CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS OF SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06038925
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2019
• Case Number: F-2016-00620
• Publication Date: October 9, 1956

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L\
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NI-E 11-6-56
9 October 1956
N? 308
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-6-56
CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS OF
SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and
the Atomic Energy Commission.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 9 October 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of his jursidiction.
.4 �
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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he title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
WARNING
This � erial contains infor affecting
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within the mea � the espionage laws,
Title 18, , Secs. 793 a 94, the trans-
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o an unauthorized person is prohibited by
DISTRIBUTION:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph
Conclusions 1-11
I. Administrative Factors
Basic Attitude of the Regime
12-14
Organization
15-17
Planning and Control
18-22
II. Resources
Financial Support
23-26
Educational Institutions
27-33
Manpower
34-37
Distribution of Effort
38-41
Quality of Manpower
42
Research Facilities and Equipment
43-45
Collection and Dissemination
46-49
Satellite and Chinese Resources
50
Foreign Aid Programs
51-53
III. Quality and Achievements
54-56
IV. Some Future Trends
Planning and Control
57-58
Manpower
59-62
Distribution of Effort
63-64
Capacity for Future Advances
65-68
Appendix A: Capabilities in Major Fields
Physics
1-3
Nuclear Physics
4-7
Mathematics
8
Astronomy
9-10
Geophysics
11-14
Chemistry
15-19
Metallurgy
20-22
Electronics
23-26
Medicine and Biology
27-28
Agriculture
29-30
CECTIET
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
�
Paragraph
Appendix B: Industrial Technology
Petroleum 2-3
Steel 4-6
Automation 7-9
Military Development Lead Time
,
10-13
Appendix C: Capabilities Related to Weapons Development
Nuclear Energy . . . . .......... .
1
Guided Missiles
2
Aircraft and Related Weapons
3-6
Ground Force Weapons
7
Naval Research and Development
8-14
Electronics and Communications
15-20
Chemical and Biological Warfare
21-24
Weapons Systems
25
Appendix D: Scientific Manpower Estimates
1-6
Figures 1-9
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CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS OF SOVIET SCIENCE'
AND TECHNOLOGY
THE PROBLEM
To assess current capabilities and trends in Soviet science and technology and to
estimate future potential in this field.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Science and technology are energeti-
cally fostered by the Soviet regime, as
instruments of the Communist program
and particularly as means for developing
the physical power of the state. Soviet
education heavily emphasizes scientific
and technical subjects, and scientists are
a privileged group held in high esteem.
Strong financial support has been pro-
vided for Soviet research and product
development. We foresee continued high
emphasis on science and technology.
(Paras. 12, 14, 23-26, 27-33)
2. The USSR has about four-fifths as
many living scientific and technical grad-
uates as the US. We believe that the
USSR has a slightly greater number of
scientific and technical graduates than
'Science" is used in this estimate to denote the
natural sciences including such fields as mathe-
matics, biology, and the agricultural and health
sciences. The estimate is focussed, however, on
-4� scientific capabilities related to national power,
and most of the detailed discussion in its appen-
dices is devoted to the physical sciences and their
applications.
has the US actually employed in scientific
and technical positions of all kinds, with
a higher proportion in physical sciences
and engineering. This comparison of
present numbers may be misleading as a
measure of relative scientific and tech-
nical strength, as it does not reflect,
among other factors, the broader US sup-
ply of scientific and technical personnel
who hold no degrees. Our estimates for
the next five years, however, project a
hi gh rate of increase in Soviet scientific
graduations and a considerable increase
in the supply of technicians having sub-
professional skills. (Paras. 34-37, 59-62;
Appendix D)
3. The USSR probably devotes only about
half as many man-hours to research as
the US does, and a considerably smaller
proportion of these to research in the
physical sciences and engineering. Soviet
research personnel, on the other hand,
are concentrated in support of heavy in-
dustry and military development, while
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a large percentage of those in the US are
working in the consumer goods field.
Existing studies do not permit any ac-
curate comparison of the magnitude of
the current effort of the two research
establishments in support of programs di-
rectly related to national power. (Paras.
38-41; Appendix D)
4. The Soviet scientific effort, closely con-
trolled in line with state planning and
party direction, has been focussed pre-
ponderantly on the building of a strong
industrial base and the development of
modern weapons, to the relative neglect
of other fields. Although close research
controls and the high priority of military-
industrial development will continue, we
believe that increasing Soviet scientific
resources will permit greater flexibility,
and that individual initiative will be en-
couraged, basic research in new fields
will be undertaken, and more scientific
and technical effort will be allocated to
agriculture and the consumer sector of
the economy. (Paras. 12, 15-21, 57-58,
63)
5. The quality of Soviet science and tech-
nology as measured by personal compe-
tence, training, research facilities, and
achievements varies widely. In all these
aspects, the best in the USSR compares
well with the best in the Western world,
but the average, though good, is still be-
low Western standards. In general, qual-
ity is high in fields related to military and
heavy industrial development, where
some outstanding advances have been
made. We believe that the unevenness
in the quality of Soviet science and tech-
nology will gradually diminish. (Paras.
42-45, 54-56, 62-63, 65-67; Appendices)
6. In priority fields the USSR is progres-
sively less dependent on foreign research
and development. Nevertheless, a new
policy of acknowledging foreign achieve-
ments and encouraging maximum use of
foreign experience has been adopted in
order to make Soviet scientists fully con-
versant with developments in the West
and to take advantage of the possibilities
of international scientific interchange.
We believe that this policy, which has
been accompanied by a reduction in ideo-
logical interference with scientific work,
will be an aid to further Soviet progress.
(Paras. 13, 22, 46-49, 50)
7. The Soviet foreign technical aid pro-
gram will probably be selectively ex-
panded. Soviet scientific and technical
resources will almost certainly be ade-
quate to support a continued and moder-
ately expanded program of scientific and
technical aid to underdeveloped coun-
tries without serious detriment to do-
mestic programs. (Paras. 51-53, 61, 64)
8. We believe that the USSR will continue
to make important progress in the funda-
mental sciences, probably breaking new
ground in physics, nuclear physics, geo-
physics, and electronics. The poor qual-
ity of Soviet biological-agricultural sci-
ences will almost certainly be improved.
(Paras. 54, 65; Appendix A)
9. We expect Soviet heavy industrial tech-
nology to become more uniform in qual-
ity. For the immediate future, we esti-
mate that the over-all level of Soviet tech-
nology will remain below that of the US,
although the most modern Soviet plants
will be on a par with those in the US.
Research and technology in the consumer
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goods field will almost certainly continue
to lag far behind. (Paras. 55, 66; Appen-
dix B)
10. In the military field, significant So-
viet advances are probable in electronics
applications, nuclear energy, guided mis-
siles, and aeronautics. We estimate that
the USSR will continue to show capability
not only in developing new individual
weapons but also in organizing the devel-
opment of integrated weapons systems.
(Paras. 56, 67; Appendix C)
11. In at least some strategic fields, the
best Soviet scientists are estimated to be
as gifted and competent as the best in
the West and must be conceded a similar
potential for wholly new discoveries.
However, we believe fewer technological
breakthroughs in the sense of successful
attacks on recognized barriers are likely
to occur in the Soviet Bloc than in the
West because the West has more first-
rank scientists and scientific resources.
(Para. 68)
DISCUSSION
I. ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS AFFECTING
SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Basic Attitude of the Regime
12. The Soviet regime has consistently placed
great stress on science and technology, in part
because its Marxist ideology is materialistic
and most of its leaders have been convinced
that science is the key to progress, but par-
ticularly as a means for developing the physi-
cal power of the USSR. As one of the state's
most valuable tools, science and technology
are geared to planned objectives and subject
to close administrative control. They have
been directed preponderantly toward the
building of a strong industrial base and the
development of modern weapons.
13. Despite an impressive tradition of scien-
tific research in prerevolutionary Russia, the
Soviet regime inherited a technologically back-
ward state and was forced to borrow heavily
from the West. As the intensive industriali-
zation program gained momentum, however,
the premium placed on strengthening native
scientific-technological capabilities was re-
flected in increasing Soviet technological inde-
pendence. Under Stalin Soviet scientists
were largely cut off from direct contact with
the rest of the scientific world, to the detri-
ment of Soviet scientific progress. More re-
cently, however, Soviet leaders have recog-
nized and taken steps to overcome the dele-
terious effects on their scientific development
of this extreme insularity. They have empha-
sized that scientists must learn from abroad,
as well as from Soviet experience. They have
instituted a far wider and more systematic
dissemination of foreign scientific informa-
tion and a new policy of encouraging contacts
and exchanges between Soviet scientists and
their professional counterparts outside the
Communist sphere. These changes from the
restrictive policies of the Stalin period have
probably stimulated creative work in many
fields.
14. Scientists as a class constitute one of the
privileged groups within the USSR. They en-
joy a high social position and are well paid.
In addition, many scientists receive large
monetary prizes, honorary awards, and other
benefits such as houses in town and country,
limousines, paid vacations at exclusive resorts,
and special stores in which to shop. Since
the death of Stalin, Soviet scientists have en-
joyed a new degree of personal security and
professional freedom from ideological inter-
ference with their work, and relations between
the scientific community and the regime have
improved.
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Organization
15. Academy of Sciences. All Soviet research
institutions are administered by the state and
there is no organized private research in the
USSR. The heart of scientific endeavor in the
USSR is the Academy of Sciences, which has
affiliates and associated academies in 13 of
the 15 Union Republics.2 The academies are
working institutions with research and teach-
ing facilities, and employ about 10 percent of
all Soviet natural scientists, including much
of the best scientific talent. Their attention
is focussed on theoretical work, although
some applied research is also performed. The
academies take an important part in formu-
lating national scientific objectives, in coordi-
nating research with other institutions, and
in selecting and training promising scientists.
Membership in the academies is generally
based upon high professional standards and is
achieved through election by Academy mem-
bers after nomination by scientific groups.
16. Ministerial Institutes. In addition to in-
stitutions under the academies, there are a
large number of research institutes under in-
dividual ministries. The emphasis in these is
on applied research and development in sup-
port of the industrial, military, or other func-
tions of each ministry. We estimate that
these institutes employ about two-fifths of all
Soviet scientists, who concentrate heavily on
research and are relatively free of other re-
sponsibilities. Facilities range from plant lab-
oratories engaged in the more routine produc-
tion problems of individual plants to large
research institutions serving all or a large
part of their respective ministries and capa-
ble of the type of basic research normally
found in the academies. For example, under
the Ministry of Aviation Industry there is the
Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (Ts
AGI) , comparable in the scope of its work to
The Academy of Sciences, USSR, is directly re-
sponsible to the Council of Ministers, USSR, and
the Union Republic academies are responsible to
the councils of ministers of their respective
Union Republics (see organization chart, follow-
ing page) . In addition to natural science as dis-
cussed in this paper, the Academy and its affili-
ates are also responsible for similar activities in
the humanities, law, and social sciences.
our National Advisory Committee for Aeronau-
tics laboratories, where both basic and applied
research are conducted. The ministerial insti-
tute category also includes the Academy of
Medical Sciences under the Ministry of Public
Health, and the Academy of Agricultural Sci-
ences under the Ministry of Agriculture.
17. Higher Educational Institutions. Since
World War II, higher educational institutions
have devoted increasing attention to research
in both theoretical and applied sciences.
Nearly half of all Soviet scientists are em-
ployed in such institutions. Since they are
concerned primarily with teaching, they de-
vote proportionately less time to research than
the scientists employed by the academies and
ministerial institutes.
