
exemplifying many problems and trends that have
persisted. At that time two separate and competing
movements temporarily came together. On the one
hand were secular modernizers determined to bring
about reform through introduction of modern Euro-
pean concepts and institutions, on the other hand were
the clergy, whose position has already been noted.
They had in common only opposition to the Shah and a
(b)(3) determination to reduce his power.
The clergy had effectively demonstrated its influence a
few years earlier by a successful campaign against a
tobacco concession granted by the Shah to a British
company." The clergy's campaign against the conces-
sion included familiar elements�xenophobia directed
against British agents of the tobacco company, and the
usual antiregime sentiment enhanced by charges of
"This was in 1891. The concession gave the British company all
rights for the sale and distribution of tobacco in Iran, a monopoly of
exports from Iran, and control of production within the country. (u)
7�
selling Iran to the foreigners. This was described
succinctly by one scholar:
The appearance of a large number of non-Muslims
working for the tobacco corporation was one of the
most important reasons for the agitation�their
dominating presence was resented especially by the
ulema. To entrust the economic affairs of the nation
to foreigners endangered the existence of Iran as it
was understood by the ulema: a national-religious
community under their guidance. 16
The description of clerical sentiment could have
applied as well to 1978 as to 1891.
The battle against the concession peaked with the
issuance of a fatwa, a legal ruling, by Ayatollah
Shirazi, the paramount leader of the Shia who lived in
Samarra in Turkish Iraq. The fatwa declared that the
use of tobacco in any form was haram (forbidden) and
tantamount to war against the Hidden Imam. Tobacco
was immediately abandoned throughout the country,
even in the Royal Court. Shortly afterward the Shah
canceled the concession. He also thought it appropriate
to thank the ulema for "strengthening the foundations
of the state." " The Russian Czar wrote to Shirazi
offering him assistance in favorably influencing the
internal affairs of Iran. The Shah's chief minister, who
had a vested interest in the tobacco market, switched
his association from the British to the Russians and
allied himself with a portion of the clergy
The very success of the campaign, however, had a
divisive effect on the clergy. The political influence
demonstrated by the clergy seduced some of them from
the pursuit of God to the pursuit of power. Some took
advantage of their new influence to improve their lot
by associating with the government, receiving in return
honors and wealth
Events in subsequent years have had a familiar ring. In
Tabriz schools, hotels, and wineshops�all_identified
with foreign influence�were destroyed by rioting
religious students. Elsewhere clergy-led demonstra-
tions, mostly directed against Russian loans, were
frequent. Attacks against the Bahais, especially in
Algar, op. cit., p. 208. (u)
"quoted in Algar, op. cit., p. 218. (u)
8
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Esfahan, turned into a massacre, and charges of
Bahaism were a useful weapon against one's enemies.
The government constantly retaliated. Clerical agita-
tors were beaten, exiled, and sometimes shot. In
Tehran troops arresting an antigovernment preacher
were attacked by students of religion. The students
were fired on, and another clergyman who protested
the action was shot dead by the commander of the
troops. In protest a thousand of the Tehran ulema left
Tehran for Qom. A prominent mujtahed in a sermon
compared the tyranny of the Qajars to that of the
Omayyads, who had been responsible for the martyr-
dom of the Imam Hosein. Sixty years later Ayatollah
Khomeini used the same analogy in a sermon against
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. It was as effective in 1963
as it had been earlier.
The secular-religious coalition that cooperated against
the Qajars was by no means monolithic. There were
factions among both groups and compromisers who
attempted to bridge the gap between the two. The
demands for an adalatkhane, a house of justice, and
later a majlis, or assembly, were voiced by both
groups, who saw such institutions as providing a rein on
the Shah's absolutism. The agitation for a constitution
emphasized the confusion in the minds of those who
were demanding it. The secularists thought of the
constitution in European terms; the clergy thought of it
as a mechanism to establish the Shariah (religious
law). Several clergymen showed much ingenuity in
demonstrating the compatibility of the two concepts.'g
The constitution as it finally emerged was an attempt
to satisfy both the secularists and the clerics. The
clerics lost. Several articles in the 1906 constitution
gave the clergy a special role that, if followed, would
have given the religious community a significant role in
government affairs. One well-known article provided
for a panel of eminent mujtaheds to judge the
acceptability of any new legislation. Most of these
constitutional provisions were ignored, and seculariza-
tion became institutionalized. A large number of
clergymen served in the majlis over the years, but they
appear to have functioned as politicians more than as
religious leaders
" Abdul-Hadi Hairi, Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), has a full account of the complexities
surrounding this problem. (u)
The constitution curbed the powers of the Shah, but it
did not eliminate the monarchy nor did it establish
good government. Subsequently, one shah attempted a
coup d'etat with Russian aid, the majlis was dissolved
for several years, and the Bakhtiari tribe seized Tehran
and achieved a political position from which some
members of the tribe have profited ever since. Cabinets
came and went as did prime ministers, and three Qajar
Shahs of descending degrees of competence came to
the throne
(b)(3)
By 1921 the political disarray in the country was so
great that there was open talk of a coup. The Shah of
the time, who could have served as a unifying symbol if
nothing else, preferred the company of Paris showgirls
to the company of Persian politicians (b)(3)
Eighty miles west of Tehran at the garrison town of
Qazvin, Reza Khan commanded the Persian cossack
division. He had risen through the ranks, and when the
Russian officers left after the Russian Revolution, he
had moved into a key position. With the support of two
other officers and a civilian editor-politician, Reza
marched on Tehran and seized the government. As
Minister of War, Prime Minister, and in 1925 as Shah,
he consolidated his power and ruled Iran with an iron
hand until he was driven into exile by the
Soviet-British invasion in 1941.
(b)(3)
Reza Shah and the Clergy
Reza Shah launched the first concerted, purposeful
attack against the clerical establishment. The clergy
and its supporters remember every detail of the story of
the 50-year battle between the Pahlavi Dynasty and
the clergy�every incident, every insult, and every
death, real and imaginary, suffered at government
hands. If the clergy succeeds in establishing its
dominance for a long period of time�a development
that is by no means certain�the history of the last half
century will be rewritten in religious terms. The clergy
will be the heroes and the major actors, and the (b)(3)
Pahlavis and their supporters will be seen as the
powerful but corrupt opposition party that ultimately
failed in its attempts to suppress the people of God.r
The clergy did not oppose Reza Khan's assumption of
the throne in 1925. It had voiced strong opposition to
an alternative proposal, that Reza establish a republic.
Ataturk had just finished proclaiming a republic in
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Turkey, and Islam had been promptly disestablished.
The clerics feared that the same thing would happen in
Iran, and they saw the continuation of the monarchy as
a lesser evil than republicanism. They were soon
disabused. In the next few years Reza Shah secured
the passage of laws stripping them of authority in the
law courts and in education and making some of them
subject to military conscription.
(b)(3)
A sense of the bitterness felt by the clergymen is
evident in two episodes recounted in their own works.
In 1927 after the military conscription act was passed,
there was a clergy-led uprising in many parts of the
country led by Haj Aqa Nurollah Esfahani. An
Ayatollah later provides this version:
(b)(3)
Nurollah and a large number of the contemporary
Ulema . . . and several thousand from other classes
revolted against the power of the time. . . and
proclaimed that this tyrannical Shah and absolute
dictator who was opposed to religion and was
introducing waves of useless innovations. . . must
be deposed. God have mercy on that holy man who
held the future-seeing glasses to his eyes and saw
that if that tyrannical Shah continued to rule, he
would cherish the evildoers and the sinners; he
would proclaim crimes and forbidden things, he
would legalize the drinking of wines. . . , he would
spread sodomy and fornication; he would make the
women shameless without veils; he would destroy
the mosques and places of pilgrimage; he would
ridicule the Ulema, kill the teachers. He rained
bullets on the Ostaneh Rezavi 'and bound together
several thousand Shi'ite pilgrims, and whether they
were dead or not, he buried them under piles of dirt
without cleaning them or wrapping them in
shrouds."
The story of the second incident in 1928 is frequently
cited to indicate Reza Shah's impatience with anyone
who opposed him. The Queen visited Qom, where she
went to a mosque unveiled, (or lightly veiled, the
"This is the shrine of Imam Reza at Mashhad. In July 1935 Sheikh
Bahlul led a massive demonstration at the shrine to protest the
introduction of Western headgear. The riot was finally put down by
rifle and machinegun fire. The governor-general of the province was
executed for his inability to control his province. (u)
" Mohammad Razi, Asar Hujjah-ya-Tarikh va Daireh al-
Ma'arif-e-Howzeh-ye-Elmiyyah-ye-Qom (The Signs of the Twelfth
Imam, or the History and Encyclopedia of the Qom Circle of
Learning), p.28. (u)
stories differ). The preacher of the mosque rebuked
them, whereupon Reza Shah rushed to Qom and, so
the story goes, kicked the Ayatollah down the steps of
his own mosque. Not surprisingly, the clergy see it
quite differently. According to its version, a well-
known preacher named Bafqi was delivering a sermon
in a mosque:
A group of women" from the royal court with bare
faces and uncovered hair were watching the people
from the top of the ivan.22 This appearance, since it
occurred before the removal of the veil, and
especially since it was in such a holy place, was
extremely painful for the true believers. They began
to call out and informed Bafqi. That ardent believer
became very upset and sent a message asking who
they were; if they were Muslims, why had they come
so; and if they were not, what were they doing there.
This caused these women to raise satanic cries
because for a long time they had been annoyed by
Bafqi's forbidding evil practices and considered him
to be a bore. They had been waiting for the
opportunity that this occurrence presented and
slandered Bafqi and claimed that he was inciting
people against the ruler.
Also, in the company of the treacherous mayor of
the city, they aroused the unjust Shah to such an
extent that the next day he surrounded the holy
place of Qom with tanks and armed soldiers and
intended to do to the holy place of these oppressed
people what he had done to those of the Imam Ali
Reza, but God was not willing and fended off his
evil. In short, that zindiq 23 passed into the
circumambulatory of the fairies with the footstep of
boldness and the shoe of disrespect and sent an
unbelieving soldier to summon Bafqi to the mosque.
That unclean person (Reza Shah) entered the
sacred place, and Bafqi was dragged to the mosque.
Because of the hatred that he (Reza Shah) had felt
for years toward him (Bafqi), he struck him with his
weapon and his booted foot. Then he ordered that he
21 The Queen, Taj al-Moluk, and two daughters. (u)
n A side chamber or reception room with one side open to the main
courtyard. In this case there was a balcony to the Ivan. (u)
" One who endangers the state by attacking the Prophet. To be
accused of being a zindiq is more serious than a charge of unbelief. It
is used as a highly charged term of vituperation. (u)
10
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and several other people 24 be taken to Tehran,
where he was imprisoned for six months, and then
he was exiled to Abd-al-Azim in Rayy, where he
was kept under constant surveillance until. . . he
either died of natural causes or was poisoned." (u)
For the rest of Reza Shah's reign the clergy was kept
firmly suppressed. Occasional outbursts by individual
clerics were dealt with harshly, and there was no
coordinated campaign by the clergy against the Shah.
The outbreak of World War II, however, gave the
religious establishment new opportunities
Mohammad Reza and the Clergy
The Shah's Approach. Shah Mohammad Reza shared
the opinion of many of Iran's educated class that the
clergy was reactionary and obstructive. He held it in
low esteem and did not bother to hide his opinions. The
Shah claimed to regard religion highly, however, and
to be religious himself. He often said that he believed
he was under divine protection and referred to his
narrow escape in two assassination attempts as proof.
The religious establishment did not believe his claim to
be a religious person. Although a man's beliefs are
private and cannot be questioned, they are reflected in
his actions, that is, his observance of those things
prescribed by Islam. The Shah did not act like a
Muslim, therefore he was not a Muslim, and his
insistence to the contrary was sheer hypocrisy. "And of
mankind are some who say, we believe in Allah and the
Last Day, when they believe it not. They think to
beguile Allah and those who believe, and they beguile
none save themselves; but they perceive not. In their
hearts is a disease, and Allah increaseth their disease.
A painful doom is theirs because they lie." 26
When Reza Shah was deposed and Mohammad Reza
took the throne, religious leaders regained some of
their influence. The chador 27 reappeared, and reli-
gious figures once more assumed a political role. In the
postwar period the most notorious of these political
24 Three common criminals had sought sanctuary (bast) in the
mosque, a not infrequent occurrence. Seizing these criminals was a
violation of religious tradition by Reza Shah. Other places of bast
were, in Qajar days, the Royal Stable, in the vicinity of artillery
pieces, and, for a while, telegraph offices. A Qajar Shah in the late
19th century issued a royal order abolishing the practice of bast. It
was ignored by everyone. (u)
Razi, Asar-al-Hujjah, p. 35f.(u)
26 Koran II, 8-10.
11
ayatollahs was Abol Ghasem Kashani, who returned to
Iran after many years exile in Palestine. He, as well as
other prominent Iranians, had been engaged in
pro-German activities and had been arrested and
exiled by the British. Kashani allied himself with
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, and between
1951 and 1953 he was spokesman for a clerical bloc in
parliament. He broke with Mossadeq, however, and
played a role in the overthrow of the Prime Minister.
He was never highly regarded by the most religious
ayatollahs, and after Mossadeq was overthrown,
Kashani's influence disappeared. It was also at this (b)(3)
time that religiously oriented terrorist groups became
active. The Fedayan-e-Islam (The Devotees of Islam),
in its quest for a completely Islamic government, was
responsible for several assassinations, including that of
Mossadeq's redecessor as Prime Minister, Gen. Ali
Razmara. (b)(3)
The Shah contributed significantly to his own downfall
both by actions he took and actions he failed to take.
For nearly two decades he ruled autocratically. His
reading of Iranian history and his own experiences
convinced him that left to their own devices, Iranian
politicians would only be inept�that they were so
bound up in their own self-interest, competition, and
political maneuvering that they were unable to accom-
plish anything. At the same time, whenever a prime
minister gained significant power, his first impulse was
to turn against the Shah. A persuasive case can be
made for both of these propositions (b)(3)
When the Shah returned from his brief exile in the
summer of 1953, he had�with some help�overcome
the sharpest challenge he had yet faced, the nationalist
movement led by Prime Minister Mossadeq." (b)(3)
" A one-piece, capelike garment. Pulled over the head with a corner
held in the teeth, it served many women as a convenient outer
garment. Custom more than religion recommended it until the last
two or three years, when wearing it became a symbol of opposition to
the Shah. The garb that seems to be popular now�the black
headscarf, long-sleeved high-neck black dress, and black stockings�
was rarely seen previously and was considered to be more Arab than
Iranian. (u)
" By mid-1953 Mossadeq had lost most of his original supporters in
political brawling. His tolerance of the Communists had frightened
the military and the clergy, and except for continuing to lambaste
the British and sometimes the Americans, he could put together no
program. His manner of going, however, left a popular myth that
was bigger than life. In a country where heroism and martyrdom go
hand in hand, Mossadeq fitted the part well. That he was done in as
much by his friends as his enemies is not part of the legend. (u)
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Within a short time he had convinced himself that the
demonstrations that had helped overthrow Mossadeq
constituted a popular mandate for him to take a direct
role in ruling. Between then and 1963 he consolidated
his control over the army and brought the government
and bureaucracy under his control. The elections in
1961, more badly rigged than usual, gave him the
chance to dissolve parliament, which was dominated
by the landlords and had consistently blocked his
attempts to get a land reform bill enacted. When
elections were held nearly 18 months later, it was the
Shah who had the almost exclusive control over who
(b)(3)vou1d be elected."
One group that he tried frequently but unsuccessfully
to bring under control was the clergy. He considered
clerics as obstructionists who were only interested in
regaining the prerogatives they had once enjoyed. As
the Shah's programs were implemented, he apparently
became convinced that he had won the allegiance of
the masses at whom he had directed most of the
reforms. He did not, however, try to organize them for
political support. More significantly, the Shah was
unable to permit any sort of free political expression.
His attempts to organize political parties were
self-defeating because everyone recognized them as
creations of the Shah. He expected, and often men-
tioned, that when economic and social conditions were
favorable, a freer political climate would be possible.
Until then he was unwilling to take a chance with any
(b)(3)party that could threaten him.
His programs depended heavily on the skills of a new,
educated middle class, familiar with Western technol-
ogy and management. The Shah attracted a large
number of these into his bureaucracy�enough to plan
and begin his programs�but never enough on the
lower levels to keep the programs moving. The scope of
what the Shah hoped to do would have taxed a more
efficient bureaucracy. With rare exceptions the bu-
reaucracy remained a Middle Eastern morass of red
tape, lethargy, inefficiency, and special interests,
(b)(4enetrated by traditional corruption
" Traditionally the Shah was only one of several power centers that
controlled the elections. The Prime Minister, the military, provincial
notables, including tribal chiefs, and the Minister of the Interior
competed or cooperated in electing favorites to the mauls. (u)
�erL
Beginning in the mid 1970s the Shah seemed to think
that the time had come to lessen his control a little. His
method, however, was traditional. He created a single
party to which everyone interested in politics would
belong. The political process then would be played out
within the single party, avoiding the divisiveness of
competition among several parties.
The Shah was also encouraged to try a more open
approach by the advent of an administration in the
United States with a strong human rights policy. The
Shah always considered Democratic administrations
to be unfriendly toward him and probably hoped that a
more liberal stance would head off the arm twisting
that he expected from Washington.
With Iran's growing interest in its human rights
image, which started around the fall of 1976, came the
realization that people remained critical of the govern-
ment's ability to respond to economic and social
challenges. It was becoming obvious to Iran's leaders
that to coordinate and continue Iran's economic
growth, something more than the tacit cooperation of
Iran's new middle class was required. By the spring of
1977 the Shah and the government began to look for
ways to encourage the active support of the new elite.
Criticism within the Resurgence Party, provincial and
city councils, and the mauls was encouraged. The
government resurrected and publicized the activities of
three bodies created to examine the workings of the
government�the Imperial Commission, the Imperial
Inspectorate, and the Study Group for Iranian prob-
lems.
The Imperial Commission was to focus on overseeing
development, eradicating waste, and eliminating cor-
ruption. The Imperial Inspectorate was to monitor the
progress of the administrative revolution and to
conduct unannounced spot inspections of government
ministries, and the Study Group was to debate and
evaluate the government's problems and policies and to
forward their reports to the Shah. By mid-1977
Imperial Commission meetings were being televised
nationally and deficiencies in planning and implemen-
tation of the development programs were receiving
widespread coverage. Government ministries and
12
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Prime Minister Amir Abas Hoveyda himself were
forced to defend their policies and promise changes. In
the Study Group many members expressed deep
distrust and antipathy toward the government. The
integrity of the government was impugned and its
performance ridiculed.
This program was initiated with the Shah's blessing,
and Hoveyda in a July 1979 press conference stated
what was to be the government's position. Every
Iranian has the right to criticize and differ in all
national affairs except on three points�the Shah, the
constitution, and the "Shah-People Revolution." The
government was clearly to adopt a more tolerant
attitude toward expressions of divergent opinions
Additional government moves further encouraged
opposition elements. A Military Court Reform bill,
which sharply limited the venue of the military court
system, and counterattacks against international
charges of torture in Iran brought some life to the
long-inactive nationalist opposition. This was rein-
forced by a growing belief that the danger of repression
was less because the US human rights policy forced the
government to be more restrained in police actions.
Two letters, one addressed to the Shah, the other to the
Prime Minister, circulated widely. They were signed
by veteran opposition figures who believed that "the
government would not dare to jail all of us in the
present climate of human rights." The letters called on
the Shah to give up his authoritarian role and for
Hoveyda to permit free expression of opposition
opinions. In religious circles, there was also stirring;
chadors began to appear on the campuses as symbols
of opposition and opposition to women's rights legisla-
tion became more pronounced.
In the year that followed, opposition elements grew
more vociferous. The more the government and the
Shah tried to appease them by concessions, the harder
the opposition�especially the religious�pushed. Con-
cessions were seen as a sign of weakness, not of good
will.
The Clergy's Interests. In the 1940s and early 1950s,
Ayatollah Behbehani controlled a clerical-political
machine in Tehran that mediated between the clergy
13
and the government," and in Qom Ayatollah Hosein
Borujerdi, the recognized head (marja-e-taglid) of the
Shias since 1948, was trying to keep conflict with the
government at a minimum
Borujerdi, whose interests ran more to theological
education and legal interpretation than to politics, let
Behbehani run the political activities. The Behbehani
machine, composed mostly of lower ranking clergy-
men, was a power in Tehran politics and elections. At
one time he controlled a bloc of 15 deputies in
Parliament. During the Mossadeq premiership
Behbehani ran into trouble with the Prime Minister
and with Ayatollah Kashani, who refused to give him
the kickbacks on government contracts and the influ-
ence in Parliament to which he felt entitled. As a result
Behbehani threw his support to the Shah in the latter's
struggle with Mossadeq. In spite of this support,
Behbehani failed to regain his prerogatives after
Mossadeq's replacement by General Zahedi.
Behbehani remained a power to be reckoned with, but
over the next decade his influence slowly dwindled.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
For a decade after the overthrow of Mossadeq there
was little more than skirmishing between the govern-
ment and the clergy. The government held the upper
hand, and the more important religious leaders kept a
low profile. Some religious leaders talked about
organizing to oppose the government, but there is no
information to show that anything was accomplished.
During Ramadan 1958 there were sermons attacking
the government. This was noteworthy only because this
had not occurred for several years. Such sermons,
however, were directed at the government and not at
the Shah directly. Religious influence continued to be
exerted on a local level. Low-ranking mullahs some-
times made antigovernment statements, usually to
their disadvantage. In places like Mashhad, where
religious influence was strong, this made itself felt in
local affairs such as the ban on public sale of alcoholic
beverages, the organization of religious schools, and
the closing of movie houses during the religious
mourning periods. During this period there was ,a
pamphlet distributed criticizing the Shah for his oil
policy and articles denouncing the presence of Ameri-
cans. Clerical pressure is credited with helping to kill
3� The Behbehani family's political importance in Tehran dated back
to 1906, and the Ayatollah's son and other relatives served in
Parliament in many sessions. (u)
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an early land reform bill and abort tentative proposals
(b)(3) to give women the vote and wider employment
opportunities."
(b)(3)
In the early 1960s, however, the Shah opened his
campaign for economic and social reform, and the
clergy felt the impact. Ali Amini had become prime
minister in 1961. That same year Ayatollah Borujerdi
died, and his policy of getting along with the govern-
ment fell into abeyance. Ayatollah Behbehani was
losing control of his Tehran apparatus, and Amini tried
to break up the Behbehani machine, threatening to
reveal the clergy's corrupt handling of land entrusted
to them. As a last resort, Amini had Behbehani's
politician-son arrested. Although the son was jailed for
only a few days, the episode turned Behbehani against
Amini and the Shah.
In 1962 the Amini government initiated a land reform
program that attacked both the landlords and the
clergy. The land controlled by the clergy was not
subject to distribution in the first phase. Later,
however, clerical-controlled lands were distributed
through the device of 99-year leases rather than
outright sale to the farmers. Income from land
provided a significant portion of the income that the
clergy used for religious purposes. Just before the
January 1963 referendum, which the Shah held to
demonstrate popular support for his policies, he went to
Qom. He confronted the clergy, calling them parasites
and telling them that he was better qualified than they
to interpret Islam for the nation. The next month the
(b)(3) Shah granted suffrage to Iranian women.
After the referendum there were a variety of clerical
actions. Leaflets were distributed in Tehran attacking
the Shah, the regime, and the reform program, and the
funerals of some persons connected with the National
Front were used as opportunities to demonstrate
religious orthodoxy and opposition to the Shah. At the
end of Ramadan on 26 February 1963, about 5,000
bazaaris went to Qom and heard religious exhortations
with thinly veiled antigovernment overtones. Ayatollah
Behbehani was denounced on this occasion because of
his past reputation as a royal supporter. The Tehran
" One unexpected clerical opponent of the 1960 land reform bill was
Hassan Emami, the Imam Jumeh of Tehran, a position to which he
was appointed by the Shah. Emami was always part of the Shah's
entourage. (u)
clergy boycotted the Shah's reception always held at
the end of Ramadan. The clergy was traditionally
invited and normally attended this ceremony. Just
before Now Ruz (new year) in late March that year,
leaflets were distributed urging that mourning ceremo-
nies be substituted for the usual Now Ruz celebrations.
This was supported by all important Iranian clergy-
men. Statements by Ayatollahs Milani, Qomi, and
Shirazi from An Najaf (the main Shia religious center
in Iraq) opposing equal political rights for women were
posted in the shrine in Mashhad, in the Tehran bazaar,
and in Qom. The National Front also posted proclama-
tions against the government in the same places.
Demonstrations were suppressed in several cities, and
the government sent 1,500 uniformed but unarmed
troops to Qom in a show of force.
One of the leaflets distributed by Khomeini at this time
included all the themes that he has continued to
emphasize. The leaflet stated that the Koran and Islam
were being destroyed "by the filthy hand of the
foreigners" through the Shah's government. "We will
be subjected to violation, thrown into jail, and de-
stroyed in favor of Jews and Americans." Khomeini's
remedy was removal of the regime and its replacement
by one that would protect the people and rule by the
Koran.
The Emergence of Khomeini. The secularizing policies
of the Pahlavis for the last 50 years have obscured the
fact that the clergy has always claimed to be the
natural leader of the masses and that many Iranians,
although not the most highly educated, have recog-
nized this role. The Safavid dynasty based its claim to
leadership on the religious credentials of its founder,
although the Safavids rapidly took on the role of the
traditional Iranian monarch rather than of the "just
jurisprudent" of Shiite theory. Even in the Pahlavi
period, the peasant or the man in the street would be
more likely to consult his clergyman than a govern-
ment official on his problems, whether religious or
secular. Clergymen thus frequently filled leadership
roles on a grass-roots level where government was
considered to be not the servant but the master of the
people. The emergence of a strong religious leader on a
national level was inevitable. In past decades the
government has often been in serious trouble, but there
was no religious leader available to exploit the trouble.
14
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(b)(3)
Conversely, a number of respected and powerful
religious leaders have had no impact on a national
political level because of government supremacy
In 1963 Khomeini moved into a position that he later
parlayed into the supreme leadership as a result of
clerical intrigues and government mishandling of the
clergy. When Borujerdi died in 1960, Behbehani had
no chance of becoming the new marja-e-taglid." He,
(b)(3) however, hoped to dictate the choice of Borujerdi's
successor, who would be in effect Behbehani's tool.
Behbehani first selected a Najafi cleric who soon died.
Behbehani then turned to Khomeini, whom he appar-
ently considered to be weak and pliable. Ayatollah
Borujerdi had designated Khomeini to handle the
funds for the support of religious students in the
committee that guided religious affairs after Borujerdi
(b)(3) died.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
In mid-1962 Behbehani began to activate his organiza-
tion in support of Khomeini, and many in the religious
community swung to the Behbehani-Khomeini
coalition. The Shah opposed this coalition, probably
more because of Behbehani than Khomeini, who was
little known outside of Qom. Ayatollah Hakim of An
Najaf, whom some Shias considered the best candidate
to succeed Borujerdi, also opposed Behbehani because
of his political activities. Ayatollah Shariatmadari was
also a strong contender for the position.
The bazaar, always subject to political and religious
incitement, was drawn to Behbehani and Khomeini by
the economic recession that was threatening its liveli-
hood. The replacement of Prime Minister Amini by
Amir Asadollah Alam in June 1962 did not improve
things, and the bazaar's enmity was directed as much
at the Shah as at Alam.
In early 1963 the religious leaders took advantage of
the government's increasing political and economic
difficulties to open a new campaign. They formed a
committee in Qom to coordinate this campaign.'
" The Point of Imitation, the title given to the recognized leader of
the Shiites. (u)
" The members of this committee were Ayatollahs Shariatmadari,
Khomeini, Golpaygani, Morteza Hairi, Mohammad Yazdi, Hashem
Ameli, Mohammad Hosein Tabatabai, and Tunakaboni. (u)
15
Khomeini and the clergy in general began attacking
the Shah personally, a confrontation that had usually
been avoided in the past. A major theme was that the
Shah had become a puppet of the Bahais, a sect that in
turn was controlled by the Jews.34 (b)(3)
When the Shah heard about the campaign against
him, and especially that it was having a significant
effect on public attitudes, he ordered his security
officials to study the problem. They recommended that
the government's campaign against the clergy be
curtailed and that anticlerical activity should be
carried on by newspapers and individuals. Neverthe-
less, the Shah insisted that he would not change the
policies of the reform program nor would he stop trying
to reduce the influence of the clergy.
(b)(3)
In June 1963 Khomeini preached a sermon that was
such a direct attack on the Shah that it could not be
ignored. He and several other clergymen were arrested
in Qom and taken to Tehran. Immediately riots broke
out in Tehran and several other cities. The riots were
subdued with a heavy loss of life, but Khomeini had
become a national hero. The government tried to
blame the riots on the landlords who had been
dispossessed (there was some landlord involvement),
on the exiled former chief of SAVAK (the National
Intelligence and Security Organization) Gen. Teymur
Bakhtiar, who may have played a role," and on
Egyptian instigation, which probably was not true."
(b)(3)
An attempt was made by some members of the clergy
and by the government to resolve their differences.
Ayatollah Shariatmadari was active in these efforts as
were Ayatollahs Golpaygani, Milani, and Khonsari.
