PRINCETON CONSULTANTS' MEETINGS 23-24 JANUARY 1957

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06032614
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: January 24, 1957

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PRUCETON CAST,TAgTS, 1:CT1i4G&) 23-24 January l57
kolleming ere the minmtes of tha ?rincaton Ccasull;ant metings on
23.24 January. The Consultants taking part for both days were Messrs.
Armstrong, Blacke Hoovers, Knorre Langer, Lincoln, Linder Millikanv
Moselye Roitsel and Strayer. Participating on 23 January only waa Young.
From ONE, Cco1eye Smith arrise and Billington were present for both
days and Admiral Schuirmann and Matthias for 24 Janmar.Y.
aalTail_and Cohesion in the Soviet Satellites: The Consultants
spent all morning and part of the afternoon of January 23 discuesix; the
draft of NI E 12-57. In discussing the basic factors affecting stability
and cohesion LINCOLN and ARMSTRCNG felt that the attitudes of the free
world should be included, and that the demonstration of unwilliagnos to
accept risks in aiding a UN member appealing for aid would have profound
repercussions in the area. HOOVER felt that nationalism was only the garb
and rallying banner for anti-communism, and that this anti-communism in
Eastern Europe had remained undiminished. He considered the lack of a
larger protest vote in the Polish election explainable only in terms of
the regivoos use of intimidation and repression. However, most of the
Consultants agreed with AILISTRO`Kl� that the Poles simply thought GonulFta
was the best they could got in the wake of the Hungarian experionce,
MOSTLY pointed out that Pilsudski also scored an overwhelming triumph
li%en he want hofore the electorate only two months after a sudden return
to the political arena. LANG1R thought that fear of Jermany was an
important factor in producing the rally behind Gomuika.
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KNORR questioned the relative laek of emphasis in the paper an
economic factor, which he considered the critical one in terms of future
prospects for the area and possible US courses of action.
The Consultant&
then generally agreed with the argument advanced by MILLIKAN that the
degree to which a national Communist Seution of the Polish type proves
viable SW depend on its ability to solve economic problems, and that
solving these problems may require destruction of some of the guts of the
Communist system. MILLIKAn and BLACK felt that as the image of the
Hungarian experience wanes, it will be a diminishiry force for induoing
stability and conformity in the area and that economic conditions will
become increasingly determinate. MILLIKAN thought that a special paper
should be written analyzing the economic debate in Poland and the
implications and political overtones of the reorganization of the Polish
economu. BLACK felt that attention should be paid to the non.Communist
liberals and modernizers in some of the Satellites who might be able to
work for a phased liberalization from within.
MOSEL& emphasised that conditions do not affect people mechanically,
but rather through the psychology of the given area. He thought the
possibilities of improvements in Poland's economic situation were better
then implied in the estimate. He thought that increased incentive to
work for an independent regime among the workers and the substantial
potential of Poland0s managerial class might bring about considerable
progress. He pointed out that Poland has a higher productivity in coal
per 'worker than England and France, and that it had a basically rich end
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balanced national esonomy, Hany of its problems might be solved by
Western aid and lowering of miLilWiryeapenditures. HOOVES and KNORR
were more pessimistic about Polish economic prospects, HOOVER pointed
to continued inabilitiee to increase production under Gomulka; KNORR
doubted that steps such as wage sonesssions will prove even as successful
as Stalin's more repressive methods in effecting economic improvemento
Although the Consultants generally agreed with the basic estimate
that the USSR is not now genuinely seeking a, formula for pulling out of
Eastern Europe, they felt that the paper ruled out too summarily the
passibility that the USSR would give more serious consideration User=
kind of offer* LIUER and LANGER suggested that the Soviets would
probably pull out of Eastern Europe if we pulled out of Western Europe;
STRAYER thought the USSR might even look with favor on Poland getting
grants from the US .to help it out of its current economic situation,
MILLIXAN felt that the categorical estimate about Soviet determination
to retain control in Eastern Europe (last sentence of paragraph 19)
overeimplified the picture and gave insufficient weight to the tremendous
costs the USSR faced in maintaining that control. He felt that although
a flat withdrawal proposal would not be accepted, stress should be placed
on the fact that a new context had been created in which the range of
alternatives had necessarily-broadened*
There was general agreement that more mention should be made of the
role of Yugoslavia and Communist China. ARMSTRONG thought that the
political considerations which were paramount in inducin& the USSR to
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rejects roaccepts and then re-reject Tito must also be operative in their
pollees toward Poland. LANGER agreed that prattige was the critical
Soviet consideration and thought it degrading for the East Europeans and
unparalleled for the' USSR to call in Chou En.lai to smooth things over in
the Satellites. BLACK felt the use of China as intereessor WAS not
resented and was probably an effective way of convincing in the Satel..