Planning and Control
18. Administrative Control. Soviet scientific
research and development, like other Soviet
activities, is subject to centralized planning
and party control. On the basis of established
broad plans, each research organization works
out its own annual program and coordinates
it with appropriate bureaus of the Academy
or ministerial directorates. The precise na-
ture and extent of party control is not known,
but all scientific organizations are known to
have party units, which probably participate
in developing the research programs as well
as exercise general supervisory and trouble-
shooting functions. In addition, research pro-
grams are subject to approval by operational
planning agencies such as the State Economic
Commission for Current Planning.
19. The effects of the attempt to apply plan-
ning principles to scientific enterprise are
mixed. The large size and diversity of the
total scientific effort complicates the coordi-
nation of research plans. Moreover, research
planning is compartmentalized by adminis-
trative organization and in practice there is
a great deal of duplication. As a partial
remedy, in the past year the Academy of Sci-
ences has set up committees to coordinate
a limited number of specific activities be-
tween various ministerial institutions and the
Academy.
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�CONFIDENTIAL
GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET SCIENCE
Council of Ministers, USSR
State Planning
Agencies
25627 9-56
Academy of
Sciences
Departments
Research
Institutes
A Typical Ministry
Chief Scientific-
Technical
Directorate
Research
Institutes
Chief Directorates
of Production
Research
Institutes
Plants and
Plant
Laboratories
�CONFIDENTIAL-
Ministry of
Higher Education
Division of
Scientific
Research Work
Chief Directorate
of Educational
Institutions
Specialized
Higher
Educational
Institutions
and their
Installations
Directorates of
Universities
and Specialized
Institutes
Universities and
Specialized
Higher Educational
Institutions
and
their Installations
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20. The general Soviet tendency to overplan-
ning and excessive bureaucracy is likely to
hamper the enterprise, creativeness, and cross-
fertilization which contribute so heavily to
progress in scientific inquiry. Constant pres-
sure for fulfillment of planned goals may also
tend to lower the quality of Soviet scientific
output. While failure of fulfillment is not al-
ways punished, it is an invitation to criticism
and possibly serious consequences. Meeting
planned schedules sometimes leads to poor
quality work and a tendency to undertake
only easily-accomplished projects. The Soviet
government has recently attempted to make
scientific plans more flexible in order to en-
courage more initiative and responsibility.
21. On the other hand, the Communist Party
and the Soviet state have powers of interven-
tion and command which are unparalleled in
free societies. For projects of high priority
they can make personnel and resources rap-
idly available without the normal play of com-
peting demands common in other countries,
and can exert pressure at all levels to expedite
these programs at the expense of those of low-
er priority. Soviet accomplishments in the
nuclear field, in weapons development, and
in industrial technology demonstrate that the
Soviet system is capable of concentrating its
scientific potential in a highly effective way
in fields of primary concern to the state.
22. Degree of Ideological Control. Before the
death of Stalin there was a strong tendency
to apply ideological tenets in the evaluation
of scientific hypotheses and to judge the va-
lidity of a scientific theory by the political
authority of its proponents. Scientists were
required to accept such doctrines as that of
Lysenko in biology on the inheritance of ac-
quired characteristics, and to reject such the-
ories as those of the resonance bond in chem-
istry and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle
in physics. These dogmatic requirements
probably hindered research to some degree,
but do not appear to have caused serious harm
except in some of the biological sciences, where
ideological interference was more pronounced.
At its 20th Congress the Communist Party
reiterated its intention to rid Soviet science of
"cliques and dogmas," and the demotion of
Lysenko signified a changing atmosphere. We
believe that during the next few years ideo-
logical interference in scientific research will
further diminish.
II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES
Financial Support
23. The Soviet government classifies research
and development expenditures in two main
groupings: (a) the financing of scientific re-
search establishments, and (b) product devel-
opment (i. e., outlays for "mastering the pro-
duction of new products" and for technical im-
provements and inventions). The first group
is believed to cover primarily research and de-
velopment in the strict sense of the term,
which includes basic and applied research and
its application to new uses up to the point of
design and production engineering. Funds
appropriated for this purpose are included in
the Soviet budget category concerned with
expenditures on education, health, and social
welfare. The second group (product develop-
ment) includes design and production engi-
neering, experimental production, testing,
prototype production, and a variety of asso-
ciated activities; funds appropriated for these
purposes are not explicity indicated in the
Soviet budget.
24. Announced expenditures for scientific re-
search establishments in 1955 were 11.6 bil-
lion rubles. The plan for the present year
calls for an increase to 13.6 billion rubles,
which is 70 percent greater than the amount
allocated in 1951 (eight billion rubles). Over
the last few years these announced expendi-
tures have increased at a slightly greater rate
than the gross national product, and now rep-
resent about one percent of GNP.3 However,
US government expenditures for research and
development, in categories comparable to the
Soviet "scientific research establishments" cate-
gory, totalled $2.1 billion in FY 1955 and are
expected to be about $2.6 billion in FY 1957. The
latter figure is about 0.6 percent of US GNP. It
is roughly estimated that the comparable US
nongovernment expenditure is about equal to
these figures. Thus, total US expenditures in
these categories are probably somewhat more
than one percent of US GNP.
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it is not known whether these expenditures
cover all outlays for scientific research (ex-
cluding product development) . A considerable
portion of the explicitly indicated funds is
probably devoted to military research, but ad-
ditional amounts for research on military
projects may be included elsewhere in the So-
viet budget. Consequently, total expenditures
on research and development in the strict
sense may be larger than the amount explicit-
ly appropriated for "financing of scientific re-
search establishments."
25. We have no direct indication of the size
of Soviet product development expenditures.
The only available index to a ratio between
these outlays and "research establishment"
costs lies in US military experience, where ex-
penditures falling within the Soviet concept
of "product development" are probably at
least equal to those the USSR would label as
"financing scientific research establishments."
If this one-to-one ratio is applied to Soviet
expenditures in both military and nonmili-
tary fields, it yield d a total for all Soviet re-
search and development expenditures on the
order of two percent of GNP.4 This procedure
for estimating product development costs is a
very rough one and would yield only approxi-
mate results even if research expenditures
proper were known with greater certainty.
Although the allocation of 13.6 billion rubles
for product development might account for a
large part of the undisclosed scientific costs
in the 1956 Soviet budget, there remains some
uncertainty on this point. Hence, our esti-
mate of total Soviet research and development
expenditures is probably on the low side.
26. In any event, past trends and announced
Soviet plans give reason to believe that strong
financial support will continue to be provided
for the scientific and technical effort in the
USSR.
Educational Institutions
27. Continued expansion of Soviet scientific
and technical manpower reserves is assured
No attempt is made to arrive at a comparable
percentage for the US because of the difficulty
of estimating US nonmilitary product develop-
ment expenditures.
by the Soviet educational system. This sys-
tem concentrates heavily on training scien-
tists, technicians, and skilled labor. The So-
viet 10-year school system, which, in terms
of classroom hours, is roughly equivalent to
the American 12-year system, is under expan-
sion. The Soviets have announced that by
1960, 10 years of primary and secondary edu-
cation will be universally available.
28. We believe the average graduate of a regu-
lar Soviet 10-year school to be somewhat
better trained in the elements of science than
an average American high school graduate.
Training in mathematics and other sciences
is emphasized (comprising more than 40 per-
cent of total course work in the upper grades) ,
teacher training is improving, and the ratio of
students to teachers is decreasing. Since
many graduates of the greatly enlarged 10-
year school must now enter nonprofessional
jobs, the curriculum has been changed to in-
clude vocational subjects such as machine
operation and practice farming.
29. The Soviet educational system includes
various levels of special schools in addition to
the regular 10-year school. At the lowest level
are short-term factory and trade schools which
develop labor skills. At the next level are
tekhnikums, roughly comparable to technical
high schools in the US, which offer specialized
training over a three or four-year period to
young people who have finished seven years
of the regular 10-year program. There are
also tekhnikums on the junior college level
which offer training to the increasing num-
bers of 10-year school graduates who do not
enter higher educational institutions. Tekh-
nikums, administered by the Ministry of
Higher Education but supported by the vari-
ous other ministries, train personnel for work
in industries under a particular ministry's
control.
30. Only graduates with 10 years of school-
ing are admitted to higher educational insti-
tutions, and competition for entrance is keen.
Selection is by competitive examination.
There is some evidence of favoritism, especial-
ly for entry into Moscow University, but this
probably has slight effect in the scientific and
technical fields. On the whole, the USSR has
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a highly effective system for selecting the
most promising young students and sending
them on to higher educational institutions.
Finally, students are channeled into fields of
study in accordance with the needs of the
state, by means of propaganda, draft exemp-
tions, quotas, and stipends which vary ac-
cording to priorities of fields. Under Soviet
law, all graduates of higher educational insti-
tutions are subject to State direction of em-
ployment for a period of at least three years
following graduation.
31. Higher educational institutions number
about 800 and are administered or have their
standards controlled by the Ministry of Higher
Education. About two-thirds of all Soviet
graduates of higher institutions are in scien-
tific and technical fields. About half of such
Soviet institutions specialize in training scien-
tific and technical personnel, and provide
training that is roughly equivalent to that
required for the average US Bachelor of Sci-
ence degree. There are three general types of
institutions offering such training:
a. Specialized engineering and technical
colleges, which offer instruction for a period
of four to six years to prepare specialists in
such fields as machine building, construction,
medicine, and agriculture. Most Soviet higher
technical educational institutions are of this
type.
b. Polytechnical institutions, which offer
five and one-half years training in a wider
variety and slightly broader fields of science
and technology such as metallurgy, electrical
engineering, and civil engineering. Students
graduate as engineers and production special-
ists. There are 25 such institutes.
c. Universities offer much broader training.
Courses of study last five years. Graduates
enter the teaching profession or become re-
search scientists. There are 35 universities.
32. Standards in these institutions are gen-
erally high, and the over-all student-teacher
ratio is similar to that in the US. Graduates
in science and technology possess good theo-
retical background, although their practical
training generally appears to be inferior to
that of their US counterparts. Only in some
areas of the biological sciences, particularly
in the agricultural field, does the present qual-
ity of Soviet higher education in science and
technology appear to be decidedly below US
average standards.
33. At the post-graduate level, there are near-
ly 500 institutions authorized to conduct train-
ing for the Kandidat degree, and 60 percent
of these are authorized to accept dissertations
for the higher degree of Doktor. Both of these
degrees are conferred by a special commission
of the Ministry of Higher Education. The
Kandidat degree requires at least three years
of graduate study, two foreign languages, and
a dissertation. In the physical sciences, engi-
neering, and some of the health sciences, it
represents training roughly equivalent to or
slightly lower than that of the US Ph.D. or
D.Sc. In some of the biological sciences, nota-
bly in agriculture, however, the Kandidat is
believed closer to the US master's degree.
The degree of Doktor has no exact equivalent
in the US.
Manpower 5
34. While the USSR has slightly less than
half as many living college and university
graduates in all fields of study, both scientific
and nonscientific, as the United States, a
greater relative emphasis on science and tech-
nology raises the number of Soviet graduates
in scientific fields to more than 80 percent of
the United States total. Moreover, since So-
viet citizens have less opportunity to change
to professions other than those for which they
were trained, we believe that the USSR has
slightly more graduates actually employed in
scientific and technical positions than the US.
(See Appendix D, Figure 1.) Of these, the pro-
portion in the physical sciences and engi-
neering is somewhat higher in the USSR than
in the US. (See Appendix D, Figure 2.) On the
other hand, many Soviet scientific graduates,
though employed in scientific and technical
positions, are believed to perform technical
duties which in the US would be handled by
-nongraduates.
For a discussion of the basis for estimates of
scientific manpower, and the probable accuracy
of these estimates, see Appendix D.
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35. In number of scientific graduates per
year, both the USSR and the United States
show wartime losses and rapid postwar in-
creases, which in the United States, because
of the veterans education program, reached
a peak in 1950. Between 1950 and 1955, grad-
uation trends in the physical sciences and en-
gineering heavily favored the USSR. In 1956,
the number graduating in these fields rose in
the US, but was still only slightly more than
half the number of Soviet graduates. (See
Appendix D, Figure 3.)