Ayatollah Mehdi Haeri-Yazdi, who 15 years later was
Khomeini's representative in the Iranian Embassy in
" The only person well-known as a Bahai who was of Jewish origin
was Habib Sabet, a wealthy businessman
" General Bakhtiar moved from Europe through Lebanon to
Baghdad shortly before the riots. He had been in touch with Tudeh
Party leaders apparently in some sort of anti-Shah planning. There is
no direct evidence that he was involved in the June riots, but he may
have been aware that something was going on. The riots clearly had
been planned.
" The day oft e riots an Egyptian was arrested at Tehran airport.
He was carrying large sums of money, which the press played as
payoff money for the rioters. SAVAK chief General Palcravan told
the writer that the man was a well-known currency smuggler who
had made several trips to Iran. The General believed his arrival at
that time was fortuitous.
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Washington, served as a go-between in some of these
meetings. The negotiations finally collapsed over the
clergy's insistence that Khomeini be released and that
the government of Prime Minister Alam be dissolved.
The Shah offered to release Khomeini and other
clerical leaders if they would go into exile quietly. The
(b)(3)lergy refused.
In early August 1963 Khomeini and other religious
leaders were released from jail and held under house
arrest. They were permitted to receive visitors, but not
to make speeches. An item in Ettela'at newspaper
suggests a reason for this:
(b)(3)
As a mutual understanding has been reached between
the security authorities and Messrs. Khomeini, Qomi,
and Mahallati to the effect that they will not interfere
in political affairs and that they will not act against the
interests of the country and its security, and as this
mutual understanding is completely acceptable, they
have been moved to their private homes."
The clerics decided not to oppose overtly the majlis
elections in September 1963 even though some, such as
Ayatollah Hadi Milani and Khomeini, had wanted to
put up militant opposition and declare the elections
forbidden. Instead, the clergy decided to support
candidates sympathetic to religion and then try to
( ....b)(37suade the new parliament to organize the five-man
erical review panel that the constitution called for.
The clergy failed to have any impact on the elections,
and in September 1963 religious leaders agreed to the
revival of the Fedayan-e-Islam, the terrorist organiza-
tion that had virtually disappeared with the execution
of its top leaders in 1955. A letter to the religious
leaders from Khomeini was probably instrumental in
this move. He criticized the other clergymen for
boycotting the elections and insisted that if they had
vigorously attacked the elections and staged demon-
strations, many of the successful candidates would
have failed, and "certainly six women would not have
u)(3)been elected."
Shortly afterwards
the Fedayan was making plans to assassinate the Shah
and other top Iranians and would then establish an
Islamic Republic. Weapons were being smuggled into
" Ettela'a , 5 August 1963. (u)
et
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Iran through Kuwait, some of the southern ports, and
over the Iranian-Iraqi border. A bazaar merchant was
canvassing former antiregime plotters to pursuade
them to join the Fedayan.
Khomeini's movement fell dormant after This. Little
was heard from him. He was released from house
arrest in April 1964 with a stern warning against
getting involved in political activity. Khomeini was
inactive during the Moharram period in June of that
year. Apparently, however, he felt the need to make
himself known again or lose his following. and in
September he resumed teaching in Qom.
The next move was a turning point in Khomeini's
career. A Status of Forces bill was debated�and
eventually passed�by Parliament. This bill gave the
American forces in Iran a juridical status in conform-
ance with the Vienna Convention. It was widely
publicized, however, as a reimposition of the old
capitulations, which had exempted foreigners from
local law in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The bill
was ineptly handled by the government. Khomeini
seized the opportunity and in speeches and handbills
attacked the government and the United States and
called on the army to overthrow the government
This was more than the government could tolerate.
Khomeini was again arrested and exiled to Turkey. A
year later he moved to the Shia center of An Najaf in
Iraq, from which he continued his campaign against
the Iranian Government. In this he had the tacit
approval, if not active support, of the Iraqis, for during
this period Iran and Iraq were at loggerheads over a
variety of issues, including the Shatt al Arab boundary
problem and the Kurds.
Throughout the last half of the 1960s and into the
1970s conflict continued to simmer between the
government and the Shia religious community, only
rarely breaking into open hostilities. The government
made occasional attempts to approach religious leaders
to try to smooth over their difficulties, and for their
part, some of the religious leaders were receptive. But
neither side was able to change its basic demands. The
religious leaders wanted a slowdown or a reversal of
the Shah's reform programs and a recognition that
16
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Islam must play a role in supervising civil affairs. They
also wanted a campaign against corruption 38 and a
reversal of Iran's policy toward Israel. The government
and the Shah for their part were committed to the
reform programs as being the only route to moderniza-
tion and rejected the religious leaders' claim to a voice
in government policy. On each side there was an
additional complicating factor. Khomeini and his
followers were always available to make sure that the
more moderate religious leaders did not compromise,
and on the government side, the hard line followed by
the security forces created hostility against the govern-
ment that became ineradicable.
Not all the clergy were militantly political. A signifi-
cant number were following the policy of "silence"
(sokut) described by one of them as "our duty is to
advise, not to fight." The late Ayatollah Hakim of
Qom subscribed to this philosophy as did Ayatollahs
Golpaygani, Khonsari, and Shahrudi. The policy is
said to have been formulated by ayatollahs prominent
in the two decades between 1940 and 1960�
Behbehani, Borujerdi, and Kashani." This policy,
however, fairly describes the attitude of Ayatollah
Haeri, who practically single-handed, had revived
Qom as a theological center in the 1920s and 1930s.
His quietism and refusal to be drawn into political
problems provided some problems for the more activist
clergy, who revered him for his work but were troubled
by his passivity in the face of government provocations.
Haeri was, one ayatollah concluded, interested primar-
ily in protecting Islam and its institutions from the
retaliation that would follow if he took an open stand
against the government.�
Government Efforts To Control the Clergy. Skirmishes
continued between religious elements and the govern-
ment in the following years. Ayatollah Taleqani, who
had spent many years in prison or exile, was finally
released only to be continually harrassed by the
"The Shah conducted many campaigns against corruption. None of
those who were most guilty from the point of view of the religious
leaders suffered. Habib Elghanian, the Jewish businessman ex-
ecuted after Khomeini's victory had served a year for price-gouging
about two years earlier. (u)
"W. G. Millward, "Aspects of Modernism in Shi'a Islam," Studia
Islamica, vol. 37 (1973), p. 115. (u)
Razi, Asar p. 88f. (u)
17
authorities. On one occasion two of his sons were
arrested. They were released a few days later.'
(b)(3)
The Shah toyed with several ideas for bringing the
clergy under tighter government supervision. He con-
templated trying to introduce a reformed educational
system for the clergy and to certify and pay them like
regular employees, and he considered creating a
cabinet post for religious affairs. Later a cabinet post
for endowments was formed to try to centralize the
administration of the endowments. (b)(3)
In 1970 the Shah proposed the formation of a Relgious
Corps that would draft religious students into the
military and assign them as mullahs in the villages.
The religious community refused to have anything to
do with the idea. The opposition of the normally
apolitical Ayatollah Seyed Ahmad Khonsari was
probably decisive in this case.
(b)(3)
Early in 1972 chances for rapprochement between the
government and religious leaders seemed improved.
Baghdad and Tehran were in the midst of hostilities
over Iran's support for Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq.
Iraq had retaliated by expelling Iranians from Iraq.
This involved many Iranian clergymen in An Najaf
and Karbala. For the first time the Iranian Govern-
ment and the religious community were united in their
opposition to Iraq's action. This brief honeymoon
ended abruptly when Senator Jamshid Alam, a crony
of the Shah, attacked Khomeini in a senate speech for
not intervening with the Iraqi Government to aid the
Iranian community. Although the speech was actually
made without the Shah's approval, it was widely
believed that Alam was speaking for the Shah. A few
days later the popular Tehran preacher Ayatollah
Mohammad Taqi Falsafi strongly criticized the gov-
ernment during a sermon at one of the most important
mosques in Tehran. (b)(3)
In early February 1972 a SAVAK official in Qom told
Ayatollah Golpaygani that the religious community
was going to come under the control of the endowments
''Ironically, Taleqani's sons were also arrested some six years later
by Ayatollah Khomeini's Komiteh, apparently on the suspicion that
they were Marxists. One son, Mojtaba, seems to have been a
member of a splinter group of the Mujahadin-e-Khalq-e-Iran. (u)
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Seeret
department. Golpaygani indignantly rejected the idea,
pointing out that the religious community had always
been independent. A couple of days later the students
at the Feyzieh School in Qom rioted. As usual, the
rioters were subdued by the security forces with
beatings and clubbings, and the normal state of
hostility between the government and the clergy
(b)(3) resumed.
Ayatollah Shariatmadari remained at least sporadi-
cally hopeful that differences could be resolved. His
outlook was at times so optimistic that he was accused
of being progovernment. His attitude changed, how-
ever, in the summer of 1972 after an incident in Qom.
In late April of that year, some 50 relatives of religious
and political arrestees went to Qom, took refuge in
Shariatmadari's home, and remained for nearly a
week. Finally the house was surrounded by security
troops and, when the bastis refused to leave, troops
entered and dispersed them. This incident, which also
resulted in demonstrations by theological students, had
a strong effect on Shariatmadari. Traditionally, the
homes of the great mujtaheds have been considered
(b)(3)o1ace5 of refuge (bast) and are inviolate.'
The government's action was not only offensive to
Shariatmadari personally but also�at least in his
eyes�an offense against religion. He retaliated by
making a speech at Feyzieh School in which he noted
that he had not supported Khomeini in 1963 because
he was against all kinds of disorders and demonstra-
tions. Furthermore, he believed that the government
was pursuing a genuine reform program. Now, how-
ever, he saw that he had been wrong. He repented of
his mistakes and asked God's forgiveness. Thus, by a
clumsy handling of a relatively minor incident, the
government turned one of the few influential
progovernment Ayatollahs into a supporter of
Khomeini.
(b)(3)
Later that year the Hosseinieh Ershad, a mosque built
around 1962 originally with SAVAK money, was
closed by the authorities. Although the incident was
confused, one version describes an inflammatory
speech made by Ali Shariati which resulted in large
demonstrations. Shariati was arrested but released the
" The tombs of the imams and their descendants (Imamzadehs) are
also places of bast. (u)
next day." Hosseinieh Ershad, which had become the
center of antigovernment propaganda, remained closed
for the next six years.
Meanwhile Khomeini, exiled for almost a decade in An
Najaf, continued his campaign against the Shah.
There is little detail available on his activities during
this period. He continued his preaching and teaching.
His book on Islamic Government, probably the defini-
tive statement of Khomeini's views on the subject, was
published in 1968. This work, in both Arabic and
Persian, had a significant impact on the thinking of
Khomeini's followers.
In late 1972 the government seemed relatively relaxed.
The occasional brushups with the clergy were trouble-
some but not dangerous. The Shah was willing to try to
pacify them as long as this did not compromise his
basic goals. The clergy were, after all, the one group
the Shah had not been able to subdue. The government
resumed issuing permits for sermons to clergymen that
had been denied them. Banned preachers were
permitted to resume their work. Mosques were re-
paired, and new religious buildings were financed by
the government.
Islamic scholars were
looking forward to the mid-1980s when
they thought it might be opportune to challenge the
Shah. n the mean-
time they did not intend to challenge the Shah and
would not present too much opposition, because any
replacement that they could foresee would be worse.
They intended only passive resistance and noncooper-
ation while building their political position.
But whatever these religious leaders might have
thought, Khomeini's followers were not as patient. The
next summer a large demonstration�by members of
the guerrilla organization the Mujahidin-e-Khalq (the
Peoples Warriors), Khomeini followers�broke out
again at the religious schools in Qom. One hundred of
the 270 arrested in hand-to-hand fighting were held for
trial.
" Although Shariati had been influential among religiously-inclined
intellectuals for a decade, he was so little known to the US official
community that he was mis-identified as an Ayatollah "who was
sometimes called Shariatzadeh." (u)
18
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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ID)p)
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ODA )
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(b)(3)
In the following years the government made little
effort to approach or placate the religious community.
The growing preponderance of Khomeini's followers
and the activities of the religiously oriented terrorist
group, the Mujahidin-e-Khalq, foreclosed what little
sentiment might have existed for rapprochement.
Politically and religiously the ground was being
prepared for the events of 1978-79.
--'7"47-717 4.-:,i,t,2`-',/:,f: ,,, � 7-1111.,. --7",-......-
, i't....,....14 ..tf
hthire.,".'-0, %; .� , . rjrn ....F. ,...7,....%
)
E ele ;--- ,
1".
ilr' -Pf'''''' 0:1.1
,v..--prr?-..... ...._
- F-4�4- ,, -.--. ---- '
,,...75,- - ,e- 4 \--nerat
�
: -- - ,.,x f�
z
Figure 3.
Pro-Khomeini demonstration, 1979
Unclassified �
19 Setit
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Part II: The Fundamentals
of Shia Islam
(b)(3)
Origins of the Shia
Because the events of the early decades of Islam are
alive to today's Shia leaders and because they, in their
several ways, want to model Iran on the original, pure
Islam as they understand it, a little history is needed at
this point.
Muhammad was born in Mecca around the year 571.
When he died 61 years later, the religion that he had
founded in 612 had begun to unify the diverse tribes of
the Arabian peninsula. A century later the expanding
Muslim empire reached from France to India and
Central Asia. During the next 750 years the Muslim
world constantly challenged and often surpassed
Europe in the Mediterranean. The work of its doctors,
philosophers, mathematicians, and astronomers pro-
vided models for European medieval scholars, and
many of the Greek philosophers have been reserved
(b)(3) only because of translations into Arabic
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
The Crusades marked only one of a long series of
violent encounters between the Muslim and Christian
worlds. The Crusades are now little more than a
historical curiosity for educated Westerners, but for
man?, Muslims the Crusades are still seen as a
motivating factor in relations between the Muslim and
Christian worlds. For people like Ayatollah Khomeini
the whole meaning of relations between the Muslim
and Western worlds is a single-minded attempt by the
latter to destroy Islam�the only bar to Christian-
Jewish hegemony.
There have been divisions and differences within Islam
from the earliest years that have contributed greatly to
the problems of the Muslim world�problems arising
not only from religious differences, but also from �
political and dynastic struggles for which Islam was
more an excuse than a cause. Iranian religious
ideologists such as Ayatollah Khomeini and the secular
sociologist Ali Shariati seek to reestablish Islam as
they think it existed before it was debased by secular
government and defeated by Christian intrigues. For
them this period ended with the death of Ali.
21
Figure 4
Selected Dates in the Early History of Islam
571 (approximate)
610 (or earlier)
622
Muhammad born at Mecca.
Muhammad has first revelation.
Muhammad flees from Mecca to
Medina. The Muslim calendar be-
gins with this flight (hijra).
632 Death of Muhammad.
632-661
The orthodox caliphates of Abu
Bekr, Omar, and Othman.
642 The last of the Sassanian Persian
shahs is defeated by the Muslims.
732 Muslims defeated at Tours and
Poitiers in France. This was deepest
penetration into Europe until Otto-
mans besieged Vienna in the 17th
century.
The above information is Unclassified.
As soon as Muhammad died in 632, a dispute arose as
to his legitimate successor. Within a generation this
dispute turned into a major schism that has divided the
Muslim world for the last 13 centuries and has had
widespread political consequences. (b)(3)
The first group were those who insisted that the
successor (Khalifa) should be chosen according to
Arab tribal custom by agreement of the community.
These came to be called Sunni, from Arabic Sunna
(custom or usage). The second group, the Shia or
"partisans" (of Ali), was much smaller. The Shia
believed that Muhammad should be followed by his
son-in-law and cousin Ali ibn Abu-Talib, who, Shiite
traditions say, was the first male convert to Islam."
�(b)(3)
The first group won, and during the next 25 years three
caliphs ruled the rapidly expanding Muslim world.
This was a period of almost constant warfare not only
against the Byzantine and Persian Empires into which
" A Shiite hadith (tradition) holds that when Muhammad was
returning from his farewell pilgrimage to Mecca, he stopped at a
place called Ghadir Kum, where he told his followers that he wanted
Ali to be his successor. The Sunnis deny this tradition. The day
(Zil-Hujja 18, by the Muslim calendar) is celebrated as a religious
holiday in Iran. (u)
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the Muslims were expanding but against internal
enemies. Two of the first three caliphs were assassi-
nated, starting a long and persistent tradition. Finally,
nearly 25 years after Muhammad's death, Ali was
chosen as the fourth caliph. He had served his
predecessors faithfully, but his four years were marked
(b)(3) by continuing warfare
(b)(3)
Al's right to the caliphate was challenged by
Muawiya, the governor of Damascus who was sup-
ported by Muhammad's wife Aisha." This dispute was
fought out in Iraq, where both sides had a strong
following. Troops of Muawiya and Ali fought two
bloody battles. As Ali was on the verge of victory, some
of Muawiya's soldiers raised a copy of the Koran on the
point of a spear. All fighting immediately stopped.
Muawiya took advantage of the lull to ask for a truce,
which Ali granted. This was prolonged, and negotia-
tions for a settlement were started. By a ruse one of
Muawiya's negotiators persuaded Ali to renounce the
caliphate, claiming that Muawiya would at the same
time renounce his claim. Ali did so, but Muawiya's
negotiator immediately announced that since the
caliphate was now empty, he nominated Muawiya.
Negotiations broke down, and fighting resumed. A
portion of Ali's supporters rebelled, claiming that he
had no right to submit to arbitration, and since he had
done so, had forfeited his right to the caliphate. It was
one of these "Outlaws," as they were called that
stabbed Ali to death two years later. He was buried in
An Najaf. This was the first of many splits among the
Shiites.
From this point the Sunni caliphate and the Shia
imamate diverged. The Sunnis (who today constitute
90 percent of all Muslims) continued their caliphate
through many vicissitudes down to 1924, when the post
was abolished�along with the Ottoman sultanate�by
" Aisha had a longstanding grudge against Ali. The incident that
created the grudge also produced one of the more important pieces of
Muslim social legislation. Twenty-five years earlier Aisha, then
about 16, was with Muhammad on one of his raids. On the way home
Aisha lingered behind to look for a necklace she had lost. When she
returned to the camp, she found that the party had left without her.
A young man passing by offered her a ride on his camel, which he
then led to the camp. There was much unfavorable comment. Ali
advised Muhammad to put Aisha aside. Muhammad apparently did
not believe the gossip and received the revelation recorded in the
Koran Sura 24, v.4, "And those who accuse honorable women but
bring not four witnesses, scourge them with 80 stripes and never
afterward accept their testimony. They indeed are evildoers." Aisha
never seems to have forgiven Ali for his attitude. (u)
Figure 5
Selected Dates in the History of the Shiites
656-661 Ali rules as fourth caliph and first imam of the
Shias.
661
Ali murdered.
680 Imam Hosein killed at battle of Karbala. This
occurred on the 10th day of the Muslim month of
Moharram. This month and especially the 10th
day is a major period of mourning for the Shias.
731-765 Reign of the sixth imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq. So many
traditions and legal rulings come from this period
that the majority school of the Shia, which is the
official religion of Iran, is often called the Ja'fari
School.
799-818 Rule of the eight imam Reza, whose tomb in
Mashhad is a major pilgrimage center.
878 The 12th imam, the infant Muhammad al-
Muntazar (the Mandi) disappears in a cave in
Samarra. Shias hold that he was taken to paradise
and that he will appear at the end of time to restore
peace and justice in the world.
The above information is Unclassified.
Ataturk. The Shia continued to follow the descendants
of Ali down to 878, when the 12th imam disappeared.
Shiite theology holds that when this Mandi reappears,
the world will be filled with justice.
This brief description focuses on only the most obvious
reason for the Sunni-Shia split. This political aspect is
more easily understood than the less tangible factors
that were probably as important, and perhaps more so,
in motivating the mass popular support for the party of
Ali.
Less tangible factors were also the main elements in
the success of Ayatollah Khomeini's campaign against
the Shah. Economic, social, and political grievances
were the terms in which the more articulate of the
opposition voiced their complaints. The theological and
philosophical opposition of the Schoolmen which
provided the religious justification for clerical leaders
had little direct impact in motivating the masses. The
sermons and leaflets directed to the public appealed
not to the intellect but to the emotions of a people for
whom religion is a story of struggle and martyrdom,
22
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(b)(3)
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whose principal holidays are celebrations of defeat not
joy, and for whom jinns are an everpresent reality."
At least two major disputes later divided the Shiites.
One was over the succession of the fifth imam. Those
who split off at that time are called the Zaidis and are
now found mostly in Yemen. The other argument was
over the succession of the seventh imam. These
"Seveners" are the Ismailis who gave birth to the
Order of the Assassins. They are represented today by
the followers of the Agha Khan. There were also
theological differences that motivated these disputes,
but they are not relevant here.
Of the 12 imams recognized by the dominant sect of
the Shia, two need to be mentioned. These are the two
sons of Ali (grandsons of Muhammad), Hasan and
Hosein. After Ali was murdered, Muawiya was
declared caliph. Hasan, Al's oldest son, called upon
the Iraqis for support, but Muawiya opened negotia-
tions with him, and Hasan agreed to withdraw in
exchange for a generous pension
For the next 19 years Muawiya ruled without chal-
lenge. He transformed the caliphate from a simple
position of first among equals to a hereditary monar-
chy with many of the trappings of the neighboring
Byzantine Empire. Muawiya designated his son Yazid
to succeed him. When Yazid took office, opposition to
the rule of his family arose once more. The most
prominent opponent was Ali's younger son Hosein,
" The concept of jinns (the genies of the Arabian Nights) is not
merely a popular superstition, although the learned and the ignorant
might view it differently. A distinguished Shia Sufi philosopher
wrote that "to understand the. . . jinn one must ... go beyond a
conception of reality that includes only the world of matter and the
mind (this paralyzing dualism that makes an understanding of
traditional doctrines impossible) to an awareness of a hierarchic
reality made up of the three worlds of spirit, psyche, and matter." As
man exists in the world of matter, the jinn exists in the psychic world
Man was made of clay into which God breathed life. Jinns are made
of fire into which God breathed life. Unlike man, jinns can appear in
different forms, but like man they possess responsibility before God.
Some are religious and Muslim, but others are forces that rebelled
against God; they are the "Armies of Satan." The evil jinn is the
most prevalent in the popular mind. They appear as concrete
physical figures of varying shapes, and man seeks spiritual aid
against them by incantations, usually of the Koran. (Seyed Hosein
Nasr, "A Note on the Jinn," in Tabatabai, Shiite Islam, pp.
235-237. For a description of jinns as they appeared to villagers, see
Robert Alberts, Social Structure and Cultural Change in an Iranian
Village, University of Wisconsin Ph.D. dissertation 1963., Chapter
23.(u)
23
who advanced his own claim to the caliphate. (There
were two other claimants.) (b)(3)
Yazid's troops and the greatly outnumbered followers
of Hosein met on the plain of Karbala in Iraq on the
10th of Moharram, 680. Hosein and all his followers
were slaughtered, an incident that is commemorated
every year by the Shias with ceremonies of mourning,
parades, and dramatic productions recreating the
"Tragedy of Karbala.'"' For many years the
Moharram ceremonies have been used as political
occasions with the Shah implicitly�and sometimes
explicitly�compared to the tyrant Yazid and the
Iranian masses playing the role of the martyred
Hosein."
(b)(3)
The Shiites were not destroyed by the massacre of
Hosein. Instead their faith was strengthened, but they
had little political power. The 12th and last imam
disappeared in a cave in Samarra, Iraq in 878. His
return is awaited by the Shias as the beginning of a
reign of peace and justice. For the next 70 years, the
Hidden Imam was visible only to four "agents" of the
imam. When the last one died, there was
communication with the imam. (b)(3)
This "absence" has had a significant impact on the
Shia attitude toward church-state relations. With the
imam absent there was no legitimate government, and
it was not even necessary to work for reform or a
change in government because that too could only be
illegitimate. Since a regime is not perfect, the way is
left open for action in the future. A Western scholar
wrote in 1960 that "such an attitude might often be
politically harmless, but there lurked in it a potential
danger. A change of circumstances might suggest to
the adherents of the movement that the time for action
had come." This seems to be what happened in 1978.
(b)(3)
In the centuries that followed, Shiism became firmly
entrenched, especially in the eastern part of the
caliphate, Persia and Iraq. (b)(3)
"See appendix A for a discussion of this important day of mourning.
(u)
Ayatollah Khomeini was first arrested in 1963 for making this
specific comparison. (u)
" W. Montgomery Watt, "Shiism under the Umayyads", Journal of
the Royal Asiatic Society (1960), p. 161f. (u)
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Many of the troubles that afflicted Islam arose from
Arabic-Persian rivalry, which roughly paralleled the
Sunni-Shia split. For a hundred years in the 8th and
9th centuries a Persian Shiite dynasty ruled much of
Iraq and western Iran, appointing the caliphs in
Baghdad and marrying into the caliphal family. It was
under this dynasty that the ancient title shahanshah
resumed and Shiite festivals, including
ku)k`?..toharram, were established as public festivals.
Shiism reached its present position in Iran in the 16th
century when the Safavids established themselves as
the rulers of Iran. The Safavids originated in a Shia
dervish order established at Ardebil in Azarbayjan.
Through intermarriage with a ruling Turkish tribe
(Turks and Mongols had overrun Iran in previous
centuries) the head of the order achieved political and
military power. His son launched a military campaign
against the Turkish tribes, which in 20 years gave him
control over much of Persia. During the next 300 years
there were frequent wars between the Persians and the
Turks reflecting not only ethnic rivalry,50 but also
(b)(3)3hia-Sunni rivalry and dynastic ambitions.
Under the Safavids Persia for the first time in a
thousand years had a Persian ruler�speaking Persian
rather than Arabic or Turkish�a unique religion,
Shiism, and an opportunity to develop its own cultural
identity. The Twelver Shiite creed established by the
Safavids as the official religion of Iran has continued
(b)(3)lominant to the present
Shiite Theology
Shiite theology need not be discussed in detail but
some points need to be kept in mind. The Shiites
believe in five principles of religion (usul al-din):
� The absolute oneness of God.
� He has sent many messengers, the last one was
Muhammad.
� Resurrection.
� The doctrine of the absolute justice of God and the
doctrine of divine bounty.
� The doctrine of imamate.
The first three principles are held by all Muslims; the
last two only by the Shiites. Muhammad is called the
5� Conflict between Iran and Turan, Persian and Turk, is a major
theme of Ferdowsi's epic poem the Shahnameh, already nearly 500
years old by the time the Safavids arose.(u)
messenger of God. There have been other messengers,
among them Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. Their
messages were valid for their times, but all have been
superceded by Muhammad, who is the final messen-
ger.
The justice of God is that justice on earth that is
produced by the application of the Shariah. It is not
abstract divine justice but is concrete justice that
results from following God's instructions.
The doctrine of imamate, as has already been noted, is
the single most important difference between Sunnis
and Shiites. The majority of the Shia believe that
Muhammad ranks above Ali, the first imam who is
sinless, infallible, and incapable of error, not only in
public acts but also in private ones. For the Shiites the
last imam�the Mandi�is the Hujja, the proof of
God, he is the upholder of the command of God, and
the lord of the age. He is deathless and has miracu-
lously remained alive since his absence." He will return
to fill the earth with justice and equity. In the
meantime the mujtaheds speak for the absent imam."
The five duties of a Muslim are well known:
� The profession of faith, "There is no God but God,
and Muhammad is the messenger of God." To this
the Shiites add "and Ali is the friend of God."
� Daily prayer. There are five required prayers. In
practice, some of these are combined, reducing
prayer to three occasions during the day.
� Pilgrimage to Mecca. Hajj is obligatory at least once
a lifetime for every Muslim who is physically and
financially able.
� Fasting during the month of Ramadan, the ninth
month of the lunar year.
� Almsgiving, technically one-fortieth of one's annual
income to be spent on the poor, the needy, those
employed in its collection, and other categories.
""The opponents of Shiism protest that.. . the Hidden Imam
should by now be nearly 12 centuries old, whereas this is impossible
for any human being. In answer it must be said that the protest is
based only on the unlikelihood of such an occurrence, not its
impossibility." Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai,
Shiite Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), p.
213. This is a reply to the anti-Shiite Ahmad Kasravi, who in a 1944
pamphlet argued that no man can live 1,000 years, and if the 12th
imam actually existed, he should have come into the open and
fulfilled his religious duty. (u)
" The role of the mujtahed is discussed in more detail later. (u)
(b)(3)
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There is an additional requirement levied on Shiites
which might be subsumed under point five. This is
khums, a religious tax paid to the family of the Prophet
which was discontinued by the Sunnis after
Muhammad's death. The Shiites maintain it, however,
as payable to the "People of the House" of Muham-
mad, that is to Ali and his descendants, the imams. The
clergy, acting in the absence of the imam, receive this
tax. Technically, it is one-fifth of yearly cash income,
half of which goes to support poor descendants of the
Prophet (that is, the Seyeds) and half to be spent at the
mujtaheds' discretion. This is the source of most of the
money that the bazaaris provided to Khomeini. It is
also the "one-fifth tax" that Khomeini refers to as
providing the financial basis of the Islamic state." The
Koranic authority is the Shia interpretation of Sura 8,
v. 41, "And know that whatever ye take as spoils of
war, lo! a fifth thereof is for Allah, and for the
messenger, and for the kinsmen and orphans and the
needy and the traveler, if ye believe in Allah and that
which we revealed unto our slave on the day of
discrimination. . . ."
The Clergy
The Setting
Two of the great centers of Shiite learning are at An
Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran. An Najaf takes
precedence because of its antiquity�a center of
religious education for a thousand years according to
one authority TM�and its proximity to the most holy
places of Shia Islam, the Mosque of Ali at Kufa, three
miles away, and the grave of Hosein at Karbala.
