THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 NOVEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06014951
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2020
• Case Number: F-2020-01702
• Publication Date: November 11, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
November 11, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 511(1),12),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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November 11, 1975
Table of Contents
Angola: The Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola has proclaimed independence unilater-
ally, and its two rival liberation groups have
set up a rival government. (Page 1)
Australia: In a surprise move that has thrown Aus-
tralia into an unprecedented constitutional
crisis, Governor-General John Kerr early today
announced the dismissal of Prime Minister Gough
Whitlam. (Page 3)
Lebanon: Prime Minister Karami is making a renewed
effort to find a political solution to the Leb-
anese crisis. (Page 4)
Spanish Sahara: Spain and Morocco will try to ham-
mer out a firm agreement on the territory from
the loose understanding King Hassan reached on
Saturday with a senior Spanish official.
(Page 5)
Cyprus-UN: Debate on the Cyprus question begins in
the UN General Assembly this week amid signs
that the parties concerned will not be able to
agree on a substantive resolution. (Page 6)
Notes: UN; Israel (Page 7)
At Annex we present the principal judgments of a
memorandum, "Prospects for and Consequences of
Increased Communist Influence in Italian Poli-
tics."
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LUANDA
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Benguela
MILES
Carmona .
-ANGOL A
0
hov
,
SOU -WEST AFRICA
(Intern ional Territory)
200 I
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ANGOLA
The Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola, which controls Luanda and
some other areas of the country, proclaimed
independence for the country unilaterally
after the Portuguese high commissioner
yesterday turned the former colonial ter-
ritory over to the "Angolan people."
The National Front for the Liberation of An-
gola--along with Angola's third liberation group,
the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola--meanwhile has set up a rival government.
According to an announcement out of Kinshasa, where
the National Front and National Union had been con-
ferring, the administrative seat of their new gov-
ernment will be Nova Lisboa, which they have renamed
Huambo.
The rival government will have a president, a
prime minister, and a 24-member council of revolu-
tion.
In a separate news announcement, the National
Union called for a cease-fire, neutralization of
Luanda, and the establishment of a government of
national unity made up of the three liberation
groups.
Portuguese leaders are divided over whether
to recognize the Popular Movement as the legiti-
mate government.
Foreign Minister Antunes and President Costa
Gomes are said to favor doing so, while Prime Min-
ister Azevedo and Socialist leader Soares prefer
that Portugal take no position. Azevedo reportedly
has insisted that his government would never recog-
nize a single liberation movement.
(continued)
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A variety of reports yesterday indicate that
a number of European and other African countries
intend to withhold recognition from either rival
claimant.
Soviet diplomatic recognition of the Popular
Movement could occur today. An authoritative
Pravda commentary over the weekend indicated that
Moscow is moving toward official recognition of the
Popular Movement. It also suggested that the So-
viets are becoming increasingly nervous about the
Popular Movement's sagging military fortunes.
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AUSTRALIA
In a surprise move that has thrown
Australia into an unprecedented consti-
tutional crisis, Governor-General John
Kerr early today announced the dismissal
of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam.
Complicated parliamentary maneuvering is still
under way, however, and it is unclear whether the
sacking will stand up.
Kerr said his decision was based on Whitlam's
inability to get government appropriation bills
through the opposition-controlled senate, where
they have been stalled for more than a month.
The Governor-General named opposition leader
Malcolm Fraser to head a caretaker government until
an election next month for both houses of parliament.
The senate, which has adjourned indefinitely,
approved the appropriation measures after Kerr an-
nounced that Fraser would take over the government.
The house countered by advising Kerr that Whitlam's
ouster is not necessary now that senate action has
freed the budget.
Kerr, as Queen Elizabeth's representative in
Australia, is constitutionally empowered to dismiss
a prime minister and call a new election. There
had been some speculation that Kerr might intercede
in the current deadlock in an attempt to work out
a compromise, but his dismissal of Whitlam was an
unexpected shock, even in parliament.