36. Soviet holders of the Kandidat degree in
scientific fields are estimated to total about
79,000 (including several thousand Doktors).
In the physical sciences and engineering,
where the degree requirements are comparable
to those in the US, the USSR has about 41,000
Kandidats, as against about 35,000 Ph.D's and
D.Sc's in the US. (See Appendix D, Figure
4.) Of greater significance than any compari-
son of present totals is the fact that in the
period 1950-1956, the number of Kandidat
degrees granted per year in the USSR has
more than doubled, whereas the number of
Ph.D's and D.Sc's granted per year in the US
has remained about the same. (See Appendix
D, Figure 5.)
37. Although considerable progress has been
made during the past decade in training the
skilled technicians and mechanics also needed
in modern technology, the USSR is not as well
supplied with them as are Western countries,
where broader sections of the population have
acquired mechanical skills over a considerably
longer period. The USSR is currently inten-
sifying its training program to increase the
supply of such technical personnel.
Distribution of the Scientific Effort
38. Of the nearly 1.4 million Soviet graduates
employed in scientific and technical positions
� slightly more than in the US � the bulk
appear to be used for technical work in engi-
neering, control testing, inspection, mainte-
nance, etc. Only about 190,000, or fewer than
15 percent, are engaged in research and teach-
ing. The comparable US figure is 280,000.
(See Appendix D, Figures 6 and 7.)
39. In terms of man-hours devoted to research
as opposed to teaching and administration,
we estimate that the USSR uses only the
equivalent of about 125,000 full-time scientists
for research of all kinds, only about half the
research effort of the US. The US also has a
considerably greater proportion of its research
scientists in the physical sciences and engi-
neering than the USSR. However, in the
USSR there is a great concentration of re-
search effort in support of heavy and military-
related industries, while a large part of US
research is in support of consumer-related
industries. Hence, the comparison of num-
bers alone is not an indication of the extent
of effort of the two scientific research estab-
lishments in support of programs related di-
rectly to national power. Existing studies
do not permit any accurate comparison on
this subject.
40. Of the total Soviet research effort repre-
sented by the equivalent of about 125,000 sci-
entists, about one-fifth is devoted to basic
research, divided about equally between the
physical and biological sciences. Imponder-
ables in the allocation of basic research effort
among fields of potential application make it
impracticable to define the proportion of basic
research which supports military and heavy
industrial programs as against other possible
applications.
41. In terms of distribution among Soviet in-
stitutions, about 15 percent of the total re-
search effort is conducted by establishments
of the Academies of Sciences, 25 percent by
higher educational institutions, and 60 per-
cent by the ministerial institutes, where ap-
plied science and development work are em-
phasized. The Academies stress basic re-
search and perform about 50 percent of the
work in this area, with educational institu-
tions handling about 15 percent and the min-
isterial institutes about 35 percent.
Quality of Scientific and Technical
Manpower
42. The quality of Soviet scientific and tech-
nical manpower is good but uneven. A rel-
atively small group of older scientists, who
were closely associated with prerevolutionary
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teachers, has continued much of the best of
Russian scientific tradition. Among persons
outside this group, quality tends to vary
according to age, since standards of higher
education, low until the early 1930's, have
improved considerably during the last 20
years. In many fields, there is no apparent
difference in quality from the Western level.
In the USSR, as in the West, scientific ad-
vances are made by a few brilliant individuals;
and the work of the best Soviet scientists is
generally comparable to that of their Western
counterparts. In broader areas of engineer-
ing and technology the average quality of So-
viet personnel remains below that of their
Western counterparts because of the large
number of persons less well trained in earlier
years.
Research Facilities and Equipment
43. The USSR has a large number of labora-
tories and institutes engaged in research and
development in science and technology. Lit-
erature identified with about 9,000 different
Soviet institutes, departments of higher edu-
cational institutions, laboratories and research
stations was received in the US during 1955.
Facilities appear generally adequate, though
perhaps in many cases cruder than those of
the West. Among major institutions recently
observed, the Institute of Epidemiology and
Microbiology (Gamaleya) of the USSR Acad-
emy of Medical Sciences had facilities compar-
able to those of US National Institute of Al-
lergy and Infectious Diseases; an important
Soviet electronics research complex at Myti-
shchi, near Moscow, resembles in many re-
spects the US Army Signal Corps Engineering
Laboratories at Ft. Monmouth; and the Mos-
cow Higher Technical School (Bauman) has
laboratory facilities comparable to those of the
best US colleges. The facilities of average
Soviet institutions probably compare much
less favorably with average US institutions
than those cited, but we estimate that lab-
oratory facilities are sufficient for effective
utilization of Soviet scientific manpower.
44. We believe that although programs of
routine priority may still suffer a considerable
shortage of scientific instruments and equip-
ment, those of major importance are little
hampered in this respect. After World War
II, the USSR at first drew heavily on equip-
ment designed or produced in the industrial-
ized Satellites and the West, but made rapid
progress in developing a native instrument
industry, gradually introducing improvements
on foreign design and designs of its own. So-
viet orders for East German optical and sci-
entific instruments, at first the mainstay of
this East German industry, have declined to a
very modest volume for the past two years.
45. Soviet industry now produces rapidly in-
creasing quantities of many kinds of instru-
ments, some of them showing considerable
originality and excellent design and workman-
ship, notably in the electronics and optics
fields. The USSR is known to have several
advanced high-speed electronic digital com-
puters. Although a portion of Soviet equip-
ment requirements is still filled by imports,
and some specialized instruments will con-
tinue in the future to be obtained from the
Satellites or the West, the establishment of
30 new instrument factories called for in the
Sixth Five-Year Plan will probably make the
USSR substantially independent of outside
sources.
Collection and Dissemination of
Information
46. The USSR's acquisition of foreign scien-
tific and technical information is many-sided
and constantly expanding. Foreign books
and journals are purchased through repre-
sentatives abroad, and through library ex-
changes. The Library of the Academy of Sci-
ences in Leningrad exchanged literature with
nearly 2,500 scientific institutions in 84 coun-
tries during 1955, receiving about 70,000 in-
dividual publications during the first half-
year. Since the death of Stalin the USSR
has increased its efforts to establish direct
contacts with Western scientists. In 1955,
Soviet representatives attended some 34 in-
ternational scientific or professional confer-
ences, and Western groups were invited to
attend 10 scientific congresses in the USSR.
Collection of information is also accomplished
by espionage operations, and we believe that
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in some cases the USSR has gained signifi-
cantly from such operations.
47. The most obvious exploitation of non-So-
viet Bloc scientific-technical knowledge has
been in military equipment, especially nuclear
energy, electronics, guided missiles, and air-
craft. The USSR exploited equipment which
it received under lend-lease or which fell into
its hands during World War II. In the Korean
conflict it acquired many US items of recent
design. It also benefited greatly in postwar
years from the transfer of German scientists
and technicians into the USSR, and from the
declassification and release of information by
the US and the UK, particularly in electronics
and radar. Western technical and trade pub-
lications, particularly those of the United
States, continue to contain a wealth of detail
concerning the development and character-
istics of new military equipment, and are
readily available to the USSR. These factors
have saved several years of development time
in some fields.
48. The USSR currently assists research work-
ers by an extensive program for the dissem-
ination and exchange of both foreign and
domestic scientific information. Scientific
and technical meetings and conferences are
held frequently. Numerous scientific books,
journals, and monographs of domestic and
foreign scientific information as well as trans-
lations, abstracts, and indexes are now readily
available. The All-Union Institute of Scien-
tific and Technical Information of the Acad-
emies of Sciences publishes monthly abstract
journals surveying several thousand Soviet
and foreign journals, and also weekly infor-
mation bulletins for industry. Thus, at least
in high priority fields, Soviet scientists have
access to the full range of published world-
wide scientific research.
49. A considerable portion of Soviet research,
including military and other sensitive projects,
is not published in open literature. This
restriction probably does not seriously hamper
the dissemination of information among those
persons having an obvious and direct need to
know. However, secrecy denies useful infor-
mation to investigators in related fields and
thus hampers general scientific progress. This
problem was recognized at the recent 20th
Congress of the Communist Party, where re-
moval of secrecy restrictions on scientific in-
formation was urged wherever possible.
Utilization of Satellite and
Chinese Resources
50. East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and to
a lesser extent Poland and Hungary, provide a
significant increment in scientific and tech-
nical manpower and facilities to the total re-
sources at the disposal of the USSR. East
Germany is strong in pharmaceuticals, elec-
tronic instruments, optical equipment, and
synthetic fibers; Czechoslovakia in communi-
cations equipment; and Hungary in electron-
ics and pharmaceuticals. On the other hand,
Communist China, because of an extreme
shortage of scientific and technical manpower
and facilities, is unlikely to contribute to So-
viet science for some time but on the contrary
will be a drain on aggregate Bloc scientific
resources. Although Satellite scientific and
technological capabilities are growing, their
relative importance to the USSR is likely to
diminish because of the increasing Soviet sci-
entific capabilities.
Foreign Aid Programs
51. The USSR has been sending substantial
numbers of scientists, engineers, and techni-
cians to other Bloc countries, including Com-
munist China, since World War II. Since late
1955, the export by Soviet Bloc countries of
scientific-technical personnel to underdevel-
oped, non-Bloc countries has been rapidly ex-
panded both in numbers of persons, which
now total several thousand, and in the num-
ber of recipient countries involved. Bloc tech-
nical aid has been concentrated mainly in
Egypt, Syria, and the South Asian coun-
tries � India, Burma, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Indonesia. Communist China's first offer
of any magnitude was made to Cambodia in
April 1956.
52. In addition to sending technical personnel
abroad, the USSR has for some years been
providing scientific and technical education
at its own institutions to substantial numbers
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of Chinese Communist and Satellite students.
More recently, similar educational facilities
in the USSR have been provided for students
from countries outside the Bloc. The Sixth
Five-Year Plan calls for continuation and ex-
pansion of the educational aid program.
53. The USSR assists Satellite and Chinese
Communist nuclear energy programs. It has
proposed aid to non-Bloc countries in this
field, but only a few firm agreements have
been made. The USSR would be capable of
providing reactors and related equipment, and
of providing training programs for foreign
personnel.
III. QUALITY AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE
SCIENTIFIC EFFORT
54. In the physical sciences, published Soviet
research is of high quality and indicates that
the authors are well informed on international
developments in their specialties. It shows
particular strength in a number of fields of
physics and theoretical mathematics. In the
geophysical sciences Soviet capabilities are
generally comparable with those of leading
Western nations, and the USSR has planned
one of the most comprehensive programs of
any of the countries participating in the com-
ing International Geophysical Year. In the
chemical field Soviet scientists have done sig-
nificant original work, for example in organic
synthesis and in combustion studies. They
are somewhat behind the West in work on
synthetic rubber, fibers, and plastics. Soviet
metallurgical research is generally on a par
with that of the West in fundamental aspects,
but lags slightly in some practical applica-
tions, especially in the light alloy field. In
electronics the USSR is crosely behind the
West in fields where equal effort has been
applied. In medicine and the biological sci-
ences quality ranges from very good in medi-
cal research to low, though improving, in
genetics and biochemistry. A major effort is
currently under way to overcome the serious
lag in developing aids to agriculture and ani-
mal husbandry. (See Appendix A.)
55. The quality of Soviet industrial tech-
nology is much more uneven than that of the
pure sciences. Even in the priority field of
heavy industry, while the best plants and
products are on a par with those in the US,
the average is somewhat below the US aver-
age. These differences within the USSR, as
well as differences between Soviet and West-
ern practices, appear to lie less in the devel-
opment of new techniques than in the extent
to which universally known techniques are ex-
ploited, as for example in the Soviet emphasis
on certain oil extraction procedures, in the
lag in Soviet steel rolling and finishing tech-
nology, and in the USSR's thus far highly
selective application of automation systems.