Sammara, Kazimain, and Karbala, all in Iraq, also
have schools of lesser importance and there are schools
of locajjportance in most Iranian cities of any size.
An Najaf The theological complex of An Najaf is to
the Shia what Al-Azhar is to the Sunnis, and the
education of a serious scholar is not complete until he
has studied at An Najaf. All the outstanding
theologians and mujtaheds have had long periods of
residence there either as students or teachers, often as
" See Khomeini, Islamic Government, JPRS 72663, 19 Jan 1979,
p. 11 ff. A collection of his traditional Islamic views on finances and
taxes is available in Ayatollah Khomeiny, Principes politiques,
philosophiques, sociaux et religieux. (Jean-Marie Xaviere (ed),
Paris: Editions Libres-Hallier, 1979), p. 151 ff. (u)
Al-Asafi, The School of An Najaf. (u)
both simultaneously. Many ordinary clerics take
advantage of the pilgrimage to the holy places in Iraq
to attend lectures at An Najaf, providing them with
additional prestige."
(b)(3)
An Najaf has about 24 colleges, among them
Borujerdi, Seyed Kazim Ali Tazdi, Akhund, Hindi,
Qawam, Sadr, Ahmadyeh, and Mandiyah. There is no
fee charged at these schools and no staff except for a
janitor. Anyone of any standard of scholarship can live
and study there as long as he can find a room. The
number of students fluctuates, but is generally be-
tween 2,000 and 3,000 from all parts of the Shia world
and as far away as Tibet.
(b)(3)
The student may remain as long as he likes, but 15
years seems to be an average stay. Students depend on
independent financing or on grants from religious
leaders. Financial figures are difficult to obtain, but in
1957 Ayatollah Borujerdi of Qom was providing about
$17,000 per month for "bread money" to students at
An Najaf. In addition, he was giving allowances to
some 500 needy scholars totaling about $5,500 per
month. Some of these allowances were as low as $5 or
$6 but a prominent, needy scholar might receive as
much as $80 to $85, an allowance that compared
favorably to Iraqi Government salaries of the time.
This was probably only part of Borujerdi's expenses.56
No current figures are available, but one can speculate
that today's expenditures must be two to three times
greater than the earlier amount
(b)(3)
The ulema of An Najaf were active against the British
during and after World War I, and even carried arms
in a jihad." The 1920 Iraqi revolt against the British
was led by the Shia mujtaheds of An Najaf, Karbala,
and Kazimain, and the Wahhabi incursion into Iraq
" Mojtaba Mirlohi, better known by his nom de guerre Navab
Safavi, the founder of the terrorist group Fedayan-e-Islam had an
eighth grade secular education and received some religious educa-
tion from an uncle. He spent a few months in Iraq and returned
dressed in clerical garb. Although his scholarship was questioned, his
status was not. There is no indication that he had any further
theological education before his execution in 1955 at the age of 32.
(u)
Jamali, "The Theological Colleges of An Najaf," Muslim World,
50(1960), p. 15-22. (u)
" Sayyid Abul Qassem Kashani, who 30 years later became a
leading figure in the oil nationalization under Mossadeq, was one of
these. (u)
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(b)(3)
about this time was met by strong resistance from the
Shia."
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
The elections that the newly enthroned King Faysal
called in 1921 were boycotted by the mujtaheds who
issued a fatwah to the effect that "Whoever partici-
pates in them or gives the slightest assistance will
disobey God and His Prophet and saints." Attempts by
the King and the British to engage the ulema in
negotiations to compromise their differences failed.
The ulema simply refused any discussion.
Two of the clerical agitators were expelled from Iraq to
Iran in 1923, and in protest several other high-ranking
mujtaheds left for Iran, where they were well received
by�among other Iranian officials�the Minister of
Foreign Affairs Mossadeq-al-Saltaneh, 30 years later
Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq.
There is nothing on the record to indicate Reza Khan's
reaction to this influx. He was then Minister of War,
and it would be another five years before Reza Shah
b 3)-vould have to confront the clergy.
()(
Shia religious writers remember how, when "the
colonialistic Iraqi Government, on the command of its
tyrannical masters . . . exiled these great spiritual
leaders," they were met at the Iran-Iraq border by
government officials and the Iranian ulema and
escorted with "utmost pomp through the cities of Qasr-
e Shirin, Kermanshah, Hamadan, Malayer, and Arak
until they reached Qom." " They were well received by
the leading clergyman of Qom, Ayatollah Abdol
Karim Haeri, in accordance with their rank and
dignity, but Haeri refrained from taking up their
cause, to the disappointment of many clergymen of the
(b)(3)me�
During these events Khomeini was at Qom as a student
and must have attended classes given by the exiled
mujtaheds and heard their arguments and debates
about the difficulties Islam was having under the rule
"The Wahhabis invaded Iraq at least three times in the 19th and
20th centuries. In the two earlier attacks Shia shrines at Karbala and
An Najaf were destroyed and thousands of Shias were killed. These
events, as well as theological differences, are behind Khomeini's
occasional attacks on the Wahhabis whom he seems to consider only
a shade better than Jews, Bahais, and Westerners. (u)
" Razi, Asar al-Hujja, p.22. (u)
ret
of the British. Most of the exiles eventually returned to
Iraq to resume their preaching and teaching.
The ulema of An Najaf were no longer a direct threat
to the Iraqi Government, but their "trials" are
recorded: the trial of Egypt (the 1956
Anglo-French-Israeli invasion); the trial of the expan-
sion of Communism, after the 1958 Iraqi revolution;
the trial of personal conditions when "Abd al-Karim
Qasim, on behalf of the imperialists, tried to renew the
elimination of Islamic laws in the area of personal
law. . . the tyrant insisted that the Muslims have
recourse to the laws of the unbelievers"; and the Trial
of Muslim Iran (1963) when "in An Najaf the ulema
took a stand in opposition to the Iranian Government
and sought to rectify the conditions of the ulema to
secur lease and put an end to these barbaric
acts.'
The difficulties of An Najaf in recent years have been
recorded in current reporting. These include the
expulsion of Iranians, many of them involved in the
religious institutions, in 1970; attempts by Baghdad to
mute Shiite religious observances, the expulsion of
Khomeini; and the rise in Shia agitation in shrine cities
of Iraq following the success of Khomeini's Islamic
revolution
An Najaf clearly has considered itself part of an
Islamic community in general and the Shia community
in particular, rather than of the nation-state of Iraq. In
this context whether a clergyman was Iranian or Iraqi
has been irrelevant, and the struggle has been Shia
Islam (sometimes Islam in general) against the godless
secularizers; geography has been incidental.
Qom. Qom, some 80 miles south of Tehran is the Shiite
center in Iran. The largest number of outstanding
schools are concentrated there, and the major Shiite
figures either live there or spend much time there.
Other cities have theological schools, but most of these
provide terminal education for the local mullah or
serve as preparation for studies in Qom and An Najaf.
Approached from across the desert and from any
direction, the first glimpse of Qom is the gilded dome
over the Shrine of Fatemah, the sister of the eighth
26
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Figure 6.
Exterior of Shrine of Fatemeh at Qom
Unclassified
imam, who is buried there. This burial was in 861, but
it was not until the 17th century that the city became a
major pilgrimage center. At that time the Safavid
dynasty, as a result of its rivalry with the Sunni
Ottoman Empire, declared Twelver Shiism the state
religion. The present Shrine was built by Shah Abas as
part of the upgrading of Shia figures. Three Safavid
shahs are buried in Qom, as are 444 descendants of the
imams. Hassan al-Sabah, founder of the order of the
Assassins, is said to have been born there
Qom has had a checkered history. It has been sacked
by both Mongols and Afghans, and in the middle of the
19th century it lost half its population to famine. In the
mid-1930s an American diplomat described it as "the
personification of dirt and filth" and except for the
Shrine "one of the least attractive of Persian towns." 60
The population of Qom today is nearly 175,000, an
increase of about 25 percent in the last decade. A large
part of the population is connected in one way or
another with the religious establishment. In the
Pahlavi years efforts were made to dilute the religious
preponderance by encouraging the establishment of
64 Henry Filmer (pseud.), J. Reeves Child, The Pageant of Persia
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1936), p. 33. (u)
27
secular schools, factories, and theaters. Nevertheless,
the influence of the religious establishment was
recognized by the election of Abol Fazel Towliat,
custodian of the Shrine, to parliament from 1937 to
1955. His predecessor from 1928 to 1937 was also a
shrine official. After Towliat, with the government
having greater control of the elections, deputies with
little or no religious affiliation were elected.
(b)(3)
Although Qom had religious schools for several
centuries, they had fallen to a second rate status, with
Karbala and An Najaf being far superior. The turning
point came in 1921 when Ayatollah Abdol Karim
Haeri-Yazdi, a well-known teacher in Arak, made the
pilgrimage to Qom.' A prominent merchant tried to
persuade him to move to Qom, but it was not until a
hadith was quoted to him, "at the end of time,
knowledge will appear in Qom and spread to the rest of
the world," that he agreed.
(b)(3)
Several of Haeri-Yazdi's followers from Arak followed
him to Qom, among them 21-year-old Ruhollah
Khomeini. In the intervening years Qom has steadily
increased its stature as a center of religious learning; it
has at the same time become the center of clerical
opposition to the government.
(b)(3)
Fifteen separate schools compose the Howze-ye-
Elmiyyah-ye Qom (the Qom Circle of Learning). They
are all private schools generally named after their
founders. Two schools, the Fayziyyeh and the Dar
al-Shifa, were the only ones in existence when Haeri
arrived in Qom in 1921; others had gone out of
existence. Thirteen were built or renovated during the
Pahlavi period, as many as half of these since 1945�a
commentary both on the vitality of religion and the
ineffectiveness of the government's anticlerical cam-
paign. (b)(3)
The best known school is the Fayziyyeh, where the
majority of the anti-Pahlavi manifestations took place.
The Fayziyyeh dates from the Safavid period and is
adjacent to the Shrine of Fatameh. The main building
measures 250 by 170 feet, but has had many additions
in the last three decades. It has 100 rooms used for
students.
(b)(3)
"Haeri-Yazdi is the father of Mehdi Haeri-Yazdi, recently
Ayatollah Khomeini's special representative in the Iranian Embassy
in Washington. (u)
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Figure 7.
Anti-Shah demonstration inside shrine at Qom
The Hujjatiyyeh comprises six two-storied buildings
with 126 student rooms. The Mandiyyeh School was
built by Ayatollah Mar'ashi-Najafi and has 100
students and scholars. One of the largest, now directed
by Mar'ashi-Najafi, is the two-story Mu'miniyyeh
School. It has 40 rooms, a storage room, and a
classroom on the ground floor; and 32 rooms, a library,
and a study hall on the second floor. A description of a
student's room gives an idea of how he lives; a room
about 12 by 15 feet, carpeted and curtained, with an
individual stove, a lamp, and a night light. Although
not included in this particular description, the student
would probably keep his clothes in a wooden chest and
his books in niches built into the walls
Little information is available on financing. Students
are supported by funds dispensed by the Ayatollahs.
Khomeini was responsible for disbursing funds to
students after Ayatollah Borujerdi's death in 1961, but
there is no information on how this is handled at
(b)(3)present.
Mashhad and Others. A detailed consideration of the
religious role of other major Iranian cities would show
that religious institutions have a sharp impact on the
local scene and have played a role in local politics.
Such a consideration is beyond the scope of this paper,
Unclassified �
but an idea of the substructure on which such influence
is based can be grasped by looking at the number of
institutions involved.
Mashhad in Khorasan Province is second only to Qom
as a religious center. The tomb of the eighth imam, Ali
Reza, is there, and the Shrine is the largest establish-
ment in Mashhad. In 1911 during the struggle between
the monarchy and the constitutionalists, Russian
artillery supporting the Shah bombarded the Shrine
killing many people. This incident has never been
forgotten and is one of the reasons for Iranian distrust
of the Russians.
Closely associated with, but not part of the Shrine is
the Shrine Foundation, a secular institution of which
the Shah was always the head. The actual administra-
tion of the Foundation was carried out by the Deputy
Administrator who was generally the governor-general
of Khorasan.
Before land reform the Shrine Organization controlled
some 500 villages in Khorasan, making it one of the
largest landowners in the country. Income was used to
support such secular activities as the Reza Shah
Hospital, fund orphanages, and build hotels and
28
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(D)(i)
(b)(3)
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ret
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Figure 8.
Entrance to the shrine in Mashhad. Since this
picture was taken the adjacent shops and homes
have been razed for several hundred yards.
factories. In addition to this, large amounts were used
to support religious students, mullahs and religious
schools. Probably even larger amounts were siphoned
off all along the line by secular administrators and
religious functionaries alike. In 1965 the Ostan-
e-Quds, or Sacred Threshold, as the Shrine Founda-
tion is called, had an estimated disposable annual
income of more than $2.5 million, although the true
income was probably about twice as much.
In spite of the fact that the Shrine Foundation
depended heavily on the government and the regime
frequently used it for political purposes, the clergy
associated with it were generally not government
stooges, and for the 1 million Iranians who made the
pilgrimage to Mashhad every year, the Shrine offered
a genuine religious experience.
The existence of a special group of people in Mashhad
should be noted, the Sadat-e-Razavi, or descendants of
the Imam Reza. There are more than 5,000 of these in
Mashhad who, if they are clerics, wear black turbans.
The indigent members of the Sadat-e-Razavi are
supported by a separate endowment. This endowment
has long been under the control of the Qaemaqami
29
Unclassified 0
family, an elite family of Khorasan that maintained
close ties with the Royal Court. (b)(3)
How the Islamic revolution will affect the administra-
tion of the Shrine is not clear. There is much money
involved here, and a struggle for control among the
clergy is likely. (b)(3)
In addition to the Gowhar Shad Mosque, Mashhad's
most important mosque located next to the Shrine,
there are some 75 other mosques, 10 of them built in
recent years; 30 imamzadehs, shrines associated with
descendants of the imams; and 20 madrasehs (reli-
gious schools). There are also a large number of
separate organizations devoted to the study and
propagation of religion.
(b)(3)
For other major cities the fi ures alone provides some
measure of religious activity (b)(3)
Esfahan has more than 200 mosques, three of them
well-known tourist attractions, as well as 14 pilgrimage
sites. There are also about 20 madrasehs with a total
enrollment of some 500 students." (b)(3)
" The author acquired this inf n 1976 from the caretaker of
the Madraseh Madar-e-Shah (b)(3)
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Figure 9.
A neighborhood mosque in Tehran
Tabriz has some 225 mosques, eight mausoleums,
three imamzadehs, and four madrasehs. About 1,000
Tabrizis are said to be in the theological center in
Qom!'
Shiraz possesses 57 mosques, 27 pilgrimage sites, three
mausoleums, and 10 madrasehs. The number of the
ulema in Shiraz is not recorded, but one "Who's Who"
(b)(3)0f the Shiraz ulema runs to four volumes!'
Tehran has a large number of mosques, some dating
back a couple of centuries. Others were built recently,
but there seems to be no overall figure available. There
are scores of Hosseiniyehs, which specialize in com-
memorating the martyrdom of Hosein. There are also
12 places of pilgrimage in Tehran and 19 in the
surrounding countryside. One of the most famous of
these is the Imamzadeh Daud located in the mountains
northwest of Tehran. It is reached by a difficult and
precipitous trail, but both the trail and the village
surrounding the Imamzadeh are crowded with pil-
grims during the summer months. One clerical writer
" Ganfineh, Vol.3, p. 287. (u)
'4 Gan.' ineh, Vol. 4, p. 417. (u)
ret
Unclassified #1D
comments that thousands have traversed this difficult
path without injury, but "if someone were to fall and
land in the deep chasm, he would climb out unharmed
because of the power of the saint." 65
The above numbers highlight the sort of structure the
clergy has available. Mosques and Hosseiniyehs and
the lesser religious study organizations connected with
them function as social and political organizations, a
shadow power structure paralleling the official power
structure, which for the first time in three quarters of a
century has recently demonstrated its ability to mobi-
lize the masses.
Education
The Iranian clergy grows up in a very special world,
and for those who achieve high rank, the world is even
more special. Most of the present day religious
leadership was born in the first decade of the 20th
century. A secular educational system was practically
nonexistent at that time. Whatever education was
available�none for most of the population�was
provided by the clergy, and the emphasis was primarily
" Ganjineh, Vol. 4, p. 344 f. (u)
30
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(b)(�))
(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
religious." For most of those who received some
education it was at an elementary level�a knowledge
of writing, arithmetic, the Koran in Arabic (often
memorized more than understood), some knowledge of
Persian poetry, and little else. For those who wanted to
go beyond the maktab, the five or six years of
elementary schooling, the madraseh, a higher religious
school, provided the avenue. This system turned out
not only clergymen, but also much of the civil service,
politicians, statesmen, and litterateurs as well as
agnostics, atheists, dervishes, Sufis, and secularists.
The clergy has been held in popular esteem in spite of
stories of clerical corruption, deceit, and general
ungodliness which are as prevalent in Iran as in other
societies.� Religion has always provided upward mo-
bility for those with the ability and stamina to undergo
the rigorous training leading to a high position. For
some clergy, the religious vocation is a family tradition
spanning many generations, and a respectable geneal-
(b)(3) ogy can be important.
Those following the path of religion start at an early
age. The example of one 17th century theologian is
typical of the regimen endured by most aspiring clerics
until very recently. By the age of five and a half he had
read the Koran and learned many poems. In the next
five years he studied Arabic grammar continuously,
memorized basic texts and commentaries of religious
authorities, made his way to Iraq to study at a famous
madraseh, and journeyed to Shiraz for the same
purpose. He studied in Shiraz until he was 20 years old.
Returning home he married�only to return to Shiraz
after three weeks, leaving his wife behind. He then
went to Esfahan to study further. There he found a
patron in the most powerful theologian of the time,
who had him appointed a lecturer at the madraseh.
After nine years, because of increasing difficulty with
" Education was mostly an urban institution and limited to middle-
class merchant or civil service, and upper class families. Often
schools were supported by a wealthy family primarily to educate
family members. Village maktabs, such as the one in which
Khomeini received his early education, were uncommon and even
where they existed they were attended by only a few students. (u)
" Razi in his Ganj ineh writes".. . it is a matter of regret that in
general the study of ethics has been abandoned and, with few
exceptions, largely ignored, and for this reason, many of those who
wear the clothes of a spiritual leader are lacking desirable qualities,
but act in such a fashion that people view them negatively and have
no faith or confidence in them." (u)
31
his eyes, he started traveling again. He visited all the
holy cities of Iraq, revisited Esfahan, and finally
returned at age 38 to his first madraseh in Iraq. For
most of his life he lived in poverty, eating little,
sometimes near starvation, his eyes ruined by studying
in the near dark or by candlelight, running errands,
and doing menial work for his various teachers. He
never attained high rank or wealth. He died when he
was 78 years old, and there is no record of whether he
thought it all worthwhile. (b)(3)
Today's clerical leaders may not have lived in such
penury, but worldly goods do not rank high among
their needs. Three hundred years ago Shiism was just
getting established in Iran, and the funding now
available for the talabeh (student of religion) was
nonexistent. For most, the life is frugal even now, and a
reputation for abstemiousness is a part of a clergy-
man's charisma. There are a few, however, whose
interests are more material than spiritual. What
influence they have�and it may be considerable�
derives more from the economic or political power they
have garnered than from their spiritual leadership.
(b)(3)
An examination of the biographies of 105 ulema living
in 1975 provides some interesting insights into the
clergy as a whole." The clergymen were drawn from
six cities: Tehran (21), Tabriz (16), Qom (21),
Esfahan (11), Shiraz (18), Mashhad (21).
(b)(3)
In this sample birthdates were available for 93. The
oldest was born sometime before 1875, the youngest in
1934. One-third were born between 1904 and 1915,
including 10 percent born in 1911 alone. About
one-third were born before 1904: The average age of
the 93 ulema is at least 63.5; in Esfahan the average
age is 78
(b)(3)
All bear the title Hojjat-al-Islam (Proof of Islam),
except 18 described as ayatollahs and one mujtahed.
Forty-six percent are seyeds, or descendants of the
Prophet, and two of the sample claim descent from the
imams. All but one or two are hajjis. Three-quarters of
" These data are taken from Razi's Ganjtheh-ye-Daneshmandan.
The criteria he used to choose his subjects are not known, except that
they have some claim to being scholars. Thus, the run-of-the-mill
mullah is not included. The only criteria used for the choices in this
paper are that they were living in the six major cities in 1975 when
the source book was published. (u)
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Figure 10
Birthplace and Residence of a Sample of Clergymen
Living there
Born there
Educated there
Tehran
21
4
8
Tabriz
16
10
14
Q0111
21
2
18
Esfahan
11
10
10
Shiraz
18
14
18
Mashhad
21
8
15
The above information is Unclassified.
the ulema had fathers who were clergymen, and of
these nearly half had grandfathers, great-grand-
,,cathers, or great-great-grandfathers who were also
b)(3)-iergymen.
As might be expected, teaching, writing, and conduct-
ing religious services of various kinds are the primary
activities of the ulema. One Tabrizi mujtahed was
described as "preaching and protesting innovation
from his own mosque," and another Tabrizi apparently
spends some of his time "fighting with unjust people."
He has probably been overworked in the last year. Five
of the 105 ulema were in exile from Iraq.
About 50 percent of the sample have studied in Qom.
The Esfahanis, however, tend to stay at home; if they
leave home to study, it is to An Najaf in Iraq. The
Shirazis also go to An Najaf more often than anywhere
else if they continue their education.
The Tabriz clergymen generally continue their educa-
tion in Qom, and if they go further it is to An Najaf.
Two of the Tabrizis were educated in An Najaf and
(b)(3)was studying in An Najaf when his son was born.
then went to Tabriz. The father, a Tabrizi, probabl
The manner in which the clergy is trained is in some
respects very free. The talabeh can choose what he
wants to study, where he wants to study, and with
whom. There are no formal examinations, no required
courses in the Western sense, and no diplomas.
Counterbalancing this is the limited range of subject
matter that is available and the attitude that whatever
is not included in the "religious sciences" is of no
Importance. This attitude has been clearly stated by
one writer:
The true and religiously enlightened thinkers are
totally in agreement on the fact that the new branches
of learning like physics and chemistry, most of which
are material and natural sciences, are nothing more
than an illusion and an empty husk and give ignorant
people pieces of knowledge far from the truth. Indeed,
most of it is misleading and harmful." (u)
Some of today's students have apparently studied at
secular institutions before turning toward religion, but
the traditionalist is not enthusiastic:
A group of students at Qom have degrees in the new
sciences like chemistry and physics, and some of them
are familiar with foreign languages. But, as we have
said, the last sciences are superfluous knowledge and
not 7/m, because ignorance of them is not a loss.
But all natural sciences are not excluded:
Astronomy consists of knowing the positions of the
heavens and the fixed and moving stars, their signs and
their influences. Mathematics consists of knowledge of
numbers and their capability of being added, sub-
tracted, etc. The religion of Islam, for a number of
reasons, has forbidden the study of astronomy and has
called astronomers liars, but it has permitted a portion
of it for the purpose of determining the qibla (the
direction of worship) and the time." (u)
Resistance to modern learning is not unique to this
particular writer. Twenty years ago an Iraqi Shiite
who had his early education in a traditional school
undertook a study of the theological school at An
Najaf, the most important educational institution for
the Shiites. He concluded:
I had many discussions with scholars and the great
mujtaheds about the need for introducing new
subject matter like modern philosophy, psychology,
sociology, some hygiene, and elements of natural
science. The response was generally negative. I re-
member talking to a professor of Islamic philosophy
about the philosophy of Henri Bergson. I found him
unacquainted with the name.'' (u)
Razi, Ganjineh-ye-Daneshmandan, p. 154f. (u)
" Ibid.
Fadil Jamali, "The Theological Colleges of Najaf," Muslim
World, 50(1960), p. 15-22. (u)
32
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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5eCiet
(b)(3)
There is some movement toward introducing modern
subjects into the curriculum, but there is little informa-
tion on what progress is being made. An Najaf may be
more advanced than Qom in this respect. The develop-
ment of a British-sponsored secular education system
in Iraq seems to have galvanized some of the Shia
leaders there to undertake a modernization. This
movement is associated with Shaykh Mohammed
Reza al-Muzafar, one of the leading Shiite scholars of
An Najaf in this century. He apparently was troubled
particularly by the inadequate preparation of the
students in speaking and writing, attributing this to the
material they were immersed in.
Shaykh al-Muzafar realized that the benefit of such
textbooks that the Najafi student encountered at this
stage was outweighed by the mark of obscurity, so that
the student was forced to spend much time under-
standing the language.
Reform was not easy in An Najaf. Al-Asafi notes
circumspectly:
caution and conservatism marked the actions of those
in charge of the affairs of guidance and thought. . . .
General opinion prevailed over the course of events . . .
in Najaf which made the undertaking of any reform-
ing activity extremely dangerous. " (u)
Between 1934 and 1956 Shaykh al-Muzafar estab-
lished a sort of preparatory school aimed at training
students for higher religious education. Between 1936
and 1944 this school, called Muntadi al-Nashr, was
expanded from one level to four. The reforming aspect
of this school apparently consisted of an effort to
simplify the language used, to produce new textbooks,
and to establish a course of study in which the student
moved from one level to the next in an orderly manner.
In 1956 Shaykh al-Muzafar established a graduate
level religious school that prepared the students for the
grade of mujtahed. Innovations at this level were the
study of sociology, psychology, education, and foreign
languages
" Mohammad Mandi al-Asafi, The School of Najaf (in Arabic)
(Najaf, 1384(1964)). (u)
33
An indication of how far this section of the Najafi
ulema had progressed is the fact that the Sheikh
applied to the government for permission to open his
schools. The Muntadi al-Nashr is only one among the
24 religious schools in An Najaf, and there is no
information to indicate what influence it has had on
the traditional schools or even how it rates among the
clergy as a whole.
(b)(3)
Qom is conservative, but seems to have one school
teaching "modern" subjects. The Muntazariyyeh
school offers�in addition to the full range of tradi-
tional subjects�English, physics, chemistry, and biol-
ogy. The modern subjects are poorly taught, according
to one authority. It is fair to say that on the whole
Shiite theological education is conservative and tradi-
tional with only limited interest in modern areas of
education.
(b)(3)
This disinterest in modern learning arises from the fact
that Shiite Islam as it has always been interpreted in
Iran is a total and closed system. Since it is divinely
inspired, it is complete and infallible, and the answer to
all questions are contained in it when Islam is rightly
understood and interpreted. This is what clerics such
as Ayatollah Khomeini have in mind when they insist
that Islam is progressive and compatible with the
modern world.
(b)(3)
A characteristic of the system of education, at least on
the more advanced level, is the constant argumentation
and debate that takes place among scholars and
between students and teachers. An orthodox view is
expressed by Ayatollah Razi:
The sciences of argumentation and debate are
branches [of theology], the knowledge of which is very
important and necessary, especially in the defense of
God's unity and the worship of God that are the root
and foundation of this branch of learning in the face of
Communism and imperialism which are threatening
the world and also in the defense of guardianship and
Imamate from the Sunni Wahhabis.
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(b)(3)
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The functioning of this process is described as follows:
The skilled student presents his own point of view, his
objections, and problems to the teacher and requests
an answer. The teacher, who must show himself ready
and prepared to answer any kind of a question and
problem ... must give an answer. If a problem is not
raised or concern is not shown or if (the student) talks
too long or is too persistent, then with scholarly
harshness or in a friendly tone (the teacher) asks the
student to wait and cease objecting. Sometimes it
might happen that a teacher may concede a point to a
student and justly say that a student is right. It is
actually very interesting when a prepared and skilled
student stands against a distinguished professor.
But all was not scholarly objectivity. The story is told
of one great scholar who was held in such awe that only
five of his students dared to question him, and he
(b)(3)ignored all but two
The development of verbal agility and extemporaneous
comment is a major asset for the mujtahed who must
be prepared at any time and place to give authoritative
opinions on a wide range of subjects calling on the sum
total of his accumulated knowledge. There is no
provision for taking a question under advisement or
(b)(3)consulting a colleague for a second opinion.
Some of the discussions apparently approach the
dimensions of the theological debates of the European
middle ages. An early European observer commented
that metaphysical debate was "little more than a series
of argumentative disputations upon wild and unprofit-
able paradoxes," and courses in logic were mostly "an
ingenious method of playing upon words, the object
being not so much to arrive at truth as to display
quickness of mind and readiness of repartee in the
(b)(3) formation of possible hypotheses.""
The Curriculum
Islamic education has a long and brilliant tradition. Its
weakness has been its difficulty in absorbing modern
learning into the system and rationalizing it with
traditional precepts. Some Sunni schools such as
Cairo's Al-Azhar have achieved this. The Shia schools
as a whole seem to have successfully resisted modern-
(b)(3)ization.
" Dwight Donaldson, "The Shrine Colleges of Meshed," Muslim
World, Vol. 16 (1926), p.77. (u)
Figure 11
The Fields of Knowledge
Transmitted or Traditional Sciences
Morphology
Syntax/grammar
Literary Sciences
Rhetoric
Art of Metaphors
Principles of Jurisprudence (usul al-flqh)
Jurisprudence (flO)
Science of Hadith
Koranic Commentary (taisir)
Intellectual or Rational Sciences
Logic
Philosophical and Theological Sciences (falsafah and kalam)
Sufism and gnosis (tasawwuf analirfan)
Medicine*
Mathematical Science
Geometry
Arithmetic
Astronomy
� No longer taught, but could be revived.
The above information is Unclassified.