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LEBANON
With the latest cease-fire now
ten days old and generally being re-
spected, Prime Minister Karami is
making a renewed effort to find a
political solution to the Lebanese
crisis.
Karami on November 8 called on the country's
warring factions to allow the Lebanese army and
internal security force to play a more forceful
role in restoring civil order. He has pledged
that once calm has returned, the government will
work to implement comprehensive political, social,
and economic reforms.
Karami's assertion that security and reform
are inseparable represents an attempt to be even-
handed and to elicit concessions from both sides.
His statement that order must be restored before
reforms can be implemented, however, constitutes
a concession to right-wing Christians.
Phalanges Party leader Jumayyil has approved
Karami's initiative, claiming the Prime Minister
has finally conceded the Phalangists' basic point--
that the government must assert its authority.
Lebanese leftists so far have not reacted and may
withhold comment until Karami elaborates his ideas.
The Prime Minister is expected to spell out his
program at a cabinet meeting tomorrow.
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SPANISH SAHARA
A Moroccan delegation will return
to Madrid this week to try to hammer
out a firm agreement on Spanish Sahara
from the loose understanding King Hassan
reached on Saturday with a senior Span-
ish official.
In an attempt to maintain pressure on Madrid,
Rabat has announced that the marchers returning
from the Sahara will remain at the Moroccan town
of Tarfaya near the border until negotiations con-
clude.
Algerian President Boumediene, who still in-
sists on a referendum for the Saharans under UN
auspices, is holding talks with Mauritanian Presi-
dent Quid Daddah. Boumediene will try to enlist
the support of the Mauritanian leader and hopes to
learn from him details of Morocco's understanding
with Spain.
Mauritania supports a partition of the Sahara
with Morocco but is willing to go along with a
limited UN role to resolve the dispute. Mauritania
would accept a referendum that does not include
independence as an option.
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CYPRUS-UN
Debate on the Cyprus question begins
in the UN General Assembly this week,
amid signs that the parties concerned will
not be able to agree, as they did in 1974,
on a resolution calling for withdrawal of
Turkish troops from the island and return
of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes.
The diametrically opposed positions of
the Turks and Greeks could be further
hardened by acrimonious debate which
would impede the resumption of the inter-
communal talks�where the problem must
ultimately be solved.
The Greeks and Greek Cypriots view the UN de-
bate as an opportunity to move the Cyprus issue
out of the regional arena--where Turkey's military
dominance gives it the upper hand--to an interna-
tional forum they see as more sympathetic to their
side. They seek a detailed hearing of their posi-
tion and will probably urge a resolution criticiz-
ing the Turks for not implementing previous UN
resolutions.
The Turks hope to focus international atten-
tion once again on regional efforts to deal with
the Cyprus question. The Turkish UN delegation has
already lobbied extensively for a brief, non-sub-
stantive resolution, stressing the need to revive
the intercommunal talks. The Turks oppose reaffir-
mation of the resolution passed last year.
The tone of the debate will probably reflect
the increasingly anti-Turkish mood at the UN. The
General Assembly's desire last year to nurture the
intercommunal talks by not pressing the Turks has
given way to exasperation with the Turkish position.
Those nonaligned countries that worked out the com-
promise resolution last year, however, have agreed
to try again if asked by the Greeks and Turks.
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NOTES
The UN General Assembly passed a resolution
last night equating Zionism with racism.
The resolution's passage may lead some of the
developed countries to suspend their financial sup-
port of the entire UN anti-discrimination program.
By a vote of 72 to 35, with 32 abstentions, the
Zionism resolution passed under the same rubric
as the traditional UN campaign against racism and
racial discrimination.
Israel probably will fail to achieve a net
population gain from immigration this year, for the
first time since its founding in 1948.
