THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06040638
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-01898
• Publication Date: August 27, 1957

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NIE 43-2-57
27 August 1957
N? 324
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 43-2-57
(Supersedes NIE 43-56)
THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 27 August 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-
telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF;
and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff.
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC
and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
REt
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
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f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
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2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
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3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
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June 1953.
4. The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or zevelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
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324
3 September 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS CP NIE 43-2-57: The Prospects for the Government
of the Republic of Chinn
Pursuant to action by the Intelligence Advisory Committee at its
meeting on 3 September 1957, the following is to be inserted as a foot-
note to paragraph 5, page 2, of subject estimate:
1/ The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State,
believes paragraph 5 should read as follows:
"On the other hand, if a new generation of leaders in time come to
place major emphasis on long term economic development, the island's
economic prospects would improve /morale would be sustained, and the
staying power of the GRC wouJe strengthened. In any event, US
military guarantees and c1stance would have to continue and
economic aid wOuld, required for the development of export
industries."
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1
DISCUSSION
2
CURRENT SITUATION
2
OUTLOOK
4
APPENDIX A
6
MILITARY
6
Army
6
Navy
6
Air Force
7
APPENDIX B
9
Table 1. ECONOMIC INDICATORS
9
Table 2. TAIWAN'S EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS
9
APPENDIX C
10
DIPLOMATIC STATUS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND
COMMUNIST CHINA
10
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THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of the Government of the
Republic of China, with particular reference to its staying power.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. The Government of the Republic of
China continues to hold as its central
objective the recovery of power on the
mainland. In fact it controls only Tai-
wan, the Penghus, and a few islands
lying off the coast of China, and it holds
its international position primarily be-
cause of US diplomatic support. It is
able to support its present military estab-
lishment and the economy of Taiwan
only with substantial US assistance.
2. The National Government remains
politically stable and the economy of Tai-
wan continues gradually to improve.
The military establishment is growing
stronger, but Nationalist forces alone
could not defend their territories against
a full-scale Chinese Communist attack.
3. The staying power of the Republic of
China will be determined by the ability
of Nationalist leaders to adjust to life on
Taiwan, by developments within Commu-
nist China, and particularly by the poli-
cies of the US. Major setbacks in Com-
munist China or the Communist world
would raise Nationalist morale and
strength of purpose. However, develop-
ments interpreted by Nationalist leaders
as indicating that the US was losing in-
terest in supporting the National Gov-
ernment and that Communist China was
gaining international prestige and inter-
nal strength and stability would foster
divisive and defeatist tendencies in Tai-
wan. The death of President Chiang
would probably be followed by a period
of domestic uncertainties and a weaken-
ing of the government's stability. Com-
munist China's admission to the UN
would result in marked deterioration of
the morale of Nationalist leaders.
4. Given continued US support, the Na-
tional Government will probably main-
tain its position on Taiwan, although its
international position will deteriorate.
Continued emphasis on the objective of
return to the mainland, however, would
increase the need for US aid to prevent
economic degeneration, particularly in
view of the population growth expected
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over the next decade. In this situation
there would be increased frustration and
defeatism, especially among middle level
elements, and there might be increased
susceptibility to Communist induce-
ments.
5. On the other hand, if a new generation
of leaders in time were to accept a "two
Chinas" arrangement and if they came
to concentrate on long-term economic
development, the island might become
economically viable and morale tend to
improve. In any event, US military
guarantees and assistance would have to
continue and economic aid would be re-
quired for the development of export
industries.
DISCUSSION
CURRENT SITUATION
6. The Republic of China on Taiwan remains
politically stable, its military establishment
is growing stronger,' and the economy of the
island continues modestly to improve. How-
ever, this appearance of well-being tends to be
misleading. The Republic of China cannot
survive without US support. Its position as
the legal government of China is being in-
creasingly threatened by Communist China.
Its leaders are not satisfied with their pros-
pects on Taiwan and continue to hold to the
return to the mainland as a major objective,
although many of them probably believe that
the chances of attaining this objective are re-
mote. Worries over their future, resentment
over US lack of support for return to the
mainland, and apprehension as to Iuture US
intentions toward Communist China have
combined to produce a mood of frustration
and concern among many Nationalist officials.