In the earliest centuries of Islam the mosque served as
a school teaching the Koran, hadith (traditions), and
Arabic, and this practice persists. In the 9th and 10th
centuries an enormous amount of Greek philosophical
and scientific work was translated into Arabic and
ultimately absorbed in the Islamic educational system.
Islamic philosophy in the Sunni world ended in the
12th century, but it has continued as a living tradition
among the Shias, especially in Iran. Although most
theological students do not go deeply into philosophy
after completing the study of the religious sciences,
those who do study logic, natural philosophy, and
metaphysics from the books of the most outstanding of
the medieval philosophers. The student who chooses
traditional mathematics will learn his geometry and
optics from Euclid and his astronomy form Ptolemy:4
" Seyed Hossein Nasr, Science and civilization in Islam (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 73. (u)
34
(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3).
(b)(3)
Knowledge in the Islamic scheme is categorized as the
transmitted or traditional sciences and the intellectual
or rational sciences. Transmitted sciences are those
that depend on texts handed down from the original
authors. Intellectual sciences are those that, in the
Islamic view, depend on the exercise of man's under-
standing and intuition. Not all subjects are taught in
each school, and some, such as medicine, have
disappeared Completely. For each there is a series of
traditional textbooks with commentaries and some-
times commentaries on the commentary.
Arabic, the language of the Koran, is essential and is
the first course studied. According to Shia tradition,
the Imam Ali "invented" Arabic grammar. One of his
companions heard someone misquote a verse from the
Koran, whereupon the companion rushed to Ali "in
great consternation." Ali explained two rules to him�
first, that a word is a noun, verb, or particle; and
second, that the subject is nominative, the object is
accusative, and a construct is genitive. From this grew
Arabic grammar.
The Arabs and Persians use different books. A Persian
student might begin with a volume called The Com-
pendium of the Introductions consisting of five books:
Conjugations (composed in the 14th century); Words
Governing Others (14th century); Guidance and The
Everlasting (both 16th century); and The Sample
(12th century). This is then followed by a 15th century
commentary on an 8th century grammar (Familiarity
of Ibn Malik). The commentary, which is generally
memorized, is in the form of a poem of 1,000 verses.
From this, one goes on to more advanced books such as
The Crown of the Bride, a commentary on a dictio-
nary, and The Freeing of the Understanding, the most
advanced grammar.
Rhetoric is "speaking according to the exigencies of
time and place" and is studied from a 13th century text
(Key to the Sciences) and its 14th century commen-
tary.
Principles of Jurisprudence is studied from 11th and
12th century texts, but there are also a number of
popular 17th, 18th, and 19th century texts. For several
centuries the Usulis were suppressed by the
Akhbaris�a dispute among Shias that has repercus-
35
sions to the present�and Usulis have prevailed only in
the last 200 years." The Principles is the methodology
of Muslim jurisprudence, the science of proofs that
lead to the establishment of legal standards in general.
the philosophy and theory of law. (b)(3)
Fiqh or jurisprudence consists of understanding and
extracting the law by applying the principles. This is
the major field in a student's career. The science of
jurisprudence was created by the fifth and sixth
imams, according to the Shia, who say that most legal
traditions and hadith come from them.
Thousands of books have been written on fiqh. A
standard text is The Firm Tie dating from the last
century, with two commentaries�Taking Hold of the
Firm Tie by Ayatollah Hakim, who died recently, and
The Utmost Extremity for the One Who Wishes to
Grasp Firmly by Ayatollah Marashi Najafi. Other
popular texts are The Enlightenment of the Allameh
and The Watering Hole of the Enquirer
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Hadith consists of not only the study of traditions but
also the "science of men"�specifically a study and
assessment of those who transmitted the hadith, since
its validity depends on who related it and how. The
isnad or chain of transmission is sometimes included in
a hadith, in abbreviated form. Thus Khomeini, in
quoting the hadith to support the argument that the
jurisprudents are representative of the Prophet, is
careful to cite the isnad, "Ali, citing Abih, who quoted
al-Nawfali, who quoted al-Sukuni, who quoted Abi
Abdollah, said. . . ." 76 (b)(3)
Koranic Commentary (tafsir) "consists of knowing the
revelation of the verses of the Koran, the inner and
outer meaning of the verses of the Koran, the inner and
outer meaning of the words, knowledge of verses not
subject to dispute, the abrogated verses, etc." This
science was created by Ali, according to Shiite
tradition. There are a large number of commentaries.
Some of the popular ones date from the 10th to 14th
" The Akhbari school dates from the 12th century. It holds that the
sources of Islamic law are only the Koran and the Sunna of the
Prophet. Akhbaris reject Ittihad and the concept of the Marja-e-
taglid and the authority of the mujtaheds. The Usulis believe the
opposite. Cities were often split between Akhbaris and Usulis, and
violence between the rival schools was frequent. In one sense All
Shariati can be considered an Akhbari, although the term has not
been applied to him by his Persian opponents. (u)
" Khomeini, Islamic Government, p. 30. (0
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2Seret
3\ centuries, although there are later ones in use, includ-
(b\, I� 1ing one by Ayatollah Taleqani.
As for the remainder of the courses, the titles are
self-explanatory. Theology (kalam), "has fallen out of
usage, although.. . many students show an interest in
it and on holidays spend time with professors studying
theology." In spite of this lack of attention "knowledge
in this field is incumbent on every eloquent, learned
man." " Marashi-Najafi, Khomeini, Khoi, and
(b)(3) Tabatabai are all known as theologians.
The fields of specialization of 67 of the 108 ulema
mentioned earlier provide a glimpse of the relative
importance the clergymen attach to the various fields
of study. Forty-two specialized in Mil and usui, seven
in kalam and hikmet, six in mathematics and astron-
omy, four in ethics, three each in philosophy and
(b)(3)literature, and two in logic.
The Role of the Mujtahed
There are a variety of titles that are applied to
clergymen. These titles do not represent a formal
hierarchical structure but are honorifics or description
of the clergyman's function. Mullah or Akhund are
general terms that can refer to any religious function-
ary, but popularly indicate the journeyman clergyman,
usually of limited education, who ministers to his
followers on a day-to-day basis in a village or a
"parish." Hojjat al-Islam and ayatollah are honorifics
that may be applied to a clergyman by his followers as
a mark of respect. Ayatollah bears a more prestigious
connotation than Hojjat al-Islam. Ayatollah al-Ozma,
or Great Ayatollah, is applied to a handful of the most
important religious leaders. Khomeini, Shariatmadari,
Marashi-Najafi, and one or two others would fall into
this category. Mujtahed and faqih are virtually
interchangeable as descriptions of a jurisprudent.
Mujtahed emphasizes the method the jurisprudent
uses, that is, Utihad, which is discussed below, while
(3)(3) laqih emphasizes the subject matter, fiqh or law.
A mujtahed is, more than anything else, a lawyer or a
jurisprudent. The source of his law is the Koran, the
sayings and deeds of Muhammad, and the acts of the
imams. Although he uses religious materials derived
" Razi, Ganfineh-ye-Daneshmandan (u)
ultimately from God, he is not primarily a theologian.'s
A recognized theologian may not be a mujtahed. The
"amount of material that must be mastered to qualify to
become a mujtahed is so great that few can also master
the equally large amount of material necessary to
become an outstanding theologian. Every Shiite must
follow a living mujtahed, a requirement that, if
completely implemented, would place clergymen as
behind-the-scenes advisers to every government offi-
cial, no matter what legal or constitutional arrange-
ments prevailed.
Shia authorities generally accept six conditions as
necessary for a mujtahed�maturity, intelligence,
faith, justice, being male, and of legitimate birth.
Justice implies one "who performs that which is
obligatory and abandons that which is forbidden." In
learning he must know theology, principles of the faith,
grammar, Arabic, logic, and principles of jurispru-
dence?'
The mujtahed by his learning and piety is capable of
properly interpreting divine law. The mujtaheds are
therefore the servants of the imam. It is from this that
they derive their authority, that they speak for God's
law not man's. Nevertheless, it is possible for them to
err, since they do not receive any supernatural
guidance.8�
There is a tradition from the sixth imam Ja'far al-
Sadiq that all those who acted as judges over the
Muslims and interpreted the law had their appoint-
ment from him.8 The mujtahed's role in interpreting
the imam's role seems to be a late development that is
not supported by early Twelver Shia doctrine. It
developed in the 17th century and became widespread
in the 18th century. This was the same time that a
" Theology is kalam, "word." The Islamic concept of theology
derives from the long debate over whether or not the "word" of God
is to be considered eternal. God is eternal, but "word" or speech is
transitory. How can an eternal god produce transitory words. Such a
debate is of limited interest to modern Western society but is still
pertinent to Muslim theologians. (u)
Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, p. 10. (u)
" Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (Oxford
University Press, 1964), p. 46, and Hassan b. Yusuf b. Ali Ibnu'l-
Mutahhar al-Hilli, Al-Babal-Hadi 'Ashar (A Treatise on the
Principles of Shiite Theology). Trans. William M. Miller (London:
Luzac and Co., 1958), p. 99. (u)
" Quoted in Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a
Changing Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962),
p. 122. (u) _
36
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closely related doctrine developed, that of the clergy's
role in government.82 It is this late doctrine that
prevails today.
Khomeini describes the jurist in this manner:
Considering that the jurisprudent is not a prophet,
then he is a prophet's trustee. In the Age of the
Absence the jurisprudent and nobody else is the imam
and leader of the Moslems and the person dispensing
justice among them justly." (u)
Ijtihad has been defined by Shia jurists as "the
capacity or ability to find what the law could possibly
be through juristic speculation" or "the capacity of
finding authoritative juristic reasoning and legal
sources of the rules of law." " Unlike other sources of
the Shariah, however, ijtihad is a process, the logical
reasoning that uses the Koran, sunna, aql, and :lima to
provide the propositions leading to a reasoned conclu-
sion.
This contrasts with the Sunni practice that requires
textual support for legal decisions. For the Sunni the
"Door of Ijtihad," that is, the right to make fresh
decisions, was closed after the great lawmakers fin-
ished their work in the 10th century.
Shiite scholars argue that the concept of ijtihad
provides the means for reinterpreting Shiite law in the
light of modern requirements. In 1962 Mehdi
Bazargan wrote that "We. . . have kept open the door
of ijtihad with our need for imitation of the most
knowledgeable mujtahed so that our religion could
remain living and fresh and progress with the changes
and the broadening of time." He points, however,
points to a problem:
If it were established that the thoughts, information,
and technical horizons of our mujtaheds centered on
matters of past centuries, what would there be in the
changing of names and transferring of positions from a
deceased Ayatollah to a living one? Then titihad
would be closed and dead. "
" Joseph Eliash, "The Ithna 'Ashari Juristic Theory of Political and
Legal Authority," Studia Islamica, XXIX (1969), p. 26. (u)
" Khomeini, Islamic Government, p. 36. (u)
" A. Ezzati, Shri Islamic Law and Jurisprudence (Lahore, 1976),
pp. 88-89. (u)
" "The People's Expectation of the Maria" (in Persian), in Bahsi dar
bareh-ye Mariryat-va ruhanniyat (A Discussion about the office of
the Maria and clericalism) (Tehran, 1962). (u)
37
Bazargan's subsequent arguments for improved educa-
tion for the clergy suggest that he believes that the
horizons of the clergy center on past centuries. (b)(3)
It is such considerations that have led to a tentative
and still incomplete reconsideration of the role of the
mujtahed and of the marja-e-taqlid. This latter office
is the mujtahed par excellence. He is one who has been
recognized by the majority of the Shiites as their
supreme leader. He is sometimes called the pishva-ye
Muslemin, the leader of the Muslims. This position
developed in the middle of the 19th century, although
attempts have been made to identify it earlier (b)(3)
The role of the marja-e-taqlids and the mujtaheds has
been discussed critically by a few. In 1962 a conference
was held in Tehran by a group of laymen and clergy to
discuss the problems involved in the emergence of a
supreme Shiite leader following the death of Ayatollah
Borujerdi in 1960." Discussing "The Peoples Expecta-
tion of the Marja," Mehdi Bazargan, then a university
professor and a well-known opponent of the Shah,
remarks that:
Our great marja-e-taqlids and mujtaheds, even
supposing that. . . they have the best preparations and
qualities . . . cannot be oceans of wisdom and pos-
sessed of all necessary skills in today's confused and
fragmented world. Specialization and centralization
are the necessities of the new human life and the
perfection of mankind. (u)
Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, although differing with
Bazargan on several points, sees a weakness in
centering too much responsibility in one man:
. a heavy responsibility with respect to God and
mankind is placed on the shoulders of a marja exactly
at the time when he is becoming elderly and his powers
are declining . . . people will gather around who are
very unsuitable, and he will remain the more secluded
from the people. . . .
" This conference is discussed, but without any translations by Ann
K.S. Lambton in "A Reconsideration of the Position of the Maria'
al-Taglid and the Religious Institution," Studio Islamica,
Vol. xx(1964), p. 115-135. The proceedings of the conference are
found in Bahsi dar bareh-ye Mariryat-va ruhaniyat (A discussion
about the office of the Maria' and Clericalism). (u)
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let
Then, in an almost prophetic comment, Taleoni
added:
Thus the religious link of the people with him will be
broken except through an intermediary, and occasion-
ally (as has happened) he will appear to be a religious
tyrant. In this manner, the spiritual leader . . . will lose
his luster. (u)
The opinions given by the mujtahed are supposed to
reflect the application of all of his accumulated
knowledge, wisdom, and acumen to the problem at
hand. By definition the mujtahed is assumed to possess
all these qualities, and some undoubtedly do. One
danger is inherent in this system. An ill or aging
mujtahed may continue to function long after his
abilities have failed with no one to contest his right to
continue. Bazargan describes an instance that he
clearly found troubling. Visiting the home of the late
Ayatollah Borujerdi, at that time the recognized leader
of the Shia, Bazargan saw problems put to the aging
Borujerdi by a medical student. The first one was
essentially a theological one about the imamate and
the appearance of the imam of the age. Borujerdi's
uninformative answer was that "it is good for every
person to question in proportion to his own understand-
ing and position." The other question, a practical one
for a Muslim medical student, concerned the responsi-
bility involved in the dissection of corpses�whether it
was forbidden or permissible and what ritual washing
was involved after touching a dead body. Borujerdi's
answer was to "consult the practical treatises." In
Bazargan's words. "The smoke rose from my head."
(b)(3)
Most Shia scholars hold that the marja-e-taqlid
"emerges"�comes to be recognized by the majority of
the Shia as the supreme leader. Participants in the
1962 colloquium seemed to hold that the marja should
be elected by a group of knowledgeable men competent
to judge the qualifications of a potential marja. There
is respectable evidence to support the opinion of the
colloquium." At present, however, the question seems
academic. The prevailing view is otherwise. Khomeini
is clearly considered by his followers to be the marja-e-
taqlid; he has "emerged," and the concept of selection
by a committee is not likely to be warmly received. On
" This is set out in Joseph Eliash, "Misconceptions Regarding the
Juridical Status of the Iranian Ulama," International Journal of
Middle East Studies, 10 (1979), pp. 9-25. (u)
the other hand, the quite different attitude toward the
marja that Bazargan, Taleoni, and Beheshti ex-
pressed 15 years ago may have been a factor in the
struggle for political power between Khomeini and
Bazargan's government.
There is some evidence to show that at times the
"emergence" of the marja has had significant help. A
Western scholar relates a procedure that had been
described to him:
There is no formal method of choosing Ayatollah
al-Uzma, but it would seem that a relatively small
group of some 30 or 40 persons, most of whom reside at
Qom, perform the function of the College of Cardinals
by acknowledging the leadership of someone. To the
insiders, these are known as ra'is tarash (sculptors of
the head) or marji dorostkun (creators of the
following). This group is partially comprised of
Ayatuiiazadegan, or the descendants of once famous
and learned mujtahids, and partially of the leading
teachers at Qom. Certain merchants are important, as
is the influential Ayatullah Behbehani in Tehran, and
a small group of muballighin or propagandists who
are not mujtahids but preachers." (u)
Whether this was an ad hoc group to try to choose a
successor to Borujerdi or whether it was the way that
Borujerdi had been chosen is not clear. It is undoubt-
edly true that much clerical politicking goes on in
maneuvering for this post, but the permanent existence
of such a group is unproven.
Shiite Law
The Shariah
Two systems of law have long coexisted in Iran, the
religious law (Shariah) and customary or secular law
(urf). The sixth Imam Ja'far as-Sadiq is considered to
be the founder of Shiite jurisprudence. At the earliest
period Shariah courts were supposed to have jurisdic-
tion in matters of personal status, and Urf courts had
jurisdiction in cases involving the state. European-style
civil courts were created in Tehran as early as 1907.
Because of the lack of administrative codes of any
kind, these civil courts were unable to function. In
practice Shariah courts came to dominate the legal
"L. Binder, "The Proofs of Islam: Religion and Politics in Iran," in
Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of H.A.R. Gibb, ed. George
Makdisi (Leiden, 1965), p. 132. (u)
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system because successive governments were too weak
and disorganized to prevail against the Shariah 's
claim of total authority. Shariah law, however, came
to be seen by the modernizers as inadequate. An
eminent lawyer, Ali Shayegan, who later became a
leading member of the National Front and supporter
of Mossadeq wrote in 1945:
It (Sharjah law) had become too involved and
ambiguous. Consequently, few mujtaheds were com-
petent to administer it properly. .. . The world condi-
tions had changed so much that the figh was not
adequate to cope with new needs." (u)
For a century the civil government has attempted to
curb clerical power and substitute a civil judicial
system with codified laws and at least the semblance of
due process. This was not only because such a system
was deemed to be more compatible with moderniza-
tion, but also because a civil government ultimately
could not permit such power in the hands of a
nongovernmental body. The Pahlavis, father and son,
completed the secularization of the legal system which
the Qajars had commenced, but some in the clergy
never forgot the power they had once wielded or
forgave those who had imposed a "foreign system" on
(b)(3) Iran.
From 1906 until 1932 a struggle went on between the
Shariah courts and the nascent civil court system.
Many of the legal reforms of this period were called
"experimental" in order to avoid direct conflict with
the clergy. Religious courts were not completely
abolished, but were greatly restricted in their author-
ity. Article 2 of the Judicial Law of 1931 limited
religious courts "to judge such cases as are defined
within their jurisdiction by the laws of the realm. No
cases may be referred to a Shariah court without
authorization from state courts and the office of the
Attorney-General." By 1932 Reza Shah was powerful
enough to ignore the clergy and had a law passed
requiring registration of legal documents of ownership
and of other transactions concerning property in
secular state courts only. This previously had been the
monopoly of Shariah courts and had been one of their
most important and most lucrative functions. As a
result, many clergymen were forced to seek secular
(b)(3) employment.
" Ali Shayegan, Hoquq-e-Madani-yi Iran (Civil Code of Iran)
(Tehran, 1945), p. 29-30. (u)
The coup de grace was given in 1936 when a law was
passed excluding most members of the clergy from the
judicial system. Judges were required to hold a degree
from the Tehran faculty of law or a foreign university
attesting to at least three years of legal study. Former
judges not possessing such a degree were required to
pass special examinations in Iranian or foreign law in
order to stay in the Ministry of Justice and could go no
higher than halfway up the promotion scale. This
inmediately followed other measures such as subject-
ing theological students to military service unless they
passed a special government-administered exam, and
the decrees removing the veil from women and putting
Western headgear on men
At the time of these events most of today's senior
Ayatollahs, Khomeini, Shariatmadari and Talegani
among them, were at the beginning of their careers.
Reza Shah's programs deprived them of the sort of
future their predecessors had enjoyed�power, influ-
ence, a key role in government and society, and for
some, wealth. (Clergymen as individuals or as execu-
tors had been among the largest landlords in the
country.) It is no surprise that personal bitterness
serves to strengthen and perhaps for some even to
motivate the theological and philosophical opposition
to the Pahlavi monarchy.
Shiite law, as administered by Khomeini and his
followers in Iran today, is harsh and uncompromising.
Certainly a significant amount of the punishment
being meted out to officials of the former regime is
probably pure revenge for which a religious coloration
is sought." Nonetheless, the severity of the judgments
" The execution of retired General Hassan Pakravan is a good
example. He was chief of SAVAK at the time of the 1963 riots when
Khomeini first came to prominence and was first arrested. The
violence of these riots was due, at least in part, to the fact that
Pakravan was reluctant to take harsh measures against the
demonstrators. Nevertheless, Khomeini was arrested while
Pakravan was in office. It did not help Pakravan that he did not hide
his distaste for the clergy.
The execution of 71-year-old Senator Alameh-Vahidi provides
another example. He was from one of Iran's oldest religious families
that had provided many mujtaheds. Alameh-Vahidi himself was
educated in Karbala and Qom and was known as a writer on
philosophy and religion. He served the Shah as a senator in the last
two parliaments. He was also a mujtahed, and in 1961 he issued a
fatwa stating that land reform was not contrary to religion, but on
the contrary Islam, in the name of justice, demanded land reform. As
a mujtahed he had the right to do this. In today's climate, however, a
mujtahed's opinion is what Khomeini says it is. (u)
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has precedent in situations where the clergy had
significant power.
Khomeini is in a direct line from such eminent jurists
in the past as the one who put to death 70 persons for
various sins and heresies. Unable to find an execu-
tioner on the first occasion, the mujtahed unsuccess-
fully tried to decapitate the malefactor himself. The
job was finished by a bystander while the cleric fainted
with emotion. Somewhat later a mujtahed acquired
the title of "Sufi-slayer" from the number of dervishes
(b)(3)tnd sufis whom he condemned to death.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
But Shiite justice need not be what Khomeini has
made it. In those times when an uncompromising
fundamentalist has not been preeminent, clerical
justice has been enlightened. One writer noted that:
Those who have been brought into contact with these
distinguished doctors have expressed a high opinion of
their integrity and the merciful inclination of their
sentences." (u)
Whether Khomeini's fundamentalism prevails or not,
the tenets of Shia Islam will be important in Iranian
politics for the foreseeable future. These tenets may be
applied harshly or leniently. This will depend to a large
extent on the character of the mujtaheds and the
amount of power that civil government can exert over
legal proceedings. The application of Shiite legal
principles in the modern world is a new undertaking. It
has been nearly a half century since the clergy lost
most of its legal prerogatives and much longer since it
had undisputed power.
The entire body of Islamic law is called the Shariah. It
is Divine Law that must be followed by all Muslims, it
is "the concrete embodiment of Divine Will according
to which man should live in both his private and social
life." 92 It covers religion, dogma, and law in the usual
sense and encompasses economic, social, and political
behavior.
9' George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London,
1892), Vol. I, p. 453. (u)
" Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of Islam (New York:
Praeger, 1967), p. 93. (u)
?e�
The Shariah for the Shiites has five sources:
� The Koran.
� The sunna, or the practice of the Prophet.
� ljtihad, or the interpretations of the mujtaheds.
� Aql (reason).
� lima (consensus)
The Koran
Every word of the Koran is regarded as the utterance
of Allah communicated in his words by the angel
Gabriel to the Prophet. Koran signifies "recitation." It
is also called Forqan (discrimination), the means by
which man can discriminate between truth and false-
hood, and al-Kitab, the prototype of all books.
In the words of Abu Hanifah, founder of one of the
four great schools of law:
The Koran is the speech of Allah, written in the copies,
preserved in the memories, recited by the tongues,
revealed to the Prophet. Our pronouncing, writing,
and reciting the Koran is created, whereas the Koran
itself is uncreated." (u)
The recitation of the Koran and the writing of it are
sacred acts. A Muslim scholar points out that whatever
one's nationality, the Koran, as well as one's prayers,
are in Arabic, otherwise he would not be Muslim.
The efficacy of canonical prayers, litanies, invoca-
tions, etc., is contained not only in the content but also
in the very sounds and reverberations of the sacred
language. (u)
The Koran is not a law code, and Muhammad was not
a lawgiver in any Western sense. The Koran is an
appeal to mankind and to the Arabs in particular, to
obey the law of God which has already been revealed -
or can be discovered
In the last years of his career the Prophet, as a ruler,
was faced with legal problems on which he sought
divine guidance, and the answers that he uttered in a
trance are a legal element in the Koran. There are said
to be 500 such texts, but most of these deal with ritual,
and only about 80 deal with legal material. These 80
"Abu Hanifah, Al-fiqh al-Akbar, translated by A.J. Wensinck, The
Muslim Creed (Cambridge, 1932), p. 189. (u)
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texts have been subjected to intensive interpretation to
extract the maximum amount of meaning from them,
and nonlegal texts in the Koran, moral exhortations,
and even divine promises have been construed by
analogy to afford legal rules.
Aside from the legal content, the Koran is interpreted
on several levels. There is a tradition relating to the
sixth Shiite Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq; the book of God
contains four things: the literary expression, the
allusion, the hidden meaning, and the spiritual truths.
The literary expression is for the common people, the
allusion is for the elite, the hidden meaning is for the
friends of God (or saints), and the spiritual truths are
for the prophets." This multilevel interpretation pro-
vides the basis for Sufism and for schools within Shia
Islam, some of which approach heresy.
The Sunna and Hadith
The sunna is the practice of the Prophet. His authority
comes next only to the Koran and is not derived from
the community's acceptance of him as a person of
authority but from Divine Will as expressed in the
Koran. For this reason the Moslem community accepts
all of Muhammad's verbal commands, his deeds, and
his tacit approval as the way of life, a binding factor,
and a model that ought to be followed.
A hadith is the story of a particular occurrence in
which the Prophet was involved, the sunna is the act
that occurs."
Aside from the Koran, the most obvious source of
information concerning the law of God to which
inquirers could turn was the practice of the Prophet
and of his companions, so far as their practice could be
taken as evidence of what he approved. Normally,
theory follows practice by a process of generalization
from observed facts. Religion is older than its theology
and law is older than jurisprudence. Yet according to
94 This hadith is related in Nasr, Ideals and Realities in Islam, p. 59.
(u)
"There are many great collections of hadith which serve as standard
references. Large parts of the Sunni collections have been translated
into English. The Shiites have their own collections. Although there
is much duplication, the Shias reject some hadith accepted by the
Sunnis and have hadith that are unique. In general, the differences
revolve around the right of succession of Ali. The great Shia
collections have not been translated into English, and there seem to
be only six sets of the major Persian language collection in the
United States. (u)
41
orthodox Islamic exposition, the theory came first, and
the practice was built upon it. Much of the law is
pre-Islamic, and all of it had a history before being cast
into the theoretical mold. Nevertheless, the theory
influenced the whole structure of the law and is still a
vital force.
(b)(3)
The sunna is to be found in traditions of what the
Prophet said, did, or by his silence approved. There are
about 40 hadith of great importance which are "sacred
sayings," traditions in which God speaks through
Muhammad. There are also traditions of the Prophet
himself and traditions that embody legal decisions of
the first four caliphs or of other "Companions" of the
Prophet. For the Sunni the authority of traditions of
the caliphs and "Companions" is less than the tradi-
tions that have the authority of the Prophet himself.
According to Shiite principles of jurisprudence, how-
ever, an authentic tradition attributed to the imams is
as binding as the direct word of God through Muham-
mad. When, for example, Khomeini quotes a hadith as
he frequently does in his Islamic Government, he is not
relating a parable or narrating a story to make a point.
He is quoting something that has the force of law.
There was wholesale fabrication of tradition from
almost the earliest period. Many of the "Companions"
had known the Prophet intimately, and it was a small
step from feeling confident of what the Prophet's view
would have been to believing that he had in fact so
decided. It is a step that could be taken without
realizing that one had passed from opinion to fact.
Many of the traditions were obvious attempts to read
back the controversies, or the conditions of later ages,
into the earlier period from which guidance was
sought.
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Muslim scholars who realized that there was such
,falsification set out to examine the traditions with
whatever critical apparatus they possessed to deter-
mine the authenticity of hadith. This apparatus
suffered from a substantial defect that is still inherent
in the Islamic theory of evidence�the presumption
that a respectable man who would not willingly tell a
lie is therefore necessarily telling the truth. The
influence of faulty memory, of wishful thinking, the
danger of reading back the present into the past, the
�te�
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coloring of facts by personal opinion, and of the effect
of leading questions seem to be little recognized.96
One Western scholar has argued strongly that at about
the time of the founders of the great Sunni law schools
and before the time of the six great collections of
traditions in the ninth century, there was deliberate
forgery of traditions by responsible lawyers on such a
scale that no purely legal tradition of the Prophet
himself can be regarded as above suspicion.97 This is a
view that every good Muslim would necessarily have to
reject. The Muslim tends to see such studies as a plot
against Islam. In the words of one scholar:
From the Islamic point of view this (critical examina-
tion of hadith by European orientalists) is one of the
most diabolical attacks made against the whole
structure of Islam."