lites that despite temporary problems they are part of a mush larger bloc
which is still the wave of the future. BLACK suggested Finland might
prove a better example of an eventual outcome in some of the more trouble-
some Satellites than Yugoslavia. In some mimeo* a Finnish solution was
praferable to a Titoist one since Finland was more subject to Soviet
dictation on foreign policy than Yugoslavia. STRAYER thought that Soviet
relations with Communist China might be the pattern that the Soviets had
in mind for future dealings with the East European Satellites. On the
question of what and how mach variation the USSR will be able to tolerate
in its Satellite empires there were three positions put forward by the
Consultants.
2. ARMSTRONG tended to think that Soviet policy had to be
toward the area as a whole, and that the same considerations of
prestige and political power will have to stiffen Soviet attitudes
toward the region as a whole, ARMSTRONG pointed out that the Bloc
has been almost as uniform in its pattern of rehabilitation and
partial reexeommunication of Tito as it was in its original
denunciation and purges of 1948+9. LOSELY tended to support this
position by suggesting that the Beviete suffered no real hesitations
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only a necessary tactical pause waiting for reinforcements before
crushing the Hungarian uprising. Most of the Consultants agreed
With the estimate that any defection from the Bloc except by Albania
would be inadmissable to the USSR.
2. STRAYER felt that the USSR would have to continue to insist
on uniform responses to the outside world, but can and will allow for
considerable and increasing variations in domestic policy.
3. BLACK felt that the USSR would allow for general divergence
between countries, wherever unavoidable, rather than attempt to
distinguish between domestic and foreign policies, which would be
difficult in key issues such as foreign trade and aid. LLIDER and
LEI= favored more discuseion of the Satellites as individuals.
LINCOLN got little support for his idea .that a soft neutral area to
the South might be sanctioned by the USSR; but there was considerable
sympathy for the idea that the USSR might feel that it could nn
continue to sanction divergences in some of the Satellites, becasu
because of the national interest of countries like Bulgaria and
Czeehoslovakia in maintaining close contest with the USSR aid the
inability or disinclination of most Satellites to follow the Polish
example at present.
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On the military importance of the area to the aloe, AILLMW
thought that the USSR continued to value Eastern REurope for defensive
purposes, it must have written off the area for possible offensive use
vs. Western Europe. LINCOLN thought the area was still considered usable
as a base even if local forces could not be trusted, and MOSELY thought t
the technological strength of Soviet forces had so increased that the
Satellite forces had lost much of their importance in Soviet planning
anyhow. LIWCOLN thought that the building up of Satellite military forces
had probably contributed to nationalism in the area -- and would probably
inevitably do so if (1) conscription was used and (2) high professional
standards were to be attained.
The Consultants thought some mention should be made of the attractive
force of Western Europe in both the eoonomic and cultural realms to may
many of the Eastern European Satellites. MOS'LLY said that the Polish
government has urged the Rockefeller and Ford foundations to open contact
and that exploratory missions have already been sent to Poland by both
foundations. He thought that the experience of Jugoslavia in 1950 (when
905' chose English and only 2% chose Russian as their second foreign
language after the choice was made elective) would probably be repeated
in other Eastern European Satellites if a choice was permitted. There
was general agreement not to expect much from the Czechs, however, who
were thought to be faring well economisally under the current arrangements
and enjoy about as much contact with the West as they probably wanted.
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