7. Throughout eight years on Taiwan the top
Nationalist leadership, and particularly
Chiang Kai-shek, has held firmly to the objec-
tive of a return to the mainland as the raison
d'etre of the National Government. The
Generalissimo is apparently concerned over
the long-term pull of the mainland on his fol-
lowers, and in addition believes that to aban-
don the objective of return would be a betray-
al of his obligations to the people of China now
enslaved by a foreign ideology and culture.
Chiang has apparently not given up hope that
Military questions are discussed at length in
Appendix A.
the return would be realized in his lifetime.
His own appraisal of developments of the past
year, in the Bloc generally and in Commu-
nist China specifically, has almost certainly
raised his estimate of the chances of a return.
He mc.,y well read into current Communist dif-
ficulties on the mainland the early signs of
that reaction against "alien rule" that his in-
terpretation of Chinese history tells him is
inevitable. The Generalissimo's faith in the
return will probably remain even though cur-
rent troubles on the mainland fail to attain
serious proportions and even if there is no
apparent prospect of major hostilities between
the US and the Chinese Communists. Fur-
thermore, whatever the actual chances of a
return, he will almost certainly continue to
believe that it is essential to proclaim the ob-
jective in order to maintain morale and a
sense of national purpose among his followers.
8. However important it may be for Nation-
alist morale to hold out promise of return, the
continued emphasis on this theme in propa-
ganda and policy constitutes a major vulnera-
bility in the Nationalist position on Taiwan,
if, as we believe likely, the realistic chances
of a return are slim. The problem of finding
constructive employment for Taiwan's large
numbers of educated and talented men is be-
coming increasingly serious. They are not
able to utilize fully their talents on Taiwan,
and are constantly subject to skillful appeals
from the mainland to come home with honor
to contribute to the building of "new" China.
It is particularly with respect to mainlanders
who are middle level officials, younger army
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officers, white collar workers, and intellec-
tuals that indications of dissatisfaction have
been in evidence. This group represents a
potentially serious morale problem and a tar-
get for Communist subversion.
9. To date Communist efforts to subvert and
to induce defections have had little success.
The security measures of the National Gov-
ernment appear adequate to prevent any
threat to the stability of the government. In
addition, recent events on the mainland have
somewhat lifted Nationalist spirits, particu-
larly the current repression of the "rightist"
nonparty figures which undercuts Commu-
nist attempts to persuade Nationalist leaders
and officials that they can become important
"democratic personages" in Communist
China. However, it is impossible to estimate
whether or to what extent frustration and the
appeal of the mainland have undermined the
loyalties of some Nationalists.
10. President Chiang Kai-shek, still vigorous
at 70, continues to be the dominant figure in
the government and the ruling Kuomintang.
The chief political rivals at present, under the
Generalissimo, are Ch'en Ch'eng, the consti-
tutional successor to the presidency, and
Chiang Ching-kuo, the elder son of President
Chiang. The latter has acquired considerable
power from his close relationship with his
father and from his control of important ele-
ments within the secret police, the Political
Department of the Army, the KMT Youth
Corps, and the secondary levels of the Kuo-
mintang organization. His growing power
has been somewhat circumscribed, however,
by distrust of him engendered by his long
training in the USSR and his association with
police activities.
11. The most striking event of the past year
was the 24 May riot and the sacking of the US
Embassy. We believe this incident did not
reflect the existence in Taiwan of intense
anti-Americanism, but did demonstrate re-
sentment against what many Chinese be-
lieved to be a miscarriage of justice. The re-
action was intensified by the existence of
deep-seated frustrations and injured national
pride. Although some officials probably
knew that a demonstration was planned and
some advantage was taken of the situation,
the pillage of the Embassy was probably not
premeditated. There was a long delay in
controlling the mob after the demonstrations
turned to violence, reflecting seriously on the
ability of the government to take prompt
action in the event of an emergency situation.
12. With US diplomatic support, the Republic
of China continues to maintain its formal in-
ternational position. The Nationalists gained
from the hardening of world opinion toward
the Bloc because of recent events in Hungary
and the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Para-
guay, and Liberia have agreed to exchange
ambassadors with the National Government,
and Jordan may soon follow suit. Pressure,
however, continues in favor of Communist
China's entry into the UN, and increases for
further lowering of CHINCOM trade barriers.
Moreover, Nationalist prestige has declined
somewhat in Asia, and the National Govern-
ment has lost face with the Overseas Chinese
because of its inability to defend their inter-
ests in specific situations in Southeast Asia.