But another Muslim apologist sees an even more
sinister and longstanding plot:
A number of Jews disguised as Muslims entered the
government of Othman (the third caliph, 644-656)
and began to falsify the traditions and the hadith and
consequently weakened the foundation of belief." (u)
If a tradition is to be found in any of the great
collections that are accepted by the Sunnis or the
Shias, it has canonical authority. The growth of
spurious tradition was not stopped, however, by the
establishment of these canonical collections, and con-
tradictory opinions habitually cite contradictory tradi-
tions. One writer says frankly, "The hadith is the form
(b)(3)in which we state our conclusions." m�
Aql is human reason or intellect. A tradition holds that
"The first thing God created was aql." Aql permits the
truth to be discovered when texts differ or contradict
each other. Legal rules made by aql must be regarded
" Khadduri and Liebesny, Law in the Middle East (Washington,
D:C.: The Middle East Institute), Vol. I, p. 193-194. (u)
" J. Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford,
1950). (u)
" Tabatabai, Shrite Islam, p. 119, note 24, by the editor Seyyed
Hossein Nasr. (u)
" "The Nation Does Not Want Christian Advisers,"
Ganj-e-Shayegan (Tehran: Publication of the Iranian Students
Association, 1332 (1952)), p. 1-7. Bazargan, Taleqani, and Sahabi
also wrote for this publication. (u)
I" Quoted by G. H. Bousquet, Precis de Droit Musulman, second
edition (Algiers, 1947), p. 31. (u)
as parts of the Shariah and people must obey them. In
Shia law God is the legislator because he created aql to
make law. Aql makes law directly, and God makes law
indirectly. Law made by aql is as the law of God in that
it is a precept of faith and a social duty, and its
obedience is obligatory. Finally, Shia jurists reject the
private use of reason as a rule of law. This is ray, a
Sunni but not a Shia doctrine.'
Jima or consensus is used by both Sunnis and Shias as
a source of law, but they define it differently. The
Sunnis recognize consensus of the community and
consensus of the great law teachers. For the Shia 1./ma
means "agreement of those who interpret in their
religious judgments the commands of the imams on a
particular question,"�2 that is, the mujtaheds.
The Law in Practice
Administration of Justice. It is useful to look at a few
instances of the application of Islamic law in Iran
today. The public record only lists the charges and the
sentences. The reasoning behind the sentences is
unavailable and probably unobtainable. The results
were reached by Islamic judges based on Islamic law
and are ipso facto fair.
The execution of Jewish businessman Habib
Elghanian was a good example of the strict application
of the Shariah, although the court's refusal�or
inability�to explain its actions in a manner compre-
hensible to its Western critics obscured the juridical
basis of the sentence. The case also casts light on the
limitations imposed by the Islamic concept of protec-
tion of minorities.
Christians and Jews (and later, Zoroastrians and
Sabians) were considered as "People of the Book"�
those who received revelation before the final one
through Muhammad�and entitled to full protection
when living in a Moslem society. In return they paid a
yearly poll tax but did not serve in the army. In
addition the "People of the Book" were expected to
pledge loyalty to Muslim authorities, not speak ill of
Islam, and abstain from any act that might prejudice
101 This brief paragraph does not do justice to the concept of aql,
which is also tied to Islamic philosophical thought. A full discussion
is found in A. Ezzati, An Introduction to Shi'i Islamic Law and
Jurisprudence (Lahore, 1976). (u)
'" Khadduri and Liebesny. Law in the Middle East (Washington,
D. C., The Middle East Institute), Vol. I, p. 127. (u)
42
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the beliefs and security of Muslims. It is this last
provision that was at the root of Elghanian's convic-
tion. As a contributor of funds to Israel he was
performing an act detrimental to Muslims while
enjoying the protection of a Muslim state. Again, the
crime was not against the state of Iran as much as it
was against the nation of Islam.
The more sophisticated members of the clergy may
make a clear distinction between Zionists and Jews.
The clergy must make the distinction as the Jews are
People of the Book and have a defined status in Islam.
The bulk of the poorly educated and badly informed
masses that make up Khomeini's following do not
make the same distinction. Some of the clergy may
share the popular view, for the Jews, while "pro-
tected," are also depicted in the Koran and in Islamic
history as opponents of Muhammad.
Muslim social practices of the past, and sometimes the
recent past, which placed minorities clearly in an
inferior position may have only a flimsy basis in the
Koran or hadith, but they became so imbedded in the
social fabric as to have the force of law. In Iran until
Reza Shah's time Zoroastrians and Jews were required
to wear distinctive garb, non-Muslims were forbidden
to ride horses, and, if on a donkey, had to dismount
when meeting a Muslim. They could not build houses
higher than their Muslim neighbors.103
Even with legal disabilities removed, under the
Pahlavis, discrimination remained, and the result�
especially for Christian minorities such as the Arme-
nians and Assyrians�was a general lack of commit-
ment to Iran as a state. With the return of Muslim
dominance the non-Muslims will be even less likely to
be integrated into Iranian society.
The jurists are unanimous that non-Muslim subjects
are to be excluded from public office. Several Koranic
passages and hadith are quoted to support this view.
One of them is Koran IV:28, "Let not the believers
take disbelievers for friends in preference to believers,
103 For Zoroastrians see Mary Boyce, A Persian Stronghold of
Zoroastrianism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 1 If. For Jews
in earlier days see Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Vol. I,
p. 165, 333 and Vol. II, p. 240. Before the advent of Western clothing
a man's religious status, as well as his social class and often his
profession, were proclaimed by the clothes he wore. (u)
43
whoso doeth that hath no connection with Allah.. . ."
A hadith of the Prophet supports this view, "Do not ask
for their advice, do not refer to their opinions, hold
yourself from them, and do not live with them."
Finally, another hadith, "Jews and Christians are
traitors."
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In spite of the jurists' opinions the facts have been quite
the opposite. Minorities, especially in the early centu-
ries of Islam, played prominent roles in government
and politics. They frequently possessed administrative
and business skills that the Muslims themselves
disdained to cultivate. The jurists' views, however, are
available to provide legitimacy for any moves
Khomeini might make to exclude non-Muslim
Iranians from public office:Gs
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Two standard charges that have been made against
nearly all of those so far executed by the Khomeini
regime have been "spreading corruption on earth" and
"warring with God." This derives from a verse in the
Koran:
The only reward for those who make war upon Allah
and his Messenger and strive after corruption in the
land will be that they will be killed or crucified, or have
their hands and feet cut off, or will be expelled out of
the land.. . . (Koran v:33) (b)(3)
An examination of seven Shia commentaries on this
passage shows a wide variety of treatments. Two of the
commentaries can be ignored. One is an interpretation
of specific grammatical forms, the other a rather brief
and elementary account of the generally accepted
meaning of the verse. The other commentaries are
more substantial, but provide differing interpretations.
Most refer to specific hadiths to support their interpre-
tations. (b)(3)
The most usual explanation for the genesis of this verse
is that a group of people arrived in Medina and
professed Islam. They were ill, and Muhammad sent
them out with his camel herds to recuperate. When
they were well, they killed the shepherds and stole the
'�' This and many more problems are discussed in Antoine Fattal, Le
Statut Legal des non-Musulmans en Pays dislam (Beirut:
Imprimerie Catholique, 1958). (u)
,Are
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camels. When they were captured, Muhammad ut-
(b)(3) tered this verse and then cut off their hands and feet
and blinded them.
How does this apply? One commentator remarks that
"the verse is not devoid of ambiguity in general"�
0:0(3 scant comfort for those who suffered an unambiguous
i� death.''
(b)(3)
Several hadith relate interpretations of this verse.
Some suggest that this is the punishment for those who
have apostatized, but others argue that this cannot be
the case because death is mandatory for the apostate
and not severance of limbs, exile, or crucifixion.'"
Other commentators contend that this verse is of
general application, "It is known that the cause of its
revelation does not necessitate the restriction of its
external meaning."'�'
� A common interpretation is that "one who wages war"
is anyone who resorts to armed violence, and "spread-
ing corruption" meant highway robbery specifically
and disturbing public security by terrorizing people in
general�"Those who spread corruption, which is
(b)(3)killing, looti � ng and highway robbery."10
The type of reasoning that the interpreters use is
illustrated by the argument of one commentator that
"waging war with God" is impossible except meta-
phorically, but "waging war with the Prophet" is
literal. Since the meaning cannot be both metaphorical
and literal, "The answer is that what is intended. . .is
opposition to the Holy Law and its responsibilities.'"09
(b)(3)" Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai, Al-Mizanfi Tafsir al-Qur'an
(Tehran, 1382 (1962)), p. 325f. (u)
106 Ali ibn Husayn al-Musavi al-Haeri al-Tehrani, Muqtanayat
al-Duwar (Tehran, 1968), Vol. IV, p. 8f. (u)
1" Tabatabai, /oc. cit. (u)
'" Husayn ibn Ahmad al-Husayni al-Shah Abd'al-Azimi, Tesir-e�
Ithna 'Ashari, (Rayy, 1956-61), pp. 61-63. (u)
1" AI-Haeri-al Tehrani, p. 9. (u)
The contemporary scholar Tabatabai favors the widest
interpretation.
It has a broad connotation that applies to the
opposition to any legal decree and every act of
oppression and excessiveness.. .what is meant by
waging war and spreading corruption . . . is the distur-
bance of the general security. The general security is
disturbed by the creation of public fear. . .11�
At any rate, in the words of one commentator "There is
no higher corruption than killing Muslims, plundering
their wealth, and violating their honor." "'
Much ingenuity was used in interpreting the meaning
of the punishments prescribed in the verse. The
manner of execution is by some described as with the
sword, a not unreasonable interpretation given the pre-
modern background. Clearly, however, the manner of
execution is optional, or Khomeini's use of the firing
squad in today's Iran would be an innovation and
therefore forbidden. There is also some debate about
the manner of dismemberment, but it is usually held
that this should be the right hand and the left foot. One
commentator insists that the thumb and the heel
should remain, but others are not so charitable. Most
commentators believe that this is the punishment for
simple theft, while theft with killing calls for dismem-
berment followed by crucifixion.
The precise meaning of "exile" is also debated. One
commentator writes that it can also mean drowning, as
"in this way they would be exiled from the realm of
Islam. . . . It is possible that drowning and imprison-
ment are among the hidden meanings that were used
by the pure imams."2 Other commentators prescribe
only driving the convicted one from one city to another.
There are also discussions about the method and
meaning of crucifixion whether before or after execu-
tion. The judge is generally held to have the option to
fix the punishment according to the severity of the
crime."3
Tabatabai, p. 326. (u)
Hajj Mirza Mohammed Saqafi, Ravan-e-Jadid (Tehran; 1950),
Vol. 2, p. 209. (u)
112 Saqafi, /oc. cit. (u)
"Amputation or dismemberment has not been used as a punishment
so far in Iran. (u)
44
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Only the modern commentator Tabatabai points out
that this verse is connected with the preceding verse
which mentions the Jews. Following the story of Cain
killing Abel (although they are called only the sons of
Adam), God said, as related in verse 32:
We decreed for the children of Israel that whosoever
killeth a human being for other than manslaughter or
corruption on earth, it shall be as if he had killed all
mankind, and whosoever saveth the life of one, it shall
be as if he saved the life of all mankind. Our
messengers came to them of old with clear proofs (of
Allah's) sovereignty, but afterwards many of them
became prodigals in the earth.
Tabatabai comments that this verse failed to include
the appropriate punishment or judgment. Because of
its contents, however, it (verse 32) is not free of
connection with these verses (that is, verses 33 and 34)
because of the punishment of the corruptors on earth
and the thieves."'
Punishment for violation of Koranic prescriptions for
private conduct is now replacing the earlier campaign
against political crimes. There are some peculiarities,
however, that may be more the result of excessive zeal
than of strict interpretation of the Shariah.
The Koran states, "the adulterer and adulteress,
scourge ye each of them with a hundred stripes, and let
not pity withhold you from obedience to Allah . "
(Koran, 24:2). The punishment is clear, but the
accounts of the recent trials in Iran lack an important
detail. Four unimpeachable witnesses of the act must
be presented. The number of cases tried so far suggests
a greater degree of exhibitionism�or of voyeurism�
than expected.
The case of the man in Ahwaz who was forced to marry
the prostitute with whom he was consorting is an
interesting one. Marriage is not valid if it is under
duress, and one can suspect that the Ahwaz marriage
was entered into with a lack of enthusiasm. On the
other hand, the Koran 24:3 says "The adulterer shall
not marry save an adulteress or an idolatress, and the
adulteress none shall marry save an adulterer or an
idolater." It appears that in the opinion of the Ahwaz
religious judge, this verse was taken as an order rather
than as simply a limitation on marriage. If there were
"4 Tabatabai, Al-Mizan, p.325. (u)
45
courts of appeal, this marriage might be declared
invalid, but as it is, the husband can take consolation in
the fact that he has saved one woman from a life of
shame. (b)(3)
Finally, the Koranic verse that follows the one dealing
with warring against God and his prophets contains a
stipulation for amnesty."' "Except those who repent
before ye overpower them. For know that Allah is
forgiving, merciful."
(b)(3)
Based on this verse, therefore, one could hope to escape
punishment by surrendering and repenting. At least
two commentators quoting hadith and the opinion of
eminent jurists support this interpretation."' In prac-
tice, any of the Shah's former officials who might hope
to escape by appealing to this verse would be well
advised to forget it. Somewhere in the thousands of
commentaries and previous legal rulings a judge can
probably find a loophole that closes the door of
forgiveness.
(b)(3)
The kind of punishments that might be expected for
specific offenses could be known with certainty only by
examining the great mass offiqh literature where such
cases are detailed. There is no doubt that Khomeini, if
he is not following precedent, is setting the tone for
punishment in Iran. His position is clear and is worth
quoting at length. He is commenting on criticism of
Koranic punishments:
I wonder how these people think. They carry out the
death sentence, under the pretext of the law, against
several people for smuggling 10 grams of heroin....
When they legislate these inhumane laws under the
pretext of preventing corruption, they see no harshness
in them. I do not condone dealing in heroin, but I
oppose death as a penalty for dealing in heroin.
Dealing in heroin must be fought but on a basis
compatible with the dimensions of the crime...traffic
accidents on the highways, incidents of suicide, and
even heroin addiction according to some people�are
the consequences of drunkenness and alcohol drinking.
Yet, they do not ban alcohol because the West has
permitted it. This is why they sell and buy alcohol with
utter freedom. Woe to Islam from them! If an alcohol
drinker is to be given 80 lashes or an unmarried
adulterer is to be punished with 100 lashes and if a
Koran 5:34. (u)
"6 Al-Tehrani, Muqtanayat, p. 11; Tabatabai, Tufsir, p.40. (u)
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married adulterer or adulteress is to be stoned, you
hear them scream; these are cruel and harsh sentences
derived from the harshness of the Arabs, whereas the
provisions of the penal code in Islam came to prevent
fornication, corruption, and abomination in a big and
vast nation.. .. It is obvious that the need for
implementing the laws was not exclusive to the
Prophet's age and that this need continues because
Islam is not limited by time or place. Because Islam is
immortal, it must be implemented and observed
forever. If what was permissible by Muhammad is
permissible until the day of resurrection and what was
forbidden by Muhammad is forbidden to the day of
resurrection, then Muhammad's restrictions must not
be suspended, his teachings must not be neglected,
punishment must not be abandoned."' (u)
In his days, the Prophet, may God's prayers be on him,
was not content with explaining and conveying the
laws. He also implemented them. He punished, cut off
the thief's hand, lashed and stoned, and ruled justly. A
successor is needed for such acts."' (u)
The Role of Women
(b)(3)
Men are in charge of women, because Allah hath
made the one of them to excel the others, and because
they spend of their property (for the support of
women). So good women are the obedient, guarding in
secret that which Allah hath guarded. As for those
from whom ye fear rebellion, admonish them and
banish them to beds apart, and scourge them. Then if
they obey you, seek not a way against them. .
(Koran 4:34
A major policy of both Reza Shah and Shah
Mohammad Reza was to improve the status of women.
Reza Shah forbade the wearing of the chador, the
major outer symbol of a woman's status, and opened
the universities to women both as students and
instructors. Under Mohammad Reza, women gained
full rights of citizenship including the vote, and women
for the first time became parliamentary representa-
tives and senators, cabinet ministers and ambassadors.
(b)(3)
The Pahlavis, however, built on a movement that had
been under way for decades. With the increase of
European influence in the 19th century, women,
Khomeini, Islamic Government, p. 5 and 6. (u)
118 ibid. p. 7. (u)
mostly of the upper classes, began their own agitation
to improve their status
In the early 1900s during the Constitutional Revolu-
tion a group of women�including two daughters of
Nasser el-Din Shah�formed a secret Women's Free-
dom Society, and another daughter (together with her
daughters) joined a dervish order whose meetings they
attended unveiled. Somewhat later (1911) a group of
high-ranking women formed the National Ladies
Society for the specific purpose of supporting the
constitution against royal and foreign intrigues.
Daughters and granddaughters of some of the founders
are still active in women's affairs. The society spon-
sored mass demonstrations and other activities not only
as constitutionalists but also as women.
For nearly two decades women struggled to establish
girls' schools. Generally, the clergy was opposed to
this, but at least one mujtahed, who was also a Majlis
deputy, encouraged his wife to open a girls' school. His
prestige as a mujtahed was so high that there was little
agitation against this school. But another headmistress
for two years concealed her activities from her
husband. Her school was prestigious enough that
another distinguished mujtahed sent his daughter
there.
In spite of opposition, women's education continued to
grow, aided substantially by the activities of schools
established by American missionaries and by a Fran-
cophile Iranian who set up a French-oriented school.
An increasing number of the intelligentsia, both men
and women, became interested in women's education.
The first state school for girls was established in 1918,
and the tempo speeded up after 1925. The social
pressures are well described by one participant in the
women's movement:
46
Change in the social environment was slow. Most of
the people were stuck in the old rut of old notions and
habits, and many were susceptible to obscurantist
preachings. The growing number of enlightened fam-
ilies were generally cautious of getting out of step with
their neighbors: they were eager enough to send their
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daughters to school, but not bold enough to think of
allowing them to work, let alone unveil."' (u)
The Women's Teacher Training College was estab-
lished in 1924 and renamed the Preliminary Teachers
Training College in 1934. Although conditions were
improving, the girls apparently found it necessary from
time to time to beat up the "louts and street urchins
who shouted obscene words or scurrilous verses at
them."'"
Adult education for women, and newspapers and
magazines aimed at women followed. One woman
publisher had her journal suppressed, and she herself
was exiled to Qom, probably considered by the
authorities as the ultimate sentence for a feminist. She
was not released until Reza Shah ascended the throne.
Her daughter is Dr. Farrokhru Parsa, Iran's first
woman cabinet minister (1968-1974) and until the
Revolution the Iranian Ambassador to Denmark.
Under Reza Shah the position of women continued to
improve slowly. On 7 January 1936, the veil was
abolished, although a few women had abandoned it
earlier. One mullah, when asked what should be done
about one such case, remarked resignedly that it was
just an example of the prevailing lawlessness and "the
chaos preceding the end of the world.'F7
Even earlier attempts by some women to change the
color of the chador from the traditional black to
another dark color was met with riots and beatings.
Reza Shah's edict was, for the clergy, a revolutionary
act for which they never forgave him. Khomeini, as
usual, is forceful on this point. "We declare forcefully
that the shameful behavior of refusing to wear the veil
is contrary to the law of God and the Prophet."'
Although the chador returned primarily as an outer
garment with little religious content after World War
II, light colors became popular.
"9 Badr al Moluk Bamdad, From Darkness Into Light: Women's
Emancipation in Iran, Trans. by F.R.C. Bagley (Hicksville, N.Y.:
Exposition Press, 1977), P. 56. (u)
'2� Bamdad, loc. cit. (u)
121 Ayatollah Khomeiny, Principes politiques, phi losophiques,
sociaux et religieux, Jean Marie Xaviere, ed. (Paris: Editions
Libres-Hallier, 1979), p. 38. (u)
47
Most of those who are now donning the chador as a
sign of protest probably do not realize that they are
undoing what three generations of women, and not the
Pahlavis, agitated for. The Pahlavi dynasty did not
create the women's movement, but rather encouraged
and pushed a movement that was well established and
used it to support their concept of a modern Iran (b)(3)
The last 40 years have seen a slow but steady increase
in the scope of women's activities. Under the protection
of Reza Shah, women's organizations flourished,
especially in the area of social services. Under
Mohammad Reza, women not only gained the right to
vote but also moved into positions previously held
exclusively by men.
(b)(3)
In the parliament that was disbanded by Khomeini's
victory there were 20 women, 18 in the majlis and two
in the Senate. The Iranian foreign service had 39
women diplomats out of a total of 580 members in
1974, the last date for which figures are available.
Women have also been serving as judges since 1968,
and the increase of women in the business world,
although not in high positions, has been notable.
(b)(3)
In respect to women's rights, Khomeini's "revolution"
must be considered profoundly counterrevolutionary.
The reversion of Iranian women to their status in
previous centuries seems likely to be written into the
new Iranian constitution.
(b)(3)
Three proposed articles seem designed to keep women
in the role assigned them by traditional Islam:
� Article 11: "The fundamental unit of Islamic society
is the family, and this will take precedence over
individual members of it."
� Article 12: "Family laws should provide mothers
with material and spiritual opportunities so they can
attend to the highly valued maternal duties that are
entrusted to them."
� Article 28: "Every person has the right to choose the
profession he wishes, provided it is not in contraven-
tion of Islam or the public interest." The public
interest was already defined in article 11, and it
seems clear that these articles are designed to give a
civil coloration to Islamic law.
(b)(3)
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Figure l�?.
Women demonstrating against Khomeini
Many of the middle and upper class women who
supported the Khomeini movement are already disen-
chanted; others try for rationalizations. A German
interviewer asked some of the new leaders of the
Iranian Women's Organization about the Koranic
provision that two female witnesses are required to
equal the testiniony of one man.'" The women ex-
plained that women by nature are more sensitive than
men, since they all become mothers, and, therefore, the
statement of one woman cannot be trusted. The
interviewer then pointed out that if all women are
equally emotional since they will all become mothers, it
is meaningless to listen to a second woman. After a
discussion the women answered, "Only God knows
people. He created them. He knows why He made this
law." " How long such an attitude can be sustained is
'" And call to witness, from among your men, two witnesses. And if
two men be not at hand, then a man and two women such as ye
choose for witnesses so, that if one of them errs, the other can remind
her. (Koran 2:282) In Islamic law testimony by witnesses is superior
to written testimony, and "proof� means the testimony of witnesses.
Written testimony alone is not "proof.- (u)
'23Stern,10 May 1979, pp. 92-100. Koranic commentator Mahmud
Taleqani writes, "Since a woman, because of the special disturb-
ances that she has, shows less precision and attention to the
recording of this type of matter and to bearing witness to it, and she
falls under the influence of emotions more readily, on matters
See1�
Unclassified �
questionable. If Islamicization is carried to its logical
conclusion the Women's Organization will be abol-
ished
Marriage
There are only about a score of passages in the Koran
dealing with women, wives, marriage, and divorce.
Although women are treated as subordinate, the
Koran provides a status superior to that generally
prevailing in Arabia at the time the Koran was
revealed. The jurists in the course of the centuries have
interpreted those, and other passages, to provide the
detailed legislation governing the position of women in
society. The major Sunni schools of law differ only in
minor points. The Shiites have at least one major
difference, temporary marriage.
Marriage in Islam is treated as a civil contract
conforming to the usual laws of contract. A betrothal is
a promise to make a contract, and either party may
�withdraw from it. The marriage contract is concluded
relating to herself, she pays more attention and is more precise."
Another commentator notes only that women are emotional
creatures, and therefore a second woman is required to counterbal-
ance this. (u)
48
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Figure 13.
Women demonstrating for Khomeini
by an offer and an acceptance, both made on the same
occasion and in the presence of two witnesses. There
must be no impediment of relationship or religion.'
No other religious rites or ceremonies are required,
although they are encouraged.
The Iranian Family Law of 1932 embodies much of
the Shariah law with some additional measures
borrowed from European law. The clergy at the time
failed to present any effective opposition, leading some
modernizers to argue that the clergy had therefore
approved the law.'25 The Family Protection Law of
1967, hailed as finally bringing the law in accordance
with generally accepted modern principles, marked a
clear break with the Shariah.
For traditionalists such as Khomeini both laws are
illegal, not only because they lack the approval of the
I" The Koran (4:22ff) spells out the forbidden degrees of relationship
including a ban on marrying two sisters at the same time. Christians,
Jews, Zoroastrians, and Sabians are forbidden to marry Muslim
women. Muslim men may marry Christians or Jews (but not
Zoroastrians, who at any rate do not normally marry outside their
own faith), but such mixed marriages are not recommended. (u)
I" "No statement is imputed to a man who keeps silence, but silence
is tantamount to a declaration where one is necessary." This legal
principle of Muslim jurists is quoted in M. Khadduri and H.
Liebesny, Law in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: The Middle
East Institute, 1955), Vol. I, p. 192. (u)
49
Unclassified C
clergy, but also because they were passed by an illegal
regime that did not have the right to legislate.
_(b)(3)
Khomeini considers divorces obtained by women under
the 1967 law to be invalid. All such women are
considered still married, and if anyone divorced under
this law remarries, the result is adultery and is to be
punished as such. Children of such a marriage are
bastards and cannot inherit.
(b)(3)
Given Khomeini's propensity to consider anything
done under the Pahlavis illegal, it would not be
surprising if he, or a like-minded successor, declared
illegal any marriage not carried out according to strict
Shariah law. This could affect thousands, perhaps tens
of thousands, and bring into question legitimacy of
birth and inheritance.
The traditional view of the position of women is best
illustrated by an interview that Ayatollah
Shariatmadari gave to Der Spiegel:
Spiegel: It will not be easy for you when you begin
dismantling basic rights such as equal rights for
women.
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Shariatmadari: We are not doing that. In our country,
women have the same rights as men. This is written in
the Koran.
Spiegel: Ayatollah Khomeini, however, interprets the
Koran differently. He wants to introduce polygamy
and force the women to wear the chador.
Shariatmadari: The Koran provides that young
women cover their body in such a way that the
contours can no longer be determined and that only the
face is left visible. However, this need not be the
chador. We accept any piece of clothing which will
meet these requirements.'
Spiegel: You have abolished the family law issued by
the Shah. This means that divorce again becomes a
one-sided affair of the man.
Shariatmadari: No, to the Moslem matrimony is a
treasure very muck worthy of protection. But if it
happens that one spouse becomes ill, then the husband
may get a divorce.'"
Spiegel: But not the wife?
Shariatmadari: Under certain circumstances the wife,
too, may file suit for divorce.'" Islam tries to prevent
divorces at any cost. But there are situations in which it
is better to separate the spouses, such as a physician
sometimes may be forced to amputate a diseased�
member.
Spiegel: What about polygamy? Will a man be allowed
to have four wives in your Islamic republic?
'26 This seems to be an interpretation of Koran 24 verse 131, "And
tell the believing women to lower their gaze and be modest, and to
display of their adornment only that which is apparent, and to draw
their veil over their bosoms, and not to reveal their adornment save to
their own husbands or fathers or husband's fathers or their sons or
their husband's sons or their brothers.. . or their women or their
slaves or male attendants who lack vigor or children who know
nought of women's nakedness. And let them not stamp their feet so
as to reveal what they hide of their adornment . ..." (u)
12' This may derive from a judicial opinion or a hadith. It does not
appear in the Koran in this form. (u)
In A wife may get a divorce with the permission of an Islamic judge,
who must determine that she has been wronged. Divorce is
automatic by mutual consent. Provisions for divorce may be written
into the marriage contract. (u)
let
Shariatmadari: This is an often misunderstood com-
mandment. A man may have four wives only when he
can be equally just to all of them. This means he may
not give preference to any one of them, and he must be
able to provide for them.'29 Besides, this commandment
does not play a great role in practice. Just try to find
those men in Iran who have four wives; perhaps one in
a thousand.
Spiegel: Because polygamy was prohibited by the
Shah.
Shariatmadari: No, it is also a commandment of
common sense. Yet there are also justified reasons in
favor of polygamy. It may happen that the first wife is
sterile. In that case, a man should take another wife in
addition.'3�
Spiegel: And the third and the fourth?
Shariatmadari: Oh well, there are many men who are
equipped with such tremendous sexual potency that
they cannot be satisfied with one or two. Should they
preferably frequent a brothel?
Spiegel: There are also women who do not feel satisfied
by their men. Then they, too, should be allowed to pick
a second or third husband.
Shariatmadari: These needs are nonexistent in
women. And just think of war times when you often
have more women than men. After all, you have had
that in Germany. If the men do not look after the
supernumerary women, this is bound to end up in mass
prostitution. (u)
Temporary Marriage
The institution of temporary marriage is one of the
major differences between Sunnis and Shias. Tempo-
rary marriage or mutah is marriage for a fixed period
of time�for as little as five minutes or for a lifetime�
and for a stipulated payment to the wife. This
pre-Islamic Arab custom was followed by the early
Muslims. The Sunnis say it was forbidden by Muham-
mad, the Shias that it was not forbidden until Omar,
the second caliph. Since that time mutah has not been
practiced by Sunnis. The Shias, however, do not
129 Koran II, verses 3 and 4. (u)
ibid. (u)
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recognize the legitimacy of the caliphs, and mutah was
not forbidden by any of the Imams
The Shiite argument for mutah is that permanent
marriage obviously is inadequate since prostitution
continues to exist in the world. Inasmuch as "adultery
and fornication are according to Islam among the most
deadly of poisons, destroying the order and purity of
human life, Islam has legitimized temporary mar-
riage. . . by virtue of which it becomes distinct from
adultery and fornication and free from their evils and
corruption." "' The woman must be single, married to
only one man at a time, and must remain unmarried
for two months and five days, one half the time that a
woman must remain unmarried following divorce from
a permanent marriage.
Navab Safavi, founder of the fundamentalist
Fedayan-e-Islam, in his scheme for an Islamic govern-
ment urged the creation of a ministry of mutah to
encourage temporary marriage. He argued that:
The number of women in the world has always been
greater than the number of men, and many women
have been and are without husbands (or many men are
traveling and away from their wives), or many men
cannot afford financially to marry and support a
woman permanently. The holy sense of sexual need
exists in them and is always hungry and active, and if
there were not a moral and legal way to satisfy this
need, eventually they would commit adultery, the
consequences of which would be diseases, immorality,
and corruption of the society.