Soviet success in shortening in some instances
the development lead time on military prod-
ucts appears to be due to administrative fac-
tors rather than to any technological supe-
riority. In areas of secondary priority, as in
heavy electrical equipment, development is
largely concentrated on the exploitation of
Western experience, and Soviet technology
generally lags behind the West by several
years. In areas of low priority, as in the sup-
port of textile, canned goods, and footwear
production, Soviet technology is far behind.
Insufficient development of farm machinery
and mineral fertilizers, along with unsound
practices in seed and stock selection, have
contributed to the persistent lag in Soviet
agricultural production. (See Appendix B.)
56. The qualitative capacity of Soviet scien-
tific and technical resources, however, is illus-
trated by current achievements in the mili-
tary field. The high calibre of. nuclear re-
search is evident from the relatively early
dates at which nuclear and thermonuclear
explosions were achieved. The Soviet guided
missile program is extensive and well ad-
vanced, and Soviet plans for earth satellite
launchings are similar to those of the US.
Aeronautical research in the USSR is gener-
ally equal to that in the US, with excellent
capability in theoretical aerodynamics and
improving competence in its applications. In
hydrodynamics Soviet theoretical research has
been equal and in some respects superior to
Western research. However, the lack of an
experimental research program has led to a
failure to apply its results. Military end-
products show effective adaptation and im-
provement of complicated foreign equipment
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designs, and the latest advanced electronic
equipment, in particular, appears to be pri-
marily the result of Soviet research and de-
velopment. More important, Soviet scientists
have demonstrated the ability to develop and
produce modern weapons systems of native
design. (See Appendix C.)
IV. SOME FUTURE TRENDS IN SOVIET
SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMS
Planning and Control
57. The basic framework of Soviet planning
and control of science and technology will
almost certainly continue along present lines.
However, the directives of the Sixth Five-Year
Plan emphasize the need for closer relation-
ships between scientific research and indus-
trial applications. The recently published re-
sults of the Fifth Five-Year Plan noted that
"insufficient contact with production work is
an important shortcoming in the work of
many scientific institutions." Such criticisms
have been repeatedly voiced in the past, and
do not appear to indicate a drastic shift.
Nevertheless, in the ministerial institutes,
there will probably be a continuing trend in
the direction of such closer ties to. industrial
application. While research and development
programs will remain under strict adminis-
trative control, it is probable that programs
will be more flexible, affording more scope for
individual initiative and encouraging labora-
tory and institute directors to assume greater
responsibilities for direction of their programs.
58. On the other hand, with respect to the
USSR Academy of Sciences, its president in-
dicated at the Twentieth Party Congress that
steps are being taken to free the Academy and
higher educational institutions from routine
industrial problems so that they will be able
to concentrate on "the most important and
fundamental tasks of science and on scientific
research in new directions which are little
investigated but show much promise." In
view of his subsequent statement that "the
direct satisfaction of current production re-
quirements is not the only or the main func-
tion of science," Soviet scientific researchers
in the top scientific establishments will prob-
ably gain a freer rein in probing new channels
of investigation, though still within the frame-
work of the national economic plan and in
accordance with the principle that the func-
tion of science is service to the state.
Manpower
59. As yet there have been no indications that
Soviet rates of growth in scientific and tech-
nical manpower will slacken, and Soviet plans
call for increasing the numbers of graduates
and post-graduates. Reasons for this con-
tinued high rate of expansion are to be found
in the needs arising from the rapidly expand-
ing Soviet economy, in the belief of Soviet
leaders that further increases in scientific and
technical manpower will improve economic
productivity, and in the Soviet intent to chal-
lenge the West in economic competition.
60. If present trends continue, the numbers
of Soviet scientists, engineers, and technicians
will increase, in the period through 1961, con-
siderably more rapidly than in the US, and
by about 1961 aggregate Soviet manpower in
these categories would be about equal to that
of the US. The number of Soviet scientific
and technical graduates per year will probably
continue to increase through 1961, leveling off
for a period thereafter, in part because of the
low birth rates of the World War II years.
(See Appendix D, Figures 8 and 9.)
61. In the engineer category, we estimate that
the Soviet supply will be generally adequate to
carry out internal objectives, and that sub-
stantial numbers could be employed in export
industries and in scientific-technical missions
abroad without significant detriment to do-
mestic programs. On the other hand, because
of increased demands for nonprofessional
technical personnel, the deficiency in this
category will continue through 1961, although
it will be significantly reduced by the large
training program designed to produce such
technicians. Similarly, because of increasing
demands within the Bloc, as well as demands
created by Soviet technical aid programs in
non-Bloc countries, we believe that shortages
of scientists will continue through this period.
62. As the large number of postwar graduates
gain experience and assume positions of lead-
ership there should be a general rise in the
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quality of research. The increase in numbers
will permit greater research coverage, and
with more attention paid to fundamental re-
search in the Academy, ad hoc research will
become less necessary in supplying answers
to specific problems. The utilization of scien-
tific graduates and post-graduates will almost
certainly become generally more effective as
subordinate training programs produce an
increasing number of technicians.
Distribution of Effort
63. The USSR will continue to give very high
priority to research related to the development
of weapons systems. Up to the present time,
the Soviet leaders appear to have concentrated
their highest-grade scientific resources in mili-
tary and basic industrial fields at the expense
of other areas of the economy, and we believe
this policy will be continued when necessary
for the attainment of priority goals. Increas-
ing Soviet scientific resources, however, will
probably make it possible for the USSR to
devote greater efforts to basic research with-
out hindering military development. In ad-
dition, more resources will probably be allo-
cated to scientific effort in those fields which
until the present have had relatively low pri-
ority, including agriculture, public health, and
consumer goods.
64. The Soviet technical aid program will al-
most certainly expand in countries already
receiving Soviet technical aid and will prob-
ably be extended to other countries. We esti-
mate that the USSR will continue to expand
its technical aid program on a selective basis
in the underdeveloped countries of Eurasia
and Africa and in Latin America. Soviet sci-
entific and technical resources will almost
certainly be adequate to support a continued
and moderately expanded program of scien-
tific and technical aid to underdeveloped coun-
tries without serious detriment to domestic
programs.
Capacity for Future Advances
65. We believe that the USSR will continue to
make important progress in the fundamental
sciences. It is likely to break new ground in
several fields of physics, nuclear physics, geo-
physics, and electronics. It is expected to
overcome a current weakness in the applica-
tion of theoretical mathematics to other sci-
ences. The lag behind Western science in
certain fields of metallurgy, such as the devel-
opment of light alloys, will probably be re-
duced. The poor quality of Soviet biological-
agricultural sciences will almost certainly be
improved. (See Appendix A.)
66. In industrial technology the USSR also
has the capability to make important ad-
vances over the next few years, in part
through the further development and in-
creased use of special-purpose tools and auto-
mation techniques. While Soviet industry is
at present characterized by sharp contrasts
in technology, the high growth rate of the
economy and the introduction of more mod-
ern production techniques tend to indicate
that the gap between "best" and "average"
performance may narrow considerably in the
future. (See Appendix B.)
67. The prospects for Soviet scientific and
technical progress are particularly great with-
in the high priority military and related fields.
For example, significant advances are prob-
able in electronics applications, nuclear ener-
gy, guided missiles, and aeronautical research
and development. We have no reason to
doubt that despite the increasing complexi-
ties of modern equipment, the USSR will be
capable of continuing the successful design
and development of modern weapons systems
for its ground, naval, and air forces. (See
Appendix C.)
68. In many fields of scientific endeavor, the
likelihood of major Soviet advances beyond ex-
isting levels of science and technology � "tech-
nological breakthroughs" � must be consid-
ered. (A "breakthrough" may comprise either
a wholly new discovery or a successful attack
on recognized barriers to the application of
existing knowledge.) We believe that first-
rank Soviet scientists and engineers have the
capability for such advances, and Soviet tech-
nology has shown itself able to develop new
ideas and to realize their military or eco-
nomic potential when priority is sufficiently
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r.!
high. In at least some strategic fields, the
best Soviet scientists are estimated to be as
gifted and competent as the best in the West
and must be conceded a similar potential
for wholly new discoveries. However, we
believe fewer technological breakthroughs in
the sense of successful attacks on recognized
barriers are likely to occur in the Soviet Bloc
than in the West because the West has more
first-rank scientists and scientific resources.
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APPENDIX A
SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN MAJOR SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
Physics
1. The present capabilities of the USSR in im-
portant fields of physics are generally com-
parable to those of the leading nations of the
West. While the scope of Soviet research in
physics, in terms of range of problems under
investigation, is less than in the US, its qual-
ity in areas given greatest priority is consist-
ently high. For basic knowledge in fields of
lower priority, reliance has been placed on the
published work of foreign scientists.
2. The USSR has shown particular strength
in theoretical physics (e.g., theory of quantum
electrodynamics and elementary particles) ,
solid state physics (e.g., semiconductors) , and
low temperature physics (e.g., first experi-
mental observation of second sound in liquid
helium, and Landau's theory of superfluidity) .
We believe that in these fields the USSR will
continue to concentrate its efforts on key
problems and will make significant advances.
3. We estimate that, if present trends con-
tinue, within a decade the USSR will have
achieved equality with the US in scope, mag-
itude, and quality of research in physics and
that the number of active Soviet physicists
will exceed that of the US. Emphasis has
been given thus far to theoretical aspects at
the expense of the experimental, but, as num-
bers of physicists increase, a better balance
will probably result. Facilities for experi-
mental work should be adequate to support
research programs.
Nuclear Physics
4. Present capabilities of the USSR in nuclear
physics research are estimated to be second
only to those of the US. Work in high energy
physics has been of good quality and compara-
ble though probably not equal to that of the
West. Cosmic ray research has been of par-
ticularly high quality and on a par with that
of the US. In the low energy region the USSR
has also shown considerable competence.
Neutron physics research, for example, is also
comparable to work performed in the US.
5. During the last year the USSR has an-
nounced that it has a number of particle ac-
celerators, including a synchro-cyclotron, the
largest machine of its type in existence, which
was allegedly rebuilt a few years after its
completion in 1949 to attain its present energy
of 680 Mev. The USSR also announced that
it expected to complete in 1956 a 10 Bev
proton synchrotron; this would be the largest
accelerator in the world. The US is presently
operating a six Bev proton synchrotron, the
largest currently operating; higher energy
machines will not be completed until 1960.
However, the US has more accelerators of
lower capacity than has the USSR and is
therefore able to carry on a greater volume
of research in this field.
6. The USSR has recently organized the Joint
Institute for Nuclear Research, which has as
its announced purpose international coopera-
tion in solving the most important problems
of contemporary physics. The new organiza-
tion will incorporate the Laboratory of Nu-
clear Problems and the Laboratory of High
Energy Physics (sites of the 680 Mev and 10
Bev accelerator, respectively) . The Joint In-
stitute will also acquire a Laboratory of The-
oretical Physics which will include an elec-
tronic computer department, and a Labora-
tory of Neutron Physics which will have a
high neutron flux experimental reactor. An
accelerator for multicharged ions will be built.
Also being considered are cosmic ray lab-
oratories and other facilities. All facilities of
the Joint Institute will be located in the USSR.
Representatives from all of the Soviet Bloc
countries have signed an agreement to par-
ticipate in this Institute, and it has been an-
nounced that membership will be open to
non-Bloc countries.
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7. We believe that establishment of this Joint
Institute will result in a somewhat better or-
ganized attack on nuclear research problems,
probably with greater stress on fundamental
aspects. It will also provide increased train-
ing facilities for both Soviet and Satellite sci-
entists at an advanced level in high energy
physics. The Joint Institute program will
serve to focus attention on the USSR as a
world center of nuclear physics research.