13. The current US aid program on Taiwan
has contributed to significant economic im-
provement but the economy is still far from
self-sustaining. The reorganized National
Government has provided a reasonably strong
and effective administration under which it
has been possible to employ US aid deliveries
efficiently. Productive investment has been
limited, but has yielded a rather sizable in-
crease in output through the rehabilitation of
existing fixed plant and increased imported
raw materials, much of which was made avail-
able through US aid. As a result, the econ-
omy has continued to expand during the past
year, but at a decelerating rate. Taiwan's
GNP in 1957 will be about seven percent
higher than in 1956, and about 72 percent
higher than in 1951. However, the apparent
economic progress is seriously overshadowed
by the increasing pressure on resources, and
inflationary forces continue to grow despite
continued large scale US aid. Two basic
problems plague the economy of Taiwan. One
is the huge military establishment which is
made necessary by defense requirements and
by the objective of returning to the mainland.
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The other basic problem is that with limited
natural resources the population is increas-
ing at the rate of about three percent per an-
num, and government and social attitudes are
hostile to any measure designed to control
population growth.
OUTLOOK
14. The prospects of the Republic of China
will continue to depend critically upon US
policies. Provided US military, economic,
and diplomatic support continues at present
levels, the National Government for the next
few years will probably be able to maintain its
position on Taiwan, prevent serious internal
discontent, and promote some economic de-
velopment. In the short term, the interna-
tional status quo of the Republic of China can
probably also be maintained with US support.
Over the longer run, however, the interna-
tional position of the Republic will probably
deteriorate.
15. The Nationalist leaders will continue to
be highly sensitive to US actions and state-
ments which appear to affect the degree of
US support of the National Government of
China. There will be an increasing convic-
tion that the US will eventually come to some
arrangement with Peiping that will be to the
detriment of the Republic of China. While
fully recognizing Nationalist China's depend-
ence upon the US, Nationalist leaders will
probably seek to exploit what they consider to
be US strategic and political interests in Tai-
wan by attempting to gain US support on
their own terms.
16. Nationalist leaders recognize the threat
that incidents such as the 24 May sacking of
the US Embassy present to Sino-US coopera-
tion, and will probably take firm measures to
prevent another such occurrence. However,
there will probably be an increase in incidents
manifesting frustrations and latent anti-
Americanism, although we believe that open
expression of such sentiments will not reach
a dangerous pitch in the near future.
17. Beyond the next few years, economic
prospects for Taiwan are poor, because of the
rapid population growth and because Nation-
alist leadership does not consider seriously the
possibility of a protracted exile on Taiwan.
If present Nationalist policies continue with
respect to military priority, economic develop-
ment, and population control, Taiwan will
have little if any hope of becoming economi-
cally viable over the long run and will grad-
ually require increased outside assistance to
maintain present economic levels. On the
other hand, a fundamental change in these
policies would improve Taiwan's chances for
economic viability.
18. So long as President Chiang remains in
power no substantial change in Nationalist
policy is likely to occur. Should he die prior
to the expiration of his present term of office
in 1960, Vice President Ch'en Ch'eng would
probably succeed to the presidency without
provoking internal disturbances. Ch'en would
probably attempt to continue the Generalis-
simo's policies, but would probably be a less
effective leader. Moreover, Ch'en's authority
would probably be contested by the Generalis-
simo's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, with adverse
effec ts upon Nationalist morale and cohesion.
19. As Chiang and other senior officials even-
tually retire from the scene, the National Gov-
ernment will probably display more flexibility
of policy. The majority of the new leaders
would probably in time accept a "two Chinas"
arrangement, provided the continued military
defense of Taiwan was assured and there
seemed to be some economic hope for Taiwan.
They would probably remain skeptical of
Chinese Communist promises, although cer-
tain Nationalists might come to believe that
they could make a successful deal with Pei-
ping. If some high-level defections occurred,
there would be great danger that blocs of fol-
lowers might go over en masse to the Commu-
nist cause.
20. Serious unrest on the mainland or a
major Communist setback of some kind in
China would greatly spark the morale of the
Nationalists. They would probably begin to
make active preparations for landings on the
continent, and would exert pressure on the
US to underwrite an invasion. They would
probably not launch an actual attack without
assurances of US support or at least acquies-
cence, unless the Nationalists believed that
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the difficulties on the mainland had assumed
such proportions as to threaten the existence
of the Peiping regime.