So the best way to prevent this danger is the holy, legal
way of concubine, for the holy laws of Islam have
established it and have considered it holier than
permanent marriage. Its eternal reward is multiple
and is superior to that of the regular one. This unusual
but moral and religious way of preventing adultery
does not exist in any other law or religion except Islam.
All over the universe, many commit adultery due to
the hardships of permanent marriage, and societies try
to prevent this corruption by stupid and meaningless
advice. This cannot be done by advice, and the only
way is to adopt the Islamic principle of temporary
marriage.'" (u)
Tabatabai, Shi'ite Islam, p.227f. (u)
1" Navab Safavi, Rahnema-ye Haqa'iq (The Guide of Truth)
translated in Adele K. Ferdows, "Religion in Iranian Nationalism.
The Study of the Fadayan-i-Islam," Ph.D. Dissertation Indiana
University, 1967. p. 42 (u)
51
Temporary marriage was discouraged under the
Pahlavis, and neither the 1932 Family Law nor the
1967 law recognize it. Under Khomeini this venerable
institution may find new life.
Observations on the Present
It seems likely that the entire legal system of Iran as it
has existed for more than a generation will be
overturned unless a secular government can achieve
enough power to prevent it. The replacement of the
secular law code by the Shariah has made thousands of
trained lawyers obsolete, but conversely it will provide
lucrative jobs for previously underemployed
mujtaheds. At best, the secular lawyers will be
reduced to little more than errand boys for the religious
judges, and the position of defense counsel, even when
it is permitted, would require more courage than skill.
The rudiments of a new legal system were established
in April 1979 after widespread criticism over the
operations of the drumhead courts. The system pres-
ently consists of a prosecutor-general, appointed by the
Revolutionary Committee with the approval of
Khomeini. He can create provincial branches of his
office as required.
A court has five members. The senior member and the
court administrator, who is appointed by the Revolu-
tionary Committee and approved by Khomeini, must
be an Islamic judge, a ghazi, and, therefore, a
mujtahed. He has the final word on the admissibility of
evidence. This is a permanent appointment. The
second member is a "lawyer" elected by the "judges,"
but there is no further information on who or what
either the lawyer or the judges are. This is also a
permanent appointment. The third permanent mem-
ber, equally obscure, is described as "someone trusted
by the people and aware of the principles of the Islamic
Revolution." The last two members of the court are
temporary members described as being "chosen from
the honest groups of the community." Submission of
evidence will be in accordance with the rules of Islamic
jurisprudence." There is no habeas corpus, bail, access
to counsel, calling of defense witnesses, or appeal.
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Ten years ago Khomeini complained in his Islamic
Government that:
Those foreign laws caused the Moslem society numer-
ous problems. . . . Whoever is an individual in a
juridical or legal case in Iran, or in similar states, must
spend a long life to win such a case.. . . We find that
the present judiciary laws intend for the people
nothing but hardship. The case on which the Shari'a
judge used to make a decision in two or three days now
takes twenty years to settle.'" (u)
Seyed Mohammad Hosein Tabatabai, an eminent
theologian, reaffirms categorically that Islam is not
simply a democratic system, any more than it is a
Communist system. It is of a different order. The
decrees of the Islamic community, as distinct from the
unchangeable laws of Islam, are based not on the
wishes of the majority, but on the truth and depend for
their stability on a realization of what is true. A true
Islamic community would be both knowledgeable and
pious and would, therefore, "never prefer its own
lustful desires over what was right and what was
(b)(3) true." '34
The fiery Ayatollah Alameh Nun i holds the same view,
although he states it more bluntly: "Other than in the
kilogram democracy, where men are counted like
cucumbers and eggs, numerical majority is not the
(b)(3) � � �
criterion in the Islamic state."
A representative government in the usually accepted
sense is clearly of no consequence. The main thing is
that the jurisprudents should rule with the government
u)(`-')acting as a supporting mechanism.
Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Government is some-
thing of a misnomer. It is not programmatic or
organizational but is mostly a series of proofs demon-
strating the right of the jurisprudents to rule. The rest
of the book consists of exhortations to his listeners to
fight tyranny and spread the truth. A sketch of
133 Khomeini, Islamic Government, p. 4. (u)
1" See Lambton's discussion in "A Reconsideration of the Maria'
Taglid , p.128 ff. (u)
"Der Spiegel, 12 Feb 1979, translated in JPRS 073101, Transla-
tions on the Middle East, no. 1930, 28 March 79, p. 66. (u)
Khomeini's argument is informative. Throughout he
uses hadith to support his contentions and to refute
opposite or alternative conclusions.
� The need for a government is enjoined by the hadith.
"People have been ordered to observe certain stric-
tures and not to violate them because violating the
restrictions corrupts people." The only way to
accomplish this is for God to appoint a trustee over
the people, for without someone to make sure that
they did what they should and refrained from what is
forbidden, "nobody would abandon his pleasure."
Therefore government is necessary.'"
� "Islamic government is not despotic but constitu-
tional. However, it is not constitutional in the
well-known sense of the word which is represented in
the parliamentary system or in peoples' councils. It is
constitutional in the sense that those in charge of
affairs observe a number of conditions and rules
underlined in the Koran and in the Sunna. . . . " '"
Khomeini here is reflecting an argument current in
the period of the Constitutional Revolution over
what is constitutionalism�mashrutah? Most early
writers took it to mean "conditional," deriving it
from the Arabic work shart, condition. It may
actually come from French la charte, which then
treated as an Arabic root would produce mashrutah.
There is no doubt that the liberal constitutionalists
understood mashrutah in the European sense, as this
was what they were fighting for, and this is the
definition that prevailed until Khomeini took over.
� Islamic government is a government of law. A person
ignorant of law is not qualified to rule. "It is an
acknowledged fact that the jurisprudents are the
rulers over the kings;. . . the real rulers are the
jurisprudents, and the sultans are nothing but people
working for them."
1" Khomeini is repeating an old and well-known argument. The
problem of rulership has occupied the attention of Islamic jurists for
centuries, and this is the usual formulation. (u)
'"The argument is found in detail in Abol Hadi Hairi, Shi'ism and
Constitutionalism in Iran, p.189 ff. (u)
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� "The rule of the jurisprudent is a subjective matter
dictated by the Shariah as the Shariah considers one
of us as a trustee over a minor. The task of a trustee
over an entire people is not different from that of a
trustee over minors, except quantitatively."
Khomeini repeats these arguments again in various
forms, buttressing his statements by quoting relevant
hadith. Beyond this he offers nothing on the composi-
tion and functioning of an Islamic government. He
may be uninterested in such detail or believes that
since any good Muslim knows how Muhammad and
the imams ruled, an explanation is not necessary.
Other Shia writers have done better. The Fedayan-e-
Islam had a considerably more detailed�if un-
realistic�program and organizational plans,"8 and
Pakistani Shias have written at length on this prob-
lem.'"
Khomeini's views are enthusiastically accepted by his
hardcore followers, but less so by others who also are
looking for an Islamic government. The conflict has
not yet come to a head, but emerging. A Western
convert to Shia Islam, and a disciple of Shariatmadari,
although avoiding criticism of Khomeini, says:
If individuals claim to create an interest group out of
Shi'ite doctrine. . . in other words, a Vatican style
exclusive elite class with Papal infallibility and the
right to condemn all who oppose it to a Spanish
inquisition�then this is . .. neither Shi'ism nor
Iran." '40 (u)
An American-based Iranian professor contends that
"neither the secular.liberals nor the Marxists nor even
the Muslim freedom fighters known as the Mujahidin
ever contemplated a Muslim theocracy headed by
Khomeini as a substitute for the Shah's dictator-
ship."4' However, another American-based Iranian
professor insists that "this imaginary schism . . . is the
latest scheme of the counterrevolutionary elements in
their continuing efforts to discredit or divide the
Iranian revolutionaries." 142
1" See appendix B. (u)
1" See for example, Seyed al-Razia Jaffery, An Approach to Politics
in Islam. (U)
Terry Graham, "Is Listening to Other Views Un-Islamic?"
Tehran Times, 12 August 79. (u)
141 Mangol Bayat, "Iran's Real Revolutionary Leader," Christian
Science Monitor, 24 May 1979. (u)
142 Mansour Farhang, "A Rebuttal," Iran Voice (Washington, D.C.)
Vol. I, No. 5, 2 July 1979. (u)
53
Although these exchanges are by Iranian expatriates,
they echo a growing conflict in Iran over what an
Islamic government is. The closing of the newspaper
Ayandegan in August 1979, about the only paper that
dared criticize Khomeini's views, is a good indication
of the state of prevailing opinion. (b)(3)
A Different Voice�Ali Shariati and His Writings
Shariati's Life and Death
Ali Shariati (1931-77) has become the guide for many
of the current generation of religiously inclined
intellectuals who seek in Islam an alternative to the
Westernization they now deplore. In some ways he is in
the mainstream of Shiism, and in others he is an
innovator. Some among the clergy seem to find
Shariati persuasive, although much that he teaches
must clash with their traditional learning.
(b)(3)
Shariati came to prominence in the 1960s when the
impact of the rapid changes set in motion by the Shah's
programs was being felt by a much larger portion of
the population than ever before. A new brand of
intellectual was emerging, one who unlike an earlier
generation had not been assimilated by Western
culture. The new intellectual comes from a modest
middle or even lower class background where religious
influence and traditional ways are likely to be strong,
but his education derives from the secular, moderniz-
ing system introduced in the past half century
(b)(3)
Shariati can be seen as representing this group. His
father, Sheikh Mohammad Taqi Shariati,'" was head
of the Society for the Diffusion of Islamic Fact and a
professor at the Faculty of Theology of Mashhad
University. He was also chairman of the board of
directors of the Mashhad branch of the Society of
Islamic Teaching, an organization founded in Tehran
by Hojjat-al-Islam Haji Sheikh Abas-Ali Eslami.
Shariati was considered a scholar in Islamic theology
and Arabic. At the same time he was well educated in
the modern sense and not a fanatic. One religious
writer who opposed Ali Shariati wrote that
Mohammad Shariati was the author of a Koran
commentary that was full of errors and more like a
Sometimes added is Mazinani-Mashadi indicating his origin in
the village of Mazinan of Mashhad. When Ali Shariati left Iran in
1976, his passport was in the name of Ali Mazinani. (u)
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Sunni than a Shiite commentary.'" Educated people
who retained their religious convictions respected
Sheikh Shariati, however, and enjoyed his sermons. He
was an eloquent, stimulating speaker. Sheikh Shariati
was a firm supporter of former Prime Minister
Mossadeq. At that time the Society for the Diffusion of
Islamic Fact joined with other religious bodies and
commercial guilds to form the Union of Islamic
Societies. The Union played an active political role in
support of Mossadeq. Shariati was a leading candidate
for the 17th majlis; the elections in Mashhad, however,
were suspended by Prime Minister Mossadeq and
never resumed.
(b)(3)
Shariati senior continued to be a Mossadeq partisan
even after the Premier's fall. In 1957 he was arrested
along with several others, but he was released soon
afterwards. Thereafter, he refrained from overt politi-
cal activity, confining his activities to religious
teaching.
(b)(3)
AR Shariati thus came from a family with a record of
political opposition as well as a religious orientation
that is not quite traditional Shiism. He was born in
Mashhad in 1931 and educated at the University of
Mashhad, where, if it is not hagiographical hyperbole,
"he had numerous clashes of opinion with his teach-
ers. . . his independence of thought and belief was
demonstrated above all by his determined defense of
truth and justice." He went on a government scholar-
ship to France, where "he was chiefly concerned with
the ideological and anti-imperialist movements that at
the time were sweeping across the Islamic world.
(b)(3)
Returning to Iran he became a fiery lecturer at the
Hosseiniyeh Ershad. He was imprisoned several times,
and when finally released went to England where he
died in 1977. (b)(3)
According to a partisan description of Shariati's last
hours,"6Shariati's wife and two daughters were to join
1" Ali Ansari, Dila'az Islam va Ruhaniyyat (A Defense of Islam and
the Clergy) Mashhad, 1973. Ansari, like Ali Shariati, was a lecturer
at the Hosseiniyeh Ershad. (u)
1" These quotes are from a book by Harnid Algar, On the Sociology
of Islam (Berkeley, California:Mizan Press, 1979) as reprinted in
Iran Voice, Vol. I, No. 5, 2 July 1979, published by the Iranian
Embassy in Washington. (u)
'46 Tehran newspaper Iranshahrr, 15 June 1977. (u)
'ere<
him in England. Only his daughters arrived; his wife,
according to this account, had been detained in Tehran
by SAVAK. Shariati left London airport and "set out
for home with his two daughters in a very disturbed
state. Shariati talked for a long time with his two
daughters, and in spite of the fact that they were all
tired, they stayed up until midnight. Then Shariati
went to his room and everybody went to sleep. It was
past ten o'clock on Sunday morning, and Shariati still
had not come out of his room. They knocked on the
door, but received no answer. When they entered the
room, Shariati was lying in the middle of it. The actual
cause of Shariati's death (the autopsy was performed
after a delay) has never been ascertained, but the
method of his death and its mysterious circumstances,
which resemble the deaths of Takhti, Samad Behrangi,
and Jalal-e-Ahmad, have eliminated the possibility
that it was natural and have earned him the title of
martyr."47
The British authorities apparently found no suspicious
circumstances in Shariati's death.
Even Shariati's body was a matter for contention
among his partisans. There apparently was a disagree-
ment as to where he should be buried. One group,
primarily those in Iran, wanted his body returned
there; another group, those outside Iran, wanted him
buried in Damascus. Among the latter were Yazdi,
Sadeq Qotbzadeh, and Sadeq Tabatabai, nephew of
the Lebanese Shiite leader Musa Sadr.
The latter group argued that the government was
preparing an official welcoming ceremony for
Shariati's body "and in this way to defame Dr.
Shariati." Europe was rejected for burial because it
was the land of unbelievers, and Iraq, a natural choice,
because it had a fascist government.
But there was apparently a more important reason�to
build up the prestige of Musa Sadr. A pro-Musa Sadr
organization, "The Awakening of Freedom in Iran
(External)," had been formed in the mid-1960s to
Takhti was a popular wrestler and a Mossadeq partisan, Behrangi
was a Marxist author, and al-Ahmad was a reformist writer. The
equation is simple: they all opposed the establishment; they all died;
therefore, they all were assassinated. (u)
54
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support Sadr's pro-Syrian position.'" Sadeq Tabatabai
was in charge of the organization, and Yazdi and
Qotbzadeh directed it in the United States and Europe.
Mostafa Chamran, a longtime resident of Lebanon,
apparently was the theorist for the organization, and
his formulations of Sadr's position appeared in
Payam-e-Mujahed. According to this account, Sadr
obtained permission from the Syrians to bury Shariati
in Syria, he read prayers over the body and gave the
eulogy. "In this way, the widespread love for Shariati
was able to help to a certain extent the establishment of
the prestige of Imam Sadr."
Yazdi claimed that this was a revolutionary step "in
wiping out the plots of the regime." Everyone, how-
ever, could not have been happy. Shariati's followers in
Iran were completely ignored, and Mrs. Shariati
arrived in London from Tehran as Shariati's body was
leaving for Damascus.
Shariati's Writings
Shariati developed many of his ideas in lectures he
delivered at the Hosseiniyeh Ershad,'" an institution
originally encouraged by the government (and prob-
ably financed by SAVAK) as a modern alternative to
the traditional mosque. It soon became, however, a
center of criticism against the regime and was subse-
quently closed.
Much of Shariati's reputation appears to come from
his oratory. He was an inspiring speaker, and much of
his published work originated as lectures and bears the
mark of an oral discourse rather than a polished
literary production. Adding to his popularity is the fact
that he claimed a "scientific" examination of Islam, a
claim that appeals to those with a modern education
(ironically, provided by the Shah) for whom tradi-
tional explanations based on faith are inadequate. The
reported popularity of Shariati among Khomeini's
followers is interesting since Shariati espoused points
of view that Khomeini himself should find distasteful,
1" According to this account Sadr supported the Syrian intervention
in Lebanon against the Palestinians because he wanted to change the
Cairo pact, which permitted the Palestinians to operate in south
Lebanon. This area was the center of Musa Sadr's influence. (u)
49 A hosseiniyeh is typically the place primarily devoted to the
performance of the martyrdom of Hosein. In small towns or villages
a hosseiniyeh might be found more often than a mosque. None,
however, were as elaborate as Ershad, a modern building with air
conditioning, a public address system, an auditorium, and class-
rooms. (u)
55
mostly his animosity toward traditional Islamic schol-
arship. Probably the two men's views converge not in
the details of each one's beliefs but in a common hatred
of the West and of the monarchy and in a desire that
Islam once more play a major role in the world. These
are adequate for opposition to a common enemy but
probably insufficient for long-term cooperation (b)(3)
Two of Shariati's longest and best known works are
Islam Shenasi (Islamology), which originated from a
series of lectures lasting more than 30 hours, and
Tashayyu'-e Alavi va Tashayyu'-e Safavi (Alid
Shiism and Safavid Shiism).
(b)(3)
In the former he attempted his own reinterpretation of
Islam, using some of the concepts he learned in the
course of his French education. He was moved, as
others have been, to react against the persistent
Westernization of Persian society. Although earlier
intellectuals looked westward for Iran's salvation, he
looked to a revitalized Shia Islam.
Today the knowledge of Islam is not undertaken only
as a religious duty or the pursuit of a branch of legal
learning. .. but to find the cause or causes for the rise
and fall of our present societies. In addition, it is a
strengthening of the social spirit and the true and
living yearning of a people for whose destiny we feel
responsibility. (u)
He found it necessary to approach Islam "scientifi-
cally" in order to recover early Islam, a socially
revolutionary movement. He argues that unlike West-
ern societies, which did not progress until "the day that
Christianity was driven from society to the interior of
the church," Islam and society were one. To generalize
from the Christian experience and argue that Islam
impeded social development was wrong.
He, like others, sees conspiracies. He rejected "the
myth that Westerners . . . have created to the effect
that. . . the Eastern mentality is incompatible with
industry and with complicated administrative struc-
tures of the present and . . . must always remain only
the producer of raw materials and the consumer of
industrial products. . . . Perhaps it is for the purpose of
establishing this point of view that they are concerned
only with reviving our mystical and literary works and
with creating a brisk market for them both inside and
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outside the country, while they speak little of the
abundant political, technical and scientific treasures of
the thousand-year history of Islam. The fate of Omar
Khayyam in this age is a perfect example of the fate of
our history and civilization.""� (u)
For Shariati (and indeed for some other Muslims)
Christianity and the West Were primarily motivated in
its relations with the Muslims by the desire for revenge
on the world of Islam, which once defeated the
Western world.
Science placed the weapons of death into the hands of
Christianity. .. who still had not forgotten. .. the
conversion of the great church, the Aya Sophia, into a
mosque and the change in name from Constantinople
to Istanbul ... and who had heard the clanging and
determined swords of Khalid, Tariq, Salah-ed-Din
Ayyubi, Muhammad the Conqueror, and the gallant
champions of the Crusades. .. and whose heart ached
from the rancor of defeat and the humiliation of
surrender. .. attacked Islam whose limbs were cut to
pieces by the sharp arrows of nationalism ... and
pressed so much on the throat of its longtime obstinate
rival that its (Islam's) face became blue. .. and it
became silent in painful and black strangulation. (u)
Shariati claimed that his book was the first one in
Persian to try to describe Islam scientifically. Since
Islam contained all that was the best in earlier
civilizations and was the "transmitter of the spiritual
and material experiments of ancient man to today's
civilization," sociologists would find Islam a proving
ground for their theories. "Within the history of Islam
it is to Iran . . . that the spiritual life of Islam is
indebted for everything."' Without knowing Islam,
(b)(3) one could not understand Iran.
'" In Iran Omar Khayyam is seen as a mathematician and an
astronomer and only incidentally as a rather minor poet. Western
scholars' interest in Islamic religion, philosophy, and literature
rather than in Islamic science arises in part from the similar
emphasis that Muslims themselves gave to their heritage. There
have been a considerable number of Western studies of Islamic
science which Shariati may have been unaware of or ignored for the
sake of his argument. For many centuries, however, the Islamic
world per se has contributed little to advance science and technology
which, as Shariati notes, was the result of European developments.
(u)
"1 Shariati derided the Pahlavi's emphasis on pre- Islamic Iranian
civilizations as "exaggeration and extravagance" and arising from a
of fanaticism. (u)
Seefet
He examined in detail and with references and
quotations from European sociologists and historians,
the bases of religion, the relation of religion to society,
the position of learning in Islam, and differences
between Islam and other religions. Monotheism, he
asserted, was the basis of Islam. He appeared to
redefine some traditional concepts, for example,
ijahad was freedom of scientific research. The final
art of Islamology is a detailed study of Muhammad.
In Alid Shiism and Safavid Shiism, Shariati contin-
ued his reinterpretation of Shia Islam. In his view
Shiism, as represented by its founder Ali and Ali's
family, was suppressed and replaced by Safavid
Shiism, an establishment religion supporting the gov-
ernment rather than being in continual revolt as it
should be. In making his argument he dismissed nearly
everything that had become typical of Shiism over the
centuries, claiming in most cases that these practices
resulted from imitation of Christian customs.
This viewpoint is central to his thesis: state and religion
have been so intertwined for three centuries that only
by denigrating both could he wipe the slate clean and
start anew. Thus, he insisted that the Safavid opposi-
tion to the Ottoman Empire resulted from the fact that
the Safavids were in collusion with the Europeans to
oppose the Ottomans, who were the protectors of
Islam. When the Safavids appeared, Shiism moved
from the "Friday Mosque of the people" to the
"Mosque of the Shah.'
The ties of the Safavids with Christianity were
obvious. Safavid missionary centers were "forced" to
bring Shiism closer to Christianity. Thus Shah Abas
moved the Armenian Christians of Armenian Julfa to
a city near Esfahan and granted them many favors.'
1" There seems to be no historical data to support this interpretation
of Shah Abas' motives. The usual explanation is that Shah Abas
wished to provide Esfahan with a skilled group of artisans. Tribal
and minority groups were frequently shifted around the country by
both Safavid and Qajar Shahs for their own purposes. (u)
56
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In a like manner the mullahs "had to" introduce a
sympathetic figure into the drama of Karbala.'"
Shariati went on to insist that the Safavids created the
position of Minister of Affairs of the Rowzehkhaneh
(the institution responsible for staging the drama of
Hosein). This official traveled to Europe and brought
back to Iran many Christian religious customs. With
the aid of pro-government religious leaders these
Christian customs were grafted onto Shiism. Such
customs were the Taziyyah (the dramatic production
of the murder of Hosein), self-flagellation, music,
communal mourning, the hanging of black curtains,
drawing pictures of imams (pictures are forbidden in
Islam), and the halo-like light surrounding the heads
of imams. Nearly everything that typified popular
Islam was rejected by Shariati. It is not necessary to
comment in detail on his argument. The "minister of
affairs of the Rowzehkhaneh" seems to appear only in
Shariati. The Taziyyah started 500 years before the
Safavids. Iran had a long pre-Islamic artistic tradition
that carried into Islamic times, and the idea of
depicting the imams would not seem to be strange. The
halo surrounding the imam's head is a striking parallel
with Christian artistic convention, but it is found also
in Buddhism several centuries before Christ.
Shariati argued that the true Shiite ulema were closely
associated with the people and were in continuous
conflict with the rulers. When they stopped opposing,
they stopped being true Shiite leaders. Shariati com-
mented that it was very hard to distinguish between
Alid and Safavid Shiism since both had identical
origins and the exterior form was unchanged. The
Safavids cleverly managed to retain the outer form,
but changed the meaning. They were adept in "making
the forbidden legal and the legal forbidden." Islamic
law was out of date because it dealt with matters like
slaves as property but not with oil rights or the rights of
the worker versus the employer, and it was shameful
'"The drama of Karbala depicting the murder of Hosein and his
followers by the troops of the caliph is the centerpiece of the
Moharram celebrations. There are hundreds of versions, some of
which contain anachronisms such as the presence of Sassanian
warriors, Crusaders, and in one case a European who shows
sympathy and support for All. Again, there is no indication that this
was done in order to bring Safavid Shiism closer to Christianity. An
easier explanation is that it was intended to show that even
Christians recognized the justice of Al's cause. (u)
57
that it was not Islam�the religion of freedom and
liberation�that emancipated the slaves, but an
American president.
(b)(3)
A major concern of Shariati was the split between the
Sunnis and Shias, which, according to him, did not
occur until the Safavids and prevented Islam from
presenting a solid front to its shared foreign
enemies�imperialism and Zionism. He deplored the
Shiite rejection of the first three caliphs and called for
unity between Sunni and Shia. Differences between
the two schools were merely scholastic differences that
should remain on that level and not involve the masses.
(b)(3)
In Shiism, A Complete Party, Shariati continued to
expand his reinterpretation of Islam.'" He commenced
by defending the emotional tone of his work. He was
not approaching the subject dispassionately but was
dealing with 1,300 years of a nation's misfortune, the
"disappearance of a freedom-granting faith, and the
stupefication of the people through force, ignorance,
and poverty."
(b)(3)
Abu Dharr did not sit in the corner of a mosque
debating the meaning of the Koran.'" When Abu
Dharr got into a dispute with Ka'b al-Ahbar over the
meaning of a verse in the Koran, he did not dispute
politely but instead struck Ka'b al-Ahbar on the head
with a camel bone. Why did he do this? Shariati
answered that Ka'b's interpretation would have been a
conscious corrupting of the verse for the purpose of
eliminating the Koran, encouraging the poverty of the
people, and allowing the capitalists freedom to
plunder
(b)(3)
Moreover, said Shariati, "This vile man [Ka'b] was a
Jew. . . . He had come and converted to Islam and
donned the garb of a learned man and spiritual leader
and mounted the minbar and interpreted the Koran to
the profit of. . . the capitalist and to the detriment of
the exploited people. . . who had turned to Islam."
'm This is the text of a lecture Shariati delivered at the Hosseiniyel(b)(3)
Ershad. (u)
'"Abu Dharr, about whom Shariati wrote another book, was an
early associate of Muhammad and a follower of Ali. (u)
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Shariati clearly found the actions of Abu Dharr the
model for conduct.'" Our imams, said Shariati, have
been dressed in the clothes of love, of submission to and
in the pay of the Caliphs. He found this wrong, "where
else do we derive our daily hope except from martyr-
dom." When one loved the family of Ali with his whole
being, how could one remain undisturbed. . . and offer
restrained criticism.
(b)(3)
Shariati explained that after he studied all the
ideologies, revolutions, societies, renaissances, soci-
ology, Islamology, the rise and decline of cultures, the
family of Ali, the imamate and governorship, he
concluded that Alid Shiism was the complete party.
Alid Shiism had all the characteristics described in the
Koran, it had all the requirements of an ideal party, a
party of God. It was an answer to the needs of this
generation of responsible intellectuals in moving the
"petrified parties of societies, in directing their class
struggles." (b)(3)
Shariati rejected the traditional Muslim scholastic
view that long study of theology, philosophy, jurispru-
dence, logic, ethics and all the normal subjects of a
religious education should be mastered before one
could move on to action. This could never be achieved.
He equally rejected the views of "new intellectuals,"
who held that one must first prepare an ideology,
choose a materialistic and secular world view. After
attaining such knowledge one could, as a revolutionary
intellectual, "look into society's ownership of its
economic resources, and forbid class strife and man's
exploitation of man." This approach was also impossi-
ble because man's knowledge was never complete.
Thought and action must go hand in hand, and "we are
confident that He will lay the straightest and most
direct road at our feet. . . and the road will be easier.
We are the group that has been entrusted with this
road. . . we shall not lose hope or hesitate and not
deceive ourselves and other people. . . and be just like
Abu Dharr."
(b)(3)
Shariati gave new definitions to old concepts. The
ummat has generally been defined as the Muslim
community, the totality of all Muslims wherever they
'56 In this the Forcian terrorist group is following Shariati. See the
section on Foron, p. 62. (u)
Seefet
are found.'" Ummat, said Shariati, was from the
Arabic root amma, "which means traveling, moving,
setting out, a forward movement on a straight road."
Thus, ummat was a group of people who had come
together freely to follow one straight road in pursuit of
a shared direction or goal. The aim of the ummat was
"becoming perfect," not "being happy." The greatest
danger was the substitution of "being" or "remaining
motionless" for "becoming" or "moving." This could
happen as a result of internal conflict, attack by
foreigners, becoming lost, or by any other obstructing
factor that could cross the path of the ummat, prevent
it from fulfilling its goal, and deprive it of its identity.
Here he seems close to the sort of esoteric interpreta-
tion of Koranic terminology that he rejected in the
traditional religious scholars.'"
Shariati also gave a new definition to imam, not the 12
imams of Shia Islam nor the imam who was the prayer
leader, but the imam who was the leader of the ummat.
He was "the motor of the movement of society and the
one who gives society direction. . . the person whose
existence is the model for 'becoming' and whose way of
acting is the guide for the nation."
This definition of imam appears to be the one assumed
by Khomeini's followers, for any other meaning would
be blasphemy or below Khomeini's position. Khomeini
himself seems neither to have encouraged nor discour-
aged this usage. His views, however, seem to parallel
Shariati on this point for he writes that ". . . the
jurisprudent and nobody else is the imam and leader of
the Muslims and the person dispensing justice among
them."59 The present usage therefore could come as
well from Khomeini as from Shariati.