While we are unable to predict with certainty
the future Soviet progress in nuclear physics
research, rapid gains in this field in the past
indicate that Soviet nuclear physicists will be
able to furnish strong support to all phases
of nuclear energy programs.
Mathematics
8. Soviet scientists display outstanding ability
in pure mathematics, and have achieved in-
ternational recognition in nonlinear mechan-
ics, probability theory, and topology. Al-
though top level mathematicians are prob-
ably fewer in the USSR than in the US, the
Soviet lag in numbers will probably be con-
siderably lessened in the next 10 years because
of the emphasis on mathematics training
during the last decade. Soviet weaknesses in
applying theoretical mathematics to other
branches of science and technology may be
largely corrected by the growing emphasis on
channeling the results of mathematics re-
search into high priority areas such as weap-
ons development. Thus Soviet over-all math-
ematical capabilities may be brought close to
those of the US.
Astronomy
9. The science of astronomy appears to be de-
veloping rapidly in the USSR under an effort
now comparable to that devoted to it in the
US. Although Soviet astronomical instru-
mentation is not as fully developed as that in
the US, astronomical facilities have been im-
proving steadly. Soviet literature in astrono-
my touches on all phases of the science and
shows emphasis on work in stellar astronomy,
the study of variable stars, solar physics, the
study of minor planets, and cosmogony. 1 One
sub-field in which Soviet astronomy is signifi-
cantly behind the US is that of astrophysical
observations for the determination of physical
and chemical properties of stars and nebulae.
10. Soviet work in positional astronomy and
astronomical contributions to geodesy and
gravimetry illustrate the full exploitation of
studies which contribute to the more precise
location of points on the earth and therefore
to long-distance target positioning. Solar
studies are emphasized for their importance to
the interpretation and prediction of terres-
trial phenomena, as in long-range forecasts
of climatic trends, especially in polar and sub-
polar areas.
Geophysics
11. Soviet capabilities in the geophysical sci-
ences, including meteorology, hydrology, ocea-
nography, geology, and terrestrial and arctic
geophysics, are generally comparable with
those of leading Western nations. Among the
geological sciences, the USSR has maintained
outstanding capabilities in engineering geolo-
gy, permafrost research, and geochemical and
geological mineral prospecting methods. So-
viet geophysical research conducted on ice
floes in the Central Arctic and at many per-
manent stations has materially aided shipping
operations along the Northern Sea Route and
could be of great importance for military oper-
ations in the Arctic area.
12. The USSR has one of the most compre-
hensive and well-planned programs of any of
the countries participating in the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year (1957-1958) . The
USSR will probably intensify its central Arctic
research, and already has a large and well-
equipped expedition in the Antarctic. During
the next few years the already high Soviet
capabilities in geophysics will almost certainly
be substantially increased through procure-
ment and analysis of the voluminous data aris-
ing from IGY activities, which will be avail-
able for the first time on a world-wide scale.
13. The USSR is currently engaged in the
development of earth satellites for research
at very high altitudes and we believe that its
Radio astronomy is treated under electronics, in
paragraph 26 below.
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efforts will be intensified during the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year. Research of this
nature is likely to enhance Soviet capabilities
for further development of guided missiles
and result in increased knowledge in many
fields of geophysics. Rockets and guided mis-
siles currently estimated to be within Soviet
capabilities could also be effectively utilized
in gathering upper atomsphere data. Im-
portant meteorological advances could result
from a current Soviet program involving the
use of high-speed electronic digital computers
in weather forecasting, and from high alti-
tude and weather control research that will
probably receive high priority.
14. In terrestrial geophysics and geodesy the
USSR is expected to expand observational
programs, particularly during the IGY. Im-
portant advances are possible in Soviet knowl-
edge of the precise size and shape of the earth
which could increase Soviet capabilities for
long-distance target positioning. 2 Possible
Soviet advances in terrestrial geophysics could
result in the development of a geomagnetic
guidance system for missiles, and of instru-
mentation for aerial gravimetric surveys.
Chemistry
15. Organic Chemistry. Soviet organic chem-
ists have contributed significant original re-
search on the synthesis of organic materials.
From the high quality of this work it is evi-
dent that the USSR has the capability to car-
ry on programs of research and development
necessary to produce new liquid fuels, petro-
chemicals, and lubricants. Soviet research
on organosilicon components is conducted by
outstanding chemists and offers promise of
useful new materials, though it is slightly
behind the US. Soviet products and publica-
tions indicate that US developments are stud-
ied closely, and that advantage Is taken of ex-
tensive world-wide literature on the subject.
In many fields, the Soviet economy has not
required organic chemical research, and in
these fields Soviet scientists appear satisfied
to remain somewhat behind the US.
= This subject will be discussed in greater detail in
the forthcoming NIE 11-5-56, Soviet Programs
and Capabilities in Guided Missiles.
16. Physical Chemistry. The USSR has con-
ducted important research on combustion,
flame propagation, and detonation, occasion-
ally in advance of Western research. Soviet
physical chemistry is strongest in the study
of fundamental mechanisms of combustion
and reaction. In the well-developed field of
basic combustion chemistry, further advances
are probable which will be of use in combus-
tion chamber design or in the selection of pro-
pellants. The USSR has for many years had
both outstanding scientists and many workers
generally versed in reaction kinetics, the con-
cepts of free radicals, and the behavior of car-
bon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen systems
at elevated temperature.
17. Macromolecular Chemistry. Soviet scien-
tists have demonstrated their capability to do
basic research in macromolecular chemistry,
and their level of technology is only slightly
behind the West in such fields as synthetic
rubber and plastics. In the field of synthetic
fibers, current Soviet practice is to rely on the
European Satellites for research and develop-
ment. Although the USSR once led the world
in the research, application, and production
of synthetic rubber, it has recently depended
on published Western technology for such ad-
vances as oil extended rubber, low temperature
polymerization, and cis-polyisoprene.
18. In the field of plastics, development and
application efforts in the USSR have followed
closely the pattern set by the West, though
use has also been made of East German re-
search. The USSR has been slow to adapt for
general use much Western information on the
newer and more important plastics (e.g., poly-
amides, polyethylene, polyesters, fluorocarbon
polymers, and silicones) , and has attempted
to acquire plants and know-how from the
West. Despite considerable research activity
in the field of macromolecular chemistry, we
believe that Soviet technology will not over-
take that of the West during the next several
years.
19. High Energy Fuels. The USSR is known
to be interested in boron hydrides and other
compounds as high energy rocket fuels. On
the basis of present knowledge we estimate
that the USSR is in an early stage of basic
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--
research related to the synthesis and thermo-
dynamic properties of boron hydrides. If
adequate priorities were given, the necessary
engineering technology could be developed
to produce boron hydrides as rocket fuels.
Research on hydrazine hydrate as a high en-
ergy fuel has been carried forward to the test-
ing stage, but there is only limited evidence
of any other extensive activity related to high
energy chemical fuels.
Metallurgy
20. Soviet fundamental metallurgical research
is generally on a par with that of the West,
and has developed some original concepts. In
physical metallurgy, Soviet metallurgists have
been very active in the theory of elasticity and
plasticity and its application to industry.
Considerable research has been performed on
creep and relaxation of metals at elevated
temperatures. The theory of dislocations has
been applied to the study of fatigue or en-
durance of metals under cyclic stress. Frac-
ture, impact and notch brittleness of metals
have also been given considerable attention.
21. Soviet metallurgy is presently devoted
chiefly to meeting the requirements of heavy
industry and the military forces. The USSR
has an extensive ferrous metallurgical re-
search program in progress to increase the
productivity of related industries and to de-
velop new alloys to alleviate the problems im-
posed by shortages of certain alloying ele-
ments. Research on high temperature mate-
rials for aircraft applications, while closely
parallel to that of the West, indicates Soviet
competence, particularly in alloy conserva-
tion.
22. In the field of light alloys, the USSR will
probably continue to exploit Western alumi-
num and magnesium research, but it will
probably make increasing effort toward origi-
nal work in this field. Soviet publications in-
dicate that the USSR is fully aware of the
military and industrial significance of tita-
nium metal and its alloys, which are in the
pilot stage of production. The USSR has
probably assigned a priority to research on
titanium in view of its application, for exam-
ple, to aircraft and guided missile compo-
nents. Research on ceramic cutting tool ma-
terials has been outstanding though present
Soviet materials are somewhat brittle.
Electronics
23. The USSR has a well balanced and exten-
sive program in a number of basic science
areas which contribute significantly to elec-
tronics research and development (e. g., di-
electrics, crystallography, semiconductors, and
ferrites) . In addition, extensive and capable
work is being done on theoretical studies and
experimental research in areas which contrib-
ute more indirectly to electronics research and
development (e. g., information and propaga-
tion theory) . In other fields of basic science,
electronics is extensively used as a tool in both
instrumentation and in control applications.
Recent Soviet radar designs reflect original
work of high quality.
24. In phases of basic electronics research in
which the USSR and the West have equal in-
terest, the USSR is closely behind the West;
and in at least one case in which the USSR
has made special efforts, in communications
theory dealing with noise studies, it now leads.
We estimate that over the next 10 years So-
viet scientists will be capable of making sig-
nificant further advances in the electronics
field, and will be generally on a par with the
West in most areas.
25. Communications Theory. Soviet scien-
tists have investigated the probability theory,
correlation analysis, and information theory
in an endeavor to obtain a comprehensive un-
derstanding of communications. The range
and depth of published native research is on
a par with unclassified research on the same
topics in the West. The type of research im-
plies that considerable classified research on
novel communications techniques, such as
squirt transmission and noise modulation, as
well as speech encryption devices and band
reduction systems, may be under way. While
no specific information is available on the
USSR's progress on these techniques, its classi-
fied research effort is probably also compara-
ble to that of the US. We estimate that sig-
nificant progress will be made in applying
communications theory to such fields as data
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transmission, data handling, and servo-mech-
anisms. One significant result may be the
achievement of communications systems
which are at once secure, reliable, and of high
capacity.
26. Radio Astronomy. Soviet research capa-
bilities in radio astronomy are believed to be
comparable in quality to those of the West.
Significant work has been performed in the
detection of weak signals in radio spectro-
scopy and in meteor studies. This work indi-
cates the attainment of a high level of experi-
mental proficiency which could have direct
applications in military fields of microwave
radio reception.
Medicine and the Biological Sciences
27. The USSR has made impressive progress
in medical research, and its work in this field
is more advanced than in most of the non-
medical biological disciplines. In the field of
hematology, the USSR has developed one of
the world's largest and most complete research
organizations for the study of blood, its de-
rivatives and plasma extenders. Important
advances have also been made in biophysics,
epidemiology, radiobiology, and physiology.
Major strength has been displayed in Soviet
research on the physiology and functioning of
the central nervous system. In certain sub-
fields of Soviet microbiological research, such
as those related to genetics and biochemistry,
the quality of work is low, though improving.
28. The major problems investigated by So-
viet clinical scientists will probably continue
to be those of heart disease, cancer and in-
fectious diseases, and those related to indus-
trial hygiene. In the more fundamental areas
of the medico-biological sciences the emphasis
probably will be on using developments in the
physical sciences for further research on the
basic nature of living matter, disease, and
radiation damage. In the aggregate, we be-
lieve that the USSR is now somewhat behind
the West in clinical research but will advance
at about the same pace as the West.
Agricultural Sciences
29. For several decades preceding 1953, agri-
cultural science was accorded a very low pri-
ority in the Soviet Union, and progress was
much slower in agriculture than in any other
major segment of the economy. Research in
agricultural science was further restricted
during the last decade of this period by Ly-
senko's influence. Currently, however, Soviet
agriculture enjoys a considerably higher pri-
ority. Present efforts to send agricultural
specialists to the US, recent widespread appli-
cations of US research findings, published
statements by Deputy Premier Matskevich on
the superiority of US agricultural research
and technology and direct observations made
in the USSR by US agriculturists � all indi-
cate that the USSR is attempting to make
improvements from a relatively low base of
agricultural research and technology.