21. Any change in US policy suggesting a re-
duction of US support for the Republic of
China would have highly adverse effects on
morale. US efforts to obtain a Nationalist
withdrawal from some of the offshore islands,
increased US official contacts with the Chi-
nese Communists, or US failure to actively
oppose Chinese Communist membership in
the UN would be viewed with alarm as moves
toward formal US acceptance of "two
Chinas." Large cuts in US military or eco-
nomic aid would have serious repercussions,
whether or not the Nationalist military estab-
lishment and economy could sustain the re-
ductions. Particularly if accompanied by
seeming indications of a relaxation of US
anti-Communist policies, such cuts would un-
dermine morale to a point that might make
maintenance of stability by the National Gov-
ernment difficult. The problem would be ag-
gravated by the Government's reluctance to
accept economic reasons for cutting its mili-
tary establishment. The difficulties caused
by the above contingencies might increase
anti-Americanism and the susceptibility of
the Nationalists to Communist propaganda.
Some defections might occur. It is possible
that in an extreme situation the Nationalists
might attempt to embroil the US in war by
launching an attack on the mainland, but we
regard such a development as unlikely.
22. However, provided most Nationalist lead-
ers remained convinced that US defense of
Taiwan was assured, we believe that, despite
the strains mentioned above, they would ac-
cept the situation and become reconciled to
the economic and psychological problems of a
Taiwan future.
23. The admission of Communist China to the
UN would be a serious psychological blow to
the National Government. In the Nationalist
view it would signify world acceptance of
Communist victory in China, US unwilling-
ness or inability to prevent this acceptance,
and a consequent further weakening of pros-
pects for a Nationalist return. While it would
accelerate the forces of deterioration, we be-
lieve that for the immediate future there
would be no collapse of National Government
authority.
24. The long-term staying power of the Re-
public of China will be determined by the
policies of the US, by developments within
Communist China, and by the ability of Na-
tionalist leaders to adjust to life on Taiwan.
Indications that the US was losing interest in
supporting the National Government, and
that Communist China was gaining interna-
tional prestige and internal strength and sta-
bility, would accelerate divisive and defeatist
tendencies on Taiwan. Major setbacks or
persistent terrorism on the mainland would
raise Nationalist morale and purpose. Con-
tinued emphasis on the objective of return to
the mainland would lead to political frustra-
tion and would require increasing levels of US
support to prevent economic collapse. Con-
versely, a limiting of political ambitions to
the horizons of Taiwan and a concentration
on long-term economic development might
make the island politically and economically
viable, though it would still need some US
support.
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APPENDIX A
MILITARY
Army
1. Army units are currently at 93 percent of
authorized strength with total personnel of
approximately 425,000. All infantry divi-
sions have completed combined-arms train-
ing. The army at present has about 80 per-
cent of its authorized equipment, with major
shortages existing in communications equip-
ment and cargo transportation vehicles.
Equipment on hand is considered to be ade-
quate for a defensive mission only. Substan-
tial improvements are being made in person-
nel and logistics management procedures.
Over-all combat efficiency of the army will
probably improve over the next few years,
particularly in logistical support. Morale of
the Nationalist army is considered to be good
with no indication of probable change.
2. There are no records available as to the
exact ratio of Taiwanese to mainlanders in
the army. Various releases from the Na-
tional Government have acknowledged that
about one-third of the armed forces are Tai-
wanese. It is not expected that the ratio
will go beyond 42 percent for the next two or
three years. Beyond that date the ratio will
begin a steady climb which will continue for
an indefinite period. The National Govern-
ment apparently fears that induction of Tai-
wanese will reduce the efficiency of their
forces for offensive action against the main-
land. It is seeking by political indoctrina-
tion of inductees to make the Taiwanese feel
that they have the same patriotic duty as
soldiers from the mainland, and is trying to
insure that no combat units are assigned a
disproportionate share of Taiwanese. Cur-
rently, the Taiwanese appear to be fitting
into the combat units successfully and there
are no indications that they will be any less
efficient as fighting men than the main-
landers.
3. The capability of the GRC Army for the de-
fense of Taiwan and the Penghus is dependent
upon outside air and naval support. The
lack of local sea and air superiority reduces
the GRC defensive capability, but the army
could probably conduct a tenacious defense
which would be costly to an invading force.
The offshore island garrisons continue to im-
prove their defensive capability, but, again,
local air and sea superiority would be needed
for a successful defense of the offshore
islands.