According to data reported to the Israeli cab-
inet late last month, the number of persons leaving
the country permanently in 1975 is expected to
equal roughly the number of those arriving to take
up permanent residence--about 18,000 in each case.
The average annual rate of emigration from Israel
since the 1973 war has been more than double the
pre-war rate. The Israelis recognize that they
must look to the Soviet Union as the major source
of potential newcomers, a factor which may become
increasingly important in determining the govern-
ment's policy toward the USSR. Jewish emigration
from the USSR this year has averaged slightly over
1,000 people a month--down approximately 30 percent
from the first ten months of 1974.
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ITALY
We present the principal judgments
of a memorandum, "Prospects for and Con-
sequences of Increased Communist Influ-
ence in Italian Politics," which has
been approved by the US Intelligence
Board.
The mid-June regional and local election re-
sults presented the Christian Democrats with their
most serious challenge in nearly 30 years as
Italy's dominant party. The Communist Party's
gains of about 6 percent brought it to within 2 per-
cent of the Christian Democrats at the regional
level. Unless the Christian Democrats act soon to
improve their standing, the Communists could pull
ahead of them in the next national parliamentary
election--to be held no later than the spring of
1977.
The vote had little to do with Italy's foreign
policy. It reflected increasing frustration over
inefficient government, inadequate services, tax
inequities, and a host of other complaints for
which the Christian Democrats were held responsi-
ble. It also reflected the sentiments of several
million new voters, enfranchised when the voting
age was recently lowered to 18, and economic strains,
which have hit the middle class harder than in the
past.
A marked deterioration in the economy, though
we AO not think it likely, would hurt the Christian
Democrats and thus might help the Communists dupli-
cate or improve on their success when the next na-
tional election is held.
In the period before the next national parlia-
mentary election, the Christian Democrats have
enough maneuvering room to avoid seeking Communist
support in forming a governmental majority. The
Communists, moreover, do not want to press the
issue.
After the election--even if the Christian
Democrats remain the largest party--their options
are likely to be cut down to a choice between ally-
ing with either the Socialists or the Communists.
(continued)
Al
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The Christian Democrats are likely, in the
pre-election period, to consider:
--Keeping the Moro government in place. The
chief advantage of Moro's government, in which
only the Christian Democrats and Republicans
hold cabinet posts, is that its existence af-
fords the parties time to sort out their op-
tions and deal with internal problems, but it
is increasingly clear that the government's
weaknesses prevent it from taking actions that
could help contain Communist gains in the next
election.
--Making concessions to the Socialists, whose
moderate gains put them in a pivotal position.
The Socialists want major programmatic changes,
some of the more important ministries, and an
arrangement that would force the Communists to
share some of the government's programmatic
responsibilities, without actually holding
cabinet posts.
--Forming an all-Christian Democratic "mono-
colore" cabinet. This is a traditional way
of letting the dust settle, but it is only a
stopgap.
--Setting up a centrist coalition. Although
substituting the small and conservative Lib-
eral Party for the Socialists is mathemati-
cally possible, the centrist coalition's slim
parliamentary majority would make this alter-
native just another stopgap.
--Calling early national elections. This
choice does not look very inviting now, but
the Christian Democrats may consider it, if
failure or inability to put together an ef-
fective government convinces them they would
lose more by waiting until 1977.
The next national election is likely to de-
prive the Christian Democrats of all options ex-
cept an alliance with the Socialists--on terms
more favorable to the Socialists than in the
past--or a deal with the Communists.
(continued)
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A centrist coalition will no longer be possi-
ble, because the losses suffered by the Liberal
Party in the local contests are almost certain to
be duplicated in a national race. The mathematical
possibility of a center-right alliance--this has
never been a politically feasible option--will also
be gone if, as is likely, the neo-fascists lose as
much in the national election as they did in June.
The Socialists will drive a hard bargain, be-
cause they have concluded that current political
dynamics threaten their survival as a separate
party. They believe that they are being hurt at
the polls by their subordinate association with
the Christian Democrats while the Communists are
helped by their opposition status.