30. The Sixth Five-Year Plan calls for a doub-
ling of grain output, with 80 percent of the
increase to be achieved by increasing per acre
yield through utilizing the results of research
and technology. Evidence indicates that ma-
jor emphasis will be placed on improving ferti-
lizer technology, on development and utiliza-
tion of herbicides, new insecticides and fungi-
cides, on developing disease-resistant and
high-yielding varieties of crop plants, on im-
provement of vaccines and antibiotics for ani-
mal diseases, on food technology, especially
preservation and storage methods, and on
methods for improving livestock quality. In
addition, the USSR will almost certainly con-
tinue to strive for a technological break-
through in photosynthesis research in the
hope of developing techniques for synthesizing
food. In summary, Soviet progress in agri-
cultural research and technology over the next
five years may result in substantial means for
improvement of the Soviet food supply.
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APPENDIX B
SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN SOME IMPORTANT FIELDS OF
INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY
1. Soviet industry has demonstrated a capa-
bility for adapting and introducing modern
techniques into the rapidly expanding indus-
trial base of the USSR. To a considerable
extent, however, Soviet progress has been
made possible by duplication or adaptation of
the machines and methods already in use in
the West. Soviet industry is characterized
by contrasts in technology, since new tech-
niques are not generally extended to existing
facilities as quickly as in the more competi-
tive industries of leading Western nations.
Thus while the best Soviet heavy industrial
technology is in some cases as good as the
best in the Western world, the average is
somewhat below average practice in the US.
Partly as a result of this, over-all industrial
productivity in the USSR is only about one-
third that of the US. This weakness, however,
is related to a number of factors in addition
to the scientific and technological capabilities
of the USSR. We estimate that for the im-
mediate future, the over-all level of technology
in Soviet industry will remain below that of
the US, although in its most modern plants
technology will be on a par with that in
the US.
Petroleum Technology
2. Soviet technical literature and statements
by senior officials of the Ministry of Petroleum
Industry, USSR, indicate that modern geo-
physical methods for locating and evaluating
petroleum deposits have been in use for sev-
eral years. In addition to gravitational, mag-
netic, and seismic methods already in use, a
radioactive method (probably utilizing the
scintillometer) was introduced in 1954. It
appears that the theoretical development of
geophysical methods of petroleum exploration
in the USSR is approximately on the same
level with that of the West. Although the
Soviets are among the leaders in the field of
geochemical exploration for oil, they appear
to be several years behind the West in the
efficient use and the relative extent of appli-
cation of other modern techniques.
3. The Soviets seem fully cognizant of the
latest advances in the techniques of petroleum
production throughout the world. Soviet
boasts of technological success, however, are
at times nothing more than references to pro-
duction techniques which have been applied
for years in the US. Two examples of the
above are hydraulic fracturing of the geo-
logical strata to increase the flow of petroleum
toward the well, and contour flooding as a
secondary recovery system to increase produc-
tion from fields where strata pressures are
low. The Soviets are currently claiming world
leadership in developing new drilling tech-
niques. While it is true that certain tech-
niques are far more widely applied in the
USSR than in other areas, this use seems to
reflect peculiarities distinctive to the geology
of the USSR rather than any great techno-
logical advance.
Steel Technology
4. Soviet steel making technology is generally
on a par with that of leading Western nations,
including the US. Results obtained by the
application of technological advances to the
various metallurgical processes have had a
significant impact on product quality and on
productivity in the Soviet steel industry.
While most new steel plant technology is well
known to all advanced industrial nations, the
USSR, now engaged in building up its steel
capacity in an effort to compete with the US
in quantity production, is incorporating new
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techniques on an ambitious scale in its newly
constructed plants.
5. The Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk plants and
several others are the equal of the best in the
US in terms of output of iron and steel per
unit of productive capacity. Investment for
technological improvements at these plants,
above all in the furnace facilities, has been
unstinted in a conscious effort to outstrip the
best plants in the world and to serve as models
for other Soviet steel works. Output per work-
er at Magnitogorsk is twice the average for the
Soviet steel industry.
6. The application of new technology to dif-
ferent segments of Soviet ferrous metallurgy
has varied markedly. The Soviet effort has
been directed primarily to blast and open
hearth furnace processes, and on high tem-
perature alloy steels, widely used in military
end-item production. In comparison, rolling
mill and finishing line technology has lagged.
The failure to broaden the range of finishing
equipment has resulted in less variety of fin-
ished products to serve specific applications
than in the US.
Automation and Mechanization '
7. In systematic knowledge about automation
the USSR has at least kept pace with the
West. A survey of the Soviet industrial appli-
cations of automation to date shows that the
USSR has placed priority on selected indus-
trial applications. The literature indicates
that the Soviets are not satisfied with prog-
ress to date. It is apparent that a majority
of existing automatic lines were set up by
tying together existing machines by transfer
mechanisms of various types. Thus many
Soviet claims of achievements in automation
involve only the elimination of hand labor
For the purpose of this section, automation is
defined as the automatic direction, regulation,
and control of industrial operations or processes
by physical or chemical means. This involves
not only mechanization of materials handling,
but also automatic programming and regulation
of a set of operations and the automatic detec-
tion, analysis, and correction of errors, so that
acceptable end-items are produced in quantity
with reduced human observation and interven-
tion.
by mechanization of materials handling and
use of individual semi-automatic or auto-
matic machines. In the production of com-
ponents for motor vehicles, including trucks,
automation and mechanization have proceed-
ed extensively in both countries, with the
USSR lagging behind the US in the extent
of application for the most part.
8. During the recently completed Fifth Five-
Year Plan, antifriction bearing output in the
USSR increased greatly, partially through the
establishment of semi-automatic lines. The
first fully automatic line for roller bearings
with new specially designed tools and com-
plete transfer equipment between machines
went into operation late in 1955. This line is
set up to take forged parts of a six-inch
diameter conical roller bearing and to perform
automatically all the operations of machin-
ing, grinding, heat treating, testing, assem-
bling, lubricating, and packaging.
9. During the period of the Sixth Five-Year
Plan (1956-1960) additional semi-automatic
lines are to be established using existing ma-
chinery. Plans for construction of fully auto-
matic lines are not known. The indications
are, however, that the USSR is counting on
automation and mechanization to increase the
productivity of labor. Soviet ability to en-
force standardization and to control design
changes is inherently favorable to the exten-
sion of automatic production methods.
Military Product Development
Lead Time
10. In at least some areas of military produc-
tion, the USSR has translated developmental
results into initial series production in times
shorter than those achieved by the US. For
example, Soviet lead time, in this phase, on
the BISON jet heavy bomber appears to have
been substantially shorter than that for the
US B-52. This appears to have been true in
other cases of aircraft development as well.
11. Where the USSR has succeeded in com-
pressing lead time, its success appears to have
been due more to design choice, planning de-
cisions, and a willingness to assume risks than
to any inherent scientific and technological
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superiority. In general, components of even
the latest Soviet air weapons systems are of
less sophisticated design than similar US
equipment. It appears that the USSR makes
it a practice to use existing tested components
to a maximum extent in developing a major
air weapon system, in order to reduce the
complexity of the over-all development pro-
gram.
12. Soviet aircraft and other weapons sys-
tems reveal a wide range in the quality of the
various parts and components. Those por-
tions of the system that are critical to its per-
formance are usually equal in quality to West-
ern counterparts. Less critical portions may
be designed and constructed in a manner
that results in lower levels of quality than
those required in the US. We believe that the
Soviet philosophy is to obtain weapons "good
enough" rather than "best in all respects."
The result of this philosophy is the acceptance
of small reductions in performance if those
reductions effect significant savings in time
and effort.
13. Soviet success in reducing lead time in
air weapons systems has also been due to an
ability to follow through without delay on
high priority projects, and to a willingness to
take shortcuts and risks such as those attend-
ant upon starting series production before all
features of the prototype have been complete-
ly tested and evaluated. In many cases, series
production has been achieved more rapidly by
holding design changes to a minimum, by
using as few different materials as possible,
by limiting the design of parts and compo-
nents to the minimum loads and functional
requirements, and by designing to maximize
the use of semi-skilled labor and to eliminate
bottlenecks in capital equipment and scarce
skills. This procedure with its attendant
risks, while generally rewarding to the So-
viets, has not always met with complete suc-
cess. In the case of the BISON, recent evi-
dence indicates that, probably at least in part
because of production difficulties, there has
been substantial delay in achieving high-
volume output after the initiation of series
production.
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APPENDIX C
SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES RELATED
TO WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
"
Nuclear Energy
1. Details of the Soviet nuclear energy pro-
gram are discussed in NIE 11-2-56, published
8 June 1956. 1 In brief, the USSR has shown
the ability to produce fissionable materials in
quantity for the military and research phases
of the nuclear energy program and to develop
a variety of air-deliverable nuclear weapons
with yields from a few kilotons to the megaton
range. It has also demonstrated a generally
well-developed capability for nuclear reactor
design and operation. The announced Soviet
nuclear electric power program for 2,000-2,500
megawatts of electric power by 1960 is of con-
siderable magnitude but could be attained
with a very high priority effort. Successful
development of reactors for aircraft propul-
sion applications probably will not be realized
for some time. It is also improbable that the
USSR will produce economical power from
thermonuclear processes for many years.
Guided Missiles
2. Detailed information on Soviet guided
missile capabilities will be presented in NIE
11-5-56, now scheduled to be published in No-
vember 1956. To summarize briefly, we be-
lieve that the USSR is engaged in an exten-
sive guided missile program and that it now
has missile systems in all categories (air-to-
air, air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, surface-
to-air) in at least limited operational status.
Guided missile testing facilities are believed to
be well-equipped, modern, and operated by
well-qualified personnel. The USSR is believed
to be well advanced in the development of mis-
sile guidance and control and of propulsion
systems. We believe it possesses, or is rapidly
acquiring, the necessary data for attacking
The Top Secret version of this estimate is NIE
11-2a-56, published 5 September 1956.
the aerodynamic, structural, and guidance
problems of intermediate-range and intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles. We also estimate
that the USSR possesses the basic scientific
capabilities, technical skills, and other re-
sources required to develop, build, and launch
an unmanned earth satellite vehicle.
Aircraft and Related Weapons Systems
3. Soviet literature indicates that in its the-
oretical aspects aeronautical research in the
USSR is generally equal to that in the US.
The new and varied aircraft types observed
in the USSR in recent years give evidence of
sound practices in applying these aeronau-
tical research capabilities, and indicate that
the USSR has probably achieved better match-
ing of airframes and engines than the US has.
On the basis of Soviet research papers, the
characteristics of current aircraft, and recent
observations at the Zhukovskiy Air Engineer-
ing Academy, we believe the Soviet air weap-
ons development effort is not restricted by lack
of research facilities or high-quality equip-
ment.
4. The USSR has an excellent capability in
theoretical aerodynamics over the entire
speed range. For example, its boundary-
layer specialists are second to none. We have
seen evidence of a high capability in the the-
oretical aspects of transonic and supersonic
aerodynamics. We have not yet seen evidence
that this capability has been applied as well
as in the US, but recent observations indicate
that rapid progress is being made in the devel-
opment of advanced aircraft. Some Soviet
aircraft, particularly fighter and light bomber
types, show evidence of advanced transonic
or supersonic concepts, although there are in-
dications that some of the present operational
and prototype aircraft are unstable at high
speeds. We believe that the USSR will nar-
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row the gap and may equal the West in apply-
ing theoretical aerodynamic knowledge dur-
ing the next five years.