Navy
4. The personnel strength of the Nationalist
naval establishment totals 57,748 including
25,076 marines. The Navy, augmented by
one ex-US destroyer and 5 ex-US PC's (which
will replace 5 patrol escorts (PF) now in serv-
ice), consists of the following:
Destroyer (DD)
4
Escort Vessel (DE)
5
Patrol Escorts (PF)
11
Escort (POE)
2
Sub-chaser (PC)
16
Sub-chaser (SC)
1
Motor Gunboat (PGM)
2
Motor Torpedo Boat (PT)
1
Mine Vessels
Minelayer Coastal (MMC)
2
Fleet Minesweeper (MSF)
6
Coastal Minesweeper (MSC)
2
Miscellaneous
Amphibious Vessels
36
Aux. and Service Craft
77
5. The general state of training is good.
Logistical support of the offshore islands,
which only a little over a year ago was in a
very bad state, has been notably improved.
Over-all combat effectiveness has continued to
show improvement, with operational availa-
bility on the increase due to improvements in
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maintenance and overhaul and improved
operating procedures. The GRC Navy has
displayed a considerable increase in aggres-
siveness while on patrol in the offshore islands
area. Taiwanese presently comprise about
four percent of the Navy's personnel. Morale
within the Navy which last year was rated as
fair, is now rated as good.
6. The GRC Navy is still incapable of engag-
ing in sustained combat at any great distance
from its major points of supply or of engag-
ing in large-scale combat against the full
force of the Chinese Communist Navy. The
GRC Navy can lift and support only small
raiding and reconnaissance parties. It is pri-
marily a defensive force, and even in this field
its capabilities are limited.
7. The Marine Corps with a personnel
strength of 25,076 has the men, equipment,
and skill to make it capable of executing
modern amphibious operations. The Marine
Type of Aircraft
APPENDIX A
Corps continues to have the capability of
planning and executing an amphibious opera-
tion involving the division and brigade
against light to moderate resistance providing
adequate naval and air support is provided.
Taiwanese comprise about 26 percent of the
enlisted strength of the Corps. As the ratio
of Taiwanese in the Corps increases, the effec-
tiveness of the Corps as an assault unit may
gradually decline.
Air Force
8. No significant changes in the over-all
strength and organization of the Chinese Air
Force (CAF) have occurred, with the excep-
tion of a slight augmentation of the Tactical
-Reconnaissance Group. That unit presently
performs daily photo and visual reconnais-
sance missions with RF-84F's and RF-86F's.
The coverage of that unit will be extended by
the addition of 2 RB-57's, which are sched-
uled for delivery within the year.
CAF Air Order of Battle
Jet Piston
Fighter
Light Bomber
Anti-Sub Warfare
Transport
Transport Helicopter
Trainer
Miscellaneous
TOTAL
323
30
9
19
140
4
165
8
353
Personnel Aircrew
345
Non-Aircrew
Pilots
Pilot Trainees
Other Aircrew
Ground Military
Ground Civilian
1,347
173
1,013
78,206*
852 (Officer
Spaces)
TOTALS 2,533
79,058
* Includes 790 pilots assigned to duties not involving frequent flights.
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APPENDIX A
9. There are six major airfields on Taiwan,
all with generally excellent supporting facili-
ties, and two more are under construction.
Three of the six are capable of supporting
operations by all types of USAF jet fighters
and jet light bombers. Of the two airfields
under construction, one will probably be capa-
ble of supporting B-47 or B-52 bombers.
10. Taiwanese now account for 42 percent of
airmen but only two percent of officers. The
Taiwanese are generally better educated than
the recruits presently in the CAF from the
mainland, and their induction will raise CAF
standards. However, CAF commanders ap-
parently doubt that the Taiwanese would sup-
port an invasion of the mainland. This lack
of confidence in the Taiwanese has led to
their being assigned less critical and less
sensitive duties in the CAF. The CAF Com-
mand also tries to limit the number of Tai-
wanese in tactical organizations to a maxi-
mum of 33 1/3 percent of the total strength.
However, the Taiwanese are treated fairly and
react enthusiastically to service in the CAF.
Taiwanese induction has not detracted from
the comparatively high morale of the CAF.
The most significant trend is the steady im-
provement of operational capability, resulting
from more effective training, personnel utili-
zation, and maintenance.