On the other hand, the Socialists are afraid
they would be overpowered in any alliance with the
Communists at the national level. That is why the
Socialists want concessions from the Christian
Democrats that would give the government a more
leftist cast and obligate the Communists to support
its program.
While the Communist Party works for a formal
share in national power it will continue the soft
line toward NATO, Europe, and the US, which Berlin-
guer has pushed since taking over the party in 1972
and which has been vindicated by the party's elec-
toral successes. This means:
--Tolerating Italy's NATO membership while
resisting any broadening of its commitment
to the Alliance or any expansion of the US
military presence in Italy.
--Encouraging West European Communist parties
to work out coordinated positions on social
and economic issues, whether or not these po-
sitions coincide with the prevailing view in
Moscow.
--Calling for eventual dissolution of both
NATO and the Warsaw Pact as part of the
detente process.
How much this soft line would harden should
the Communists come into the national government
(continued)
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and how responsive the Communist Party would be to
Soviet influence are questions on which differences
of opinion remain in the US Intelligence Community.*
There is no doubt that the greater the party's
influence on or in the government the more difficul-
ties NATO will have in Italy. And for all the Com-
munist Party's clear differences with Moscow, there
are close ideological ties, and the policies of the
two are parallel in many respects. In addition,
there is evidence of division within the Communist
Party on questions of foreign policy; some party
leaders, at least, would probably prove more respon-
sive to Moscow once the party got into the govern-
ment.
If they entered the government, the Communist
leaders would probably avoid at the outset any pre-
cipitate move (trying to pull Italy out of NATO,
for example) that could endanger their position over
the longer run. They would realize, moreover, that
allowing the Soviets a strong say in how Italy is
run would jeopardize the Communist Party's pain-
staking efforts over the years to stress its Ital-
ian identity.
The Communist leaders would be heavily influ-
enced by tactical considerations. They would want
to move cautiously, at least at the outset, in
*The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assist-
ant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Air Force believe
that the relationship of the Communist Party to
Moscow is a more fundamental one than suggested
here. Although the Communist Party is no 'longer
fully subservient to the dictates of the Soviet
Politburo, the text does not sufficiently emphasize
that the party would be responsive to Moscow, par-
ticularly on East-West issues, once in power.
(continued)
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order to avoid the risks of conservative counter-
reaction, or alienation from Western Europe and the
US, which would arise from all-out opposition to
NATO or from behaving, for example, like the Com-
munists of Portugal.
The Communist Party's cautious approach would
be complicated, however, by increased pressure for
results from its own rank and file. In any event,
there is every reason to believe that the Communists
would be able to influence government policies sub-
stantially.
While Communist membership in the national
government may have been brought closer by the
party's recent success, the Christian Democrats
have other options and will take them--at least
in the period before the 1977 elections. In terms
of real political influence, however, the Communist
Party, which now participates directly in the gov-
ernments of most major cities, five of the 20 re-
gions, and nearly a third of the 94 provinces, is
much stronger today than before the elections.
Communist leader Berlinguer has always
stressed the gradual nature of his "historic com-
promise" strategy and will welcome additional time
to consolidate these gains. Continuing his cau-
tious approach, Berlinguer's major aim will be to
demonstrate that the party can deliver the effi-
cient local-level administration it promised dur-
ing the campaign.
Any success he achieves in that respect will
go far toward breaking down the remaining psycho-
logical and traditional barriers to Communist mem-
bership in the national government.
Our estimate of probable Communist behavior is
based on the near certainty that �the party would not
only have to share power with other parties if it
entered the government, in the near or medium term,
but would also have to take account of public opin-
ion. Further into the future, the Communists would
work to gain predominant power and, if this were
achieved, constraints on their behavior would clearly
diminish. In such circumstances, the Communist Party
could be expected to become more aggressive and .
doctrinaire.
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