5. Two significant features of Soviet aircraft
propulsion work to date have been the devel-
opment of the 19,000-lb-thrust axial flow
turbojet engine powering the BISON and
BADGER bombers and the 12,000-equivalent-
shaft-horsepower turboprop engine powering
the BEAR. Improvements in both these en-
gines are probable in the next several years,
and in addition, we estimate that Soviet en-
gine technology has progressed to the point
where a 22,500-lb-thrust turbofan engine
could appear in 1958. A major factor in So-
viet turbojet engine development has been
simplicity, dictated by the desire to obtain
the necessary engines in the shortest possible
time. We believe future turbojet develop-
ment efforts will probably emphasize basic
technical improvements in axial flow engines.
The existing Soviet design for axial flow en-
gines permits great flexibility in this effort,
particularly with respect to high-thrust en-
gines with a weight-thrust ratio of less than
.25, necessary for the design of aircraft for
extended supersonic flight.
6. Some experimental work on high-energy
aircraft fuels, reportedly including metallic
slurries, has taken place in the USSR during
the past five years. Although little is known
of this Soviet activity, we estimate that the
USSR has the capability to develop within a
few years an aircraft fuel system using either
a combination of petroleum and high-energy
fuels or high-energy fuel exclusively.
Ground Force Weapons
7. The Soviet research and development pro-
gram in ground force weapons has yielded
many new and improved designs which have
appeared in weapons and other items of equip-
ment in the last few years. The primary So-
viet objective in the development of new
ground force weapons is to increase firepower
and mobility for ground troops. In this con-
text, we estimate that over the next few years
the USSR will be able to develop new weap-
ons to fill the few existing gaps in ground
force weapons systems, such as certain self-
propelled artillery types and antiaircraft
weapons for defense against low altitude at-
tacks. In vehicle design, we believe it prob-
able that Soviet experimentation with gas
turbines for automobiles has been or soon will
be extended to military vehicles. Soviet ex-
periments with light-weight, high-strength
metals and alloys suggest that these materials
will be used to decrease the weight of military
equipment. Further development of known
Soviet capabilities in both solid and liquid
rocket propellant could lead to high-perform-
ance field and antiaircraft rockets. Signifi-
cant advances may be made in ammunition
design.
Naval Research and Development
8. For about the last 50 years, Soviet the-
oretical research in hydrodynamics has been
equal to, and in some respects superior to,
Western research. Only recently, however,
have there been enough model basins and
other research facilities for an adequate ex-
perimental hydrodynamics research program
to supplement theoretical research. Conse-
quently, the failure of naval architects in
some cases to incorporate refinements of de-
sign reflects the lack of an adequate experi-
mental research program.
9. In the structural design of ships, Soviet
theoretical work has been superior to Western
work. Advances in the structural field have
now become dependent on empirical research,
however, and a lack of intelligence on Soviet
structural test facilities and programs pre-
vents us from determining the present status
of the USSR relative to the West.
10. Published research in the field of marine
diesel engineering has been voluminous, but
known Soviet naval diesel engines are copies
or derivations of Western designs. There are
indications, however, that the engines in the
largest of the postwar Soviet submarines are
modern high-speed types, possibly of native
design. A sizable amount of research has
been published on naval gas turbines and a
2,000-HP plant has apparently been designed,
but no shipboard gas turbine installations
have been detected to date. Although Soviet
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25
4."
scientists continued German World War II
developments in closed cycle hydrogen-perox-
ide submarine propulsion plants, and also did
extensive work on a recycle diesel, we believe
that progress in nuclear propulsion has prob-
ably been sufficient to permit the dropping of
these two projects.
11. Soviet design of conventional propellers
has been generally similar to US and Western
practice. An original and probably signifi-
cant advance was made in the 1940's, how-
ever, when a Soviet academician announced
his theory of "supercavitating" propellers.
Although we have no information permitting
an assessment of Soviet progress in super-
cavitating propeller development, we believe
that research on such propellers is continuing.
12. Naval Ordnance. The results of a strenu-
ous postwar research and development pro-
gram in naval gunnery have become evident
in warships built or modernized since 1953.
Gyroscopically stabilized fire control directors
and gun mounts have received special em-
phasis with apparently successful results. A
Soviet capability to provide servo-mechanisms,
computers, and associated electronic equip-
ment for modern automatically loaded guns
with automatic tracking against air and sur-
face targets is evident. While refinements
to these systems will continue, naval guided
missiles for AA defense also may be developed
for use in large vessels and new naval con-
struction.
13. The Soviets have the scientific knowledge
which would enable them to develop sophisti-
cated acoustic, magnetic, and pressure devices
for use in underwater ordnance. A magnetic
mine recovered in Korea (1950) was judged
to be very good and reflected a knowledge of
advanced World War II concepts. In the field
of torpedoes, the Soviets have apparently de-
veloped a high-speed long-range weapon
using a hydrogen-peroxide propulsion system;
such a torpedo could be fitted for pattern-
running. Since 1950 there has been evidence
of a program for developing an acoustic hom-
ing head for an electrically driven torpedo
and it is estimated that such a weapon is now
available for operational use.
14. Soviet capabilities in the theoretical as-
pects of acoustics related to hydro-acoustic
detection are believed to be excellent. Re-
search and development in this field are
strongly supported by the Acoustics Institute
of the Academy of Sciences. Unclassified arti-
cles in Soviet journals reveal understanding
of the acoustic principles underlying LOFAR
and SOFAR, and the recent awarding of an
Academy of Sciences prize for research on low-
frequency hydro-acoustic emanations of ships
indicates that the USSR attaches importance
to this field. Available evidence does not per-
mit an estimate of the degree of Soviet suc-
cess in applying these principles.
Electronics and Communications
15. During the last five years, the USSR has
made great progress in electronics research
and development. In the initial years after
World War II, Soviet electronics was heavily
dependent on copying from the West. How-
ever, some recently developed electronic equip-
ment appears to be primarily the result of
native research and development, indicating
that the Soviets have achieved considerable
independence in this field. They have devel-
oped and put into production many types of
radar and other electronics equipment com-
parable to the latest Western designs in oper-
ational use. Significant advances are believed
to have been made in such militarily impor-
tant fields as electronic countermeasures, mis-
sile guidance and control, high-speed digital
computers, and airborne intercept radar
equipment. Although the development of
proximity fuzes is within Soviet capabilities,
we have no evidence that it has taken place.
16. Radar. Some 40 types of Soviet radars
have been reported during the past five years,
including advanced types for air, ground, and
naval use. Many older ground radar sets are
still in use, but are rapidly being supplemented
by more advanced types which should over-
come some of the previous deficiencies, for ex-
ample in height-finding. There is consider-
able evidence of advanced native Soviet re-
search and development in naval radar, par-
ticularly for surf ace and air search and fire
control applications. For example, the SEA
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'
NET air search radar appears to be an ad-
vanced design based upon native effort. The
airborne intercept radar set in the FRESCO
"D" fighter, although of comparatively short
range, has complex search and track charac-
teristics not similar to those of any other
known radar, and the FLASHLIGHT is
equipped with an airborne intercept radar
which is probably different and considerably
larger than that of the FRESCO "D". We be-
lieve that Soviet research and development
capabilities in the field of radar will be gen-
erally comparable with those of the West over
the next few years.
17. Communications. Soviet electronics re-
search and development establishments are
capable of providing communications equip-
ment equal in quality to that of the West.
Although to date Soviet communications
equipment designs have been conventional,
with little indication of miniaturization, re-
cent Soviet advances in semiconductor re-
search and in the development of transistors
should permit the de-sign of lighter, more com-
pact communications equipment. Improved
Soviet competence in television research and
development will probably result in a greatly
increased industrial and military use of tele-
vision.
18. Navigation. In the development of air
navigation equipment, the USSR has relied
rather heavily on conventional and depend-
able instruments, the principles of which have
been proven through wide use by Western
nations. Improved airborne navigational aids,
including automatic astronavigation and vis-
ual omnirange systems, will probably come
into more extensive use during the next sev-
eral years. Future Soviet techniques for long
and short range air navigation are expected
to be adaptations of well-established basic
theory for the most part.
19. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). The
USSR has devoted substantial efforts to the
development of electronic countermeasures
equipment since the end of World War II, and
we believe that ECM activities will almost cer-
tainly continue to receive priority considera-
tion. The USSR is currently employing
groundbased, shipborne, and airborne signal
detection equipment, probably extending from
the very low to the microwave frequencies.
We believe that Soviet researchers have in-
vestigated the potential of antiradar coating
and are continuing to extend their efforts in
this direction, but we believe that these ef-
forts will be only partially successful. Al-
though evidence is scarce, we believe that the
USSR is devoting considerable effort to the
development of active jamming equipment in
many forms for the entire usable radio spec-
trum. Intelligence reports reveal that Soviet
scientists are aware of the recent develop-
ment of the carcinotron, which has great po-
tentialities in the development of highly effec-
tive jamming equipment, and that they have
directed that development work be done on
it in East Germany. Although CHAFF tech-
niques have been known since World War II,
the USSR has only within the past year or so
become actively engaged in developing tech-
niques for its production, dispensing, and tac-
tical employment.
20. Infrared. Although intelligence informa-
tion on Soviet work in infrared is scanty, we
believe the USSR's military infrared program
includes the development of equipment for
air-to-air detection systems, guidance, hom-
ing, and fuzing systems for missiles, and near-
infrared night vision equipment for ground
forces. Infrared communication equipment
is probably in use by Soviet ground and naval
forces at the present time. We believe the
USSR will remain approximately on a par
with the US in infrared research and over the
next several years could surpass us in opera-
tional employment of certain applications of
infrared such as terminal guidance for
ground-to-air missiles, if the necessary effort
were allocated to them.
Chemical and Biological Warfare
21. Chemical Warfare (CW). The USSR has
a well-established CW research and develop-
ment program which we believe to be capably
staffed. The program probably emphasizes
the development of more effective nerve gases.
Soviet scientists have also conducted research
on phosgene oxime, tabun, fluorine-containing
organophosphorus compounds of the sarin
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type, and sulfur-containing organophosphorus
compounds of the "V" agent type. They are
probably conducting research on psychochem-
ical agents. Research to increase the effec-
tiveness of older known gases is also probably
being conducted to a limited extent.
22. We have evidence of Soviet research in
aerosols (applicable to dissemination of toxic
agents and smokes under field conditions) ,
the acetylcholine-cholinesterase enzyme sys-
tem (essential to an understanding of the bio-
chemical and physiological action of nerve
gases and the development of antidotes for
them) , surface chemistry (applicable to the
removal of toxic agents from the atmosphere) ,
detection and identification of industrial toxic
vapors (applicable to detection devices for CW
agents) , aluminum soaps (usable as thicken-
ers in fuels for flame weapons) , and therapy
for industrial poisoning. The accumulated
results of this research will probably add sig-
nificantly to Soviet CW capabilities.
23. Biological Warfare (BW) .2 Accumulated
evidence shows that the USSR almost certain-
ly has an active BW research and development
program which encompasses antipersonnel,
antilivestock, and possibly anticrop agents.
Relatively little is known, however, about the
nature and magnitude of this program, par-
ticularly its offensive aspects. The causative
organisms of at least four human diseases
(anthrax, tularemia, plague, brucellosis) and
of two animal diseases (foot and mouth dis-
ease, rinderpest) are believed to be under con-
sideration as BW agents. The USSR has con-
ducted research and development in fields
which have direct application to BW, includ-
ing aerosol production, decontamination,
micrometeorology, air sampling for organic
materials, and storage of micro-organisms. In
these fields, Soviet scientists are considered to
be competent and their research is of much
potential value to the defensive and offensive
'Soviet BW capabilities have been treated in de-
tail in the Scientific Estimates Committee esti-
mate SEC 3-56, dated 17 September 1956.
aspects of BW. The USSR also possesses the
facilities, scientific personnel, materials, and
experience in related fields which could be
used for the mass production of BW agents.