In his general attack on the "forms" of Shiism as
contrasted with its content Shariati argued that the
Koran supported the view that "One can break the
form in order to preserve the contents, and turn it
upside down." In support of this he cited the case of the
"See for example, Khadduri and Liebesny, op. cit., p. 3. (u)
15'Arabic etymology is often complex, if not obscure. Amma is
movement of various kinds both concrete and abstract, as to go and
to lead by example or to follow the example of someone. Other
derivatives are the words for "mother" and "ignorance." (Hans
Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic ed. J. M. Cowan
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1976), p. 25. The Koran uses ummat in the sense of
"religion," (Koran 43, verse 21). A straightforward derivation would
seem to be "those who follow the example" of Muhammad. (u)
1" Islamic Government, p. 36.
58
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change in the direction of prayer from Jerusalem,
which Muhammad first used, to Mecca, which he
prescribed some years later. "In this instance," said
Shariati, "the Koran broke the frame and changed the
divine direction in order to free the spirit and the
contents."6� Shariati held that a Muslim stood in the
middle of his society and held himself responsible for
the leadership of the people of the East and West. He
never countenanced making peace or tolerated coexis-
tence with those who enslaved and exploited the people
of the world. War was waged for the sake of liberating
the oppressed. It was an economic, political, expansion-
ist, and liberating war.
Finally, Shariati discussed the well-known injunction
to "command what is good and forbid what is evil." He
castigated those who believed that this applied only to
matters of personal conduct. "Today its meaning is
limited to minor and superficial matters such as the
chastising of a child or forbidding women to wear
skirts. . . . However, Israel's transgressions against
Palestine and one nation's plundering the great Mus-
lim nation is not considered by them to be a matter of
'commanding what is good.'"
Shariati said this principle must be considered in its
original and noble sense. Every "knowledgeable guide"
and legal opinion (ijtihad) of every period must
discover and explain what was permitted and what was
forbidden for that period and become a guide in
implementing this precept. The responsibility of the
ummat in this was eternal and worldwide, not paro-
chial.
Shariati returned to earlier arguments that true Islam
was corrupted by the priests and the West. Islam was
an ideology before it was changed to a collection of
social traditions and rigid exterior forms. Now it was a
culture composed of philosophy and sciences�the
specialty of an elite�which made it resemble any
other philosophy and science and eliminated its origi-
nal goal to enjoin the good and forbid the evil
The Islamic scholar was an ideological scholar who
acted as a guide. He was not a literary figure or a
philosopher, but one who followed the road of the
The impious and the infidels note that the change occurred after
Muhammad had a dispute with the Jews of Medina who originally
had supported him. (u)
59
prophets. With the book of God in one hand and the
sword in the other he would face Ali's enemies. In
short, Shariati concluded, Islam was an ideology not a
culture. The ummat was an intellectual society and a
religious group in motion along a shared road with an
imam as a guide. The ummat chose its own guide-
model so that it could act as a guide for other people.
Under this guidance the best ummat will be formed
and its message would be enjoining, forbidding, and
believing in God. There must always be such an
ummat among Muslims. This, concludes Shariati was
a "party" in the complete sense of the term
(b)(3)
Shariati's Religion against Religion developed another
key concept in his version of Shia Islam�the idea of
monotheism. It is this definition that should be kept in
mind when considering the philosophy�such as it
is�of the Forqan group.
(b)(3)
As in other of Shariati's works, he resorted to stylistic
devices, the repetition of emotionally laden phrases
and symbols more than to the logical development of
an argument. This arose partly from the fact that most
of his work originated in lectures, and his impact came
less from what he said than how he said it. One might
observe unkindly that the subordination of content to
form that he attacked in modern Islam he raised to an
art in his own work.
(b)(3)
Religion against Religion held that the usual view of
religion opposing irreligion was false. No one in history
had ever been without religion.'6' The conflict was
always between religions. He went on to limit these
religions to monotheism and polytheism. Islam, prop-
erly understood, was monotheistic, but more than unity
of God was involved. Recognition of the unity of God
logically required the unity of man on earth, the unity
of mankind, races, qualities, families, individuals,
right, values, and distinctions.
(b)(3)
All else, Shariati insisted, was polytheism, and
polytheism's goal was to support the status quo. The
"fabricators" of polytheism were always among the
upper classes, and the roots were economic, to assure
wealth for the privileged and to deprive the poor. In
polytheism "There must be several goals for various
161 He discounted atheism which was a recent development and was,
moreover, confined to individuals, not groups or classes. (u)
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areas and peoples so that several classes and races can
deprive others by force."
(b)(3)
There were two kinds of polytheism�the direct and
open kind was the worshiping of multiple gods; the
other he called hidden polytheism concealed by a veil
of monotheism. It was here that his special definition
of monotheism was involved. Whatever promoted the
status quo, recognized classes or other distinctions in
personal status was polytheism. Clearly, he included
traditional Shia Islam in this and opposed it to his Alid
Shiism, which was monotheistic.
(b)(3)
Polytheism always meant social polytheism, which
involved the proliferation of races, groups, classes, and
families in human society. The only time monotheism
truly existed was during Muhammad's 10-year resi-
dence at Medina, for it was only at that time that the
economic and social system and the relations between
individuals and classes were regulated by a belief in
God and the people. (b)(3)
In conclusion, after the Seal of the Prophets, that is,
Muhammad, it was the ulema�the intellectuals�
who must continue his labor. "The duty of the ulema is
to fight with religion to establish and revivify religion,
and to understand the meaning of monotheism in such
a way as to know that monotheism differs from idol
worship, and to be able to distinguish polytheism in its
guise of monotheism."
(b)(3)
Shariati basically was grappling with a perpetual
theological and philosophical problem�how could
God permit evil to exist? He could not reject God and
become an atheist, putting all the responsibility on
man, nor could he reject Islam and search for the
answer in some other religion. He searched for the
Islamic utopia and found it in early Islam when both
Muhammad and Ali ruled according to God's will. To
recapture the utopia, he redefined key concepts and
asserted that a proper understanding and application
of these concepts would restore pristine Islam. Tradi-
tional Shia Islam had not been able to right the wrongs
that he saw in society. Therefore, he rejected it as
being a deliberate corruption of true Islam perpetrated
both by Western imperialism and by indigenous rulers.
True Islam was militant, continually battling with evil,
and this battling was to be the major purpose of the
ummat�the Muslim community moving forward with
a goal and a purpose. The leader of the ummat was the
imam who emerged and achieved leadership by recog-
nition of the ummat. Both ummat and imam are to be
the models for the entire world.
Shariati's opposition to traditional Shia Islam was
described by one sympathetic scholar:
He opposed the extreme traditionalists who spun a web
around themselves, separated Islam from society into a
corner of the mosque and Madraseh, and often reacted
negatively to any kind of intellectual movement within
society; they had covered the brilliant truths of Islam
with a dark veil behind which they themselves also
hid 162 ( u)
Opposition to Shariati
Shariati's teaching aroused strong reaction from some
clerical circles. One attack was by Muhammad
Muqimi, a religious popularizer.'63 Muqimi is espe-
cially angered at Shariati's insistence on Sunni-Shia
rapprochement:
For fourteen centuries scholars have protected the
truth from the claws of the plunderers and have spent
much time and effort fighting the enemy . . . they have
thanked God that in the Sunni atmosphere where it
was considered deserving of the highest reward to shed
the blood of the Shiites, they were able to bring the
light of Shiism. It is again necessary to recognize the
babblings of the Sunnis in Shiite societies. (u)
Muqimi accuses Shariati of being an enemy of the
Ahl-e-Bayt (the People of the House), the term used to
refer to Ali and his descendants. He is especially angry
that Shariati refused to correct his errors after they
were pointed out to him. "I am ashamed," says
Mtiqimi, "to mention what one so-called scholar of
religion has written. . . because he has made the
blessed name of Hussayn ibn Ali a step for the
162 Iran Voice, Vol I, No. 5, 2 July 1979. This is reprinted from
Hamid Algar, On the Sociology of Islam (Berkeley, California: The
Mizan Press). This is a translation of eight of Shariati's lectures. (u)
163 Mohammad Muqimi, Confusion over Some Errors of Dr. Ali
Shariati, (Tehran, 1973). Some of Muqimi's books were published
under the editorial supervision of Muhammad Beheshti of the
University of Tehran Theological School. (u)
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shameful desires of imperialism 'and has tau ht
misleading lessons to the coming generation."
Muqimi's language is no less impassioned than
Shariati's. He is incensed by Shariati's insistence that
Muhammad grew up in a pagan household and insists
that even some Sunni writers accept the fact that
Muhammad's family was monotheistic and even Mus-
lim. According to Muqimi, "it is proven that the
ancestors of the prophet all the way back to Adam were
monotheists and believers." The truth was obscured by
"those who play tricks with history. . . to introduce
thieves as the best guardians, the hard-hearted as the
most compliant, the deadliest enemy as the best friend
and, in short, to place a mask over their faces, truth
and reality receded behind a dark cloud of oppressive
thought and ambitions."
Muqimi also attacks Shariati for asserting that Abu
Bekr led prayers while Muhammad was still alive.
Devout Shia hold that Abu Bekr, the first caliph,
wrongfully obtained the caliphate, which should have
gone to Ali. The story of Abu Bekr leading prayers is
meant to indicate that Muhammad approved Abu
Bekr as his successor. Muqimi continues attacking
Shariati's errors and quoting hadith against him:
He places his own opinion before the people in
contradiction to Shiite beliefs and has attracted a
group of young people who do not have the slightest
knowledge of religious matters to his side. He has
accused the guardians of the holy law of being
backward and being hated by the public.. . he has
attacked the spiritual leaders for contradicting his
errors and has told the imperialism and west- struck '"
young people to attack them because they were
making them prisoners of their twisted beliefs .. . the
young people accepted Mr. Shariati's views and
without the slightest thought, attacked the defenders
of Shiism's laws, even the great Marjis who are the
representatives of the Imam of the Age
Other religious writers, especially Sheikh Ansari,
attack Shariati on much the same grounds and with
the same ammunition, piling hadith on hadith to
I" "Imperialism" is for Iranians of all persuasions a blanket term of
contempt with little reference to its original meaning. (u)
I" Gharbzadegi, see p. 7. (u)
61
refute Shariati's errors, misconceptions, and false
interpretations. Ansari even compared Shariati to the
detested Ahmad Kasravi at one point. (b)(3)
But Shariati is not attacked only by the religious
conservatives. Some Marxists do not like him either. A
Marxist analysis, perhaps the only one, is found in Ali
Akbar Akbari's "A Study of Some Social Ques-
tions."166 Akbari's attack on Shariati has some of the
same features as Muqimi's: accusations of ignorance,
attacks on Shariati's contradictions, distortions, and
ambiguities. For Muqimi, these shortcomings arise
from Shariati's misunderstanding of Shi'ah Islam; for
Akbari they arise from Shariati's misunderstanding of
Marxism. Shariati's basic error, Akbari believes, is to
see reli ion rather than economics as the locomotive of
history. (b)(3)
Akbari refutes the claim that the disappearance of the
Ottoman Empire as Shariati had argued in Alid
Shiism and Safavid Shiism was a defeat for Islam. The
Ottomans were tyrants and oppressors who left no
cultural heritage. It was not only the Ottomans who
passed from the scene in 1924, "but all the great
feudalistic, tyrannical powers in the face of the
advance of the bourgeoisie." It was the bourgeoisie, not
Christianity that plundered the world through mer-
chants and capitalists, and it was capitalism, not
Christianity that attacked Islam. It was the capitalism
of Europe and America that attacked and plundered
the nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Shariati mistakenly followed the reactionary historian
Toynbee, who held that imperialist exploitation was
the result of religious beliefs and nonscientific reasons.
Shariati's errors will only aid imperialism and reaction
by misleading his readers and give them an incorrect
knowledge of colonialism and its method of advance.
(b)(3)
Shariati also misunderstood the matter of social
classes, which originated in economic not religious
conditions. The landlord-peasant struggle will not
disappear by the weakening of the landlords' belief in
their own system, as Shariati believed. The elimination
of the capitalist class can only be accomplished by
'" Chapkhane-ye-Tabish (Tehran, 1349 (1970)) 112 pages. (u)
Seft
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eliminating the capitalist system. Akbari assaults
Shariati at every turn for his ignorance of the true, that
is, Marxist, reason for social classes, poverty, corrup-
tion, and crime. (b)(3)
Although the debate between Shariati and his oppo-
nents involves interpretations of history and religion,
these are more than sterile academic exercises. Both
sides are arguing political action, and at least some
who follow Shariati are invoking his ideas to support
terrorism.
(b)(3)
Forqan and All Shariati
The terrorist group calling itself Forqan 167 came to
prominence in early 1979 when it claimed responsibil-
ity for the assassination of Major General Qarani, a
former Chief of Staff, and Ayatollah Motahari, a
professor at the University of Tehran Theological
School who was close to Khomeini. It may go back,
however, as far as early 1977. (b)(3)
Forqan has been reported as representing several
different groups�the Fedayan-e-Islam; a group of
confused, aimless students; and "a group organized by
SAVAK more than two years ago with the specific
purpose of instigating ideological friction within the
Islamic revolutionary movement." 168
(b)(3)
Another view is that Forqan represents the followers of
Shariati who are trying to realize in practice what
Shariati preached. At least one of Shariati's followers
denounces this identification. "Shariati," he wrote,
"always perceived the Iranian clerics as potential
revolutionary leaders not only in destroying the monar-
chy, but also in constructing a new sociopolitical
1" The meaning offorrian in the Koran is severalfold. As indicated on
p. 40, it has the meaning of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It
also occurs in reference to one of Muhammad's battles�"the day of
distinction," that is, between Muhammad and the unbelievers of
Mecca. Some commentators take this in a more general sense and
interpret /organ as a victory over unbelievers. This is probably the
meaning intended by the group calling itself Forqan. (See J. Penrice,
A Dictionary and Glossary of the Koran (London: 1873), pp. 109-
110; R. E. Bell, Introduction to the Koran (1953), p. 136f;
Encyclopedia of Islam, new edition, Vol. 2, pp. 949-950. (u)
Mansur Farhang, "A Rebuttal," Iran Voice, Vol. 1, No. 5, 2 July
1979, p. 3. (u)
Seef�
order."69 "Last January," he continued, "in a street
demonstration in Tehran I saw an eight- to ten-year-
old boy distributing a Forqan leaflet containing some
distorted quotations from Shariati's writings. . . .
Forqan is completely unknown to Iranians, no one has
ever met a member of the organization. . . .'7� Many
Iranians are convinced that these counterrevolutionary
actions are designed and directed by the CIA/Israeli
agents."
One of the fullest accounts was provided by an Iranian
newspaper.'" Claiming to possess Forqan documents,
the newspaper described what it considered to be basic
beliefs of Forqan:
� Islam. It emphasizes monotheism,'" the Koran, and
its interpretation.
� Human beings are divine, and a fighter should
recognize God. Until the poor inherit the earth,
humans should emphasize monotheism and "take up
arms in anger."
� Martyrdom. "The martyr evaluates all of the
directions, ebbs and tides, and society's ups and
downs with the principles of Koranic ideology." The
martyrs of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq and Shariati are
especially praised.
� Alid Shiism.
� Leadership is by "distinguished prophets" and "mar-
tyrs from the poor." The leaders . . . set the direction
for saving the poor, the people, the imamate and their
heredity.
� Forqan is "Islam without clergy." It accuses the
clergy of dictatorship, being reactionary, deviating
from monotheism, defending the interests of land-
owners and capitalists, and "Akhundist dictator-
ship."
1" Farhang, /oc.cit. The Shariati material that has been examined
does not support Farhang. What Shariati may have said privately is
unknown. It is true that a clergy that conformed to Shariati's view of
what the clergy should be would fulfill a revolutionary role. Shariati,
however, did not seem to have been successful in finding clergy that
fit his model unless he thought Khomeini filled the bill. Farhang says
that Shariati "admired Khomeini both as a theologian and as a
leader of the Iranian Islamic revolution." One wonders how Shariati
would view the Islamic revolution as implemented by Khomeini. (u)
'" Some members were reported arrested, but nothing more has been
heard of them. (u)
'' Ayandegan, 10 May 1979, p.14. This paper was subsequently
suppressed. (u)
1" See p. 59 for Shariati's definition of monotheism. (u)
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� Forqan supports the poor and believes that the
looting of the poor has been the constant procedure of
all systems. . . colonialists and nonbelievers in
monotheism.
� Fighting is an inseparable part of mankind and is
essential in expressing the identity of the poor.
"Sanction is given unto those who fight because they
have been wronged; and Allah is indeed able to give
them victory." (Koran XXII:39) The main charac-
teristic of believers is that "socially and from God's
nature they are constantly in bloody fighting with
gods of history and the masters of the world."
� Forqan despises "political fighting," for example,
meetings and strikes.
Forqan appears opposed to almost everyone and
everything�Russia, China, the United States, Af-
ghanistan, both of Daoud and Taraki, colonialists east
and west, Marxists, and the Tudeh party�a branch of
SAVAK.'" Zionism, Sadat, Cuba, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, the Lebanese Phalange, and Japan are all on
Forqan's enemies' list. In addition to the poor, Forqan
supports the Eritrean Muslims' Movement, Arafat's
PLO, Islamic and non-Islamic liberation movements,
and the "Sahara" [sic] movement
Finally, Forqan attacks Bazargan and Motahari for
"plotting against the ideas and writings of Shariati." A
joint statement of Bazargan and Motahari on 14
December 1977 in which they asked for unity against
the Shah is castigated as suggesting that Shariati had
been in error on Islamic issues. The joint statement,
insists Forqan, "was made to change the aims of the
martyrs and the revolutionary culture." After
Motahari's assassination he was accused of "turning
his back on the unification movement of Iran's poor
Muslims during Satan's era," and of taking sides
against Shariati. He is also accused of creating the
term "materialist hypocrite" in order to isolate the
Muslims who follow monotheism.
This, at least, is not far wrong. In the 1960s most "Tudeh"
organizations in Iran were run by or penetrated by SAVAK. Tudeh
abroad, however, was not although even there SAVAK had
penetrations. (u)
63
Qarani, who was later assassinated, was a follower of
Ayatollah Milani, and Milani was an opponent of
Shariati. Shariati also had attacked Milani, whom he
accused of creating conflicts among Muslims. (b)(3)
Shariati's openly identified followers reject the idea
that Forqan represents his philosophy. It is not at all
unlikely, however, that less educated, unsophisticated
readers of Shariati could have seized on some of his
ideas to support their course of action. Forqan might be
an offshoot of the Mujahidin-e-Khalq, for the ideas
expressed would seem to be in accord with the
Mujahidin. Finally, Forqan could be the tool of a
faction in the present religious/political maneuvering.
The Fedayan-e-Islam of the 1940s and 1950s was
manipulated and used by several different factions
against its enemies.'"
'" Some unsubstantiated reporting at the time suggested that the
Shah had used the Fedayan to eliminate Prime Minister Razmara.
(u)
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Part III: Major Shia Leaders
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, indisputedly the domi-
nant figure in Iran today, has had more than his share
of luck in reaching that position. When he began his
campaign against the Shah in 1963 he could not have
anticipated the events that gave him the opportunity to
press this campaign to a successful conclusion.
Khomeini's expulsion from Iraq in October 1978 was a
key occurrence. That development gave Khomeini and
his followers the opportunity to launch the kind of
campaign from Paris that they could not have at-
tempted from Iraq.
The origin of Khomeini's opposition to the Shah and
his government appears to have been based entirely on
Khomeini's interpretation of religious principles. No
early personal experience can be found that might have
influenced him. This appeal to religion gives him a
much wider constituency than that of the nationalists
whose three decades of opposition has been based on
secular principles. The fundamentalist interpretation
of Shia Islam which Khomeini espouses puts him in
opposition to more liberal trends, but the vehemence
and uncompromising nature of his positions have
intimidated other clerics who fear, not without cause,
that open opposition to Khomeini could be calamitous
for them.
Ruhollah Khomeini was born in the village of
Khomeyn in the province of Esfahan north of
Golpayegan around 1900.'" His father was Seyed
Mustafa al-Shahid al-Khomeini, and his grandfather
was surnamed al-Hindi, reflecting his origin in Kash-
mir. His father bore the title Hojjat al-Islam, an
honorific suggesting something more than a mullah
l" Most of this biography is from Muhammad Razi, Asar al-Hujjah
(The Signs of the Twelfth Imam). The more recent Ganjineh-.
ye-Daneshmandan does not include Khomeini, possibly because by
1972 Khomeini was anathema to the Government of Iran and the
book might have been banned. Additional information is from an
interview with his brother, Morteza, in Tehran Journal,
16 January 1979, p. 4. (u)
65
Figure 14
Highlights in life of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
About 1900
Born in Khomeyn.
1916 Goes to Arak for theological education.
1921 Follows his teacher Haeri-Yazdi to Qom.
1921-38 Studies in Qom.
1-938-48
Teaches at Qom. .
1961 Death of Ayatollah Borujerdi makes
Khomeini one of several contenders for
Shiite leadership.
4 June 1963
April 1964
Arrested after antigovernment sermon.
Released from house arrest.
October 1964
Rearrested and exiled to Turkey after
attacking Status of Forces Bill.
October 1978
Expelled from Iraq. Goes to Paris after
being refused entry to Kuwait.
1 February 1979
Returns to Iran.
The above information is Unclassified.
but not as grand as an ayatollah.'" The family claims
descent from Muhammad. Ruhollah was the youngest
of six children who were orphaned when Ruhollah was
only 9 months old. His mother and aunt died when he
was 15 and he went to live with his older brother. The
brother, now 85 years old is, Hojjat al-Islam Seyed
Morteza Pasandideh, who was released from internal
exile in September 1978 and has been a constant
companion of his younger brother ever since. Khomeini
had two sons. Mostafa died a few years ago in An
Najaf in what are now called "mysterious circum-
stances." He died of a heart attack, but his death is
said to have had a profoundly unsettling effect on
1" The assertion (e.g. in Paul Balta and Claudine Rulleau, L7ran
Insurge' (Paris 1979), p. 156), that he is from a long established line
of ayatollahs is possible but unsubstantiated. His father was not so
designated, and his maternal grandfather Imam Mirza Ahmad is not
mentioned in the Ganjineh, an omission that would be unusual. (u)
7/
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Figure 15.
Ahmad Khomeini, son
of Ayatollah Khomeini
Unclassified �
Khomeini who is convinced his son was killed by the
government. A second son, Ahmad, is married to the
niece of the missing Lebanese Shiite leader, Musa
Sadr
(b)(3)
Khomeini received his early training from a local
clergyman. After mastering the Muqaddimat�the
elements of religious knowledge�he went to Arak 40
miles to the north. Arak, when Khomeini arrived in
1916, was about a century old. Its population was
perhaps 15,000�including several Jewish families�
and it would be more than a decade before the railroad
would come through. This prosperous city was well
known for its carpet manufacturing, but its religious
renown was derived from the presence there of
Ayatollah Abdol Karim Haeri-Yazdi (d. 1937), one of
the most eminent religious figures of his day.'"
Khomeini followed Haeri-Yazdi when the latter
'"Haeri-Yazdi attempted to remain uninvolved in politics, a difficult
job for a lifetime that spanned both the Constitutional Revolution
and the rise of Reza Shah. Haeri moved from An Najaf to Arak in
1900, left Arak in 1906 when the religious leaders got involved in the
Constitutional Revolution, and returned to An Najaf. When the An
Najaf scholars also became involved, he moved to Karbala. In 1913
he returned to Arak and stayed there until 1921 when he went to
Qom, where he reestablished the Qom Circle for Religious Studies
(Howzeh-ye-Elmiyyah-ye Qom). He joined other clergymen in 1926
in opposing Reza Khan's attempt to establish a republic. (u)
moved to�Qom in 1921. He continued to study figh
(jurisprudence) and usu/ (the science of proofs that
lead to the establishment of legal standards) with
Haeri-Yazdi, who was recognized as an outstanding
authority. Khomeini also studied ethics, philosophy,
and irfan (esoteric knowledge). From 1938 to 1948 he
taught in Qom, specializing in ethics. Later he taught
courses in principles of Islamic taxation. He is the
author of at least 24 works.
How and why Khomeini turned into such an intracta-
ble opponent of the Shah remains undetermined. He is
said to have coauthored an anti-Pahlavi book in 1944 or
1945 after the exile of Reza Shah, but he was known
primarily as a scholar.'" He was well enough con-
nected in the Qom religious establishment, however, to
be entrusted by Ayatollah Borujerdi, recognized leader
of the Shiites at the time, with responsibility for the
affairs of religious students when Borujerdi died in
1961. According to his brother, Ruhollah's "first
serious encounter with the regime was sparked by the
Shah's plan to launch the land reform in 1963."
From February-March of 1963, when the Shah pushed
through parliament a law enfranchising women and
permitting them to be elected to Parliament, until
June, there was a buildup of antiregime activity by the
mullahs fronted by Khomeini. According to one
account he was selected by others in the clergy who
believed they could control him and manipulate his
operations.
Khomeini's activities culminated in his arrest in Qom
by SAVAK on the morning of 5 June 1963, which fell
in the religious mourning month of Moharram. Wide-
spread rioting occurred immediately in Tehran and
Shiraz with high casualties. Khomeini remained in
prison and later under house arrest until early April
1964. The issue was whether Khomeini would agree to
abstain from political activities if released. He was
released but immediately resumed his antigovernment
sermons, concentrating on themes such as excessive
Jewish and Bahai influence, unconstitutionality, cor-
1" This book cannot be identified. It might, however, be a 1941 book,
The Keys of Spirituality (Qom, 1941), which was anti-Reza Shah.
(Morteza Katabi and Jean Leon, "The March towards the Islamic
Republic of Iran�Society and Religion according to Imam
Khomeyni," in LeMonde Diplomatique, April 1979, trans. in JPRS
073353, 1 May 79, p. 81). This work, however, cannot be identified
among the 24 books known to be written by Khomeini. (u)
66
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ruption, the danger of foreign influence, and the
anti-Muslim character of the Iranian Government.
The government immediately warned him that if he
continued, he would be arrested. He lapsed into
silence.
In November 1963 Ayatollah Khomeini sent a mes-
sage to the United States Governmen
\ Khomeini ex-
plained that he was not opposed to American interests
in Iran. On the contrary, he thought the American
presence was necessary as a counterbalance to Soviet
and possibly British influence. Khomeini also ex-
plained his belief in close cooperation between Islam
and other world religions, particularly Christendom.
Khomeini's subsequent activities until his return to
Iran in 1979 have been covered earlier in this paper.'79
A detailed analysis of Khomeini's thought is not yet
possible. His public statements are noted for their lack
of substance except insofar as he is proclaiming
punishment for malefactors. Aside from Islamic Gov-
ernment, a French translation of excerpts from three of
Khomeini's books is available. A few of Khomeini's
observations taken from this book may help in under-
standing the Ayatollah.
On War
Holy War (jihad), he says, means the conquest of non-
Muslim territory. It can be declared after the forma-
tion of an Islamic government and on the order of the
imam. All Muslim males have the duty to participate
in the jihad whose purpose is to establish Koranic law
throughout the earth. The whole world knows that the
universal supremacy of Islam is quite different from
the hegemony of other conquerors. Such a war under
the leadership of the imam is distinguished from unjust
and tyrannical wars by the principles of Islam.
67
On Punishment
If the punitive law of Islam is applied for only one year,
all injustice and immorality can be eliminated. The
hand of the thief must be cut off, the killer killed, the
adulterer and adultress beaten. "Humanitarian" scru-
ples are more childish.
(b)(3)
On Medicine
The rulers have caused the people to forget traditional
medicine in order to encourage the youth to study
European medicine. Such diseases as typhus and
typhoid can only be cured by traditional indigenous
remedies. Western doctors and surgeons are ignorant
about the cures that are successfully used in the
Iranian bazaars.'"
(b)(3)
Khomeini's views on daily life and conduct are very
traditional and prescribe in detail what is forbidden
and what is permitted. He prescribes procedures for
everything from personal health to prayer. Rules
regarding the treatment and conduct of women are
detailed as are finances and taxes. None of these rules
is peculiar to Khomeini. They are traditional. Islamic
observance or portions, at least, have been absorbed
into everyday life by millions of Iranians. For the first
time in generations, however, the clergy is in a position
to enforce all of these rules as law rather than as
recommended observances.
(b)(3)
Khomeini, like Shariati, is more an advocate of pan-
Islam than of sectarian Shia Islam, although they
probably arrived at their positions by different roads.
Many devout Iranians will be troubled�if not
incensed�by this because the Sunni-Shia split is a
very real and emotional issue. Without this difference
an essential aspect of their identity as Shias would�
disappear, and they would be no different from the
Arabs, who generally are not held in high regard. (b)(3)
Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari
Kazem Shariatmadari is generally recognized as the
most important clergyman in Iran after Ayatollah
Khomeini. His main interest seems to be in promoting
a more widespread interest in and knowledge of Islam
both at home and abroad.
'" See appendix B for similar views. (u)
cret
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Figure 16.
Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari
Unclassified �
Kazem Shariatmadari '8 was born in Tabriz in 1904,
although his family was originally from Borujerd. He
traces his geneology to the fourth imam (seventh to
eighth centuries). He was the son of Sayyid
Mohammad Alavi al-Aftasa, and his grandfather was
Sayyid Hajj Mohammad Borujerdi, a prominent
figure in Borujerd in the 19th century. The 12th-
century tomb of one of his ancestors is a landmark in
Borujerd. (b)(3)
Shariatmadari studied under two prominent
ayatollahs in Tabriz until 1924 when, at age 20, he
moved to Qom, which was just beginning to flourish as
a religious center under Ayatollah Abdol Karim
Haeri-Yazdi, with whom Khomeini also studied. It is
likely that Khomeini and Shariatmadari became
acquainted at this time. During the next 25 years he
continued his studies, traveling twice to An Najaf to
study with Ayatollah Esfahani, who was recognized as
the head of all the Shias from 1920 to 1945, and
Ayatollah Naini, a supporter of the constitution in
1906. Both had also been active in Iraq against British
authorities there, and both had favored Reza Khan
(later Reza Shah) over the last of the Qajar Shahs and
opposed the establishment of a republic at the time.