11. The CAF is incapable of defending Taiwan
against a determined, large-scale air assault
by the Chinese Communist Air Force. The
short operating radius of the predominantly
fighter and fighter-bomber equipped CAF in-
hibits effective use of these units in the de-
fense of the offshore islands against the
stronger Chinese Communist Air Force. The
CAF, by means of daily photo and visual
reconnaissance missions, is capable of pre-
venting a major assault from achieving sur-
prise. The CAF can also patrol the straits
and interfere with the flow of supplies into
coastal areas opposite Taiwan. Though it
would probably be eventually eliminated by
enemy air superiority, the CAF could initially
give effective support to GRC ground forces
either in opposing an amphibious invasion or
in possible offensive operations.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX B
Table 1. ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Category
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1958
1957
Agricultural
production
100
111
122
123
126
133
Index
Industrial
production
index
100
135
176
184
202
207
GNP in 1955
prices (millions
of US$)
757
901
946
1,067
1,135
1,220
Per capita GNP 1
93
107
109
117
121
124
(US dollars)
Wholesale
price index
100
123
135
137
157
177
1902
The population data have been lowered to conform with the 1956 census, result-
ing in a somewhat higher per capita GNP than shown in NIE 43-56.
2 The wholesale price index has leveled off since December 1956, with the index
for specific mcnths moving as follows:
1956 December
188
1957 January
188
February
190
March
190
April
190
May
189
June
190
Table 2. TAIWAN'S EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Exports, f.o.b.
90
119
125
94
131
125
Imports, c.i.f.
150
217
200
211
193
225
Trade balance
�60
�98
�75
�117
�62
�100
Balance on current
account
�60
�98
�85
�123
�72
�110
Grants from the US
61
92
83
85
91
96
Changes in gold and
foreign exchange
reserves (increase)
�11
�4
�17
+23
�25
+2
Other transactions*
10
10
19
15
6
12
NOTE: From exchange settlement statistics adjusted to include aid imports.
Calendar year data.
* Including all capital transactions and errors and omissions.
R E T 9
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APPENDIX C
DIPLOMATIC STATUS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AND COMMUNIST CHINA
1. Countries with which the Republic of China maintains diplomatic relations
(Embassies or Legations):
Country
Chinese Representation Foreign Representation
in the country in China
Argentina Embassy
Australia Embassy
Belgium Embassy Consulate
Bolivia Embassy, c/o Chinese
Embassy, Peru
Brazil Embassy Embassy
Canada Embassy
Chile Embassy
Colombia Legation
Costa Rica Legation Consular Agent
Cuba Legation
Dominican Republic Legation, c/o Chinese Legation
Embassy, Panama
Ecuador Legation
France Embassy Embassy
Greece Embassy
Guatemala Legation
Haiti Legation, c/o Chinese
Legation, Cuba
Holy See Legation Legation (Papal
Internunciature)
Honduras Legation,c/o Chinese
Embassy, Panama
Iran Embassy
Iraq Embassy
Italy Embassy
Japan Embassy Embassy
Korea Embassy Embassy
Lebanon Legation
Luxembourg Legation, c/o Chinese
Embassy, Belgium
Mexico Embassy
Nicaragua Legation
Panama Embassy Embassy
Peru Embassy
Philippines Embassy Embassy
Portugal Legation Legation
El Salvador Legation, c/o Chinese
Embassy, Panama
10
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APPENDIX C
Country
Chinese Representation Foreign Representation
in the country in China
Saudi Arabia Embassy
Spain Embassy Embassy
Thailand Embassy Embassy
Turkey Embassy Embassy
United States Embassy Embassy
Venezuela Legation Legation
Vietnam Legation Legation
2. Countries with which the Republic of China maintains consular relations only:
Cambodia Consulate
New Zealand Consulate Consulate
United Kingdom Consulate
(Recognizes Peiping
regime)
Union of South Africa Consulate Consulate
3. Countries with which negotiations are in process for establishment of diplo-
matic relations:
Liberia
Jordan
Paraguay
4. Countries recognizing Communist China:
(a) UN members
Afghanistan
Albania
Bulgaria
Burma
Ceylon
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Israel
Nepal
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Poland
Rumania
Sweden
Syria
United Kingdom
USSR
Yemen
Yugoslavia
(b) Non-UN members
Switzerland
(c) Communist Regimes supporting Communist China:
Byelorussia (UN member)
Ukraine (UN member)
East Germany
North Korea
North Victnam
Outer Mongolia
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