Future Soviet BW research and development
probably will be on suitable agents and meth-
od of dissemination.
24. Soviet developments in the field of immu-
nology, such as the vaccines of brucellosis,
tularemia, and anthrax, are of potential sig-
nificance to the BW defensive capabilities of
the USSR. The USSR probably will continue
the emphasis given to medical research and
other fields which will improve Soviet BW
defensive capabilities.
Weapons Systems Development
25. In addition to its capabilities for develop-
ing individual weapons and items of equip-
ment, the USSR has shown the capacity to
develop complete weapons systems, by timing
and integrating individual developments in
vast and complex programs using resources
and scientific and technical skills from many
contributory fields. A good example is the
postwar development of a modern air defense
system, which now includes a series of jet in-
terceptors equipped with airborne-intercept
radar, modern early-warning and ground con-
trol equipment, communications and data-
processing equipment, radar-directed antiair-
craft artillery, and surface-to-air guided mis-
siles. Similarly, Soviet development of a long-
range nuclear-air offensive weapons system
includes not only the long-range bombers
themselves, but also air-deliverable nuclear
weapons and facilities for refueling the deliv-
ery aircraft in flight. In general, we estimate
that Soviet weapons systems development ca-
pabilities are well advanced and compare fa-
vorably with those of the West. Despite the
increasing complexities of modern warfare, we
estimate that the USSR will be capable of con-
tinuing the successful development of weap-
ons systems necessary for up-to-date air,
ground, and naval forces.
3ECIZET
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CECRET 28
APPENDIX D
SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER ESTIMATES
4
1. This appendix presents data in graphic
form comparing Soviet and US scientific and
technical manpower as to numbers of living
graduates from higher educational institu-
tions (Figure 1) , field of employment (Figure
2) , annual rates of graduation, by field (Fig-
ure 3) , annual rates and distribution of higher
degrees (Figures 4 and 5) , numbers employed
in research and teaching, by field and place
of employment (Figures 6 and 7) , projected
annual rates of graduation (Figure 8) , and
trends (for the USSR only) in the number of
living scientific and technical graduates (Fig-
ure 9) . In the interpretation of the graphical
data the following points should be borne in
mind.
2. Personnel statistics are not by themselves
accurate measures of national scientific and
technological strength. There are a number
of factors, some of which are discussed in
the body of this estimate, which must also be
noted. Among these are the number of non-
professionally trained individuals working in
professional positions, the general utilization
of scientific and technical manpower, includ-
ing the availability of technicians to support
the professional scientists and engineers, the
stage of development of the economy and
general technological level of the country.
These are factors which are not amenable to
numerical treatment but which nevertheless
have a great bearing on the comparative sci-
entific and, technological strength of nations.
3. The data used in the calculations for the
USSR are drawn from open Soviet literature �
statistical year books published up to 1940,
and postwar journals and newspapers. The
following considerations support the reliability
of the Soviet data:
a. Data from the prewar statistical compila-
tions have proved consistent in other respects
with subsequently ascertained facts.
b. The manpower figures in the 1941 Soviet
plan, which was classified by the USSR but
seized by the Germans and later published,
agreed well with the information which had
previously appeared in open Soviet publica-
tions.
c. Data since the war, while generally
scarce, are consistent with prewar trends.
While an analysis of the Soviet Statistical
Handbook published in 1956 has not been com-
pleted, a preliminary examination reveals no
significant discrepancies with the data used
in the calculations.
4. The Commission of Human Resources and
Advanced Training of the National Research
Council and the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare supplied most of the mate-
rial upon which the US figures are based.
Some adaptations and extensions of US and
Soviet materials have been made in order to
reduce them to comparable categories.
5. The data for both the USSR and the US are,
in some places, estimated or incomplete. Dur-
ing the postwar period up to 1956, data for the
USSR have become increasingly scarce, while
for the US the reverse is true. In breaking
down raw data into more useful form and in
supplying data to fill gaps in certain catego-
ries or for certain years, statistical methods
have been used. The numerical data on sci-
entific and technical personnel are believed
to be correct within plus or minus 10 percent.
6. While every effort has been made to arrive
at comparable categories of scientific person-
nel in the US and USSR, there are inevitably
differences in the definitions of corresponding
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29
groups in the two countries which make exact
comparison difficult. For the purposes of the
breakdown among scientific fields illustrated
in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 7 the sciences have been
categorized as follows:
a. Physical sciences and engineering
Physics
Chemistry
Mathematics
Metallurgy
Astronomy
Meteorology
Geology and geography
Engineering (mechanical, chemical,
civil, electrical, etc.)
Other fields based on physics, chem-
istry, or the earth sciences (e.g.,
seismology)
b. Agricultural Sciences
Agriculture (agronomy, animal hus-
bandry, forestry, entomology, etc.)
Other biological sciences related to ag-
riculture (e. g., plant genetics)
c. Health sciences
Medicine and medical sciences
Dentistry and dental sciences
Other fields supporting health and
sanitation (excluding nursing un-
less based on 4-year curricula)
Other biological sciences relating to
health (e. g., epidemiology)
Persons in residual fields of biology not
clearly associated with agricultural or health
sciences (e. g., microbiology) have been di-
vided equally between these two categories.
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Figure 1
�C-014FH,ENT-Filt�
RELATIVE SIZES OF MAJOR GROUPS OF SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER
AS OF MID-1956
'
lbf�
MILLIONS OF PER SONS
3,125,000
living graduates of
higher educational
institutions in all fields
1,690,000
living scientific and
technical graduates
1,360,000
graduates employed in
scientific and
technical positions
190,000
scientists in
research and teaching
...
� .0"..*_� � �_� � # �
25628 9-56
USSR
CONFIDENTIAL
US
6,40Q000
living college and
university graduates
in all fields
1,970,000
living scientific and
technical graduates
1,240,000
graduates employed in
scientific and
technical positions
280,000
scientists in
research and teaching
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s�
Figure 2
CONFIDENTIAL
NUMBER OF GRADUATES ACCORDING TO FIELD OF EMPLOYMENT
AS OF MID-1956
25629 9-56
44.
765,000 -
in physical sciences
and engineering
56%
Total� 1,360,000
USSR
CONFIDENTIAL
590,000
in physical sciences
and engineering
Total � 1,240,000
US
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-CONFIDENTIAL - Figure 3
NUMBER GRADUATING PER YEAR FROM HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
ACCORDING TO FIELD
1930-56
u).
*14
90
80
70
60
C:11
z 50
0
z 40
30
20
10
i
I
I
I
�I
i
-
PHYSICAL SCIENCES
AND ENGINEERING
USSR
#
/
/
/
\
\
�
US
-
/
/
/
/
\
\
%
�
\
\--4'
/
_
....
,....... .....""
� ,.. ....,...
.�
I,
I
/

//
... ...
.
i
I
I
I
Noe
I
1
_
1030
50
40
10
'32
'34
'36
38
1940
42
44
46
48
1950
52
54
195
. I
I
I
�
AGRICULTURAL
SCIENCES
_
.
_
USSR
/
�
I
......
��.0......
/
......'"'"'"'"....'
0.,........,
II/
I
I
I
I
1
i
1930
50
40
z 30
0
z 20
10
'32
'34
'36
'38
1940
'42
'44
'46
'48
1950
52
105
1
1
1
1
1
i
HEALTH
_
SCIENCES
"....... ".......
,
7
USSR
� US
NM 111.111 �����
"ft� MOM
MM. ...." 01.....
/930
25630 9-56
'32
'36
'38
1940 '42
'44
46
CONFIDENTIAL
48
/950
52
54
/956
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CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 4
NUMBER OF PERSONS HOLDING HIGHER DEGREES
AND DISTRIBUTION WITHIN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
AS OF MID-1956
ALL FIELDS
PhD's and DSc's
Kandidats
PhD's and DSc's
Kandidats
z.z, /Jai r
I I I
SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
US
57,000
USSR
79,000
USSR
92,000
0 10 20 30 140 so 60 70
THOUSANDS
41,000
in physical
sciences
52%
USSR
Kandidats
Total-79,000
80
90
100
110
US
PhD's and DSc's
Total-57,000
These charts do not take into account the fact that in some biological sciences, which moke up o port of
the agriculture and health sciences, the Kandidat degree is more nearly equivalent to the US master's
degree than to the Ph. D. or D. Sc. Figures for US holders of master's degrees are not included.
/20
25631 9-56
CONFIDENTIAL
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2
3
THOUSANDS
9
6
7
6
5
4
3
2
-CONFIDENTIAL - Figure 5
HIGHER DEGREES IN SCIENCE AWARDED ANNUALLY
1933-56
_
I
I
I
i
1
�
Soviet
Kandidats
_
�
� U.S. PhD's
and USc's
0%
_
/
/
/
/
'...
%
�
����" 00'
i
�
�
N .
...0
/
/
�
do .0.
�
...... ....
1
1932
25632 9-56
'34
'36
'38
1940
'42
'46
CONFIDENTIAL
'48
l950 '52
54 1956
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CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 6
NUMBER OF SCIENTISTS IN RESEARCH AND TEACHING
1930-56
THOUSANDS
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
/00
80
6o
40
2
_
I
I
1
/
,
/
/
/ -
/

/
/
/
/
-
----US
USSR
_
/
/
/
/
/
/
-
_
�
/
/
� I
/
/
-
_
/
/
/
/
/
/
_
_
..I
.0.�
..... '''...
-
I
I
I
I
I
I
�-
1930
'32
25633 9-56
'34
'36
'38
/940
'42
'44
'46
'48
1950
'52
1956
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CONFIDENTIAL Figure 7
DISTRIBUTION OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
ENGAGED IN RESEARCH AND TEACHING
AS OF MID-1956
By Place of Employment
50%
in higher
educational
institutions
25634 9.56
(industry,
agriculture,
health, etc.
60,000
in health
sciences
32%
40,000
in agricultural
sciences
21%
in higher
educational
institutions
60%
in industry, agriculture, health, etc.
By Field of Employment
90,000 in
physical sciences
and engineering
47%
Total- 190,000
USSR
30,000
in agricultural
sciences
11
225,000
in physical sciences
and engineering
80%
Total- 280,000
US
CONFIDENTIAL
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-CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 8
THOUSANDS
260
240
220
200
180
i6o
/40
/20
100
80
60
40
20
NUMBER OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
GRADUATIONS PER YEAR
1938-61
I
i
I
I
I
1
�
�
USSR
US
�
IS 0 �
�
�,
.--
.
1%
A
###
�
I.
�
�
I�
-,
� '
�� �
_ .
F'
/
/
/
/
%
%
%
��
�..*
�
�
�
.......
�
ro��
of
/
i
i
i
I
r Pro
ections*��-
�
,�
I
I
I
1
I
�
I
/938 1940 '42
25535 9-56
'44
46
'48
/950 '52
'54
'56
*Projections are hosed on current enrollments adjusted
for attrition on the basis of past experience.
-CONFIDENTIAL
'58
1960
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Figure 9
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.0
2.8
2.6
2.4
(f)
2.2
2.0
1.8
/.6
1.4
1.2
I.0
.8
.6
4
.2
0
TREND IN THE NUMBER OF LIVING SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL GRADUATES IN THE USSR
I
I
I
I
I
I
�
�
_
�
_
�
�
I�d
�
I -
�
I
�
�
_
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, ��
I if
I I
�
�
�
1-*-- Pro'ection*--*-
1-
-
I
I
I
I
I
--.
I
/938 1940
'44
46
'48
/950 '52
'54
'56
'58
/96o
Projection is based on current enrollments adjusted for attrition on the basis of past experience,
25636 9-56
CONFIDENTIAL
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-SECRET--
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