He returned (time unspecified) to Tabriz at the
invitation of the religious leaders there and taughtfigh
until 1949 when he went to Qom, again at the request
of Tabrizi theologians living in Qom, to teach J./4h and
usu/.
Shariatmadari and the late Ayatollah Borujerdi, at
that time the recognized leader of the Shia community
(marja-e-taqlid), became close, and when the latter
died in 1960, Shariatmadari took over the task of
administering the finances of the Qom religious
complex. Shariatmadari was the overwhelming choice
of the Azerbaijani Shiites to succeed Borujerdi, and a
delegation of Tabriz merchants and religious leaders
went to Qom to plead his case. The supporters of the
Najafi-based Ayatollah Hakim prevailed, however�
perhaps because of Shariatmadari's inclination to
compromise with the government when possible, and
the belief that a leader in Iraq would be less susceptible
to pressure from the Iranian Government. Shariat-
madari continues teaching but also finances religious
schools in other cities. The Dar al-Tabligh Islami
(Foundation for the Propagation of Islam), which he
founded, occupies much of his time.
is' Most of this data, unless noted otherwise, is from Muhammad
Razi, Ganjineh-ye Daneshmandan (Tehran 1974). (u)
Shariatmadari's eminence is based on these activities
rather than his learning for he seems to have published
little. A group of his students have, however, published
his lectures. His views were also expressed in a series of
articles in the journal published by the Dar al-Tabligh,
and a long speech that he made at the opening of the
Dar al-Tabligh has also been published. Shariatmadari
begins this speech by quoting the tradition "On the day
of judgment ... the ink of the scholars will outweigh
the blood of the martyrs."
He then urges jihad, that is, a holy war, but, he said,
before everything else there is a jihad of learning, the
pen and the tongue. Of course, there are other
meanings of jihad, but the rational, intellectual,
literary, and oral jihads take precedence over them.
He compares unfavorably Muslim efforts to propagate
the faith with Christian and Jewish propaganda.
"Even worse," he says, "than those two is the
'misguiding group' that is the least worthy of the
68
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religious groups of the world." 1" Shariatmadari is
more moderate in his attitude toward church-state
relations than is Khomeini. Many of his statements on
the subject, however, seem to have been forced by
Khomeini's actions, and are not completely consistent.
Shariatmadari was in favor of the Shah's remaining on
the throne until the overwhelming power of Khomeini
made it obvious that anyone who had any relationship
with the Shah had to be eliminated. He was very
reluctant to push for any confrontation with security
forces which would result in fatalities, precisely the
opposite of what Khomeini was seeking
Shariatmadari is sensitive to the fact that he was
rather late to express his total opposition to the Shah.
In the course of an interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper
reporter he was asked if he had thought that modera-
tion was the path to victory over the Shah.
Shariatmadari answered that "conditions required
1" The Shiite ulema apparently will not refer to the Bahais as such
but only as the fergeh-ye zalleh, the "misguiding group." (u)
69
that we resist in a more temperate manner because of
the narrow area in which we were moving both
politically and at the level of information, whereas the
freedom that Khomeini had put him into a better
offensive position than ours." (b)(3)
The reporter pressed Shariatmadari, asking if his
stand in the fall of 1978 for implementation of the
1906 constitution with the retention of the Shah was
not a fundamental difference with Khomeini. Shariat-
madari commented that "the Shah's regime was
present and was not a subject of discussion. The subject
of discussion between us and the Shah was the
disregarded portions of the constitution." He went on
to remark that if the constitution had been imple-
mented, the Shah's oppressive role would have been
ended. The reporter continued to press, "Can I
understand from this that you would have accepted the
Shah's stay had he implemented the constitution?"
But Shariatmadari remained evasive, "During the
phase in which we were demanding the constitution,
the Shah's throne was not the subject of discussion.
Khomeini himself demanded that the Shah implement
the constitution years ago."83 (u)
Ayatollah Abol Qassem Khoi
Ayatollah Abol Qassem Khoi, although an Iranian by
birth, has spent nearly his whole life at the Shiite
religious center in An Najaf, Iraq. He is a traditional
scholar of great learning and influence, but appears to
be apolitical, a position that may be required as much
by his circumstances as by his personal attitude. (b)(3)
In the opinion of his biographer,'" Ayatollah Khoi is
now the paramount religious leader of the Shia. He
heads the Howzeh-ye-Elmiyyah Najaf (the Najaf
Circle for Religious Studies), the most important of
the Shiite theological schools. The Circle was seriously
affected by the 1970 expulsion from Iraq of 100,000
Iranians�most of them gathered around the Shiite
holy places�as part of the anti-Iranian campaign of
the Iraqi Government. Khoi was so affected by this
that he fell ill and had to be treated in London. "He
1" Al-Watan (Kuwait), 25 May 1979. Translated in JPRS 73752,
Translations on the Near East and North Africa, No. 1987, 25 June
1979, pp. 26-27. (u)
1" Razi, Ganjineh-ye-Daneshmandan. (u)
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returned to Najaf to save the thousand-year-old
Howzeh and now resides there with a limited number
of Iranians." (b)(3)
Khoi was born in the city of the same name in 1899.
His father was Haj Ali Akbar Musavi, a well-known
clergyman of Mashhad who was leader of the congre-
gation at Gowhar Shad Mosque located adjacent to the
Shrine of the Imam Reza. His known lineage traces
back no further. Khoi probably got his initial training
from his father, and in 1921 both of them went to An
Najaf, where Khoi studied with Ayatollahs Naini and
Esfahani as had Shariatmadari. In the words of his
biographer "he snatched the ball of precedence from
all the other students" and collected and published the
lectures of his teacher Naini. (b)(3)
Two dreams relating to Ayatollah Khoi are recorded.
His father reported that before his son's birth a very
devout student had come to him saying that Imam Ali
had appeared to him in a dream saying that the child
when born should be called Abol Qassem. Khoi's
biographer dreamt that the last imam had apneared
and mentioned Khoi by name.'" (b)(3)
" Dreams are often related in connection with the lives of religious
figures as well as others. Ali said that the knowledge of dreams and
the ability to interpret them and to predict the future resided "in him
and his family." Dream interpretation is often found in religious
literature. In this connection the alleged dream of Ayatollah Shirazi
in December 1978, in which Ali chastised Khomeini for his
opposition to the Shah, would be believable to many. The Shah's
claim that Ali appeared to him several times in dreams is very much
in the Iranian tradition. (u)
A measure of the respect in which he was held as long
ago as 1948 was the ceremony with which he was
received during a trip to Iran in that year. Visiting and
teaching at Qom, Tehran, and Mashhad, he was
received by notables outside each city and escorted
in�a procedure reserved for distinguished visitors in
the 19th and early 20th centuries but which had
nearly fallen into disuse by 1948
At the age of 79 Ayatollah Khoi may not have many
more years as head of the Shiites. On his death both
Khomeini and Shariatmadari will be aspirants for this
post, providing either still survives.
70
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Appendix A
The Meaning of Moharram
On 1 October 680, which was the first day of the
month of Moharram and 46 years after the death of
Muhammad, two Arab Muslim armies faced each
other on the west bank of the Euphrates River at the
plain called Karbala south of present-day Baghdad.
The two forces were poorly matched. On one side were
4,000 men of the forces of Yazid, Caliph of Islam in
Damascus, and on the other some 200 followers (in
Arabic, Shia) of Hosein, grandson of Muhammad,
who disputed Yazid's claim to be caliph and considered
himself the rightful successor of the Prophet.
Hosein was surrounded, and for 10 days occasional
skirmishes alternated with periods of negotiation. On
the 10th day Yazid's forces opened an all-out attack,
and the battle went on until late in the afternoon.
Finally, with all his followers dead, Hosein dashed into
the midst of his enemies. The final blow was dealt by
Shimar, according to Shia tradition, which also records
that Hosein's body bore 23 spear wounds and 34 from
swords. Hosein's head was cut off, and his body
trampled in the dust by Yazid's horsemen. The Shias
believe that the head that was initially sent to Yazid,
(b)(3) subsequently was returned to Karbala and is buried
there in Hosein's shrine.
This event�which the Shiites call the Tragedy at
Karbala�is at the center of the Moharram mourning
period. For centuries the yearly reenactment of the
death of Hosein at the hands of Yazid (although he
was not present) and Shimar has aroused intense
emotion among all classes throughout the country. The
occasion has often been used to voice veiled political
comment, and a sermon by Ayatollah Khomeini in
(b)(3) which he explicitly compared the Shah to the tyrant
Yazid was a major factor in the Ayatollah's exile.
The Ceremonies
The mourning ceremonies occur in several forms:
recitations of the story of Hosein in the mosque
combined with a sermon, recitations in private homes,
dramatic presentations in public, and parades. What-
ever the form, the intention is always the same�to
incite the participants to a frenzy of weeping and
71
wailing through flagellations and beatings. If these
tears are mingled with blood, the participants gain
even greater merit.
(b)(3)
In Tehran, for example, as many as 3,000 worshippers,
mostly men, may be gathered in a large bazaar
mosque. Around the mosque for many blocks crowds
gather so tightly that movement is barely possible.
Most are paraders who are just formin or who have
ended a parade at the mosque
(b)(3)
Inside the mosque several mullahs in succession give
sermons on the Hosein theme. As each speaker reaches
the climax of the story, weeping and wailing increases.
Finally, the main speaker begins. He starts with a
sermon dwelling on the virtues and suffering of the
family of Ali and then begins the chanting of the
Hosein narrative. Again, as the story reaches its
climax�the decapitation of Hosein�the weeping and
groaning increases in volume, and many begin to
pound their foreheads and beat their chests. Finally,
the sermon ends, and the crowd becomes calm. Some
may remain at the mosque all day listening to
repetitions of the narrative, others may join one of the
many parades that are being held, and still others may
go to other mosques or private homes for further
commemoration ceremonies.
(b)(3)
The public parades that take place throughout the first
10 days of Moharram are basically the same whether
they occur in Tehran with thousands of participants or
in a small village with only a dozen (b)(3)
The parades are arranged by a group specifically
organized for that purpose and usually represent a
district, a neighborhood, or the members of a mosque.
Often this group�called a dasteh�meets year round,
not only to plan for the ceremonies but also as a social-
religious group to study the Koran, listen to recitations
of the Hosein story, and discuss politics. A parade is
often preceded by a meal sponsored by someone in the
district to which the members of the dasteh, prominent
people, and the poor are invited. After the meal the
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leader of the dasteh begins chanting a lament in verse
accompanied by rhythmical beating of the chest. The
parade then moves outside and through the streets,
preceded and followed by black banners and stopping
at each mosque or shrine in the area. This may go on all
day and long into the night
On Ashura, the 10th day of Moharram and the day on
which Hosein and his family were murdered, the major
ceremonies take place. The parades begin to form at
sunrise. The breastbeating resumes, and the parades
move through the streets to a central square where
several dastehs may be gathered. All join in a final
breastbeating, and then a mullah seated on a raised
platform recites the Hosein story. Following this the
symbols are brought out�black and green standards
and the centerpiece, the nakhl. This type of sedan
chair is so large that 40 or 50 men may be required to
carry it on their shoulders. It represents the vehicle in
which Hosein and his relatives were carried to the final
battle at Karbala. The bearers enter the square at a
trot, turning themselves around twice as they enter.
They circle the assembled dastehs three times and then
settle down on the fringes of the crowd. The combined
dastehs form large circles, and under the leadership of
a chanter in the center breastbeating resumes and the
whole circle moves one step to the right with each beat.
Finally at a drum signal this part of the ceremony ends,
and the depiction on stage of the tragedy at Karbala
begins.
The drama, which may go on for several hours,
recounts a story that is well-known to all those
watching, but which never fails to excite the most
intense emotion. Although Ashura is the peak of the
mourning period, such performances, as well as other
observances, continue for the whole month and may be
repeated 40 days after Ashura as well.
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cret
Appendix B
The Fedayan-e-Islam
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
,(b)(3)
The Fedayan-e-Islam (the Devotees of Islam), which
flourished in the decade from 1945-55, was the
prototype of today's religiously oriented terrorist
organizations---Forgan and the Mujahidin-e-Khalq.
The Fedayan was probably founded in 1945 by
Mojtaba Mirlohi, who took the name Navab Safavi. It
became the most violent element associated with
Muhammad Mossadeq's National Front, although it
eventually turned against him. The size of the organi-
zation was always in dispute, but probably consisted of
no more than 50 or 60 hard-core members, with 25,000
to 30,000 more who could be expected to follow the
Fedayan's lead. The Fedayan was responsible for at
least three assassinations--including a prime minister
and a former prime minister�and three unsuccessful
attempts including those against the Shah and another
prime minister. The killing of Prime Minister Mansur
in 1965 may have been the work of a religious
organization influenced by the earlier Fedayan.
The Leaders
Mojtaba Mirlohi was born in Tehran in 1923. He was
from a fanatically religious family claiming descent
from the Prophet. He went to elementary school in
Tehran and then to a German vocational school for
three years. When his father died in 1938, Mojtaba
was put under the guardianship of his uncle, from
whom he received a religious education. He worked for
a short time for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company but
quit and went to Iraq. When he returned a few months
later, he was wearing clerical robes. In 1940 he
married a .r1 from a middle-class religious family of
Mashhad.
Although Mirlohi/Safavi's religious knowledge was
not great, he was a spellbinding speaker whose ability
to attract a following from among the uneducated
masses was phenomenal. He showed complete devotion
to his cause and his willingness to die for that cause,
was an important ingredient in his attraction. Safavi
seems to have been solely responsible for planning the
Fedayan's activities and assassinations, although he
73
had two capable lieutenants, Abdul Hosein and Seyed
Muhammad Vahedi from Kermanshah. Safavi,
Vahedi, and one other were executed in 1955. (b)(3)
Fedayan Activities
The Fedayan cut its assassination teeth on Ahmad
Kasravi, (see page 6). When Safavi and Hosein Imami,
who were believed responsible for the assassination,
were brought to trial, not a single witness could be
found, although the deed had occurred in Kasravi's
crowded office at the Ministry of Justice. The court-
room was packed with mullahs and religious fanatics.
The defendants were dismissed for lack of evidence:86
(b)(3)
The next move was nearly three years later, in early
1949; when an attempt was made on the Shah's life.
Although the motivation is still unclear, the attacker
carried a press card of the Parcharn-e-Islam, the
Fedayan newspaper. He also was a fanatic Tudeh
Party member, according to his wife. The government
used this as an excuse to outlaw the Tudeh. Which
organization was actually responsible remains an open
(b)(3)
question.
Court Minister Hajir was killed in November 1949. A
year and a half earlier Hajir, then a candidate for
Prime Minister, had been violently opposed by
Ayatollah Kashani. An anti-Hajir demonstration by
Kashani's followers turned violent. As the demonstra-
tors marched on the majlis, they were met by troops
who fired on them, wounding about 70. According to
an American Embassy report:
Because the crowd on whom the police fired had been
led by a mullah carrying the Koran, the antagonism of
the mullahs to Hajir has become even more violent
than before. The two majlis sessions which he has
attended since he presented his program have been
broken up in disorder due to insults hurled at the
186 The presiding judge said that he had fainted and did not know
what had taken place. (u)
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Prime Minister from the spectators' gallery, the press
gallery, and even from the parliamentary opposition
itself. Early in the week five deputies signed an
indictment against Hajir charging him with sacrilege
against the Koran. . . .
The sacrilege was revenged the next year when Hosein
Imami�previously acquitted in the Kasravi
slaying�shot the Minister as the latter was attending
religious services at Sepahsalar Mosque. It was the last
day of Moharram. This time, however, Imami was
tried and executed. The execution was held secretly to
avoid more demonstrations. Imami confessed that he
had planned to kill several other officials.
(b)(3)
A year and a half later the Fedayan played a key role
in bringing Mossadeq to power. General Ali Razmara,
appointed Prime Minister in June 1950, opposed the
proposal for oil nationalization that was being pushed
in the majlis by Tehran deputy Mohammad Mossadeq
and his National Front coalition. Razmara's objections
were on economic grounds, but the Fedayan felt that
Razmara was a tool of the British and was trying to sell
the country to foreigners. In March 1951 he was killed
by Fedayan member Khalil Tahmasebi. A month later
the Shah appointed Mossadeq Prime Minister. The
new Prime Minister and Safavi soon had a falling out.
Safavi was angry because Mossadeq had not obtained
the release from prison of the assassin. The Fedayan
threatened to kill both Mossadeq and Ayatollah
Kashani, who was then Mossadeq's chief lieutenant.
Mossadeq hid in the majlis, where he remained until
Safavi was arrested. (b)(3)
Safavi remained in jail for the next six months. In
January 1952 a group of Fedayan members entered
the prison where he was being held and refused to leave
without him. They issued a proclamation threatening
that "our reaction will be so violent that it will surprise
the whole world." They also threatened the new
parliament that "the same force will be used and will
plunge the 17th majlis in blood." The Fedayan
confidently predicted that "soon we shall assume
power, and the country will be ruled by Moslems."
A month later Deputy Prime Minister Hosein Fatemi,
a close friend of Mossadeq's, was shot and seriously
wounded by a youthful Fedayan member.'" The
government once more cracked down, arresting a large
number of members who remained jailed for varying
lengths of time.
The majlis had heeded the Fedayan warning and in
August unanimously adopted a bill stipulating that "if
Khalil Tahmasebi is proven to be the killer of
Razmara, he will be pardoned and liberated by
stipulations of this bill." Three months later
Tahmasebi was released. He promptly was received by
both Mossadeq and Kashani and visited Safavi, who
was still in prison
Safavi was released a short time afterwards. Little was
heard of the Fedayan for a couple of years. The Shah
ousted Mossadeq in August 1953, and opposition
elements of all stripes were suppressed
The last gasp of Safavi's Fedayan was in November
1955 when an assassin tried to kill Prime Minister
Hosein Ala. This time Safavi, his lieutenants, the
Vahedi brothers, and Tahmasebi, who had been acting
as a Koran-chanter in a Mashhad mosque, were all
executed. The words of one scholar can serve as their
epitaph:
They all faced their death with victorious smiles on
their faces, certain that they were commissioned by
God and joining him and all the faithful in paradise as
a reward for the service they had rendered to Islam
and Iran."8
The Fedayan Program
Navab Safavi would be happy in today's Iran. The
programs of Khomeini and his followers are nearly
identical with those of the Fedayan. A few extracts
from the Fedayan's program, as summarized by a
1" A year and a half later Fatemi, who had been Mossadeq's Foreign
Minister, was executed for treason following the Shah's return to
power. (u)
'" Adele Ferdows, Religion in Iranian Nationalism: The Study of
the Fedayan-i-Islam, Indiana University PhD Dissertation, 1967,
p. 48. (u)
(b)(3)
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Tehran magazine in mid-1951, will convey some of the
flavor. The original is written in a heavily arabicized
Persian:
If Islamic instructions were put into effect in this
country, the rays of prosperity and happiness would
shine constantly upon this land ... three-fourths of the
educated class of Iranians are void of human character
and have many vices.
Men, women, girls, and boys in the street, bazaars,
offices, factories, and in other public places get
together day and night and give their passions full
freedom. The conferences held in various ministries
every day . . . are some samples of such activities
between male and female officials.
Those who are wearing the clergy's cloak but in reality
are enemies of Islam should be unmasked and
denounced.
An administration should be established under the
supervision of well-informed and honest clergymen in
order to command people according to religious laws
to do good things and prohibit evil things.
In schools courses have been prohibited.. . such as
music should not be taught. .. . Only men should be
employed for boys' schools and women for girls'
schools.
The present cinemas or houses of crime and debauch-
ery must be annihilated. If the country has to have
cinemas and theaters. .. special places should be
provided for men and for women. The subjects of plays
and cinemas must always consist of pieces of the
history of Islam and Shi'ism and stories that would
conform with morals. . . . Instead of the awful noises
that are usually heard in these cinemas, the delightful
voices of persons who recite verses of the Koran must
be heard.
The public dress and the hat are like the national flag
and are reminiscent of religious and national tradi-
tions. .. . Then why does the Moslem Iranian nation
wear strange hats and attach reins to their necks. A
new style of hat should be invented which would
remove entirely the foreign look from the Moslem
people.
75
Medical faculties of the world and the Iranian Islamic
university must make meticulous study of the radiant
tenets of Islam. Humanity should be dependent on
Islam. The health of the people of the world must be
insured. In this sacred cause we are ready to extend
practical assistance to the world and to the Islamic
University of Iran. .. .
Iranians who have the honor of going to Najaf and
Kerbala are well aware of the fact that upon arrival in
the date producing areas of the holy land and getting
acclimatized, they sense a need for dates. When they
return to Iran they do not eat dates. The matter . . .
speaks for itself. A great medical point was encom-
passed in a small example. A medical mistake is
hereby revealed. The people of each area are the same
as the environment in which they live. In order to live,
be healthy, and be immune from the diseases of
Baghdad, the plants, medicines, the water, and the
weather of that area are necessary. Likewise, the
medicine and food in other areas are undoubtedly
harmful for people in that area. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon medical men and the Islamic Univer-
sity of Iran and the universities of the world to study
scientifically the life-weather around them and to
prepare appropriate medicines. If the Islamic Univer-
sity of Iran and the medical universities of the world
need any help. .. we will, with the help of God, put at
their disposal the necessary scientific and practical
equipment.'" (u)
The Fedayan died with Safavi, but thousands who had
been followers remained. Although there seems to have
been no formal organization, occasional acts of vio-
lence by "religious reactionaries" may have been
carried out by some of those remnants. The murder of
Prime Minister Mansur in early 1965 is likely to have
been carried out by Fedayan remnants.
The reestablishment of a Fedayan-e-Islam by
Ayatollah Khalkhali provides a link with the Islamic
movement of the past, emphasizing the continuity of
the movement, as well as further legitimatizin vio-
lence as its chief instrument of persuasion.
For similar views of Khomeini, see p. 67. (u)
Seefet
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,ore
Glossary
adalatkhane: A house of justice.
akhbari: A school of thought in Shia Islam that
believes that the only sources of the
Shariah are the Koran and the Sunna.
The Akhbaris reject Utihad, the author-
ity of the mujtaheds, and the concept of
the mara-e-taqlid. The Akhbaris flour-
ished between the 12th and 19th centu-
ries and were defeated in a power
struggle with the usulis.
Al-Kitab: (The Book). Used as an epithet for the
Koran.
anima: Traveling, moving, a forward movement on a
straight road.
aql: Human reason which permits the truth to be
discovered.
Ashura: The tenth day of Moharram (The month of
religious mourning).
ayatullazadeh: A descendant of a famous and learned
mujtahed.
Bahai: An adherent of a religious movement originat-
ing among Shia Muslims in Iran in the
19th century and emphasizing the spirit-
ual unity of mankind.
Bakhtiari: An Iranian tribe. Also a proper name.
bast: Sanctuary, usually in a mosque or in the home of
a religious leader. Refuge.
bazaaris: Bazaar merchants.
caliph: A successor of Muhammad as temporal and
spiritual head of Islam.
chador: (tent) A one-piece, cape-like garment. Pulled
over the head with a corner held in the
teeth, it served many women as a
convenient outer garment. Custom more
than religion recommended it until the
last two or three years when wearing it
became a syinbol of opposition to the
Shah.
dasteh: A neighborhood social-religious group that
meets to discuss politics and the Koran.
falsafah: Philosophical sciences.
faqih: Jurisprudent.
farangi: A non-Muslim European. The unclean and
heathen.
fatwa: A legal ruling.
17
Fergeh-ye zalleh: (The misguiding group). Term
applied by the clergy to the Bahai.
fiqh: Jurisprudence.
jot-07n: Victory over unbelievers. The triumph of good
over evil. Also used as an epithet for the
Koran.
gharbzadegi: Westernization (pejorative usage).
ghazi: An Islamic judge.
hadith: A tradition relating to the Prophet or, for the
Shiites, one of the imams.
haili: One who has made a pilgrimage to Mecca (often
used as a title).
haram: Forbidden.
Hidden Imam: The 12th and last imam of the Shiites
whose return will mark the beginning of
a just world.
hijra: Flight (Muhammad from Mecca in 622 A.D.).
hikrnet: Wisdom, usually equated with falsafah, or
Islamic philosophy, that is, the applica-
tion of human reason and intellect to
proving the truth of the Shariah.
Hojjat al-Islam: An honorific suggesting something
more than a mullah but not as grand as
an ayatollah.
Hosseiniyeh: The place primarily devoted to the
performance of the Martyrdom of
Hosein.
Hujja: The Proof of God.
Unix Consensus.
ijtihad: The right of a mujtahed to give a new legal
opinion based on the traditional sources
of law.
i/m: Knowledge.
imam: A Muslim leader of the line of Ali held by
Shiites to be the divinely appointed,
sinless, infallible successors of
Muhammad.
imamate: The office of an imam.
imamzadeh: Shrine associated with descendants of the
imams.
irfan: Esoteric knowledge.
isnad: The chain of transmission of a hadith.
ivan: A side chamber or reception I00111 with one side
open to the main courtyard of a mosque.
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jihad: A holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a
religious duty. A crusade for a principle
or belief.
jinn: One of a class of spirits that according to Muslim
demonology inhabit the earth, assume
various forms, and exercise supernatural
power.
kalam: (The Word). Theology.
Khalifa: Successor to Muhammad. Sunni usage.
khums: A Shia relgious tax (literally one-fifth) paid to
the family of the Prophet.
komiteh: Committee.
Koran: The book composed of writings accepted by
Muslims as revelations made to Mu-
hammad by Allah through the angel
Gabriel.
madraseh: A religious school.
Mandi: The Messiah. The Hidden Imam.
majlis: Assembly.
maktab: The five or six years of religiously oriented
elementary school.
marja-e-taglid: A mujtahed worthy of imitation. The
mujtahed par excellence, recognized by
Shiites as their supreme leader.
mashrutah: Constitutionalism.
minbar: The pulpit.
Moharram: Month of religious mourning.
muballighin: Propagandists who are not mujtaheds
but preachers.
mujtahed: One who by reason of his education,
knowledge, and piety has the right to
make new judgments on matters of
Islamic law.
mullah: A Muslim of a quasi-clerical class trained in
traditional law and doctrine.
Muqaddimat: The elements of religious knowledge.
mutah: Temporary marriage.
nakhl: Ceremonial sedan chair which represents the
vehicle in which Hosein and his relatives
were carried to the final battle at
Karbala.
Now Ruz: New Years Day. A pre-Islamic Iranian
holiday still observed today.
Parcham-e-Islam: (The Banner of Islam). Fedayan-e-
Islam newspaper of the 1940s and
1950s.
qibla: The direction in which a Muslim faces when
praying.
Ramadan: The ninth month of the Muhammadan year
observed as sacred with fasting prac-
ticed daily from dawn to sunset.
ray: The private use of reason as a rule of law.
seyeds: Descendants of the Prophet.
Shahanshah: Ancient title for the sovereign of Iran.
Shariah: Islamic law.
sheikh: An Arab chief but also used as a title for one
with religious learning.
Shia: The Muslims of the branch of Islam comprising
sects believing in Ali and the imams as
the only rightful successors of Muham-
mad and in the concealment and Messi-
anic return of the last recognized imam.
sokut: (silence). A policy followed by some Iranian
religious leaders of avoiding criticism of
secular authority.
Sufism: Islamic mysticism.
Surma: Custom or usage.
Sunni: The Muslims of the branch of Islam that
adheres to the orthodox tradition and
acknowledges the first four caliphs as
rightful successors of Muhammad.
NAM Koranic commentary.
talabeh: A student of religion.
tasawwid: Mysticism. Sufism.
Taziyyah: The dramatic production of the murder of
Hosein and his followers.
Tudeh Party: The Iranian Communist Party.
Twelver Shiism: Became the state religion of Iran in
the early 16th century. Those who
recognize 12 imams rather than five
(Zaidis) or seven (Ismailis).
ulema: The clergy.
ummat: The Muslim community.
urf: Customary or secular law.
us/4i: Roots or principles. The science of the proofs
which lead to the establishment of legal
standards.
usu/i: The currently predominant school of Shiah
Islam that accepts the Koran, Sunna,
tjtihad, aql, and Uma as sources of the
Shariah. They uphold the authority of
mujtaheds and of the marja-e-taqlid.
This school became dominant in the
19th century.
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usul al-din: The five principles of religion in which the
Shiites believe.
usul al-fiqh: Principles of jurisprudence.
Kull: The pious foundation which supports schools,
orphanages, shrines, and other
institutions.
zindiq: One who endangers the state by attacking the
Prophet. To be accused of being a zindiq
is more serious than a charge of unbe-
lief. It is used as a highly charged term
of vituperation.
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Sources of Copyrighted Photographs
Figure 1
Figure 2
1979.
October 1978.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Figure 3. UPI, 1979.
Figure 6. Aratnco Handbook, 1968.
Figure 7. UPI, 1979
Figure 12. UPI, 1979.
Figure 13. Wide World, 1979.
Figure 15. Wide World, 1979.
Figure 16. US News and World Report, 24 June 1978.
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